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PARTI
Introduction

CHAPTER 1
Introductory Remarks
1.1. Topic and Reasons for Choosing It.
The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fun­
damental Freedoms of 4 November 1950 or • as it is normally known - the 
European Convention on Human Rights1 is together with its Additional 
Protocols are generally regarded as the most effective and advanced 
international system for the protection of human rights in existence today.2 
This is largely due to the existence and work of its supervisory organs: the 
European Commission of Human Rights, the European Court of Human 
Rights and the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe. These 
organs have interpreted the Convention in such a way that it is still today, 40 
years after its conclusion, a living instrument with a steadily increasing 
impact on the law of its signatories.
Despite the fact that Denmark and Norway were among the original sig­
natories to the Convention on 4 November 1950, with Sweden signing on 28 
November 1950, the impact of the Convention became visible somewhat later 
in Scandinavia than in the rest of the Memberstates of the Council of Europe. 
In many respects in fact it was not before the 1980’s that the Convention 
became a living instrument in Scandinavia. Although Scandinavian acade­
mics like Professor Frede Castberg and Professor Max Sprensen played a 
very active role in the shaping of the Convention in its early days, it was 
only in the 1980’s that research on the Convention and its impact on 
domestic law was first carried out to any extent. Although the body of studies 
on the Convention is on the increase at the present time, what has been 
written on the Convention in Scandinavia is still, compared to other 
countries, rather limited. In particular, no complete exposition of the impact 
of the Convention on domestic Scandinavian law (apart from a few Articles 
containing surveys) has yet been carried out.
This study attempts to remedy the lack of such a complete exposition.
' From now on, the European Convention on Human Rights will be referred to as "the 
European Convention", "the Convention" or "the ECHR".
1 See. for example, Drzemczewski (1983), p. 3, with further references.
Chapter 1: Introductory Remarks
Thus its basic aim is to examine the impact o f the European Convention on 
Human Rights on domestic Scandinavinan law.
The choice of topic is theoretically as well as practically motivated.
Over the last few decades there has been an ongoing discussion in 
Scandinavian legal writings about the position of international law, including 
the Convention, within domestic law. Since this discussion has never focused 
on all three countries at the same time, it may be assumed that a comparative 
study of the status of international law in the domestic law of Denmark, 
Norway and Sweden will help to contribute to a better understanding. 
Solutions set forth in one Scandinavian country will undoubtedly have an 
impact on similar problems in the other two countries. Moreover, there are, 
at least in Denmark and Sweden, still some theoretical "gaps" which need to 
be studied further. As is well-known, the Scandinavian countries are tradi­
tionally considered as adhering to the "dualist" countries in which interna­
tional law and domestic law are regarded as belonging to two different legal 
systems. This view, set forth by legal scholars who were at the same time re­
presentatives of so-called Scandinavian legal realism, may to some extent 
seem surprising and - in the words of Professor Ole Espersen3 -"... gives the 
impression of being based on doctrinal views rather than unprejudiced 
evaluations".4
However, it is not without some hesitation that one embarks on a study 
involving "monist" and "dualist" theories about the relationship between 
international law and domestic law. As Professor Max Sorensen pointed out 
25 years ago, ”[n]othing new has been said in the last twenty years in spite 
of the important works devoted to it during that time."5 On the other hand, 
certain trends in contemporary Scandinavian law may justify yet another 
study on the application of an international treaty in domestic law.
In Scandinavia, as in other European countries, increasing attention has 
been paid to the Convention in legislative and legal practice over the last
* Cf. Espersen (1970). p. 14.
4 (... giver indtryk af at v*re baseret p i doktrinaere synspunkter end fordomsfri 
vurderinger.)
5 Cf. Max Sorensen: Obligations o f a Stale party to a Treaty as regards its municipal law 
in A.H. Robertson (ed.): Human Rights in National and International Law, The Proceedings 
of the Second International Conference on the European Convention on Human Rights held 
in Vienna under the auspices of the Council of Europe and the University of Vienna, 18-20 
October 1965, Manchester (1968), pp. 11 ff.. at p. 11.
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decade. Accordingly, the question of the position of the Convention in 
domestic law is indeed an important one - also when considered from a 
practical point of view.
In Denmark on 19 May 1989 the Folketing passed a resolution in which 
it called on the Government to appoint a committee of experts with terms of 
reference to considering the advantages and disadvantages of the incor­
poration6 of the Convention into domestic Danish law, as well as that of 
putting forward proposals for such an incorporation.7 A committee was 
subsequently appointed, with Commissioner Karsten Hagel S0rensen of the 
Ministry of Justice as chairman. In Norway, on 30 January 1989, the 
Government took a decision of principle: international conventions on human 
rights shall be incorporated into domestic Norwegian law. In accordance with 
this decision the Norwegian Ministry of Justice appointed on 18 September 
1989 a committee of experts, chaired by Professor Carsten Smith, with terms 
of reference more or less similar to those of the Danish committee. In 
Sweden, as far as is known, there are for the present no plans for incor­
porating the Convention into domestic law. However, in 1988 Sweden passed 
new legislation introducing judicial review of certain administrative acts, 
partly as a consequence of cases in which the European Court of Human 
Rights had found that Sweden had violated the Convention.8
One may ask why the question of passing legislation transforming the 
Convention into domestic law has been raised some 35 years after the rati­
fication of the Convention.
The proposers of the Danish resolution enumerated three main grounds 
for incorporating the Convention into domestic law: (1) The Convention 
cannot be applied directly by the domestic courts, and it is therefore not 
possible for any domestic authority to ascertain whether the Convention has 
been infringed in concrete cases. (2) The practice of the European Commis­
sion and Court of Human Rights is dynamic; the applied domestic im­
plementation of the Convention - the so-called passive incorporation (see
6 In this study, the word "incorporation" is used to signify the general reception of 
international legal norms into domestic legal systems of state parties; thus it encompasses both 
"reformulation" ("transformation") and "adoption". For further information, see section 2.1.
7 See Folketinget 1988-89, Folketingsbeslummg B 38 om indkoiporering af den 
curopæiske menneskercttighedskonvention l dansk ret.
* See Act No. 1988:205. For further information, see Hans Danelius: Judicial Control of 
Administration - A Swedish Proposal for Legislative Reform in Matscher & Petzold (1988), 
pp. 115 ff.
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infra section 2.1) - was not able to take this development into account. (3) 
Finally, the proposers pointed out that to pass legislation incorporating the 
Convention into domestic law would itself disseminate knowledge to the 
Convention.
It may thus be concluded that the question of the impact of the 
Convention on domestic Scandinavian law is both theoretically and 
practically relevant.
1.2. Delimitation of the Study.
The study approaches the question of the impact of the Convention on 
domestic Scandinavian law from five different angles:
(1) The theoretical point of departure as to the rules governing the 
relationship between international law and domestic Scandinavian law. In 
accordance with recent trends in Scandinavian legal doctrine, it is submitted 
that international law in general and the ECHR in particular are de lege lata 
sources of law in domestic law. The other parts of the study attempt to 
elaborate on this submission.
(2) The impact of the Convention on the legislative process in Scan­
dinavia. Does the Convention generally play a prominent role in the 
preparation of legislation? In what situations and to what extent has the 
Legislature passed legislation in order to fulfil obligations deriving from the 
Convention? Does the Legislature feel obliged to amend existing legislation 
as a consequence of case-law from the European Commission and Court of 
Human Rights?
(3) The application of the Convention in domestic Scandinavian law. To 
what extent has the Convention been applied by the domestic courts and 
other law-enforcers? How do law-enforcers view the Convention as a source 
of law in domestic law?
(4) The application of the Convention in domestic Scandinavian law in 
a comparative perspective: a survey of Spanish, Italian and English law 
regarding the domestic position of the Convention. These countries have been 
chosen in order to illustrate the application of the Convention in a "monist" 
country, in a "dualist" country into which the Convention has been incor­
porated into domestic law, and a purely "dualist” country.
(5) The official Scandinavian view on the domestic status of the Conven­
tion as it has been put forward by the respective governments in proceedings 
before the European Commission and Court of Human Rights. How do the
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governments themselves regard the domestic position of the Convention? And 
how do the European Commission and Court view the governments’ 
submissions in this respect?
The study is divided into five parts which each reflect the angle under 
which the impact of the Convention on Scandinavian law is studied and a 
pan containing a general recapitulation and conclusion. It is probably fair to 
say that Part III, in which the application of the Convention in domestic 
Scandinavian law is examined, constitutes the core of the study. The 
conclusions to this part can be found in chapter 10 and - in a comparative 
perspective - in chapter 14.
In principle the study deals solely with the impact of the ECHR on 
domestic law. However, as regards the concrete application of the latter, 
international law in general is also included in the study, insofar as it may 
illustrate this application more fully. Since in this respect it is difficult to 
separate the ECHR from other international instruments, this part of the study 
is to a large extent a general discussion of the position of international law 
in domestic law. This is not the case, however, as regards the chapters 
containing a survey of English, Italian and Spanish law. The study does not, 
on the other hand, deal with the question of the position of the Convention 
in European Community law.
The study encompasses, with the exception of the already mentioned 
comparative chapters, only the Scandinavian countries, i.e. Denmark, Norway 
and Sweden. Therefore, the term Scandinavian rather than Nordic is chosen 
in order to signify that the study deals only with the said countries.
1.3. M aterial and Method.
The study is, apart from the available (basically Scandinavian) legal literature 
in this field, based on all reported and a number of unreported cases 
concerning the domestic application of the Convention from which it appears 
that reference to the Convention has been made in the grounds of judgment 
or explicitly invoked by the parties. However, no systematic investigation of 
unreported case-law has been carried out because the quality of the results 
was deemed too doubtful in comparison to the quantity of practical problems 
involved in carrying out this type of investigation. Moreover, all reported 
case-law from the European Commission and Court of Human Rights 
concerning the Scandinavian countries is in fact being studied. Finally, the 
official reports of parliamentary proceedings concerning the passing of new
7
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legislation or the amending of existing legislation in order to fulfil obligations 
under the Convention are in process of being studied.
As regards the application of the Convention in domestic law, the method 
of looking only at "open" references to the Convention suffers from certain 
shortcomings. There may be instances where e.g. a judgment from the 
European Court of Human Rights has been cited by counsel for the defence 
to support his arguments and also taken into account by the domestic court 
without this, for one reason or another, appearing in the reported judgment. 
This applies in particular to countries like Denmark and Sweden where there 
is a tradition of writing short and very concentrated judgments in the 
Supreme Courts.
The said shortcomings are to some extent sought remedied, but they can 
probably not, within the framework of a study as the present one, be 
completely avoided. Within relatively small jurisdictions as the Scandinavian 
ones, information about cases in which the Convention has been invoked 
and/or played an important role in deciding the case is circulated within the 
legal community relatively quickly. Moreover, as will be seen, the courts 
have recently become more willing to discuss the Convention explicitly in 
their judgments. Taking it all in all, one should probably be careful of not 
overstating the shortcomings mentioned above. The method employed 
undoubtedly provides a sufficient basis for getting a clear picture of how the 
Convention is applied in domestic Scandinavian law.
The method of the study is primarily analytical-descriptive. Thus atten­
tion will be paid to court practice rather than to doctrinal views set forth in 
legal writings. In chapter 2 it is argued that this is the most appropriate 
method in this context. Moreover, the study takes a comparative approach, 
since it constantly attempts to make comparisons between the individual 
Scandinavian countries, as well as with other domestic legal systems, namely 
those of the United Kingdom, Italy and Spain.
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The Effect of International Law in General in Do­
mestic Scandinavian Law: from "Dualism" to the 
Sources of Law Doctrine
2.1. General Principles.
The Scandinavian Constitutions contain no specific provisions as to the effect 
of international law on domestic law.1 The general legal principles governing 
this question are, however, quite clear. These principles are concerned partly 
with the methods for the application of international law and partly with the 
limits of this application.
Article 19(1) of the Danish Constitution stipulates:
"The King shall act on behalf of the Realm in international affairs. Provided that 
without the consent of the Folketing the King shall not undertake any act whereby 
the territory of the Realm will be increased or decreased, nor shall he enter into any 
obligation which for fulfilment requires the concurence of the Folketing, or which 
otherwise is of major importance; nor shall the King, except with the consent of the 
Folketing, terminate any international treaty entered into with the consent of the 
Folketing...."1
A similar provision can be found in Article 26 of the Norwegian Con­
stitution:
’’The King shall have the right to assemble troops, to commence war in defence of 
the Kingdom and to make peace, to conclude and denounce treaties, to send and 
receive diplomatic envoys.
Treaties on matters of special importance, and in any case, treaties the implemen­
tation of which, according to the Constitution, necessitates a new law or a decision
1 Note should, however, be taken of Article 20 of the Danish Constitution, Article 93 of 
the Norwegian Constitution and Chapter 10, section 5, of the Swedish Instrument of 
Government which permit the transfer of powers vested in domestic authorities to suprana­
tional organizations. For the passing of a bill transferring powers to supranational or­
ganizations a specific qualified majority in Parliament is required or else ~ as is the case in 
Denmark - the bill, once passed in Parliament with a normal majority, must be submitted to 
the Electorate for approval or rejection.
The procedure laid down in Article 20 of the Danish Constitution was used when 
Denmark entered the European Communities in 1973. See Act No. 447 of 11 October 1972 
on Denmark's Accession [to the European Communities).
2 Cf. Blaustein <St Flanz, Binder IV, October 1990, Denmark^ p. 17.
on the pan of the Storting, shall not be binding until the Storting has given its 
consent thereunto."3
Likewise, the Swedish Instrument of Government reads, inter alia, in Chapter 
40:
”Section 1. An agreement with another state or with another organization shall be 
concluded by the Government
Section 2. The Government may not conclude any international agreement binding 
upon the Realm without the Riksdag having approved thereof, if the agreement 
presupposes any amendment or abrogation of any law or the enactment of new law, 
nor if it otherwise concerns a matter in which the Riksdag shall decide.
If in such a case as is referred to in the preceding paragraph a special procedure 
has been prescribed for the requisite decision of the Riksdag, the same procedure 
shall be followed in connection with the approval of the agreement.
Nor may the Government in any case other than such as is referred to in the first 
paragraph of this Article conclude any international agreement binding upon the 
Realm without the Rigsdag having approved thereof, if the agreement is of major 
importance. The Government may, however, omit obtaining the Riksdags's approval 
of the agreement if the interest of the Realm so requires. In such a case the 
Government shall instead confer with the Foreign Affairs Advisory Council before 
the agreement is concluded.”4
These provisions have traditionally been regarded as government prerogatives 
which furnish exclusively the Government with the competence to act on be­
half of the Realm in foreign affairs.5 However, the consent of Parliament is 
legally required in the more important cases. In practice Parliament can 
further limit the Government’s competence to act on behalf of the Realm by 
threatening to launch a no-confidence motion which, if passed by Parliament, 
would oblige the Government to resign.
Since the provisions governing the treaty-making power in Article 19 of 
the Danish Constitution, Article 26 of the Norwegian Constitution and 
Chapter 10, section 5, of the Swedish Instrument of Government all make a 
distinction between, on the one hand, the conclusion of treaties and, on the 
other, their incorporation, it has been deduced from these that under Danish,
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3 Ibid.. Binder XI, Norway, October 1990, p. 2.
4 Ibid., Binder XVII, Sweden, October 1990, p. 104.
5 On the treaty-making power, see. inter alia, Ross (1980) Vol. 1, pp. 377 ff.; Anden*s
(1986), p. 299; and Strdmberg (1989), pp. 112 ff.
' A different interpretation of the concept of government prerogatives, including treaty- 
making power, is expressed by Zahle (198o), Vol. 3, pp. 33 ft.
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Norwegian and Swedish law provisions of a validly concluded treaty are, 
generally speaking, not direcdy enforceable by the courts or administrative 
authorities.6 When and if a conflict between a treaty and an express 
provision of a domestic statute arises, the courts7 shall apply the domestic 
legal rule and not the treaty provision (the principle o f the supremacy o f 
domestic law). Nor can a treaty provision serve as legal authority for those 
acts which under domestic law, according to the so-called principle o f 
legality, may be carried out only when authorized by statutory law, i.e. acts 
which encroach upon the rights and obligations of the individual.8 Conse­
quently, any treaty provision which is to have domestic effects must be incor­
porated into domestic law by a domestic legal act (the principle o f transfor­
mation). Thus, there exists in Danish, Norwegian and Swedish law no 
constitutional principle of automatic or quasi-automatic incorporation of trea­
ties.
Similarly, in Denmark and Norway also international customary law re­
quires incorporation in order to be directly applicable in domestic law,9 
whereas this does not appear to be the case in Sweden.10
6 A considerable body of literature on the effect of treaties in general and the ECHR in 
particular on domestic Scandinavian law is now available in English. In recent years, see. inter 
alia: Drzemczewski (1983); Gulmann (1983). pp. 47 ff.; Gulmann (1987); Eilschou Holm 
(1986); Melander (1984); Mikkelsen (1989); Smith (1968); Rehof & Gulmann (1989); Sztucki
(1986); Sundberg (1988); and The Protection of Human Rights in the Nordic Countries, 
Proceedings at the Turku-Abo Colloquy, June 1974, published in Revue des droits de 
I'homme, Vol. 8. 1, 1975.
7 In this sense, Mthe courts” also, stricdy speaking, encompasses other law-enforcing 
authorities.
1 With the exception of Sweden, the principle of legality is unwritten in Scandinavian law 
(see infra section 10.2).
9 In this respect the legal position in Denmark and Norway is different from the situation 
in the United Kingdom, another "dualist" country, where international customary law is part 
of law of the land. See, for example, R. Higgins: The United Kingdom in Jacobs & Roberts
(1987), pp. 123 ff., at p. 125.
10 See, inter alia, Hans Core 11: Incorporation of the European Convention Seen from a 
Swedish Point o f View in Rehof & Gulmann (1989), p. 155; Hilding Eek, Ove Brine & Lars 
Hiemer: Folkratten [International Public Law], 4th edition, Stockholm (1987), p. 260; and 
SOU 1974:100, p. 45, note 1.
However, Erik Holm berg & Nils Stjemquist: Introduction. Constitutional Documents of 
Sweden, Published by the Swedish Riksdag, Stockholm (1981), p. 68 (though apparently 
modified in Vdr forfattning, [Our Constitution], Stockholm (1988), pp. 179 r.); and Hans 
Regnemalm in Ulf Bemitz et alii: Finna rati - juristens kdllmaterial och arbetsmetoder [How 
to Find Law - the Jurist’s Source Material and Working Methods], Stockholm (1985), pp. 62 
ff., assert that also customary international law - as in Denmark and Norway - needs 
incorporation if it is to be direcdy applicable in domestic law.
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If it is found that a treaty is intended to have effects on domestic law, 
existing domestic law will be examined to see whether it already complies 
with the treaty provisions or whether changes herein are necessary. In the 
, latter case, this will usually be achieved by Parliament enacting a statute or 
by an administrative act being issued pursuant to legislative authority.
The traditional method of incorporating treaties into Scandinavian law" 
- and still the most common - is by reformulating12 them (also known as 
transformation), or rather that part of a treaty which requires implementation, 
either in a statute or an administrative regulation. It has, however, become 
more and more common to incorporate treaties by adoption,11 i.e. the treaty 
(as a whole or in part) is adopted into domestic law merely by reference to 
the treaty provisions either in a statute or in an administrative regulation. In 
this case and to the extent specified in the domestic legal instrument concer­
ned, the provisions of the treaty are directly applicable under domestic law. 
The difference between the two forms of incorporation is, generally speaking, 
that with the adoption method the courts refer to international principles of 
interpretation, whereas in reformulated treaties the courts apply domestic 
principles rather than principles of international law. Of course, if domestic 
law is already in conformity with the provisions of a newly concluded treaty, 
it is not necessary to implement its provisions by a specific act. In these 
cases the fulfilment of the treaty is obtained by ascertaining that domestic 
law is in harmony with the treaty provisions. This is known as passive incor­
poration.1*
Under such a "dualist" approach to the question of the impact on 
domestic law of duly concluded international obligations, the actual
" The question of the implementation of treaties in domestic Scandinavian law in the 
broadest sense was considered on a partly common basis in three national government expert 
committees in the early 1970*s and resulted in three national reports: Betcenkning 68211973 - 
0Denmark); NOU 1972:16 (Norway); and SOU 1974:100 {Sweden).
12 In Danish: "omskrivning"; in Norwegian: "tra ru fo rm a sjo n and in Swedish: 
*'transformation
13 In Danish: "indkorporering in Norwegian: "inkorporasjon" and in Swedish: 
"in/corporation".
14 In Danish: "konstatering af normharmoni”; in Norwegian: Mkonstatering av retshar- 
mom'. In Sweden this is normally not considered an independent method of incorporation, but 
a part of the ’‘transformation" method.
Me lander (1984), pp. 66 f.„ argues, however, that the establishment o f harmony between 
norms should be considered as a method of incorporation, since otherwise “Sweden would be 
left in the curious situation that she quite often and openly does not fulfil her international 
obligations.”
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implementation in domestic law of these treaty obligations is primarily the 
responsibility of the Legislature. It is for the Legislature to provide for the 
adjustments necessary in order that domestic law may allow for, or authorize, 
the implementation of international commitments. In practice this task is 
primarily carried out by the Government.
These methods of incorporating treaties into domestic law  imply the 
inevitable risk of accidentally producing divergencies and, though more 
unlikely, even clear-cut conflicts between domestic law and a treaty. Such 
divergencies emerge most frequently because the Legislature, in passing new 
legislation, has not been aware of the potential conflict between the 
international obligation and domestic law, or because the scope of the 
international obligation has been extended, as for instance is the case with the 
so-called dynamic interpretation of the ECHR. It is difficult to imagine that 
the Scandinavian Parliaments would deliberately legislate contrary to 
international obligations in general and the ECHR in particular.
However, domestic Danish, Norwegian and Swedish law is generally 
presumed to be in conformity with undertaken international obligations. This 
is known as the principle o f presumption. The practical consequence of this 
presumption is that the domestic courts, when in doubt about the inter­
pretation of the domestic rule, shall prefer the interpretation that best 
complies with undertaken international obligations.
On the other hand, as pointed out by Professor Carsten Smith, it is "... 
a comparatively elementary assumption that the courts will seek to eliminate 
the internationally illegitimate solutions, since otherwise the state will face 
the risk of reactions on the international level".15 Such a vague principle 
does not give clear guidelines as to how the courts should resolve divergen­
ces between treaties and domestic law.
2.2. National Distinctions.
In Denmark an attempt has been made to give the vague principle o f 
presumption some substance by making a number of distinctions.
In the case of a divergence between international law and domestic 
Danish law, it is generally asserted that, when in doubt about the interpreta­
tion of a domestic legal provision, the courts should prefer the interpretation 
that will best comply with international law. This is known as the rule o f
15 Cf. Smith (1968), p. 160.
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interpretation. Nowadays it is further asserted that, in the case of a di­
vergence between a treaty provision which has previously been observed in 
Denmark and a provision in the domestic legislation enacted subsequently, 
' in the absence of any specific indication to the contrary, the conflict should 
be resolved by applying the new provision in a manner that will respect the 
treaty provision, even if the wording of the new provision is clearly at va­
riance with the treaty. This is known as the rule o f presumption: the courts 
should presume that it was not the intention of the Legislature to pass legisla­
tion contrary to Denmark’s international obligations.
Although this distinction is not made formally in Norway and Sweden. 
the principle o f presumption is considered to be applicable in both situa­
tions.16 In this study the Danish terminology will be used since it is more 
precise than the mere principle o f presumption.
It has been discussed whether the rule o f presumption is applicable only 
to international customary law, or if it is also applicable to treaties.17 
Moreover, another controversial point has been whether this rule applies only 
to treaty provisions that have previously been observed. In a memorandum 
from the Danish Ministry of Justice - relating to certain constitutional prob­
lems on the EEC accession - it was explained tha t"... in the Ministry’s view, 
Danish law courts would in all probability prefer a more ad hoc application 
of the law to a literal interpretation if the latter were to make the State of 
Denmark responsible under international law for an unintentional violation 
of a treaty.”18 This view has subsequently been reaffirmed by Danish aut­
horities on several occasions,19 and it has also been accepted in the legal
16 Almering (1973), p. 785, tried to introduce a similar terminology as regards Swedish, law 
by making a distinction between a so-called ("utfyllnadsresonemeng"] and a ("korrekt- 
ivresonemeng”] which more or less corresponds to the application of the rule o f interpretation 
and the rule o f presumption respectively. However, this terminology is not generally employed 
in Swedish legal writings.
Smith (1980), p. 306, has likewise employed the Danish distinction between a rule of 
presumption and a rule o f interpretation.
17 Ross. Andersen, Lehmann & Magid (1984). p. 80, express doubts as to whether this 
should be the case.
'* Cf. the Ministry of Justice, pp. 80 f.
” See. for example. The Initial Reports of Denmark of 29 March 1977 and 3 January 1978 
under Article 40 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. UN-doc.. 
CCPR/C/l/Add. 4 and Add. 19.
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doctrine.20
Moreover, it has been emphasized strongly that administrative authorities 
are under a legal obligation to exercise their discretionary powers in such a 
way that administrative acts, whether they be specific decisions or general 
regulations, conform to validly concluded international obligations. This is 
now known as the rule o f instruction. The courts have not yet, however, had 
the chance to decide once and for all whether such an obligation exists under 
Danish law, but the available case-law certainly contains statements indicat­
ing that the courts will accept this view.
The strong emphasis in Denmark on the administrative authorities’ 
obligation to exercise their discretionary powers in accordance with 
undertaken international obligations is not to the same extent found in 
Norway and Sweden (see infra chapter 9). Thus, the Swedish Regeringsrdtten 
has denied that administrative authorities have such obligations, whereas a 
commitment of this type has been established clearly in a Norwegian decision 
of the H0yesterett.
On the other hand, in Norwegian legal writings there has, generally 
speaking, been a stronger tendency to emphasize the importance of the 
presumption that domestic Norwegian law is in conformity with international 
law. As will be seen, part of the Norwegian legal doctrine has, within the 
present constitutional framework, attempted to reformulate the general 
principles governing the relationship between international law and domestic 
Norwegian law.
This tendency has roots that go back to shortly after World War II when 
some attempts were made by different legal writers to modify the aforesaid 
traditional view of the effect of international law on domestic law. These at­
tempts were, to a large extent, based on different - de lege lata more or less 
valid - theoretical points of view, and they did not win general support in 
Norwegian constitutional theory. These writings indicated, however, an 
emerging change in the view of the relationship between international law 
and domestic Norwegian. This which has gradually been developed further 
in subsequent writings on the subject.
Perhaps the first step in this direction was taken by Edvard Hambro in a 1947 article 
where the legal position on the application of international law in domestic
20 See Claus Gulmann (1987), p. 36; Gulmann. Bernhard & Lehmann (1989). p. 93; 
Eilschou Holm (1986), p. 89; and Opsahl (1979), p. 164.
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Norwegian law was described as follows: "It is tempting to summarize the relation­
ship between Norwegian law and international law in the following manner:
The courts will apply international law directly in all those cases where it is clear 
that there is no conflict between Norwegian law and international law. Furthermore, 
it is clear that the courts will endeavour to interpret Norwegian legal rules in such 
a way that no conflict arises between these rules and the commands of international 
law. If, in spite of all attempts to the contrary, it must be admitted that there is a 
conflict, it will be difficult to predict for certain what the courts will do. The un­
animous theory says that Norwegian law prevails. And it is very likely that the courts 
will come to the same conclusion. The position of the courts is, on the other hand, 
so free that other results are also possible. Thus, it is presumerably quite conceivable 
that the courts will overrule a Norwegian customary rule or a Norwegian statute 
because it is incompatible with a treaty which subsequendy has become binding on 
Norway."2122
It was further asserted de sententia ferenda  that international law should be con­
sidered a source of law in domestic Norwegian law. This assertion was based on the 
argument that there was no clear court practice which pointed in the opposite direc­
tion.23
A fairly similar view is expressed by Per Augdahl in his examination of the 
sources of law: "But it is conceivable that one cannot avoid a conflict with interna­
tional law unless the provision in question is left entirely out of consideration.
The case is hardly likely and, as far as one knows, has never been submitted to 
the courts. That these should accept the doctrine without reservations, should the 
occassion arise, is not likely and in my opinion not desirable either - especially not 
in cases where the statute is contrary to one in optima form a  concluded treaty. To 
mention an extreme possibility: In an overheated frame of mind during a war a 
statute is passed which prescribes the death penalty for all enemy subjects who take 
pan in acts of war. I can scarcely doubt that the courts would set aside such a statu -
21 [Det er fristende á sammenfatte forholdet mellom norsk rett og folkerett p i folgende 
máte:
Domstolene vil anvende folkeretten direkte i alle de tilfelle hvor det er heit klart at det 
ikke er noen konflikt melleom norsk rett og folkerett. Ennvidere er det klart at domstolene vil 
soke á fortolke norske rettsregler pá en slik máte at det ikke er konflikt mellom disse regier 
og folkerettens bud. Hvis det tross alie forsok pá det motsatte má indrommes at det er en 
konflikt, kan det neppe forutsies sikkert hva domstolene vil gjore. Den enstemmige teori siger 
at norsk rett skjaerer igjennom folkeretten. Og det er meget mulig at domstolene kommer til 
samme resultat Pá den annen side er domstolenes stilling sá fri at ogsá andre resultater er 
mulige. Det kan sáledes vel tenkes at domstolene vil underkjenne en norsk sedvanerettsregel 
eller en norsk lov fordi den strider mot en traktat som pá et etterfolgende tidspunkt er blitt 
bindende for Norge.]
22 Cf. Edvard Hambro: Noen bemerkninger om forholdet mellom norsk rett og folkerett 
[Some Observations on the Relationship between Norwegian Law and International Law], TfR 
1947, pp. 96 ff., at p. 110.
23 Ibid., at p. 109.
f 24 Cf. Per Augdahl: Rettskilder [Sources of Law), 3rd edition. Oslo (1973). p. 79.
25 [Men det kan jo tenkes at man ikke kan uxtngá konflikt med folkeretten uten ved á sene
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In a 1953 article H. Kiær Mordt asserted that a concluded treaty binds the 
Legislature in such a way that a subsequent statute, if incompatible with the treaty, 
is constitutionally inapplicable.“  The Legislature, he argued, must be assumed to 
be constitutionally obliged after the ratification of the treaty to implement the 
necessary statutory rules for the incorporation of the treaty provisions as soon as pos­
sible. Accordingly, the constitution does not allow the Legislature to pass legislation 
contrary to the undertaken treaty obligations. The reference to a domestic "duty of 
transformation” is presumeably overstated and the view has not been accepted in 
subsequent Norwegian constitutional theory.27
In the aforesaid report (see supra section 2.1) from a Norwegian Government 
expert committee on the implementation of international agreements in Nor­
wegian law28 it was considered whether, in relation to the domestic status 
of international law, there was an actual requirement for a change from a 
"dualist" to a "monist" system. The majority in the committee did not 
recommend a specific solution in this respect, since it could "... be ascer­
tained that [international law] in many cases will be a most weighty means 
of interpretation or part of the background material for the laying down of 
Norwegian law".2930 This view was, inter alia, based on reference to 
Carsten Smith’s works on the relationship between international law and 
domestic Norwegian law (see infra section 2.4). The Government endorsed 
this view and Parliament subsequently approved it.31
In Sweden, where it has previously been common to consider intemation-
vedkommende lovbestemmelse helt ud av betrakming.
Tilfellet er lite praktisk og har sividt vites aldn vsrt forelagt domstolene. At disse i 
pikommende tilfelle skulde akseptere doktrinen uten rescrvasion, er neppe sannsyniig og efter 
min mening heller ikke enskelig - spesielt ikke i tilfelle hvor loven er i strid med en in optima 
forma inngAt traktat. For A nevne en ekstrem situation: I en overophetet sinnstilstand under en 
krig blir der vedtatt en lov som setter obligatorisk dtfdsstraff for alle fiendtlige undersitter der 
deltar i krigshandlinger. At domstolene bor sette sig ut over en slik lov, forekommer mig lite 
tvilsomtj
26 Cf. H. Ki*r Mordt: Om be slag og konfiskation av herboende fienders formue [On 
Seizure and Confiscation of the Property of Here-Living Enemies], TfR 1953, pp. 193 ff., at 
pp. 205 ff.
27 See Smith & Smith (1982), p. 171; and Finn Hiorthoy: Den norske lovgivningom 
fiendegods [The Norwegian Legislation on the Property of Enemiesj, TfR 1953. pp. 379 ff., 
at p. 388.
21 See NOU 1972:16.
29 Ibid., at p. 32.
30 [... kan konstateres at den i mange situasjoner vil vaere et sacrdeles tungtveiende 
tolkningsmiddel eller del av bakgrunnsmaterialet for fastsettningen av inholdet av norsk rett.J
31 See Stortingsmelding No. 77 (1974-75).
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al law - whether international customary law or treaties - as directly 
applicable before domestic law-enforcing authorities,32 over the past two 
decades there has been a growing tendency to stress that treaties cannot be 
applied by domestic authorities, unless they have been incorporated into 
domestic law. In Sweden this is known as the transformation theory,33 Al­
though this tendency has certainly not been unanimous,34 it is probably fair 
to conclude that in contemporary Swedish constitutional theory the transfor­
mation theory is the prevailing approach to the question of the effect of 
treaties on Swedish domestic law.35 Furthermore, Swedish authorities have 
on a number of occasions presupposed that this is valid Swedish law.34 
However, as already mentioned, the principle o f presumption is also conside­
red part of Swedish law, although in legal writings it is expressed in some­
what guarded terms. Professor Jerzy Sztucki has described the state of 
Swedish law as regards the ECHR in the following way:
"Normally, however, the courts, though ultimately still applying the Swedish law 
only, act on an ostensible presumption that it is in conformity with the Convention. 
Or, to be more exact, they used to take note of the Conventional provisions in order 
to establish that their content did not prejudice the application of Swedish law. 
Apparendy, whenever more than one interpretation of domestic regulation is possible 
the courts will choose the interpretation which best conforms to international conven­
tions. Yet, even if this is impossible, the courts cannot set aside the Swedish law in 
force."37
This use of guarded terms in describing the impact of treaties on Swedish 
domestic law seemed to be well-founded, since, as will be seen, Swedish
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“  See, for a survey. Ole Espersen (1968), pp. 284 ff.; and SOU 1974:100, p. 45 note 1.
}i In this study the term "transformation theory" will be used synonymously both with the 
term "principle o f transformation" and the term the "principle o f the supremacy of domestic 
law" when discussing Swedish law, since the term "transformation theory" has a precise 
meaning and is widely used in Swedish legal writings.
* For further information on the debate of the transformation theory in Sweden, see, for 
example, Sundberg (1988), pp. 200 ff.
M Cf. Danelius (1984). p. 56. In Om mdnskliga rattigheter i Sverige • en replik, [On 
Human Rights in Sweden • a Replication], SvJT 1987, pp. 64 ff., at p. 65, Hans Danelius 
pointed out that his view was solely de lege lata, and ihat it might improve the protection of 
individuals’ rights if the Convention were incorporated into domestic Swedish law. This view 
is maintained in Danelius (1989), p. 70.
* See. for example. The Initial Report of Sweden of 7 April 1977 under Article 40 of the 
International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, UN-doc. CCPR/C/l/Add. 9.
57 Cf. Sztucki (1986), p. 227.
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courts have been more willing than Danish and Norwegian courts to recog­
nize the existence of conflicts between treaties and domestic law, as well as 
maintaining strongly that Swedish law should prevail in such cases. However, 
recent Swedish court practice has also become more open vis-à-vis the 
ECHR, and it is now a question whether this restricted view on the 
application of the Convention in domestic Swedish law is an appropriate one.
2.3. The Limits for the Application of the Principle of Presumption.
At a first glance, the principle o f presumption seems to be a useful tool in 
resolving cases of conflict between international law and domestic Scan­
dinavian law. However, its vague contour does not provide clear guidelines 
as to the resolving of such conflicts. This is probably due to the fact that the 
principle has two different functions. On the one hand, it serves as legitima­
tion for the application of international law in the domestic legal order and, 
on the other, as a principle of interpretation for conflicts between inter­
national law and domestic law in concrete cases. Even within each of these 
functions the principle o f presumption is, judged on its own premises, to 
some extent self-contradictory from a constitutional point of view.
As regards the principle o f presumption as legitimation for the application 
of international law in domestic law, it is usual to draw a distinction between 
international customary law and treaties. Historically, the distinction is 
probably well-founded. The competence to conclude treaties rested with the 
Government (the King) alone, and there was a real risk of undermining the 
influence of Parliament if treaties per se were applied as domestic law. The 
governments did not, it was asserted, obtain control in the same way over 
whether Denmark, Norway or Sweden should be bound by international cus­
tomary law. Moreover, as regards international customary law this presump­
tion has been legitimized by the fact that for a long period now the Scandina­
vian countries have recognized the customs of international law as expressive 
of the fundamental principles of law and have insisted that other states 
respect these customs too. Finally, it should be pointed out that if legitima­
tion for the application of international law in domestic law is a presumption 
that the Legislature did not want to infringe international law, the pre­
sumption is easier to defend as regards international customary law than as 
regards treaties which have already been concluded and therefore ought to be
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known to the Legislature.3*
Accordingly, the principle o f presumption (the rule o f interpretation) is 
regarded as valid in every situation in which a divergency between interna­
tional law - whether treaties or international customary law - and domestic 
law arises, provided domestic law can be interpreted in more than one way. 
Thus the application of the principle in this respect does not give rise to 
particular problems.
However, the scope of the principle o f presumption in cases in which the 
domestic rule only provides for one interpretation (the rule of presumption) 
is more vague. As has been seen, in these situations it is also asserted that the 
courts can apply domestic law in conformity with undertaken international 
obligations, even though, according to an ordinary interpretation of the 
relevant domestic provision, this is not possible. This view is based on the 
pronounced, but fictitious, presumption that it was not the Legislature's 
intention to legislate in a way that was contrary to undertaken international 
obligations.39 As pointed out by P J. Duffy, "[ijndeed there may be a 
practical argument for allowing use of the [European] Convention. It would 
be quite unrealistic for Parliament to attempt to discover and amend all 
legislative ambiguities which might be contrary to the newly-acquired 
international obligation of such general nature as the Convention: hence 
practical considerations may be argued to dictate that ambiguities should be 
construed in accordance with the Convention in the case of prior legislation" 
(emphasis added).40 From a theoretical-analytical point of view it is, of 
course, difficult, if not impossible, to have any exact knowledge of the Legis­
lature’s intentions in this respect since, according to the principle itself, he 
was not aware of the problem.
Therefore, certain difficulties have arisen in defining precisely to what 
degree the principle o f presumption (the rule o f presumption) is applicable 
in cases where domestic law only provides for one interpretation. Some legal 
scholars have asserted that, in this instance, the principle is only applicable 
to international customary law and treaties which have been concluded
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* Sec Espersen (1970), p. 159; Eilschou Holm (1981), p. 126; and Madsen (1986). pp. 
34 f.
* Cf. Zahle (1986), p. 121.
40 Cf. P.J. Duffy: English Law and the European Convention on Human Rights, 29 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly, pp. 585 ff., at p. 539.
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previous to the enactment of the statute at issue.41 Others have argued that 
the principle is generally applicable insofar as the domestic rule is not 
deprived of its real substance.42 However, it is obvious that the principle 
cannot be applicable to treaties concluded after the statute at issue has been 
passed if the presumption of the Legislature’s intentions is to be taken 
seriously.
One may, however, question the premises for drawing this distinction 
between international customary law and treaties.
As regards treaties, it may be questioned whether the assumption that the 
Legislature did not intend to legislate contrary to undertaken international 
obligations, implied in the principle of presumption, can be maintained when 
the constitutional point of departure is taken into account. The Scandinavian 
Constitutions are founded on the principle of the separation of powers in 
which the legislative power is vested in the Government and Parliament 
conjointly. The Executive is not considered to have independent competence 
to issue general regulations; all administrative regulations must be authorized 
by law in accordance with the principle o f legality. Article 19(1) of the 
Danish Constitution, Article 26 of the Norwegian Constitution and Chapter 
10, section 2, of the Swedish Instrument of Government, which furnish the 
respective governments with the competence to conclude treaties, should be 
seen in this light Thus the requirement of incorporation of treaty obligations 
is intended to ensure that the competence to legislate is not displaced from 
the Legislature to the Government. Consequently, the principle o f presump­
tion is, so to say, in direct contradiction to the principle o f transformation.
These constitutional principles for not undermining the legislative 
procedure carry some weight in relation to treaties.43 However, there has 
been some willingness to stretch a point on these constitutional principles in 
order not to violate undertaken international obligations: the "presumption" 
of what the Legislature might or might not have intended is introduced as a 
means of legitimation for derogating from the constitutional point of de­
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41 Cf. Ross, Andersen. Lehmann & Magid (1984), pp. 75 ff. See also Frede Castberg: 
Norges Statsforfalnmg (The Constitution of Norway], 2nd edition, Oslo (1947), Vol. 2, p. 172, 
where the principle of presumption is only regarded as applicable in relation to treaties which 
contain a codification of already applicable international law.
42 See Espersen (1970), p. 388; Gulmann (1983), p. 50; Holst-Christensen (1989), p. 49; 
and Madsen (1986), p. 39.
*3 Cf. Eilschou Holm (1981), p. 126.
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parture.
On the other hand, these constitutional principles should not be over­
stated.44 The consent of Parliament is required before a treaty of some 
importance can be ratified. Once this consent has been obtained, there can be 
no real objection based on constitutional principles if the treaty, although not 
incorporated by a specific act, is later applied by the courts with respect to 
the principle o f legality.45 Since the principle o f legality within the field of 
human rights must be assumed to have only minor significance (see infra 
section 10.2), it is unobjectionable that in these situations Parliament employ 
a more simple procedure than when passing legislation. The power to legis­
late is not transferred from Parliament to the Government in these situations, 
any more than in other cases in which it is accepted that the courts create 
law, as for example with the judicial review of statutes.44 The normal reme­
dies by which Parliaments control governments are still available. In a parlia­
mentary system of government a conflict between Parliament, on the one 
hand, and the Government, on the other, is not likely to occur. Conflicts 
within Parliament are more likely to occur, e.g. if a treaty has been ratified 
during one Parliament and the majority changes after a general election: then 
the new Parliament may not want to incorporate the treaty into domestic 
law.47 Finally, one should not forget that through the present system of go­
vernment Parliament has considerable - political -opportunities for influencing 
foreign policy, including the conclusion of treaties.
As regards international customary law there have, in recent years, been 
some instances proving that the basis of a custom has been established 
through a number of states’ co-ordinated efforts or through the drafting of 
UN-resolutions or treaties. By participating in this co-ordination or by voting 
in the UN the Government exercises its influence on what is going to apply 
as international customary law. However, the consent of Parliament or of a 
parliamentary committee will usually be obtained in such situations.4*
44 Cf. Malmlof & MeUqvist (1982), p. 54.
45 Cf. Aall (1989), p. 620.
44 Cf. Trond Dolva: ¡nternasjonale menneskerettighelskonvensjonsr og intern norsk rett, 
[International Human Rights Conventions and Domestic Norwegian Law), TfR 1990. pp. 121 
ff., at p. 131.; and Edward Hambro: Folkerettsanvendeise ved norske domstoler, [The 
Application of International Law in Norwegian Courts], TfR 1955, pp. 48 ff„ at p. 55.
47 Cf. Helgesen (1982), pp. 99 f.
41 Cf. Madsen (1986), p. 35.
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It may, apart from the obvious practical advantages, seem unnecessary, 
and from an analytical point of view even misleading, to draw a distinction 
between the rule o f interpretation and the rule o f presumption, as is the case 
in Denmark. The criterion for distinguishing between the two rules is solely 
whether the domestic provision leaves any doubt as to its interpretation. First 
of all, it is not possible to distinguish between situations in which the 
domestic statutory provision is clear and when it is ambiguous: there is a 
smooth transition between these extremes which is not, strictly speaking, 
reflected in the distinction between the rule o f interpretation and the rule o f 
presumption. Moreover, as pointed out by professor Henrik Zahle, the dis­
tinction itself seems to presuppose that the process of interpretation is divided 
into different phases. Thus, the first phase is an interpretation of domestic 
law and, provided that any doubt subsists, the interpretation passes to the 
next phase which includes international law.49 This division into phases 
probably does not correspond to practice (see infra section 6.3). When the 
presupposed doubt exists, this may be due solely to the existence of relevant 
international law which both creates the doubt, so to say, and solves it too.50 
In this sense the legal position in Scandinavia seems to be different to that 
of the United Kingdom where the courts usually apply a "preliminary test of 
ambiguity" regarding the domestic provision.31
As indicated, constitutional principles leave ample room for am biguity. 
Thus, it is difficult to conclude anything certain from the constitutional 
provisions governing treaty-making power as to the position of international 
law in domestic law on the basis of these principles.52 Moreover, legal 
doctrine seems to have tried to have had its cake and eat it at the same time, 
so to say. This applies in particular to the contradiction between the principle 
o f presumption and the principle o f transformation.
Thus, the weight of constitutional arguments is not overwhelming and, 
since these arguments cannot provide a proper answer to the question of the 
position of international law in domestic law, it seems reasonable to
The Limits for the Application o f the Principle o f Presumption
49 Cf. Zahle (1989). Vol. 2, p. 97.
50 Ibid. See also Ross (1958). pp. 135 ff.
51 Cf. P.J. Duffy, op.cit., p. 590.
31 Cf. Frederik Harhoff: Skenheden og udyret. (The Beauty and the Beast], retsviden-
skabeligt Institut B, Studier nr. 18, Arsberetning 1986, Copenhagen (1987), pp. 69 ff., at p.
73; and Zahle (1989), Vol. 2. pp. 95 f.
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formulate a new approach to the question of the application of international 
law in domestic Scandinavian law.
2*4. Reformulation of the Traditional View on the Relationship 
between International Law and Domestic Law.
Notably in Norwegian legal literature, but also in recent Danish legal writ­
ings, there is now a tendency to agree that international law is one of the 
sources o f law to be applied by domestic courts. Since the commonly used 
Scandinavian concept of a "source of law" is a very broad one indeed - it 
may be understood to cover all factors of a general nature on which the judge 
shall or may rely when deciding a case53 - such a statement is in itself of
55 It is a common feature of modem Scandinavian legal theory that it recognizes that a 
number of different factors can be regarded as sources of law.
Among Scandinavian legal philosophers Alf Ross is probably the most prominent and best 
known outside the region. In his book On Law and Justice, London (1958), p. 77, he defined 
sources of law in the following manner:
""Sources of law”, then, are understood to mean the aggregate of factors which exercise 
influence on the judge’s formulation of the rule on which he bases his decision; with the 
qualification that this influence can vary * from those "sources” which furnish the judge with 
a ready rule of law which he merely has to accept, to those "sources” which offer him nothing 
more than ideas and inspiration from which he himself has to formulate the rule he needs.
Since the ideology of the sources of law varies from one legal system to another, its 
description is a task for doctrinal study of law (the doctrine of the sources of law). This task, 
as we have seen, can only be accomplished through a detailed study of the manner in which 
the courts of a country do in fact proceed to find the norms on which their decisions are 
based. And the task of jurisprudence here can only be the establishment and identification of 
general types of sources of law which according to experience are found in all mature legal 
systems (the theory of the sources of law).M
As to the practical consequences of this theoretical point of departure, Alf Ross pointed 
out that the sources of law are: Legislation (in the widest sense), custom, precedent and 
"reason” or • as it is often called in Scandinavia - the nature of the case.
Since Ross does not make a detailed analysis of the material and the specific principles 
which underlie the rules of law, it appears from his own starting point that the limitation of 
sources of law to the above-mention«! four must be considered as completely arbitrary.
Thus, subsequent legal theory has on the same theoretical basis been more inclined to 
recognize other sources of law as well. This applies in particular to Professor Torstein Eckhoff 
who rejects the use of the concept 'source of law" since it lends itself to associations such as 
"law can be drawn directly like water from a spring”, cf. Eckhoff (1987), pp. 17 f. He does 
not give a general definition of the sources of law, but draws a distinction between sources 
of law factors and principles of sources o f law. A source of law factor is an argument which 
one is permitted, but not always required to include in legal reasoning. The principles of 
sources of law give guidance as to what is necessary and permitted to take into account when 
one solves a legal controversy. And they indicate what weight should be ascribed to the dif­
ferent considerations. As regards the sources of law factors, Eckhoff mentions legislation, the 
travaux préparatoires of legislation, court practice, other forms of practice, custom, legal 
doctrine and real considerations (i.e. the nature of the case), cf. Éckhoff (1987), p. 18. 
However, Eckhoff emphasizes strongly that this list of sources of law factors does not claim 
to be complete and he also discusses international law in his exposition of the sources of law.
A largely similar view is expressed by Professor Stig Strômholm in Ràttf ràttskâllor och 
rattstillampning [Law, Sources of Law and the Application of Law). Lund (1981), pp. 296 ff.
It is probably fair to conclude that Eckhoff s and Strômholm s "definitions“ of the sources
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no great help. According to this definition international law may per se be 
regarded as a source of domestic law, because it can be used as the basis for 
arguments on the specific interpretation of the latter. So far, the recognition 
of international law as a source of law in domestic law adds nothing new to 
the general principles outlined in section 2.1. However, in common usage the 
concept of sources of law is probably applied in a narrower sense, that is, the 
term "sources o f law" is reserved to factors of a general nature on which the 
judge not only shall or may rely when deciding a case, but factors which 
actually carry some weight in this respect; and it is generally asserted that the 
courts have in fact been more willing to apply international law than implied 
in the aforesaid general principles governing the relationship between 
international law and domestic law.
That international law should be considered a source of law in domestic 
law was first realized by Professor Carsten Smith who some 20 years ago 
concluded as regards Norwegian law:
"In my opinion the Norwegian Courts have in fact expressed a more positive view 
on the municipal significance of international law than the above-mentioned principle 
suggests. A foundation has therefore now been provided for a reformulation of these 
maxims. I will attempt to demonstrate that it is today more accurate to draw up a 
principle of municipal effectivation of the norms of international law, a principle of 
direct application o f international law, and a more limited principle of supremacy of 
statute law  in certain cases of conflict"54
In a 1980 article, Carsten Smith went one step further and stressed the 
sources of law perspective-even more forcefully:
"The question of the position of international law before Norwegian (domestic) courts 
is a primary one of sources o f law and it ought not to be resolved, as has generally 
been the case, by laying down constitutional rules."5“*
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of law are expressive of the view in contemporary Scandinavian legal theory.
In more recent Scandinavian writings on the sources of law. there is furthermore a strong 
tendency to emphasize the internationalization of the sources of law in the sense that different 
kinds of non-national sources are becoming more and more significant in the domestic 
application of law. See, for example, Peter Blume: Til en ny retskildelcere, [To a New 
Doctrine of the Sources of Law], TfR 1990, pp. 863 ff., at pp. 864 and 882 ff; and Ruth 
Nielsen: Retskilderne, [The Sources of Law], 2nd edition, Copenhagen (1989), pp. 20 ff.
54 Cf. Smith (1968), p. 157.
55 [Spergsm&let om folkerettens stilling ved norske (nationale) domstoler er primxrt av 
rettskildemessig art. og det ber ikke loses, slik man gjennomgBrende har gjort. ved opstilling 
av stattsretslige regler.]
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In the writings of Carsten Smith much attention has been paid to the cases 
deriving from the purge after the German occupation. In most of these cases 
it was not quite clear whether, or to what extent, international law made 
demands on domestic law.37 Moreover, the situation was indeed extraor­
dinary and one should probably be careful not to overstate the general vali­
dity of these cases. However, the writings of Carsten Smith have undoubtedly 
introduced more subtlety into the discussion of the position of international 
law in domestic Scandinavian law. His views, as will be seen, have clearly 
had an impact on Danish legal writings on the subject.
In a work from the early 1980’s, Jan Erik Helgesen has tried to discuss 
the question of the position of international law in Norwegian law from a 
pure source of law point of view. Accordingly, his perspective was: "The 
question of "the position of international law" before Norwegian courts - or 
before Norwegian law-enforcers in general - is not primarily, but solely a 
question of sources of law."583’ An analysis of the Norwegian theory and 
relevant case-law led Helgesen to the following conclusion that "... the ter­
minological consequence of my view, that arguments of international law are 
relevant and that the law-enforcer is not facing a fundamentally different task 
here as compared to other cases of conflict [of rules], must be that "interna­
tional law is part of Norwegian law"."4061
This conclusion is indeed confirmed by a more recent study by Justice 
Trond Dolva who states that the openness of Norwegian law vis-à-vis 
international law makes it doubtful whether it is useful to characterize the 
present state of Norwegian law by the use of the word "dualism”.42
In Denmark Professor Ole Espersen appears to be the first to try to
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34 Cf. Smith (1980). p. 307.
57 See Helgesen (1982). p. 40.
”  Ibid., at p. 6.
”  [Min perspektiv blir derfor: Sporsmâlet om "folkerettens stilling" ved norske domstoler - 
el 1er hos norske retsan vendere genere It - er ikke primaert, men utelukkende av rettskil- 
demessig art.]
60 [Den terminologiske konsekvens av mitt syn, at folkerettslige argumenter er relevante 
og at rettsanvenderen ikke stir overfor en prinsipielt annerledes opgave her enn ved ovrige 
motstridstilfelle, m i bli at "folkerett er en del av norsk ret.]
61 Ibid., at p. 115,
62 Cf. Trond Dolva, op.cit., p. 123.
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approach the question of the status of international law within the Danish 
legal order from a sources of law perspective. This view was, in contrast to 
that of Carsten Smith, based on theoretical considerations rather than studies 
of the case-law in the field: "On the basis of Ross’ theory on the sources of 
law, including when the doctrine is submitted to the adjustment which has 
been proposed, one may claim as a matter of course that treaties are part of 
domestic law." 6364 The "adjustment which has been proposed" is, that it 
is not conceptually possible to distinguish between the ideology o f sources 
o f law and the ideology o f method or interpretation,45 According to Ole 
Espersen the real problem is to what extent international law is part of the 
factors which determine the judge’s formulation of the rule on which he 
bases his decision.66 This basic observation is generally reflected in 
subsequent legal writings on the topic.67 However, Espersen draws no 
practical consequences from this starting point on how to resolve conflicts 
between international and domestic law; he relies on the principle o f transfor­
mation, the rule o f interpretation, the rule o f presumption and he introduces 
the rule o f instruction.
Similar points of view with regard to Danish law have been put forward 
by Professor Henrik Zahle, who has maintained that nothing can be deduced 
from Article 19 of the Danish Constitution with regard to the position of 
international law within the Danish legal order. Accordingly,
"... [the] application of international law - or rather of international sources of law - 
must be judged in line with other types of sources of law (...] Hence (1) interna­
tional law is relevant for the judgment of domestic sources of law, and (2) if interna­
tional law and domestic law point in different directions a conflict of laws is present. 
Thus, as the theory of the sources of law appears today, such conflicts cannot be 
resolved by referring to simple principles.”
H [Pi grundlag af Ross’ relsluldelacre, herunder nir lærcn er undergivet den justering. som 
lige er foresliet, wr det herefter hzvdes, at traktater uden videre er en del af intern ret.]
“  Cf. Espersen (1970), p. 163.
M Ibid.. at pp. 159 ff.
“  Ibid.. p. 164.
*7 See Gulmann (1983), p. 48.
“  [Anvedelsen af international ret - eller snarere international! retskildemateriale - ved 
afgerelsen af et nadonalt retsspergsmil m i bedommes p i lime med anvendelse af andre typer 
af forskelligt retskildemateriale... Hen ligger (1) international ret er relevant ved bedcmmelsen 
af nationale retssporgsmil. og (2) hvis international! og nationalt retskildemateriale trækker
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So far, no systematic study - seen from a source of law perspective - of the 
position of international law in domestic Danish law has been carried out.
In Sweden Professor Jacob W.F. Sundberg has touched upon similar 
issues. Thus he has asserted that the "... European Convention is part of the 
Swedish sources o f law doctrine" (emphasis added), since
"... those who examine the Institute’s [The Stockholm Institute of Public and 
International Law] annual reports to Strasbourg will find that it is in no way unusual 
that the argumentation before Swedish courts should refer to the provisions of the 
European Convention and • depending on the counsel’s capability and commitment - 
also to court practice in Strasbourg. It is more difficult to find a court referring to 
the European Convention in its summing-up and decision, although it is not so un­
usual to find such references in dissenting opinions. This should, however, not mis­
lead with regard to the legal effects of the Convention. It may be useful to compare 
with the precedent doctrine. For a long time it was extremely difficult to find the 
precedent referred to in summing-ups and decisions in Swedish judgments without 
anybody for this reason seriously asserting that in Sweden a precedent doctrine and 
a precedent effect did not exist.”70Tl
So far, it would not seem that this point of view has been wither theoretically 
developed as extensively in Sweden as in Denmark or more notably in 
Norway, nor has it been generally accepted in contemporary Swedish con­
stitutional theory; emphasis has been put primarily on criticizing writers in 
favour of the transformation theory and the case-law reflecting this view.72
i forskellig retning, foreiigger en rcgclkonflikt. SAledes som reiskildelacren i dag ser ud, lader 
sAdanne konflikter sig ikke lose efter enkle principper”].
69 Cf. Zahle (1989). Vol. 2, p. 101.
70 [Den som granskar Institutes Arsrapporter till Strasbourg skall finna ait det i svensk 
domstolsprocess ingalunda är ovanJigt alt argumenteringen inför domstolen hänför sig just till 
Europakonventionens olika atiklar och ibland - beroende p i advokatemas kunnighet och 
engagemang - ocksA till rättspraxis in Strasbourg. Det är svArare au finna att en domstol i 
kläm och fc*slut Aberopat Europakonventionen, ehuru det icke ar sA ovanligt att finna det i 
dissenser. Deua bör dock icke missleda beträffände konventionens rättsverkan. Det kan vara 
nyttigt att jämföra med prejudikatsläran. Det var ocksA länge utomordentligt svArt att finna 
prejudikat Aberopade i kläm och slut i svenska domar utan att nAgon för den skull ville hävda 
pA all var att det i Sverige skulle heit felas prejudikatlära och prejudikatsverkan.]
71 Cf. Sundberg (1986), p. 660. See also Almering (1973), pp. 735 f., who asserts that to 
the extent that non-incorporated treaty provisions influence the courts, these provisions 
represent an independent source of law.
72 Fredrik G.E. Sundberg: Om ingripan mot administraiivt frihetsberövande i elt 
rättighetsperspekliv, [On Interference against Persons Administratively deprived of their 
Liberty - in a Rights Perspective), Förvaltningsrättslig tidskrift 1983, pp. ¿00 ft., at p. 205, has 
suggested that Chapter 11, section 14, of the Instrument of Government, granting the courts 
the competence to review the constitutionality of legislation, also enables the courts to xeview
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It is, however, difficult for a non-Swede to understand the somewhat exag­
gerated and dogmatic arguments put forward now and then in the Swedish 
debate both for and against giving treaties a stronger position in domestic 
law.73
By emphasizing that international law is a source of law in domestic law, 
it is emphasized that it is not possible to resolve conflicts between inter­
national law and domestic law on the basis of simple principles. While the 
more traditional view focuses on clear conflicts between international law and 
domestic law, the source of law point of view focuses on the more frequent 
minor divergences between the two. The approach to the question of the 
impact of international law on domestic law is thus in the process of being 
methodically changed from a normative point of view to a more descriptive 
one. In the words of Professor Carsten Smith,
"... it is erroneous to assume that one can arrive at clear rules as to which norms, the 
national or the international, shall take precedence in cases of conflict That the 
discussion has for so long been carried out on such lines in this field can probably 
be explained by the fact that the conflict has taken a particularly sharp and dramatic 
form because there were different legal systems which collided. But if one recognizes 
at the outset that international law is a part of Norwegian law, there is also reason 
to draw the consequence that this kind of norm conflict must be resolved in the same 
manner as are conflicts between different municipal legal norms."74
Based on extensive studies of the available Norwegian case-law, Professor 
Carsten Smith has concluded that the only restriction on the law-enforcing 
authorities’ application of international law is the principle o f legality. 
international law cannot substitute the requirement of statutory authorization 
laid down in this principle. Moreover, he has pointed to a number of specific 
considerations as having an impact on the solving of conflicts between 
international law and domestic law. Finally, it should be noted that to the 
extent international law is regarded as a source of law in domestic law, the 
distinction between international customary law and treaties loses its 
relevance. The interest then centres on the courts’ application of international 
law - be it international customary law or treaties.
the conformity of statutes with the Convention and, if necessary, set aside domestic statutory 
provisions.
71 See Hilding Eek, Ove Bring & Lars Hjemer, op.ciL, p. 261.
74 Cf. Smith (1968), p. 192. See also Smith (1962), pp. 182 ff.; Smith (1964), pp. 356 ff.; 
and Smith (1980), pp. 302 ff.
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However, the source of law perspective does not mean that international 
law, when it conflicts with domestic law, should prevail absolutely. Such a 
conflict must be resolved on the basis of an overall evaluation of the facts of 
the case - including the different sources of law factors. As in other cases of 
conflict between, on the one hand, a statutory rule and, on the other, another 
source of the law, it is certain that the statutory rule will carry considerable 
weight. But the considerations pointing in the opposite direction may carry 
such weight that a total evaluation makes the international rule of law prevail.
The acceptance of international law as a source of law has been criticized 
because it does not help to resolve problems in the relationship between the 
international sources and other domestic sources, i.e. how possible conflicts 
between international and domestic sources may be resolved, and it does not 
help to decide whether a non-incorporated international legal rule may or 
may not create directly enforceable obligations and rights for individuals.75
This may be so, but, as will be seen in the following chapters, the 
guidelines provided by what could be called the source o f law doctrine seem 
nevertheless to be more adequate than the traditional general principles 
governing the application of international law in domestic law. This is 
undoubtedly due to the fact that these guidelines are based on the available 
case-law in the field rather than on a rigid constitutional normative point of 
view.
2.5. Tentative Conclusions.
The source of law perspective and the more traditional general principles 
seem at first to be at loggerheads with one another. This may, however, not 
be the case. While the traditional view focuses on the clear-cut conflicts 
between international law and domestic law and emphasizes that, in such 
cases, the constitutional principles must predominate, the writers in favour of 
the sources of law approach underline that more attention should be paid to 
the more frequent cases in which only minor - and presumerably unin­
tentional - divergences between international law and domestic law appear. 
Moreover, they emphasize that it is not possible to resolve such conflicts by 
simple means. A conflict between international law and domestic law does 
not differ from conflicts between two domestic rules and. consequently, it 
must be resolved by similar means. In other words, where the traditional
Chapter 2: the Effect o f International Law on Domestic Law
7! See Gulmann (1987), p. 34.
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view is normative in its approach, the sources of law perspective is descrip­
tive, i.e. it aims at describing the law-enforcing authorities’ application of 
international law.
As regards the ECHR it is unlikely that clear-cut conflicts between the 
Convention and domestic law will emerge, since rights similar to those in the 
Convention are to a large extent embodied in the national Constitutions. As 
pointed out by Dr. Niels Eilschou Holm, "... in the context presented by the 
European Convention on Human Rights, the impact of this reservation should 
not be exaggerated. In this particular area the practical problem confronting 
domestic authorities is to find means of preventing accidental infringements 
of the developing European standards of human rights from the dynamic 
element of commitments undertaken."76
It is submitted in this study that the ECHR de lege lata is a source of 
law in domestic Scandinavian law, and that this de sententia ferenda and de 
lege ferenda is desirable. Thus it is argued that legal practice, taken as a 
whole and with certain exceptions, has gone so far in its application of the 
Convention that this application can only be explained by the fact that the 
Convention holds the position of a source of law in domestic law. According­
ly, the study as such takes a source of law perspective on the application of 
the Convention in domestic Scandinavian law. Furthermore, the study seeks 
to elaborate more generally on the source of law perspective.
Reformulation o f the Traditional View
7‘ Cf. Eilschou Holm (1986), p. 94.
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CHAPTER 3
The Attitude taken by the Scandinavian Countries 
before ratifying the European Convention
3.1. Denmark.
Denmark was one of the original signatories of the European Convention on 
4 November 1950. The Convention was ratified on 13 April 1953.
Article 19 (see supra section 2.1) of the Danish Constitution of 1953 lays 
down that the consent of the Folketing, inter alia, is required when the Go­
vernment undertakes international obligations which require the concurence 
of the Folketing for fulfilment or which otherwise are of major importance. 
A similar provision was embodied in the Constitution of 1920, still in force 
when the Convention was ratified. In accordance with these provisions the 
Rigsdag1 approved the ratification by a resolution - which is distinct from 
an act of incorporation2 - passed on 20 March 1953.3
Prior to the ratification, the Government reviewed the compatibility of 
Danish law with the provisions of the Convention. This review showed that, 
in the Government’s view, Danish law was consistent with the provisions of 
the Convention, although a few provisions of the statute on social assistance 
were amended by Act No. 33 of 25 February 1953. This amendment abolis­
hed the right to detain a person who failed either to support his family or to 
pay alimony or maintenance. According to the Minister of Foreign Affairs’ 
oral introduction to the proposal on the basis of which the consent of the 
Folketing to the ratification of the Convention was obtained, the amendment 
of this statute was the reason why so much time had passed since the 
conclusion of the Convention. The Government had, he explained, been of
1 According to the Constitution of 1920 the Rigsdag consisted of two houses: The Folke- 
tin^ and the Landsting. The Landsting was abolished when the Constitution was amended in
2 Parliamentary resolutions do not possess the status of legislation and cannot change 
existing law. They are, inter alia, used by the Folketing to give its consent to the ratification 
of treaties which have been concluded by the Government; or when the Folketing wants the 
Government to introduce a Bill on a certain topic according the specifications contained in the 
resolution; and also when a no-confidence motion is launched
3 See RT 1952-53, Folketinget, cols. 1100, 1141 and 1385; Tillæg A, col.; Tillæg B. col. 
429; Tillæg C, col. 475 f.; Landstinget, cols. 183, 676, 689 and 753.
the opinion, however, "... that a country like Denmark which so clearly pro­
fesses the principles of which the Convention is the expression, ought not to 
make any reservations but should wait to ratify until this can be done without 
reservations of any kind."43
When the proposal was refered to a committee, the question of the com­
patibility of Danish law and the Convention was posed again. A list of 
specific questions was addressed to the Minister of Foreign Affairs. After 
having sent enquiries on the subject to the other Ministries involved, the 
Minister answered the questions in a memorandum of 22 January 1953 in 
such way that in its report of 27 February 1953 the committee passed the 
proposal without further discussion.6
A central question for the commiuee was the relationship between section 13 of the 
Danish Penal Code which prescribes that punishable acts carried out in seif-dcfence 
within certain limits are exempt from punishment and Article 2 of the Convention 
which protects the right to life.
The questionable point was whether the phrase "absolutely necessary" of Article 
2(2) in the Convention was more restrictive than the concept of self-defence in the 
Danish Penal Code.
The Ministry of Justice maintained that, according to the Danish provision, self- 
defence is only exempted from punishment when the "offender” has protected 
himself against an "imminent unlawful assault" and the act of self-defence is propor­
tional. The provision should, therefore, be considered compatible with Article 2 of 
the Convention.7
There can be little doubt that, after amending the statute on social assistance, 
the Government and the Rigsdag considered Danish law to be compatible 
with the Convention. The Rigsdag’s consent to the ratification of the Conven­
tion seemed to have been given on the presupposition that Danish law was 
compatible with the Convention. One could probably go one step further and 
say that the Rigsdag considered it to be beyond any doubt that this was the 
case; the spokesmen in the Rigsdag were more interested in discussing how, 
under the system set up by the Convention, human rights could be protected
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4 See RT 1952-53, Folketinget, col. 1389.
5 (Regeringen har imidlertid vac ret af den mening, at et land som Danmark, der s i klart 
bekender sig til de prìncipper, som konventionen er udtryk for, ikke burde tage forbehold ved 
ratifikationen af denne konvention. men vente med at ratificere, indtil dette kunne ske uden 
forbehold af nogen art.]
* See RT 1952-53, Tillaeg B, cols. 429 f.
7 Ibid.
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Denmark
in other countries. Having this in mind, one could therefore hardly imagine 
that the rules of the Convention ought to be directly applicable in Danish 
courts or normative for administrative authorities in their relationship with the 
citizens.8 This attitude should be seen in connection with the amendment of 
the Danish Constitution which was also completed in 1953. This amendment 
contained, inter alia, a modest expansion of the scope of some of the in- 
dividul and political rights embodied in the Danish Constitution. The former 
President of the H0jesteret, Peter Christensen, has recently characterized the 
Danish attitude to the ratification of the Convention in the following way:
"It is expressive of the significance which one, when the Constitution was amended 
in 1953, ascribed to the contemporary European Convention on Human Rights and 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted by the UN in 1948, that none 
of these texts obtained any influence on the new Constitution’s description of the 
rights of the citizens. Although the international texts together contain more rights 
than the previous Danish Constitutions and, furthermore, are far more elaborate in 
their descriptions of the rights, in the new Constitution there was not touched much 
on the hereditary wording which, for more than one hundred years [and] to common 
satisfaction, had been the written basis for the civic rights of the Danes.”910
3.2* Norway,
Like Denmark, Norway was also one of the original signatories of the Eu­
ropean Convention of Human Rights on 4 November 1950. The Convention 
was ratified on 15 January 1952.
In accordance with Article 26 (see supra section 2.1) of the Norwegian 
Constitution the Storting approved the ratification on the recommendation of 
the Foreign Affairs and Constitutional Committee.11
Before ratifying the Convention, the Norwegian Government considered
* Cf. Peter Christensen: Den Europceiske Menneskerettighedskonvention og dansk ret% [The 
European Convention of Human Rights and Danish Law], in Edward Andersson (ed.): 
Festskrift til Curt Olsson 70 dr, Helsinki (1989), pp. 31 ff, at p. 32.
9 Ibid.. at p. 31.
10 [Det siger lidt om den betydning, som man ved grundlovsaendringen i 1953 tillagde den 
samtidige Europaeiske Menneskerettighedskonvention og den af FN i 1948 vedtagne 
Verdenserklacring om Menneskerettigheder, at ingen af disse tekster kom ul at eve nogen 
indflydelse p i den nye gmndlovs beskrivelse af borgemes rettigheder. Skont de intemationale 
tekster tilsammen indeholder Here grundlsggende rettigheder end de tidligere danske grundlo- 
ve og desuden er langt udforligere i deres beskrivelse af rettighedeme, blev der ikke i den nye 
grundlov ran ret meget ved den nedarvede ordlyd, som i mere end hundrede Sr til almindelig 
tilfredshed havde vaeret det skriftlige grundlag for danskemes frihedsrettigheder.]
11 See Stortinget, 1951, St. prp. nr. 83, Innst. S. nr. 289, pp. 538 ff., and 5. des.-Tiltr. av
Europaridets konvensjon om menneskerettighetene, pp. 251 d tf.
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that Article 2 of the Constitution, which prohibited the activity of Jesuits on 
Norwegian soil, was incompatible with Article 9 of the Convention and a 
reservation was made in this respect. The Constitution was subsequently 
amended and this reservation was withdrawn.12 Apart from this provision 
of the Constitution, Norwegian law was, in the Government's view, con­
sidered compatible with the Convention.
However, one member of the Foreign Affairs and Constitutional Committee posed 
the question whether Article 32 of the Convention, stipulating the competence of the 
Committee of Ministers, was compatible with Article 1 of the Norwegian Constitu­
tion which lays down that "... the Kingdom of Norway is a free, independent, indivi­
sible and inalienable realm".
The Department of Foreign Affairs had asked for an expert opinion from 
Professor F rede Castberg who, in a memorandum of 26 October 1950, stated that, 
in his opinion, it would be compatible with Article 1 of the Norwegian Constitution 
to undertake such obligations as laid down in Article 32 of the Convention. On the 
other hand, Castberg did not find the provisions in this article appropriate, since pure 
legal decisions would be taken by the Committee of Ministers for political or 
diplomatic, rather than legal, motives, and he recommended that the Norwegian 
Government should try to get the text of the Convention modified in this respect11 
The above-mentioned member of the Foreign Affairs and Constitutional 
Committee proposed within the Storting that a reservation be made as to Article 32 
of the Convention, but this was rejected by the Storting}*
Apart from the discussion of the relationship between Article 32 of the Con­
vention and Article 1 of the Norwegian Constitution, no further questions as 
to the compatibility of Norwegian law with the Convention were posed. It 
seems quite clear that the Government and the Storting considered Norwegian 
law to be compatible with the Convention. As in Denmark, the Storting’s 
consent seems to have been given on the presupposition that Norwegian law 
was compatible with the Convention.
3,3. Sweden.
Sweden signed the European Convention of Human Rights on 28 November 
1950. The Convention was ratified on 4 February 1952.
Chapter 10, section 2, of the present Swedish Instrument of Government
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,J Cf. 1 Yearbook, (1955-57), pp. 41 f.
15 See Stortinget 1951. St. prp. nr. 83, p. 4.
14 Ibid., 1951. 5. des.- Tiltr. av Europaridets konvension om menneskerettighetene, pp. 
2526 ff.
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Norway
(see supra section 2.1) lays down that the consent of the Riksdag, inter alia, 
is required when the Government concludes any agreement which presup­
poses an amendment or abrogation of any law, or if the agreement is of 
major importance. Under Chapter 12, section 1, of the former Swedish 
Instrument of Government of 1809 international agreements which dealt with 
matters requiring the concurrence of the Riksdag or which were of major 
importance should ”... contain a reservation making their validity dependent 
upon the sanction of the Riksdag". In accordance with this provision the 
Riksdag approved the ratification of the Convention on 9 May 1951.15
Prior to the ratification of the Convention the Swedish Government re­
viewed the compatibility of Swedish law with the Convention. This review 
showed that, in the Government’s view, Swedish law was compatible with the 
Convention, although a statute laying down some restrictions on religious 
freedom was amended. The review, as it appears in the explanatory 
memorandum on the proposal for obtaining the consent of the Riksdag,16 
was of a rather summary character and no closer comparative analysis was 
attempted.17 Viewed retrospectively, it is of particular interest to observe 
that, as pointed out by Hans Danelius,18 only one sentence in the explana­
tory memorandum was devoted to Article 6 of the Convention which 
subsequently created serious and well-known problems for Sweden (see infra 
section 18.3). Thus it was laconicly stated: "The provisions in Article 6 on 
legal guarantees are completely covered by the Code of Procedure.”1920
However, Nils Herlitz, a prominent professor of public law and a member 
of the Riksdag, submitted a motion to the Committee on Foreign Relations,
15 See Riksdagen 1951, Proposition: 165; Modoner i Fôrsta Kammmaren: 459; Utrikes- 
utskottets utlitande nr. 11, i anledning av dels Kungl. Maj:ts proposition nr. 165 om 
godkànnande av Sveriges anslutning till Europarâdets konvention angâende skydd fôr de 
mànskliga r&tighetema och de grundlàggande frihetema, dels ock i àmnet vàckt motion I: 459; 
Fôrsta Kammararens Protokoll, Vol. A 2, nr. 13-18, pp. 18 ff.
16 Ibid., Proposition: 165.
17 Cf. Hans Danelius: De manskliga rattigheter - ràcker 2 kap. RF eller behovs mer ?, [The 
Human Rights - does Chapter 2 of the Instrument of Government Suffice or is more needed?], 
SvJT 1987, pp. 645, at p. 647; and Sztucki (1986), pp. 221 f.
Cf. Hans Danelius: Europadomstolen och den svenska rdttsordningen, [The European 
Court and the Swedish Legal Order], SvJT 1989, pp. 653 ff., at p. 654.
19 Cf. Riksdagen 1951, Proposition: 165, p. 12.
20 [Bestammelseme i art. 6 om ràttegângsgarantiema âro i full utscrackning tackta av 
ràttegângsbalkan.]
37
Chapter 3: the Attitude taken before Ratifying the ECHR
which represented both Houses of which the Riksdag was then composed, in 
which the Committee was called on to pay special attention to the com­
patibility of Swedish law with the Convention as regards (1) the concept of 
"law" in Swedish constitutional law and in the Convention respectively, 
because some acts of government were regarded as "law” in the Instrument 
of Government (Article 89), (2) the possibility of judicial review of the 
legality of detention21 and (3) whether under Swedish law an "effective 
remedy" could be initiated before a national authority for persons whose 
rights had been violated in accordance with Article 13 of the Convention (see 
infra sections 18.1 and 18.2).22 Accordingly, he requested that the Co­
mmittee, and subsequently the Riksdag, should consider the problem and 
make a declaration on the desirability of developing Swedish law to make it 
conform more closely with common European ideals.
The Committee on Foreign Relations (in the presence of 7 members out 
of a total of 32) considered the motion, but did not adopt it and recom­
mended that the Riksdag approved the ratification of the Convention without 
any reservations.
It is probably fair to conclude that the Riksdag also considered domestic 
law to be compatible with the Convention. The questions posed in connection 
with the approval of the ratification of the Convention were, however, very 
fundamental, and one may doubt that the Riksdag in this respect was able to 
foresee the implications of the questions posed by Nils Herlitz. This was 
probably acknowledged by Herlitz himself in his final remarks during the 
proceedings in the Riksdag: "Nevertheless - that is what I wanted to 
emphasize - via the circumstances’ [normative] power, the Convention will 
be a forceful and valuable support for the development of Swedish law, 
provided that it is taken seriously..."2324
11 That there could be problems in this respect had already been indicated in the above- 
mentioned explanatory memorandum. The Government’s assumption that the institution of 
J ustitieombudsmanden [now Riksdagens Ombudsman] was an "effective remedy" within the 
meaning of Article 13 of the Convention was questionable from the outset and was later 
repudiated by the European Commission in Application No. 3893/68 (see infra section 17.2.5).
n  See Riksdagen 1951, Motioner i Första Kammaren: 459.
23 [Konventionen kommer ändl - det i t  vad jag har velat betona - att genom omstän- 
dighetemas makt, förutsatt att vi ta den pA allvar, bli ett kräftigt och värdefullt stöd för den 
svenska räuens utveckling...]
14 See Riksdagen 1951, Första Kanunarens Protokoll, Vol A 2, nr. 13-18, p. 22.
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Concluding Remarks
3.4. Concluding Remarks.
It is somewhat surprising how little debate there was in the Scandinavian 
Parliaments when they had to approve the ratification of the Convention; the 
Convention established a review system which, though facultative for the 
signatories of the Convention, was an innovation in the post-war period. The 
fact that the ratification implied that the Scandinavian countries should recog­
nize the competence of the Commission to receive individual petitions 
(Denmark and Sweden accepted the Commission’s competence to receive 
individual petitions already in connection with the ratification of the Con­
vention), i.e. to some extent accept a limitation on national sovereignty, does 
not make this lack of debate less surprising. The only reasonable explanation 
to this is that the Scandinavian Parliaments considered it beyond any doubt 
that the national jurisdictions more than fulfilled the requirements of the 
Convention;23 they probably even belived that other European countries 
would have to leam from the Scandinavian countries.26
Since a general incorporation was not considered necessary, the Con­
vention can thus be said to have been subject to passive incorporation. It 
may be said that this was a "laissez-faire" way of "incorporating" it into 
domestic law. However, it happens quite frequently (see infra chapter 4) that 
domestic legislation is amended in order to fulfil the obligations under the 
Convention; such amendments to existing legislation may be considered as 
partial incorporations of the Convention. Moreover, it should be noted that 
principles and rules similar to the provisions of the Convention were to a 
large extent already in force by virtue of the national Constitutions, of 
express statutory provisions and of general principles of law. As regards 
provisions of the Convention where this was not considered to be the case, 
special legislation was passed or a reservation was made.
This does not mean, of course, that the Convention did not make a legal 
impact on the Scandinavian countries. It served, and still serves, as a basis, 
binding upon each country under international law, for a corresponding set 
of domestic rules of law. Thus the responsibility of the day-to-day fulfilment 
of the Convention lies primarily with the Legislature, although the law-en-
13 Cf. Eva Smith: Menneskerettighedskonventionerne o f de nordiske retsplejeordruneer, 
[The Human Rights Conventions and the Nordic Systems of Administration of Justice], The 
Proceedings of the 32nd Nordic Meeting of Lawyers, Reykjavik (1990), Vol. 1, pp. 11 ff.. at 
p. 13.
“  See Hans Danelius, op.cit., p. 654.
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forcing authorities also have a major responsibility in this respect
40
PART II
The Impact of the European Convention on 
Scandinavian Legislation

CHAPTER 4
The Impact of the European Convention on Scan­
dinavian Legislation
4.1. Introduction.
As pointed out in sections 2.1 and 3.4, a consequence of the "dualist" 
approach to international law is that the implementation of the obligations 
under the Convention is primarily the responsibility of the Legislature. It is 
for the Legislature to make sure that domestic legislation constantly meets the 
requirements of the Convention. This is particularly important with regard to 
human rights conventions; it also, however, implicates a series of concrete 
difficulties. This is due to the fact that those domestic rules which form the 
basis of the fulfilment of the Convention are not codified in one legal 
instrument only. They are to be found in the national Constitutions, in 
ordinary legislation, in sub-legislation, in unwritten general principles of law 
or they follow from legal practice. Moreover, the said statutory rules are 
spread over different areas of legislation and under the competence of 
different ministries.1
This would suggest that the day-to-day fulfilment of the Convention is 
a very complicated task. This is not the case, however. Since domestic rules 
similar to those of the Convention are applicable in domestic Scandinavian 
law to a very large extent, it is often, as pointed out by Dr. Niels Eilschou 
Holm, unnecessary to carry out individual and specific studies of these 
relations: considerations on the relationship between the Convention and 
domestic statutes and principles which are central are sufficient.2 This is 
illustrated clearly by the fact that in a recent Danish handbook on the 
framing of statutes, the relationship to the Convention was not indicated as 
any one of the possible substantial barriers of which the Legislature should 
be aware when passing legislation.3
1 See Danelius (1984), pp. 57 f.
2 Cf. Eilschou Holm (1981), p. 122.
5 Cf. John Vogter & Hanrik Dahl Scrensen: Indholdmassige krav til lovgivningen, 
[Substantial Requirements to the Legislation] in W.E. von Eyben (ed.): Juridisk grundbog, 4th 
edition, Copenhagen (1989), Vol. 2, pp. 43 ff.. at p. 49.
As a result, however, the study of the impact of the Convention on 
domestic Scandinavian legislation is in general affected by difficulties typical 
of those mentioned in the first paragraph. This may explain why no 
systematic studies on the impact of the Convention on either domestic 
Danish, Norwegian or Swedish legislation have been made so far. In fact it 
is remarkable how little attention the Legislature’s attempts to fulfil the 
Convention by passing new or amending existing legislation has received in 
legal writings in comparison to that given to the courts’ application of the 
Convention.
In spite of constant efforts to ensure that domestic Scandinavian law is 
compatible with the Convention, it happpens that in individual applications 
the European Commission and Court find a domestic Scandinavian provision 
either in itself or the way in which it has been applied in the case at issue is 
in breach of the Convention. In such cases the country in question is, under 
the Convention, obliged to see to it that its domestic legislation is amended 
in order to meet the requirements of the Convention. As will be seen in the 
following sections, it is clear that in such situations the Scandinavian Legisla­
tures feel obliged to bring domestic legislation into line with the Convention.
In this chapter, an overall survey of the impact of the Convention on 
Scandinavian legislation is made. It should be underlined that the chapter 
contains only a survey of the most illustrative examples of considerations as 
to how domestic law should be enacted in order to comply with the 
Convention. However, the material studied should suffice to draw some 
general conclusions.4 A basic distinction is made between the impact of the 
Convention in general and the impact of specific decisions from the European 
Commission and Courts, the former being discussed in section 4.2 and the 
latter in section 4.3. Finally, in section 4.3 some conclusions are drawn.
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4 The study is, although it includes other kinds of material also, in principle only based 
on an examination of official Scandinavian parliamentary reports of cases which have been 
indexed under "human rights", “the European Convention on Human Rights", "the Council of 
Europe" or "international law“ in the period from 1970 - 1988. Moreover, the public inquiries 
of the states of the same period have also been examined.
Due to insufficient registration of the questions relating to human rights, it may be 
assumed that not all the examples of cases in which the Convention has been discussed or has 
had a specific impact on the enactment of legislation are included in the study.
It should also be noted that the Convention is probably frequently considered in Ministries 
in relation to the preparation of legislation without the question, for one reason of another, 
being expressly raised in the official written material subsequently submitted to Parliament. 
No attempt has been made to study this kind of material.
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4.2. The Impact of the European Convention in General.
It is important to keep in mind the legislative process in Scandinavia when 
discussing the impact of the Convention on domestic legislation. Within the 
administration of justice the normal procedure for initiating the work on a 
new statute or an amendment to an existing statute is to appoint a commis­
sion or committee of experts to which the Minister in question gives more 
or less detailed terms of reference. This applies, generally speaking, 
irrespectively of whether the iniative has come from the Government, a 
private member of Parliament or a third party who has drawn the attention 
of the Government to a problem calling for action. Since the legal expertise 
is normally in majority in such committees, it is normally at this stage of the 
legislative procedure that the more complicated technical legal questions are 
elucidated. This applies also, as will be seen, to the question of the 
relationship between either existing or proposed statutory provisions and the 
Convention. Unless the question of the relationship with the Convention is 
likely to have further political implications, or the Bill is specifically aimed 
at redressing a divergence between domestic law and the Convention, it is 
normal that the Committee’s considerations to this effect be discussed no 
further in Parliament.
The report of the Committee is submitted to the Minister concerned and 
usually published. Either the report of the Committee or the draft Bill which 
is subsequently drawn up within the Ministry itself is sent to a number of 
different public and private bodies which are invited to comment on the 
report or the draft Bill. On the basis of the comments received the final Bill 
is drafted. In Sweden the Bill may then be sent to the Council of Legislation 
[Lagrâdet] which gives a reasoned opinion if it concerns matters where 
problems of legislative technique, constitutional questions or questions of 
interpretation are predominant Then the Bill is introduced in Parliament. Of 
particular interest for the subsequent interpretation of the passed Bill is the 
committee stage where a standing committee examines the Bill and submits 
a report to the House.5
In this section some examples of the impact of the Convention in general, 
i.e. not cases where a decision of the Commission and Court is implemented
The Impact o f the European Convention in General
5 On the legislative process in Scandinavia, see, example, Slig Stròmhoim: Introduction 
in Stig Stròmhoim (ed.): An Introduction to Swedish Law, 2nd edition, Stockholm (1988), pp.
21 ff., at pp. 35 ff.; and John Vogter: Lovgivningsproceduren, [The Legislative Procedure], 
in W.E. von Eyben. op.ciL, pp. 91 ff.
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in domestic law, are discussed. A distinction is made between cases in which 
the considerations of the relationship is only contained in the report of an 
expert committee, and cases where such considerations also appear in the 
explanatory memorandum accompanying the Bill or at later stages in the 
legislative procedure.
4.2.1. Considerations o f Committees o f Experts.
As mentioned, the forum in which discussions of the relationship between the 
present state of domestic law and the Convention take place is usually in the 
reports of committees of experts appointed to consider and propose 
amendments of existing law. Such considerations and discussions take many 
forms but they all show that the Committee has been aware of the re­
quirements of the Convention. However, as will be seen, it may from time 
to time be questioned whether the considerations of the Committee in this 
respect are sufficiently profound.6 Moreover, it can by no means be claimed 
that the Committee will necessarily draw consequences from its outline of the 
requirements of the Convention. Frequently, the question of the compatibility 
of a proposed amendment with the Convention is not subjected to further 
discussion in the Parliaments other than the one which has already taken 
place in the Committee of Experts.
When the new Danish Aliens Act was enacted in 1983 the relationship 
to, inter alia, the Convention was considered by the committee of experts 
who had been requested to submit a draft Bill on the matter to the Ministry 
of Justice.7
The Committee considered that already under the present legislation the 
provisions in Article 3 and 8 of the Convention were - in relation to allowing 
aliens into the country as well as their expulsion from it - nonnative for the 
police and the Ministry of Justice when exercising their discretionary powers 
in pursuance with the Act (see infra chapter 9).* Furthermore, a minority of 
the Committee proposed to draft the provision on family reunification in the 
Bill in accordance with the practice of the European Commission and Court
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6 As regards Danish law, Rehof & Trier (1990), p. 100, note 109, observe that 
considerations about the relationship between the Convention and domestic law in expert 
committees seem to be increasing, but that it has not yet reached a satisfactory level.
7 See Beteenkning nr. 968/1982 om udltendingelovgivningen, (Report No. 968/1982 on the 
Aliens Legislation].
'  Ibid., at pp. 30 f. and 43 f.
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on the application of Article 8 of the Convention in relation to aliens, 
whereas the majority, though concurring on the merits, wanted to empower 
the Minister of Justice to issue such rules.9 The minority’s proposal was, 
with some minor changes, finally embodied in section 9 of the new Aliens 
Act (Act No. 226 of 8 June 1983).
Moreover, it was stated clearly that under Article 63 of the Constitution, 
the courts are considered to be entitled to monitor that under the exercise of 
their discretionary powers the administrative authorities had not violated Den­
mark's obligations under international human rights conventions.10 This was 
considered "an effective remedy before a national authority" within the 
meaning of Article 13 of the Convention and no change in this system was 
proposed by the majority of the Committee.11 However, the Committee was 
aware of the fact that in cases concerning the expulsion of aliens the 
Commission had held that Article 63 was not a "domestic remedy" within the 
meaning of Article 26 of the Convention which remedy needed to be exhaus­
ted before the Commission could declare an application admissible (see infra 
section 17.2.1).12 A minority of the Committee considered it ”... unfortunate 
that the mentioned international organs under the present legal position may 
take decisions concerning a here-living person’s fundamental rights without 
Danish courts having had the possibility to influence the decision."13u 
Accordingly, these members of the Committee proposed a more intensive 
judicial review with suspensive effect regarding the enforceability of 
administrative decisions.13
When the Bill was discussed in the Folketing,16 its relationship to the
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9 Ibid., at p. 31.
10 Ibid., at p. 81.
M Ibid.. at pp. 67 f.
12 Ibid.
I} Ibid., at p. 86.
“ [... uheldigt, at de nivnte international« organer under den nuvaerende retsulstand kan 
trxffe afgerelse vednZrcnde herboende personers fundamentale rettigheder, udcn at danske 
domstole har haft mulighed for at five indlydelse p i afgttrelse.j
15 Ibid., at pp. 110 ff.
“ See FT 1982-83, Forhandlingeme, cols. 4502 ff.. 5316 ff., 12152 ff.. 12587 ff. and 
12847; Tillzg A. cols. 2027; Tillacg B, cols. 1935 ff.. 2775 ff. and 2845 ff.; and Tillaeg C, 
cols. 609 ff.
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Convention and other international instruments does not seem to have played 
any important role. But there can be no doubt that the Act which was 
eventually passed fulfilled the requirements of the Convention.17
In 1983 a Norwegian committee of experts submitted a report1® 
containing a draft Bill for a new Act on Aliens to the Ministry of Justice. 
The report contained a survey on Norway’s international obligations in 
relation to the treatment of aliens in the widest sense.19 The requirements 
of the relevant Articles of Convention and the practice of the European 
Commission and Court in this respect were outlined.20
Of particular interest is that the Committee also considered what 
consequences Norway’s international obligations should have for the drafting 
of the Bill. First, it was emphasized that no systematic examination of the 
consequences on domestic law of the international obligations had been 
carried out. However, in comparison with the other Committee reports 
examined in this chapter, the survey in the this report regarding international 
obligations and the possible consequences of these for the question at issue 
is of a considerably higher standard. Moreover, it was also pointed out that 
unintended doubts or unpredicted divergences arising from the international 
obligations may come up in the domestic application of law. Accordingly, the 
survey of international obligations and their consequences for domestic law 
did not aim at preventing such unintended effects. But the purpose of the 
survey was to raise the Legislature’s consciousness on this point.21
As regards the draft Bill, the Committee stated that it had ”... assessed 
each kind of obligation from point to point to see which was the most 
appropriate way"2223 of framing its proposals, aiming to state these in such 
a way that they be compatible with Norway’s international obligations.
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17 Cf. Peter Christensen: Den Europœiske Menneskerettighedskonvention og dansk ret. 
[The European Convention on Human Rights and Danish Law], in Edward Andersson (ed.): 
Festskrift for Curt Olsson 70 àr, Helsinki (1989), pp. 31 ff., at p. 33.
11 See NOU 1983:47 Ny Fremmedlov, (NOU 1983:47 New Aliens Act).
19 Ibid., at pp. 115 ff.
"  Ibid., at pp. 134 ff.
Jl Ibid.. at p. 139.
a  Ibid.. at p. 140.
23 [... sâvidt muhgt vurdert fra punkt til punkt for de enkelte slags forpliktelser hvilken 
mite som er mest hensiktsmessig.]
48
Accordingly, the international obligations had been incorporated in the 
following ways: (1) reformulated directly in the draft Bill; (2) the ad­
ministration had been empowered to issue regulations incorporating the 
obligations into domestic law; (3) an attempt was made to specify the legal 
position deriving from international obligations; (4) to provide a better legal 
position than that required under international obligations; or (5) - which is 
of particular interest in this respect - by proposing a general clause according 
to which the Act should be applied in accordance with international 
obligations aiming at improving the legal position of aliens in domestic law.24
The general clause was included in the Bill which the Ministry of Justice 
subsequently introduced in the Storting.25 In the explanatory memorandom 
accompanying the Bill it was explained that
"(t]he provision implies that international rules binding upon Norway, and which aim 
at strengthening the position of aliens, shall be applied
• to interpretation and complementation of the Act,
- as substitution of, or with trenchancy towards, legislative provisions in the opposite 
direction,
- as binding for discretionary decisions pursuant to the Act"2627
It was further stressed that the provision did not mean that rules of inter­
national law which did not aim at strengthening the legal position of aliens 
could not be applied at all; to those rules the normal principles governing the 
relationship between international law and domestic Norwegian law would 
be applicable.2* The draft provision did not give rise to any debate in the 
Committee of Justice; but it was noted that to the extent Norway was bound 
by international obligations, the power of the Legislature was limited in 
accordance with these obligations.29
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* Ibid.
25 Cf. Stortinget 1986-87, Ot.prp. nr. 46, pp. 46 and 189.
26 Ibid., at p. 190.
27 [Bestemmelsen innebaerer at intemasjonale regier Norge er bundei av og som har til 
formil ä styrke uüendingens stilling, skal anvendes
* til tolkning og utfylling av loven, .
- til erstaming Tor, eller med gjennomslagskraft overfor, lovbestemmelser i motsatt retnrng,
- som bindende for skjtfnsmessige avgjtfrelser i henhold til loven.)
»Ibid.
29 Cf. Stortinget 1987-88, InnsL O. nr. 92, pp. 4 and 6.
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On the 19 January 1984 the European Commission declared admissible 
Application No. 9330/81.30 The application concerned alleged violations of 
Articles 3, 8 and 13 of the Convention in a case of the expulsion of an 
adolescent. A friendly settlement was subsequently reached. In the settlement 
it was, inter alia, stipulated:
"As regards the question of a remedy on the enforcement stage of an expulsion order, 
the Government have appointed a Commissioner to deal with this matter. The 
directives to the Commissioner, issued by the Government on 18 October 1984 (Dir. 
1984:39), state that the Commissioner shall analyse closely such demands for 
changes of the regulations which may follow from the European Convention on 
Human Rights or which may otherwise be called for. In this context he should have 
regard to such regulations as may exist in other States which are parties to the 
Convention. Furthermore, he is to propose such new rules for which the analysis may 
give cause. The proposals should be presented during the year of 1985.
The Government will then, on the basis of the investigations made and if 
possible before the end of 1985, propose such amendments of the rules concerning 
the enforcement of expulsion orders that make these provisions fully comply with 
Article 13 of the Convention."31
In a Danish report on coercive measures in psychiatry, reference was made 
to the Committee of Ministers’ Recommendation No. R (83) 2 of 22 
February 1983 concerning the Legal Protection of Persons suffering from 
Mental Disorder placed as Involuntary Patients.32 Furthermore, reference 
was made to the decision of the European Court in X. v. the United Kingdom 
in which the Court held that judicial review as limited as that available in the 
habeas corpus procedure in the applicant’s case, while adequate for 
emergency measures for the detention of people on the ground of un­
soundness of mind, was not sufficient for a continuing confinement such as 
the one undergone by the applicant.33 The Committee then stated that "[i]n 
this decision there lies a precondition that Article 5 of the Euroepan 
Convention on Human Rights makes certain demands on the scope and the 
intensity of the review the courts shall make when deprivation of liberty is 
at issue. It is important to be aware of this requirement when the revision is
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"  Cf. 35 D.R., pp. 57 ff.
}l Cf. 39 D.R., pp. 75 ff., at p. 79.
”  Cf. Principbeteenkning nr. ¡068/1986 om tvang i psytiatrien, [Report of Principle No. 
1068/1986 on Coercive Measures in the Psychiatry], pp. 140 ff.
”  Cf. Eur. Court H.R., Case o fX  v. the United Kingdom, Series A, Vol. 46 (1982), para.
59.
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going on."3413
The same international instruments as well as Articles 7 and 10 of the 
UN-Covenant were discussed by a Norwegian committee of experts 
considering similar questions.34 The Committee found that Norwegian law 
clearly fulfils the requirements of the said international obligations, but one 
of the reasons why the international human rights were included in the 
recommendation to the Legislature was the wish to introduce them in a 
Norwegian context.37
In a similar Swedish report38 there seems not to be any discussion of the 
requirements of the Convention in relation to compulsory commitments to 
psychiatric hospitals. However, the proposals of the Committee - such as 
definite rules concerning the maximum duration of compulsory care, judicial 
review of the medical decision to commit a patient to compulsory treatment 
in a psychiatric hospital as well as the decision to prolong such treatment39 - 
was, in effect, very much aimed at meeting the requirements of Article 5(4) 
of the Convention.40
The compatibility of Article 3 of the Convention of solitary confinement, 
to which detainees on remand may be subjected by a court order in Denmark, 
has been questioned on different occasions. In a report of a committee of 
experts who considered the question, it was rejected that Danish law and 
practice were at variance with the requirements of Article 3 of the Conven­
tion.41 This view was based in part on the general practice of the European
34 Cf. Principbetsnkning nr. 1068/1986, op.cit., p. 141.
55 [I denne forbindelse ligger der en forudsastning ora, at art. 5 i den europaeiske 
menneskerettighedskonvention stiller visse krav til omfanget af og in tens ite ten i den 
efterprcvelse, domstolene skal foretage, nir der er tale om frihedsberevelse. Det er vigtigi at 
vsre opmxrksom pi dette krav ved den igangvxrende revision.]
54 See NOU 1988:8 Lov om psykisk helsevern uten eget samtykke, [NOU 1988:8 the 
Mental 111 Persons Act], pp. 94 ff.
57 Ibid.. at p. 98.
* See SOU:1984:64 Psykiatrin, tvdnget och rattssakkerheten, [The Psychiatry, the 
Compulsion and the Rule of Law],
”  Ibid., at pp. 472 ff. (the Summary in English).
40 For futher information of the Commission's and Court’s practice concerning Article 5(4) 
of the Convention in relation psychiatric detention, see Fawcett (1987), pp 120 f.
41 Cf. Betcenkning nr. 975/1983 om isolation a f varetctgtsarrestanter, [Report No. 
975/1973 on Isolation of Detainees on Remand], pp. 35 and 106 ff.
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Commission on solitary confinement and in particular on the Commission’s 
decision in Application No. 8395/78.42 In this case, the Commission held 
that the fact that the applicant had been isolated for 425 days when remanded 
in custody did not amount to a violation of Article 3 of the Convention. The 
Commission specifically noted that the cell "... bearing close resemblance to 
the accomodation provided in students’ halls of residence", as well as the fact 
that throughout the period of isolation the applicant was allowed to exercise 
in the open air for one hour every day, had the loan of books from the prison 
library, had personal contact with the staff 8-10 times daily, was seen by a 
doctor, had contact with his counsel without any restrictions and was allowed 
to receive controlled visits by his children.43
A report of a Swedish committee considering the anti-terrorist legislation 
contains an in-depth analysis of the interpretation of the Convention and its 
Protocols and the relationship between these instruments and domestic 
law.44 The analysis of the requirements of the Convention and their possible 
impact on domestic law is probably the most profound so far in a report from 
a committee of experts in Scandinavia. Two questions in particular were 
discussed:
First, whether restrictions on the right to move within the Realm, to 
which aliens suspected of terrorist activity under the anti-terrorist legislation 
could be subjected, amounted to "deprivation of liberty" within the meaning 
of Article 5 of the Convention. It was noted that Hôgsta Domstolen in NJA 
1989.121 (see infra section 8.3) had interpreted Article 5 in such a way that 
the said restrictions could not be considered as "deprivation of liberty" within 
the meaning of this provision. Moreover, it was noted that in Application No. 
13344/87, the European Commission with reference to the Guzzardi Case 
decided by the European Court45 had found that restrictions imposed under 
the anti-terrorist legislation was not "deprivation of liberty". In this case, the 
Government had decided to expel the applicant but the expulsion was, due 
to the risk of political persecution in his own country, suspended on the 
condition that the applicant stay in the two municipalities of Helsingborg and
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41 Cf. 27 D.R., pp. 50 ff.
45 Ibid., at p. 53.
44 Cf. SOU ¡989:104 Terroristlagstiftningen [SOU 1989:104 The Anti-Terrorist
Legislation], pp. 115 ff.
45 Cf. Eur. Court H.R., Guzzardi Case, Series A, Vol. 39 (1981).
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Malmd, and that he should report to the police three times a week.
It was then considered whether the imposition of such restrictions for 
very long periods would amount to a "deprivation of liberty" and thus 
infringe upon Article 5 of the Convention. The Committee considered it very 
unlikely that the Strasbourg organs would reach such a result. In particular, 
it was emphasized that ”[t]he Convention, it is true, is now being interpreted 
more and more extensively, but this would involve an analogous interpreta­
tion; something which does not seem to have appeared in the practice of the 
European Court. Nor does any indication exist in the Commission’s decision 
of 1989 that one should establish such a way of looking at things.”4647 
Second, it was considered whether the fact that the decision of the 
Government could not be appealed against was compatible with Article 13 
of the Convention, which requires that an "effective remedy before a national 
authority" is available to everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in 
the Convention have been violated. Again reference was made to the 
Commission’s decision in Application No. 13344/87 in which the Commis­
sion held, after having found the other complaints manifestly ill-founded, that 
neither was this complaint substantiated, since the right to an effective 
domestic remedy presupposes "an arguable claim". On this basis the 
Committee concluded that insofar as the anti-terrorist legislation was applied 
properly, there would be no problem in relation to Article 13. However, if 
this legislation was applied so extensively that it touched upon the in­
dividual’s rights in a strict sense, the Committee would not exclude the 
possibility of an violation of Article 13.4®
Altogether the Committee concluded that the Swedish anti-terrorist 
legislation, if applied correctly, met the requirements of the Convention.49
A committee set up to consider some questions of criminal law proposed 
to include in the Penal Code a provision which would expressly prohibit
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44 Cf. SOU 1989:104. p. 127.
41 [Konventionene har visserligen kommil au tolkas mer och mer extensivt, men detta
skul la innebara en anaiogisk tillampning, nìgot som inte synes ha fôrekommit i Europadomsto- 
lcns praxis. Det finns inte heller nigon som heist antydan i kommissionens avgôrande frân âr
1989 om att man skulle kunna anlagga ett dylikt betraktelsessâtt.]
“  Ibid., at p. 137.
49 Ibid., at pp. 143 f.
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analogous interpretations in criminal law.50 The Committee was of the 
opinion that this state of law was already implicit in Chapter 10, section 2, 
of the Instrument of Government,51 but since Hdgsta Domstolen did not 
share this view, the Committee proposed to codify it explicitly in the Penal 
Code. The Committee noted in particular that the prohibition of analogous 
interpretation in criminal law could be deduced from Article 7 of the 
Convention as interpreted by the European Commission in, for example. 
Applications Nos. 6683/74, 7721/76 and 8141/78.32 Similarly, in a Nor­
wegian report by a Royal Commission the requirements and the scope of the 
principle o f legality in criminal law was considered. Contrary to the Swedish 
Committee, the Norwegian Committee did not find that Article 7 of the 
Convention required that sentences be founded in statutory law.53 Moreover, 
the Commission mentioned briefly that the question had been raised whether 
the present provisions of the Penal Code relating to security measures were 
in breach of Article 5(4) of the Convention. However, the report simply 
referred to this question and did not contain any study or comments relating 
to this article.54
Article 5(5) of the Convention stipulates that "[ejveryone who has been 
the victim of arrest or detention in contravention of the provisions of this 
Article shall have an enforceable right to compensation." The scope of this 
provision was discussed by a Danish expert committee considering an 
amendment of the rules on compensation for criminal persecution of the 
Administration of Justice Act.55
4.2.2. Amendments o f the Existing Legislation.
As already mentioned, it is not very common to find examples of con­
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50 Cf. SOU 1988:7 Frihetfrdn ansvar - om legalitesprincipen och om allmanna grander 
for ansvarsfrihed, [Exclusion from Responsibility: on the Principle of Legality and on General 
Grounds for Exclusion of Responsibility], p. SI.
51 Ibid., at p. 45.
52 Ibid., at p. 49.
n Cf. SOU 1988:57 Straffelovgivningen under omformning, [The Penal Legislation under 
Conversion], p. 115.
* Ibid., at p. 199. See also Application No. 11701/85 (Case o f E v. Norway), report of the 
Commission, decision on the admissibility, p. 61.
55 Cf. Betœnknirxs nr. 801/1977 om erstatning i anledrung a f strafferetiig forftlgning. 
[Report No. 801/1977 on Compensation in Consequence of Criminal Persecution], pp. 22 F.
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Amendments o f the Existing Legislation
siderations on the relationship between domestic law and the Convention in 
general in explanatory memorandums or at subsequent stages of the 
legislative procedure. However, a few examples might be mentioned:
In Application No. 11219/8456 the applicant complained about the 
Htjesteret’s judgment in UfR 1984.81s7 in which the majority of the Court, 
inter alia, held that, "... if the circumstances give reason to believe that the 
making of statements in such cases involve an obvious risk that the witness 
or persons closely related to him would suffer any harm, regard to the wit­
ness may allow that the identity is kept secret from the accused, if respect for 
the public interest in view of the seriousness of the case and the importance 
of the statement quite exceptionally would require that the statement is 
made."58 Allowing such anonymous witnesses in the trial was, in the 
applicant’s view, contrary to Article 6(3)(d) of the Convention. Since, "... 
when the applicant was ordered to leave the courtroom, his defence counsel 
remained in the room and had every opportunity, in accordance with Article 
6 para. 3 (d) to examine the two witnesses in question", as well as "... the 
interests of the defence could be safeguarded just as well by the lawyer as by 
the applicant himself', the Commission concluded that the requirements of 
Article 6(3Xd) were met and the application was thus manifestly ill- 
founded.59
As a consequence of the above-mentioned private Bill, the Minister of 
Justice asked the Permanent Advisory Council on the Administration of 
Justice to consider the matter. In its report,80 the majority of the Council 
proposed an amendment to the Administration of Justice Act according to
“  Cf. 42 D.R.. pp. 287 ff.
57 Scandinavian cases are not cited by reference to the names of the party or the parties, 
but to the publication where the case is reported and the year of publication. Tne more impor­
tant cases in Denmark are reported in UfR, in Norway in NRt. and in Sweden in NJA, as 
regards cases from Hogsta Domstolen, and in RA, as regards cases from Regeringsraiten.
39 Here cited in English from 42 D.R., p. 289. This decision had given rise to the 
introduction of a private Bill containing a prohibition on the use of anonymous witnesses. In 
the explanatory memorandum accompanying the Bill it was explained that the decision 
appeared to be “strikingly" contrary to Article 6 of the Convention, cf. Folketinget 1984-85, 
Lovforslag nr L 102. However, in an extrajudicial comment on the decision in UfR 1984 B. 
pp. 289 ff., at p. 291, Justice Palle Kiil explained that the question of the compatibility of the 
use of anonymous witnesses with Article 6 of the Convention had been pleaded by the counsel 
for the defence. Since the counsel for the defence had the right to question the witnesses in 
question, the Htjesteret did not find that there was any divergence between domestic law and 
Article 6 of the Convention.
"  Cf. 42 D R., p. 292.
40 See Betcenkning nr. 105611985 om anonyme vidner m.v. [Report No. 1056/1985 ^  
Anonymous Witnesses etc.].
which the use of anonymous witnesses, under certain restricted circumstan­
ces, may be authorized. Since these circumstances were stricter than the ones 
set forth by the Htjesteret in UfR 1984.81, the Council did not consider the 
relationship to Article 6 of the Convention any further. However, before the 
Council had submitted its report, a new private Bill to the effect that the use 
of anonymous witnesses should be completely prohibited was introduced. 
This Bill was finally passed as Act No. 321 of 4 June 1986 despite the 
recommendations submitted by the Permanent Advisory Council on the 
Administration of Justice.61
In the explanatory memorandum accompanying the Bill on the coming 
into force and amendment of the new Norwegian Act of Criminal Procedure, 
some considerations were made in relation to the requirements of the 
Convention. The Bill embodied, inter alia, proposals for new provisions 
governing detention on remand. One of the reasons on the basis of which 
detention on remand could be ordered was when there was specific reason to 
believe that the suspect would impede the investigation. It was noted that 
although this particular reason for the ordering of detention on remand was 
not explicitly recognized by Article 5(1 )(c) of the Convention, it was 
nevertheless considered to be compatible with the Convention.“  As regards 
the possibility of ordering detention on remand out of respect for the public 
interest, the Ministry of Justice considered that such a possibility was neither 
contrary to the Committee of Ministers’ resolutions of 9 April 1965 and 27 
June 1980 nor incompatible with Article 5(1 )(c) of the Convention. This view 
was based on the fact that in a number of other European countries also it is 
possible to remand suspects in custody out of respect for the public interest, 
as well as on the fact that the Recommendation of 27 June 1980 recognizes 
that detention on remand out of respect for the public interest "... may 
exceptionally be justified in certain cases of particularly serious offences"63 
(for similar Danish considerations, see infra section 4.3.2.A).
4.3. The Impact of Decisions of the European Commission and Court.
It follows from the "dualist" attitude to international law that it is the task of
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“  Sec FT 1985-86, Forhandlingeme cols. 730 f., 1959 ff.. 11302 ff. and 11570; TUl*g A. 
cols. 1035 ff.; Tillæg B, cols. 1565.; and Tillæg C, cols. 737 f.
62 Cf. Stortinget 1983-84, Ot. prp. nr. 53, p. 26.
43 Ibid., at p. 33.
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the national Legislature to secure that domestic law conforms to undertaken 
international obligations. Moreover, Article 53 of the Convention obliges the 
Member States to abide by the decisions of the European Court in cases in 
which they are parties. In order to do so, it may frequently be necessary to 
pass new or amend existing legislation. However, no such obligation follows 
from the Article as regards cases directed against other states. Such decisions 
may nevertheless have a strong pursuasive impact on the national Legislature.
4.3.1. Decisions in Cases to which the Scandinavian Countries have not been 
a Party.
It frequently happens that the reports of committees of experts contain 
considerations as to the impact of the Convention in general, and specific 
decisions of the Commission and Court in cases against other states (see 
supra section 4.2.1). It is more rare to find examples of cases in which a 
decision in a case directed against another Member State is the direct cause 
of introducing new legislation. There exists, however, one clear example of 
the passing of legislation on such a basis.
In the private Danish labour market closed shop agreements have 
traditionally been recognized as valid. The compatibility of this legal position 
in Denmark with Article 11 of the Convention became, as a consequence of 
the European Court’s decision in the British Rail Case,6* questionable. In 
this judgment it was laid down that Article 11 does not only protect the 
positive freedom of association (i.e. the right to associate), but also the nega­
tive freedom of association (i.e. the right not to be a member of an as­
sociation (trade union) at all) in the sense that it is not compatible with the 
provision as such if, under domestic law, it is lawful to dismiss employees 
who refuse to become members of a trade union which subsequent to their 
employment has concluded a closed shop agreement with the employer. The 
judges from the Nordic countries dissented since, in their opinion, it was 
quite clear from the travaux préparatoires of Article 11 that it did not aim 
at protecting the negative freedom of association. However, it was also 
emphasized in the judgment that it did not take a stand on the question of 
whether or not closed shop agreements in general were compatible with 
Article 11 of the Convention.
The question of the validity of closed shop agreements in the Danish
The Impact o f Decisions o f the European Commission and Court
* Cf. Eur. Court H.R.. Case o f Young, James and Webster, Series A, Vol. 44 (1981).
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labour market has over the years been a very sensitive one. It is generally 
assumed that closed shop agreements are not valid within the public labour 
market as they infringe upon the principle of equality which, although 
unwritten, is part of Danish administrative law. Similarly, in that part of the 
private labour market where the Danish Employers Association is a party to 
collective agreements, there exist no closed shop agreements. When the 
matter has been discussed in the Folketing, generally speaking, the right-wing 
parties have been against the existance of closed shop agreements, whereas 
such agreements have been supported by the Left.
Against this background it is quite interesting that the Social Democratic 
Government, which was in general in favour of closed shop agreements, on 
28 January 1982 introduced a Bill on protection against dismissal on the 
grounds of association relations.65 In the explanatory memorandum accom­
panying the Bill, it was stated that
"[i]t may thus be assumed that Danish law does not fully secure the aspects of the 
negative right of association which have been established by the Human Rights 
Court’s judgment. The Government regards it as a matter of course that Denmark 
should observe its obligations vis-à-vis the Human Rights Convention. This is the 
background for the introduction of the present Bill.”
On the other hand, as stressed by the Minister of Labour in his written intro­
duction of the Bill, ”... it should be underlined that with this proposal the 
Government does not change more in the applicable Danish legal position 
than the judgment delivered necessitates.”6869 The Minister of Labour and 
other Social Democrats stated repeatedly during the first reading of the Bill 
that they were opposed in principle, but that Denmark, of course, should
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45 See FT 1981-82, Forhandlingeme. cols. 798 ff.. 1423 ff.. 7763 ff. and 8050 ff.; Tillasg 
A, cols. 1599; Till®g B, cols. 853 ff.; and Tillaeg C, cols. 497 f.
“  Cf. FT 1981-82, Tillaeg A. col. 1604.
97 [Det m l sAledes artages, at dansk ree ikke fuldt ud sikrer de aspekter af den negative 
foreningsfrihed, som er fasisliet ved Mermeskerettighedsdomstolens dom. Regeringen betragter 
det som en selvfelge, at Danmark skaJ overholde sine forpligtelser efter Menneskerettigheds- 
konventionen. Dette er baggnmden for fremsacuelsen af nasrvacrende lovforslag.]
M Ibid., Forhandlingeme, col. 799.
69 [... skal det understreges, at regeringen ikke med forslaget aendrer mere i den gacldende 
danske retstilstand. end den afsagte dom ntfdvendigger.]
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observe the judgment of the European Court.70 Also the spokesmen of most 
of the other parties considered the Bill to be a "minimum solution" which did 
not go any further than what was required by the judgment of the European 
Court; but they did not dispute the fact that Denmark should fulfil its 
obligations under the Convention.
After much debate the Bill was, with only one change, passed as Act No. 
285 of 9 June 1982 on Protection against Dismissal on the Grounds of 
Association Relations. It was subsequently questioned in legal writings 
whether the legal effects of an unlawful dismissal under the Act - damages 
corresponding to a maximum of 78 weeks salary, but no possibility of 
reinstatement - were in accordance with Article 11 of the Convention.71 The 
Act was, inter alia, applied in the well-known HT Case in UfR 1986.898 (see 
infra sections 5.2.1 and 6.2); a case subsequendy brought before the 
European Commission which declared it inadmissible because the complai­
nants could not be regarded as "victims" within the meaning of the 
Convention.72
4.3.2. Decisions in Cases to which the Scandinavian Countries have been 
Parties.
When the Scandinavian countries have been found guilty of a violation of the 
Convention the question of how to bring domestic law into line with the 
Convention arises. It is only rarely brought into question that the State should 
do so, but the ways in which domestic law is to be changed in order to 
remedy the divergence with the Convention are frequently debated at length. 
This applies in particular when the decision of the Commission or Court 
touches upon a principle which is central to domestic law and which has 
hitherto been considered to be in accordance with the Convention. Moreover, 
it happens that the premises of a decision of the Commission and Court are 
criticized, even though it is not questioned that the decision should be 
implemented in domestic law.
Since Denmark and Norway have each only once been found guilty of 
violating the Convention, the number of examples available are rather scarce. 
However, it happens that decisions on the admissibility or the mere filing of
Decisions in Cases against other Countries
70 Ibid., at cols. 1424 f.. 1439 f.. 1440 ff.. 1452 ff. and 1458 ff.
71 Cf. Lars Adam Rehof: Afskedigelse som menneskerettighedsproblem. [Dismissal as a 
Human Rights Problem], UfR 1987 B, pp. 193 ff., at p. 196.
71 Cf. Application No. 12719/87 (sec infra section 5.2.1).
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an application give rise to legislative initiatives. 
4.3.2A. Denmark. 
Under section 762 of the Danish Administration of Justice Act, in its 
wording before the 1 July 1987,
"... (2) [a] suspect may furthermore be detained on remand when there is a 
particularly confirmed suspicion ["scerlig bestyrket mistanke"] that he has committed 
an offence which is subject to public prosecution and which may under the law result 
in the imprisonment for six years or more and when respect for the public interest 
according to the information received about the gravity of the case is judged to 
require that the suspect should not be at liberty."73
This sub-section was inserted in the Administration of Justice Act in 1935, 
following an aggravated rape case. The parliamentary committee considering 
the Bill explained the need for the provision in the following way:
"When everyone assumes that the accused is guilty and therefore anticipates serious 
criminal prosecution against him, it may in the circumstances be highly objectionable 
that people, in their business and social lives, still have to observe and endure his 
moving around freely. Even though his guilt and its consequences have not yet been 
established by final judgment, the impression may be given of a lack of seriousness 
and consistency in the enforcement of the law, which may be likely to confuse the 
concept of justice."74
Section 762(2) was amended in 1987 in order to extend its application to 
certain crimes of violence which were expected to entail a minimum of sixty 
days’ imprisonment. Under the proceedings in the Folketing, the com­
patibility of the Bill with the Convention played a certain role.75 
The Bill was introduced in the Folketing in spite of warnings from legal 
experts to whom the matter had been submitted.76 The Council of the Law
73 Here cited in English from Eur. Court H.R., HauschUdt Case, Series A, Vol. 154 
(1989), para. 33.
74 Ibid.
75 See FT 1986-87, Forhandlingeme, cols. 4781 ff.. 5250 ff., 12309 ff., 12887 ff. and 
13240 ff.; Tillzg A, cols. 2603 ff.; Tillsg B, cols. 2155 ff.. 2429 ff. and 2635 f.; and Till*g 
C, cols. 899 f.
T‘ In Betankning nr. 978/1983 om varetcegsfcengsling i voldssager, [Report No. 978/1983 
on Detention on Remand in Cases of Violence), pp. 54 ff., an expert committee considered, 
inter alia, whether an extended use of detention on remand out of respect for the public 
interest was compatible with the mentioned recommendations from the Committee of 
Ministers. The majority of the committee held that this was the case. The minority, on the
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Society [Advokatrádet) considered the draft provision to be contrary to 
Article 5(1 )(c) of the Convention,77 as well as contrary to the Committee of 
Ministers’s Recommendation of 9 April 1965.78 The Vestre Landsret and 
Rigsadvokaten [the Attorney-General] both expressed doubts as to the 
compatibility of the draft provision with the said Recommendation, as well 
as another Recommendation of 27 June 1980.79
In the Folketing, at the first reading of the Bill, spokesmen in favour of 
the Bill considered it compatible with the Convention and the said recom­
mendation, whereas those spokesmen who opposed the Bill considered it to 
be contrary to the Convention and the recommendations.80
In the Folketing's Standing Committee of Justice, the Social Democrats 
introduced a technical change of the draft provision, as well as the inclusion 
in section 60 of the Administration of Justice Act of the following provision:
"(2) No one shall act as judge in the trial if, at an earlier stage of the proceedings, 
he has ordered the person concerned remanded into custody solely under section 
762(2), unless the case is tried under section 925 or 925 a [as a case in which the 
accused pleads guilty]."*1
However, it was the Social Democrats’ view that neither the present system 
nor the system embodied in the Bill on an increased use of detention on 
remand out of respect for the public interest were contrary to Article 6 of the 
Convention. Nevertheless they felt the need to point out that in its decision 
of 9 October 1986 the European Commission had declared admissible the 
Hauschildt Casé2 in which it expressed doubts as to the compatibility of
other hand, did not find that this was the case since the recommendation of 27 June 1980 
recognizes that detention on remand out of respect for the public interest "... may exceptional­
ly be justified in certain cases of particularly serious offences."
17 However, in Application No. 13671/88 concerning a case where the accused through 
all the stages of the case had pleaded guilty and eventually was sentenced to 40 days 
imprisonment, the European Commission held that detaining him pending trial under section 
762(2X2) of the Administration of Justice Act did not disclose any violation of Article 5(1 Xc) 
of the Convention. Accordingly, the application was declared inadmissible.
71 Cf. FT 1986-87, Tillæg B. cols. 2157 f.
”  Ibid.. at cols. 2176 ff. and 2181.
"  Ibid.. Forhandlingeme, cols. 5250 ff.
*' Ibid., Tillxg B, col. 2159. Here cited in English from Eur. Court H.R., Hauschildt Case, 
Series A. Vol. 154 (1989), para. 28.
,J Cf. Application No. 10486/83.
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the Danish procedural system with the Convention in this field. Accordingly, 
the Social Democrats feared that ”[t]he Commission’s attitude must be 
expected to be intensified regarding the passing of an extension of the use of 
detention on remand out of respect for the public interest."8384
The Bill, including the amendment to section 60, was finally passed as 
Act No. 386 of 10 June 1987. It was stressed by different members of the 
Folketing that the amendment of section 60 of the Administration of Justice 
Act was by no means an admission that the Danish rules in this particular 
field were contrary to the Convention.83
As will be seen in section 8.4 and chapter 16, in the Hauschildt Case the 
European Court finally found that Denmark had violated Article 6 of the 
Convention. Shortly after this judgment was passed, the Danish Ministry of 
Justice began to consider how to bring the state of Danish law into line with 
Article 6 of the Convention. In the first domestic case following the decision 
of the European Court, UfR 1990.13, the H tjesteret went very far in its 
application of the Convention as interpreted in the Hauschildt Case. In a 
subsequent case in llfR 1990.181 the Hcjesteret recommended that the 
Legislature considered an amendment to the rules on the disqualication of 
judges embodied in the Administration of Justice Act (see infra section 8.4).
On 17 January 1990 the Minister of Justice introduced a Bill in the 
Folketing84 aiming, as it was stated in the explanatory memorandum 
accompanying the B ill,"... to reconcile the provisions of the Administration 
of Justice Act on the disqualification of judges with Article 6(1) of the 
Human Rights Convention on hearings by an impartial tribunal, which was 
expressed in the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights of 24th 
May 1989 in the Hauschildt Case.’,87 According to the Minister of Justice’s 
written introduction of the Bill,
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”  Cf. FT 1986-87, Tiling B. col. 2160.
** [Denne holdning hos kommissionen m i forventes skacrpet i forbindelse med vedtagelsen 
af en udvidelse af brugen af retshindhaevelsesarrest.]
85 See, for example* FT 1986-87, Forhandlingeme, cols. 12312 ff. and 12340 f.
* See FT 1989-90, Forhandlingeme, cols. 5173 ff., 10233 fM 10717 ff. and 11229; 
Folketinget 1989-90, Lovforsiag nr. L 150; Skriftlig fremsacttelse; Betaenkning afgivet af 
Retsudvalget den 18 maj 1990-, Till*2sbet*nkning afgivet af Retsudvalget den 23. maj 1990- 
and Tiltejelse til tillaegsbetaenkning afgivet af Retsudvalget den 30. maj 1990 over Forslag til 
lov om aendring af retsplejeioven.
17 Cf. Lovforsiag nr. L 150, p. 4. Here cited in English from a translation provided by the 
Danish Ministry of Justice.
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"[t]hc provisions of the Bill on the disqualification of judges are drafted on the basis 
of the Human Rights Court’s decision in the Hauschildt Case." The rules of the 
Bill go further, however, than the decision of the Court, as there is proposed 
disqualification in a number of situations following similar principles as those which 
manifest themselves in the judgment.
The background for this extension of the scope of the disqualification of judges 
in relation to the Human Rights Court’s decision is that in the future the matter of 
Denmark's fulfilment of the requirements of the Human Rights Convention regarding 
trial before an impartial tribunal will not be called into question.
According to the Bill, a judge will thus be disqualified from the trial in a 
criminal case if the judge has previously ordered remand in custody on the basis of 
a particular confirmed suspicion or has permitted the police to discharge activity of 
an agent [provocateur] or to stop and open post during the investigation. Further­
more, a judge shall also step down from the trial, according to a concrete discretion 
of the particular circumstances of the case, if the judge has previously made a 
decision which is liable to call the complete impartiality of the judge into question. ' 8990
The proposed extension of the field of disqualification was considered to 
bring about an increase of the burden on the courts in terms of staff, 
administration and economy. To remedy this extra burden, it was proposed
M In the draft section 60(2) it was stipulated: "No person shall participate as judge at the 
trial of a criminal case if - before the trial has commenced of the act to which the indictment 
relates - that person has made decisions on a remand in custody of the suspect in pursuance 
of Sect. 762(2) or on taking of measures set forth in Sect. 754 a. or on the opening or 
stoppage of mail in pursuance of Sect 781(3). However, this rule shall not apply if the case 
is being heard in accordance with Sect. 925 or Sect. 925 a. or the case otherwise, concerning 
the offence that gave rise to measures defined in the 1st sentence above, does not involve an 
evaluation of the evidence of the suspect’s guilt"
The draft secdon 61, which, in effect, was similar to section 62 of the Act (see infra 
section 8.4), reads as follows: "No person shall act as judge in a case when there are otherwise 
circumstances that are liable to call complete impartiality of the judge in question", cf. 
Folketinget 1989-90, Lovforslag nr. L 150, p. 1. Here cited in English from the translation 
provided by the Danish Ministry of Justice.
w Cf. Folkednget 1989-90, Lovforslag nr. L 150, Skrifdig fremsxttelse, p. 1.
90 [Lovforslagets bestemmelser om dommeres habilitet er udformet pi grundlag af 
Menneskerettighedsdomstolens afgtfrelse i Hauschildtsagen. Regleme i lovforslaget gir dog 
noget videre end domstolens afgcrelse, idet der foreslis inhabilitet i en raekke situationer ud 
fra tilsvarende principper, som kom til udcryk i dommen.
Baggrunden for denne udvidelse af omridet for dommeres inhabilitet i forhold til 
Menneskerettighedsdomstolens afgerelse er, at der ikke fremover b«r kunne rejses tvivl om, 
hvorvidt Danmark opfylder kravet i Menneskerettighedskonventionen om rettergang ved en 
upartisk domstol.
Efter lovforslaget vil en dommer siledes vcre inhabil under domsforhandlingen i en 
straffesag, hvis dommeren forinden har cruffet afgtfrelse om varetaegtsfengsling p i grundlag 
af en saerlig bestyrket mistanke eller har tilladt politiet at udtfve agentvirksomhed eller standse 
og Abne brevforsendelser under efterforskningen. Endvidere ml en dommer vige sit saede 
under domsforhandlingen efter et konkret sktfn over sagens omstaendigheder, hvis dommeren 
tidligere ved dom har truffet en afggrelse, som medfarer, at han ikke fremstlr som fuldstaendig 
upartisk.]
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that the five largest Byretter [City Courts] should each have or» extra judge 
attached with a particular view to the handling of judge delegate cases.
At the First reading of the Bill in the Folketing, all the spokesmen of the 
different parties were, with one exception, in favour of the Bill as regards the 
disqualification of judges. They all stressed the importance of the fact that 
domestic legislation should be amended in such a way that it would be 
beyond any doubt that Denmark was fulfilling its obligations under the 
Convention; and that the Bill was the expression of this fact.91 The spokes­
man who did not support the Bill considered it to be an overreaction to the 
judgment in the Hauschildt Case, but did not question that Denmark should 
amend its legislation so that it would conform to the requirements of the 
Convention.92
In a joint statement from the Presidents of the High Courts and the City 
Courts and the Danish Association of Judges, to whom the matter had been 
subjected, the Bill was criticized in quite strong terms.93 First, there were 
no objections to the expansion of the instances in relation to complexes of 
cases in which a judge should be considered disqualified. However, on 
grounds of principle, it was emphasized strongly that this expansion of the 
scope of disqualification in relation to complexes of cases ought to be 
included in the text of the draft section 61 and not only in the explanatory 
memorandom accompanying the Bill, i.e. as a part of the travaux préparatoi­
res. Even though it might be difficult to formulate a general rule which 
clearly indicated the criteria for the situations in which a judge should be 
considered disqualified, it should at least within the text of the provision have 
been possible to indicate and delimit some of the main groups of cases. 
Moreover, the merits of the provision were also considered to be unclear, 
giving rise to doubts. Second, it was doubted whether the scope of the draft 
section 60(2) in relation to the ordering of remand in custody during the trial 
was completely compatible with the Convention in the case of very 
prolonged trials.
As regards the first point, High Court judge Peter Rtrdam  characterized 
the draft section 61 "... as a copy of the decisive criterion in the present 
section 62, and one must rub one’s eyes before one understands that it is 
really seriously that the Ministry has chosen this way of legislating. We have
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”  FT 1989-90, Forhandlingeme, cols. 5173 ff.
”  Ibid., at col. 5185.
”  See Folketinget 1989-90. Bcucnkning afgivet af Retsudvalget, Bilag 3, pp. 12 f.
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an unpleasant tendency to legislate in the travaux préparatoires in this coun­
try, but I do not believe that I have ever seen such a hair-raising example of 
this."9495
The Ministry of Justice responded to this critique by stating that, as 
regards the draft section 61, the explanatory memorandum was drafted in 
such a way that the extended scope of disqualification of judges was 
indicated as clearly as possible. Accordingly, the content of the rules - which 
are primarily directed towards judges - should thus not have given rise to 
doubts in practice. As regarded the fact that the draft section 60(2) did not 
include decisions on remand in pursuance of section 762(2) made during the 
trial, the Ministry said that the judgment of the European Court in the 
Hauschildt Case attached importance only to those decisions on remand in 
custody which were made before the trials commenced, notwithstanding that 
the applicant also referred to the decisions which had been made during the 
trial. It also appears, the Ministry explained, from the ruling of the Htjesteret 
i UfR 1990.13 (see infra section 8.4) that the Hauschildt Judgment should be 
construed to the effect that what is relevant to the question of disqualification 
is any decision on remand in pursuance of section 762(2) made prior to the 
trial.
On the basis of the critique of the Bill by the legal experts, the Social 
Democrats and the Socialists withdrew their previously expressed support of 
the Bill and proposed that the matter be reconsidered in order to secure the 
quality of the amendment. However, the Bill was, without any discussion 
about the disqualification of judges under the second and third reading in the 
Folketing, finally passed as Act No. 403 of 13 June 1990.94
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** Cf. Peter Rirdam: Justitsministeriets lovforsiag om dommerhabilitet, [The Ministry of 
Justice's Bill on the Disqualification of Judges], Juristen 1990, pp. 93 ff., at p. 95 f.
”  [... er en afskrift af det afgerende kriterium i den gxldende § 62, og man ml gnide sig 
i ejnenc. fer man forst&r, at det er i fuldt alvor. ministeriet har valgt denne máde at lovgive 
pá. Vi har en kedelig tilbejelighed herhjemme til at lovgive i motíveme, men jeg tror ikke, 
at jeg tidligere har set et s í hárrejsende eksempel herpl]
* For a brief account on the amendment, see Torsten HesselbjeTg: Ny retsplejelovgivning, 
[New Administration of Justice Legislation), Juristen 1990, pp. 336 if. Eva Smith: 
Menneskerettighedskonventionerne og de nordiske retspleieordninger, [The Human Rights 
Conventions and the Nordic Systems of Administration of Justice], The Proceedings of the 
32nd Nordic Meeting of Lawyers, Reykjavik (1990), Vol. 1, pp. 11 ff., at pp. 20 f., criticizes 
the alnendment for being based only on a formal criterion: the distinction between a "justified 
reason to believe" ("begrundet mistanke om"] and a "particularly confirmed suspicion" ["sser- 
lig bestyrket mistanke’ ], so that disqualification only arises when the judge has previously 
warranted a measure in criminal procedure which may only be carried out when there exists 
a particularly confirm«! suspicion. Consequently, in the view of Eva Smith, there is a serious
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In Application No. 7658Z7697 the applicant complained that, as the 
father of a child bom out of wedlock, he could not. under the present Danish 
legislation, successfully petition the courts that he be granted custody of the 
child in the normal way. While the case was pending before the Commission, 
the Minister of Justice introduced a Bill98 which, inter alia, provided as 
follows:
"The right to the custody of a child bom out of wedlock may be accorded of the 
father by order of court where deemed necessary, having special regard to the 
welfare of the child. In making the order the court shall attach paramount weight to 
the father’s previous relations with the child."”
The introduction of the Bill was not, according to the explanatory memoran­
dum accompanying the Bill, motivated by the case pending before the 
Commission. However, it was stated that "[i]t may in that connection be 
mentioned that the European Commission of Human Rights is at the moment 
dealing with two complaints concerning the very limited possibilities which, 
under applicable Danish law, exist for attributing the custody of a child bom 
out of wedlock to the father."100101 The Bill was subsequently passed 
without its relationship to the Convention being discussed in the Folketing. 
Upon the information of the enactment of the said amendment, the Commis­
sion declared the application inadmissible since it was of the opinion "... that 
the new legislation gives the applicant reasonable satisfaction in regard to his 
present complaint."102
In Application No. 8777/79 a Danish man complained to the European
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risk that the result - rather than being a real strengthening of the accused's legal guarantees 
under the trial - entails a weakening of his guarantees when remanded in custody, because 
judges may be expected to rely less on section 762(2) whenever there is the slightest 
possibility of applying section 762(1).
* Cf. 15 D.R., pp. 128 ff.
91 See FT 1977-78, Forhandlingeme, cols. 7065 f., 7460 ff.. 11654 ff. and 11882 ff.; 
Tillaeg A* cols. 4381 ff.; Tillaeg B, cols. 1569 ff.; and Tillaeg C. cols. 781 f.
99 Ibid., Tillaeg A, col. 4381. Here cited in English from 15 D.R., p. 130.
100 Ibid.. at col. 4387.
101 [Det kan i den forbindelse naevnes, at Den europaeiske Menneskerettighedskommission 
i Cjeblikket behandler to klagesager vedmende de meget begrsnsede muhgheder, der efter 
gsldende dansk ret bestir for at tillsgge faderen til et bam uden for sgteskab foraeldremyn- 
digheden.]
102 Cf. 15 D.R., p. 130.
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Commmission that he had been subjected to discrimination on sexual 
grounds, contrary to Article 14 of the Convention, taken in conjunction with 
Article 6 (right to a fair trial, including the right of access to court) and with 
Article 8 (right to respect for private and family life), in that, under the 
relevant Danish law applicable at the time, his former wife had an unlimited 
right of access to court to challenge his paternity, while he did not have such 
a right. In a decision of 8 December 1981, the Commission declared the 
application admissible.103
Under the proceedings on the admissibility, the Danish Government 
informed the Commission that the Matrimonial Committee, an expert 
committee appointed to consider family law questions, in its report on 
cohabitation without marriage, inter alia, had recommended that "... the 
mother’s right to institute affiliation proceedings and request re-opening 
should also be subject to a relatively short time-limit".104 On the basis then 
existing it was the intention of the Ministry of Justice to introduce an 
amendment of the Childrens’ Act so that the same procedural rules as to the 
institution of affiliation proceedings would apply to men and women. 
Accordingly, on 12 March 1982 the Ministry introduced a Bill to this 
effect.105 In the explanatory memorandum accompanying the Bill, it was 
mentioned that a case against Denmark on this point was pending before the 
Commission, and that the Ministry of Justice had informed the Commission 
that it would seek to have the existing law amended.106 However, there 
were no explicit considerations on the compatibility of the existing provision 
with the Convention, but the eagerness of the Ministry to amend the present 
state of law on this point without any discussion on its compatibility with the 
Convention indicates that it was indeed aware of the fact that there could be 
problems in relation to the Convention.107 The Bill was passed unanimously 
by the Folketing, without the question of compatibility with the Convention
105 Cf. 27 D.R.. pp. 105 ff.
104 Cf. Betctnkiùng nr. 915/1980 om samliv uden aegteskab, [Report No. 915/1980 on 
Cohabitation without Marriage], p. 72. Here cited in English from 27 D.R., p. 117.
105 See FT, Forhandlingeme, cols. 3510 F., 4565 ff., 7466 f. and 7681; Tillaeg A, cols. 
3861 ff.; Tillzg, cols. 811 ff.: and Tilleg C. cols. 443 ff.
104 Cf. FT. Tillaeg A, cols. 3866 f.
m  The European Commission subsequently found that there had been a violation of 
Article 14 of the Convention in conjunction with Articles 6 and 8, whereas the Court did not 
find that this was the case, cf. Eur. Court H.R., Rasmussen Case, Series A. Vol. 81 (1984). 
the report of the Commission, para 87, and the judgment, para 42.
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being touched upon at all.
4.3.2.B. Norway.
On 31 July 1985 the Norwegian Ministry of Justice appointed a Sub­
commission to the Royal Commission mentioned above in section 4.2.2. to 
consider certain questions relating to criminal liability and security measures. 
While this Sub-commission was working, the European Commission decided 
the Case o f E v. Norway in which it held that the Norwegian procedure 
relating to the imposition of security measures (see infra chapter 16 and 
section 18.4) was not wide enough to bear on the conditions essential for the 
applicant’s detention in the sense of Article 5(4) of the Convention.10® This 
applied both to the form of judicial review available to the applicant and the 
speed with which the review had taken place.109 The application had been 
introduced on 13 May 1985, i.e. only a few months before the Sub- 
Commission was appointed. The Sub-Commission briefly discussed the 
requirements of Article 5(4).110 It did not find "... any reason to assess the 
relationship between valid Norwegian law and the Convention. Those rules 
of procedure the Sub-Commission proposes will satisfy the requirements of 
the Convention."111112 These proposals consisted of establishing by means 
of an amendment of the Penal Code, a possibility of judicial review of a 
number of decisions in relation to security measures where this was not the 
case under the present legislation.
Whether these proposals are being produced in legislation remains to be 
seen.
4.3.2.C. Sweden.
On 10 March 1983 the Swedish Government appointed a one-man committee
Cf. Eut. Court H.R., Case of E v. Norway, Series A, Vol. 181 (1990), Report of the 
Commission, para. 144.
109 However, after the Sub-commission had submitted its report, the European Court found 
that only the speed of the proceedings amounted to a violation of Article 5(4) of the Conven­
tion (see infra section 18.4).
110 Cf. NOU ¡990:5 Strafferetlige utilregneHghetsregler og sarreaksjoner, [Criminal Rules 
on "Non Compos" and Security Measures], p. 37.
Ibid.
111 [... ikke funnet grunn til i  vurdere forholdet mellom gjeldende norsk rett og
konvensjonen. De saksbehandlingsregler utvalget foreslir vil tilfredsstille konvensjonens krav.)
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to consider the existing rules on arrest and detention and, if necessary, 
propose amendments to these.113 The President of Hovrdtten for Ovre 
Norrland [the Court of Appeal of Upper Norriand], Carl-Iver Skarstedt, was 
appointed to carry out the task. While Mr Skarstedt was working, the 
European Court decided two cases against Sweden concerning the procedure 
in Sweden on detention on remand.
In the Skoogstrom Case the Commission found that the fact that the 
applicant had to wait seven days from his arrest before being brought before 
a judge or other officer authorized by law to exercise judicial power was a 
breach of Article 5(3) of the Convention.'14 A friendly settlement was 
subsequently reached between the Swedish Government and Mr Skoogstrijm. 
The settlement provided for the introduction of a Bill amending the Code of 
Judicial Procedure, publication for the benefit of the judiciary and prosecutors 
of a summary of the Commission’s report and reimbursement of Mr 
SkoogstrOm’s cost (see infra chapter 9). The Court took formal note of the 
judgment and decided to strike the case off the list (four votes to three).115
In the McGojf Case the Court held that the elapse of fifteen days 
between the arrest and remand in custody of the applicant until he was 
brought before a judge amounted to a violation of Article 5(3) of the 
Convention.116
These cases affected the terms of reference of the Committee con­
siderably. The Committee explained this in the following way:
"One of the questions which the Committee was to consider according to its terms 
of reference was time limits in conjunction with arrest and remand in custody. The 
question of time limits in conjunction with deprivation of liberty in criminal 
procedure has become of even greater immediacy in the course of the investigation 
through two suits against Sweden heard by the European Commission of Human 
Rights and in one of these cases also by the Euroepan Court of Human Rights in 
Strasbourg. According to Article 5(3) of the European Convention for the Protection 
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms anyone who is deprived of liberty 
pending trial shall be brought prompdy before a judge or other officer authorized by 
law to exercise judicial powers.
"* For a comment on the Committee's task in relation to the European Convention, see 
Peter Nobel: Traktatrtiit vid ankdllande och haktning, (Treaty Law in relation to Arrest and 
Detention], SvJT 1984, pp. 394 ff.
114 Cf. Report of the Commission, p. 89.
1,5 Cf. Eur. Court H.R.. Case o f Skoogstrom, Series A, Vol. 83 (1984), para. 25.
"* Cf. Eur. Court H.R., McGojf Case, Series A, Vol. 83 (1984). para. 27.
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In one of the cases the Commission established that a Swedish prosecutor did not 
fulfil the Convention’s demand that he be an officer authorized to exercise judicial 
powers and that a remand hearing seven days after the deprivation of liberty did not 
fulfil the Convention’s demand of appearance before a court without delay. In earlier 
cases the European Court has accepted four days after factual deprivation of liberty. 
This period must, however, include Saturdays, Sundays and public holidays."117
In order to redress the divergence between the Swedish rules on detention on 
remand the Committee proposed a procedure according to which the 
prosecutor had to submit to the court a request that the suspect be remanded 
in custody as soon as possible after the factual deprivation of liberty, i.e. 
usually on the same day as the apprehension or on the following day. If, 
however, for purposes of the investigation or on practical grounds, it was 
impossible for the prosecutor to come to a decision on the remand in custody 
issue within this time, he could request that the suspect be remanded in 
custody at the latest on the third day after his apprehension. When such a 
question was raised, the Court, it was proposed, should hold a hearing 
without delay. Normally this should be possible on the same day as the 
prosecutor raises the question or on the following day. Accordingly, a remand 
hearing should normally be held on the second day after the deprivation of 
liberty, and only in exceptional cases should the full time of four days 
allowed by the European Court be utilized.11®
The Government subsequently introduced a Bill, drafted in accordance 
with the proposals of the Committee, amending the Code of Judicial 
Procedure on this point.119 In the explanatory memorandum accompanying 
the Bill it was explained that ”... the question of an adjustment of the 
Swedish rules to the norms which have emerged from the practice when the 
European Convention is interpreted are therefore more a question of just such 
an adaption to a formal system than a question of the rule of law in its 
proper meaning."120121
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117 Cf. SOU 1985:27 Gripen-anhdllen-haktad. Straffprocessuella tvingsmedel m m, [SOU 
1985:27 Seized, arrested, detained: Coercive Measures in Criminal Procedure), p. 44. The 
report contained an analysis of the above-mentioned cases, at pp. 54 ff.
"* Ibid., at. pp. 44 f.
See Riksdagen, Proposition 1986/87:112.
110 Ibid., at p. 26.
111 [... frâgan om en anpassning av de svenska reglema till de normer som har kommit 
fram i praxis vid tolkningen av Europakonventionen âr det dârfôr mer en frâga om just en
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The Council of Legislation to whom the Bill was submitted for 
comments stated in general terms that Sweden as a party to the Convention 
had undertaken to adjust its legislation to the provisions of the Convention 
and the interpretation of those provisions that the European Convention and 
Court considered appropriate. If the Strasbourg organs stated that certain 
Swedish provisions were not compatible with the Convention, the conclusion 
had to be that the Swedish provisions did not meet the requirements of the 
rule of law which could be deduced from the Convention. Contrary to what 
was stated in the explanatory memorandum "... the Council of Legislation 
considers therefore that an adjustment to the norms which have emerged from 
the practice when the European Convention is interpreted, are questions of 
the rule of law in its proper meaning and not primarily an adjustment to a 
formal system."122123 The Council had, with some minor modifications, 
no objections to the Bill.124
The Standing Committee on Constitutional Affairs subsequently 
recommended the Bill but proposed a change in one of its provisions so that 
it became manifest that in no circumstance could more than four days elapse 
between the arrest and the remand hearing in court.125
In its judgment of 23 September 1982 in the Sporrong and Lonroth 
Case126 the European Court concluded that Sweden had violated its 
obligations under Article 6 of the Convention. The case essentially concerned 
the fact that certain administrative decisions taken by the Government as the 
first and only instance could not be subject to judicial review by the courts. 
In a fairly high number of subsequent decisions from both the European 
Commission and Court this view was confirmed and also considered to apply 
when the Government took the decision on appeal from a lower administra­
tive authority (see infra section 18.3.2).
The Swedish Government first took a narrow view of the impact of the
s&dan anpassning till ett formellt system an en frága om ráttssákkerhet i egentlig mening.]
122 Ibid., at p. 84.
125 [... anser lagrádet dárfór att en anpassning till de normer som kommit fram i praxis vid 
tolkningen av Europakonventionen ár en frága om ráussakkerhet i egentlig mening och inte
i fórsta hand en anpassning till et forme It system.]
124 rbid.
125 Cf. Riksdagen, Justitieutskoucts betánkande 1987/88:7, p. 29 f.
124 Cf. Eur. Court H.R., Sporrong and Lonnroth Case, Series A, Vol. 52 (1982).
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judgment on domestic law and considered that no administrative measures 
were required.127 However, certain amendments of the legislation on 
expropriation, building and planning had already or were due to take place. 
In the light of the growing case-law of the Strasbourg organs on Article 6(1) 
of the Convention, in particular the cases directed against Sweden, it became 
clear that something had to be done to remedy the discrepancy between the 
requirements of Article 6(1) of the Convention and that part of Swedish 
administrative law where no judicial review existed.12*
In June 1986 the Ministry of Justice published a report which contained 
the proposal of a Bill providing for a general right to have administrative 
decisions reviewed by Regeringsratten, including the decisions of the Go­
vernment, in cases in which such a possibility did not exist under the present 
legislation, as well as an amendment of the legislation on expropriation.129 
As regards the relationship between Article 6(1) of the Convention and 
domestic Swedish law, it was concluded that ”[i]f one proceed from this 
interpretation [of the practice of the European Commission and Court on 
Article 6(1)] it would probably become clear that the Swedish legislation does 
not completely meet the requirements of the Convention."130131 To the 
extent one wants "... to adapt Swedish legislation to the interpretation of the 
Convention established by the European Court, a possibility for having a 
judicial review of the administrative decisions concerned must be crea­
ted.’’132133
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127 For further information, see Hans Danelius: Judicial control o f the administration - a 
Swedish proposal for legislative reform in Matscher & Petzold (1988), pp. US ff.
See, for example, Torkel Opsahl & Erik Friberg: Sverige ftillt av Europadomstolen, 
[Sweden sentenced by the European Court], SvJT 1983. pp. 401 ff., at pp. 414 ff.; and Erik 
Friberg: Europakonventionens krav p i  domstolsprovning av fdrvaltningsbeslut, (The Require­
ment of Judicial Review of Administrative Decisions of the European Convention], SvJT 
1986. pp. 325 ff., at pp. 333 ff.
See Ds Ju ¡986:3 Europarddskonventionen och ratten till domstolsprovning i Sverige, 
[The Convention of the Council of Europe and the Right u> Judicial Review in Sweden]. The 
conclusions of the report are reproduced in English by Hans Danelius. op.cit., passim.
m  Cf. Ds Ju 1986:3. p. 55.
1,1 [Utgfir man frin denna tolkning torde det sti klart an den svenska lagstiftningen inte 
fullt ut uppfyller konventionens krav.]
IJJ Ibid.. at p. 56.
1,5 [... anpassa den svenska lagstiftningen till den tolkning av konventionen som den 
europeiska domstolen har lagt fast miste en moilighet for enskilda parter skapas att f i till 
stAnd en domstolsprdvning av de fdrvaltningsbeslut som det har galler.]
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It is quite remarkable that the report contained a proposal that the 
Government’s decisions in large areas should be subject to judicial review by 
a court. The Swedish Government had so far been very reluctant to accept 
such a review and it seems, at least in principle, to have had a significant 
impact on the division of powers between the executive and the judicia-
134ry-
The proposal was to a large extent based on an extension of the existing 
possibility of the re-opening of a case in exceptional circumstances 
["resning"] before Regeringsrdtten (see infra sections 17.2.3 and 18.3.2) so 
that the jurisdiction of the Court in this respect would be extended to a 
general competence to review, on appeal, the decisions of the final ad­
ministrative instances.133 Thus, it would be possible for the Court to quash 
unlawful decisions so that administrative authorities would have to examine 
and reconsider the case in all its aspects. It was pointed out in the report that 
the re-opening of a case did not fulfil the requirements of Article 6(1) of the 
Convention as interpreted in, for instance, the Sporrong and Lonroth 
Case,m  but the proposed extension of the competence of Regeringsrdtten 
made i t "... difficult to see anything but that the possibility of review should 
be acceptable from the point of view of the Convention.”137138
The criterion "civil rights and obligations" employed in Article 6(1) of 
the Convention was not found to be sufficiently precise to be used in the 
present context. Instead, it was proposed to delimit the competence of 
Regeringsrdtten in such a way that the jurisdiction of the Court would be 
extended to any decision involving the exercise of public power. It was also 
proposed to apply of a provision relating not only to matters provided for in 
Chapter 8, section 2 or 3, of the Instrument of Government, i.e. provisions 
relating to the personal status of private subjects or to their personal and 
economic interrelationships, but also to the sphere where the principle o f
1,4 Cf. Hans Danelius. op.cit., pp. 122 f. For a historical account on the division of powers 
between the executive and the judiciary in Sw eden, see Hans Danelius, op.cit.. pp. 116 if.; and 
Stig Jágersldüld: Administrative Law in Stig Strómholm (ed.): An Introduction to Swedish Law, 
2nd edition, Stockholm (1988), pp. 79 ff.
Cf. Ds Ju 1986:3, pp. 8 and 59.
1M Cf. Eur. Court H.R., Sporrong and Lonroth Case, Series A, Vol. 52, para. 86.
1,7 Cf. Ds Ju 1986:3, p. 63.
[... svSrt alt se annat an att SverprSvningsmójligheten skulle bli godtagbar frán 
konventionens synspunkt.]
legality was applicable (see supra section 2.1 and infra chapter 9).139
The possibility of having an administrative decision reviewed by 
Regeringsratten was proposed, although subjected to the following res­
trictions: (1) the review should be exercised only on appeal from the 
individual; (2) the competence of Regeringsratten should be limited in such 
a way that the Court would only be able to hold an administrative decision 
invalid and refer it back to the administrative authority but not take any deci­
sion on its merits; (3) decisions which might otherwise be reviewed by a 
court would not be brought before Regeringsratten; (4) all administrative 
remedies should be exhausted before Regeringsratten admit an appeal; (5) the 
review should be directed only against the legality of the administrative 
decision, that is, whether or not it is contrary to "the law or to any other 
statute"; (6) the normal rules of the Act of Administrative Procedure on when 
a public hearing should be held in the case should also apply to this kind of 
review of administrative decisions;140 and (7) the decisions of certain quasi­
judicial administrative legal bodies were exempted from review under the 
proposed rules.141
It was emphasized, though not very convincingly, that the proposal was 
not only made in order to reconcile domestic Swedish law to the requirements 
of the Convention as set forth in the interpretation of the European Commis­
sion and Court. "In a community governed by law such as ours, it is 
important that endeavours to enforce the rule of law lead to a continous 
development."142141
The report was subsequently, in accordance with the normal legislative 
procedure in Sweden, submitted to various authorities for their comments. It 
appears from the published summary of these comments144 that the majority 
of the authorities heard, generally speaking, recommended the proposals of
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Ibid., at pp. 67 f.
140 The report added in this respect that "(ijt is of course possible that the view taken by 
Sweden will change if on this point the European Court interprets Article 6 differently", cf. 
Ds Ju 1983:3, p. 70. Here cited in English from Hans Danelius, op.cit., p. 121.
m Ibid., pp. 65 ff.
142 Ibid., p. 64.
M* [I eu rattssamhalle av vir typ ar det viktigt att strivandena att ffirdjupa rittssikkerheten 
leder till en fortldpande utvickling.]
144 Cf. Riksdagen. Proposition 1987/88:69, Bilaga 2, pp. 168 ff.
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the report However, these authorities recommended that the question of 
judicial review be regulated in the long run not by one general rule but by 
several detailed rules within each branch of administrative law with due 
consideration for the specific problems and requirements of each branch. A 
number of critical observations were, however, expressed by, inter alia, 
Justitiekansleren, the Faculty of Law of the University of Stockholm and the 
Faculty of Law of the University of Lund.145 These applied in particular to 
(1) the fact that Regeringsratten, under the proposal, would act as a mere 
court of cassation;146 (2) that the remedy proposed was similar, or even 
more restrictive, than the re-opening of a case before Regeringsratten which 
the European Court had declared did not fulfil the requirements of Article 
6(1) of the Convention;147 (3) the review proposed had the character of an 
extraordinary remedy; 148 (4) that some quasi-judicial administrative bodies’ 
decisions were exempted from review, since it was questioned whether the 
Commission and Court would accept that these bodies were ’ tribunals" 
within the meaning of Article 6(1) of the Convention when they were not 
courts according to Swedish law;149 (5) that the review was only con­
templated as concerning whether the decision was contrary to "the law or to 
any other statute";150 and (6) the fact that there was no absolute right to a 
public hearing before Regeringsratten.151
On the basis of the report and the comments on it, the Government 
introduced a Bill which, as is stated in the explanatory memorandum 
accompanying the Bill, ”[f]or the purpose of securing that Swedish law 
correspond to the requirements of the European Convention for access to 
judicial review, a new possibility for having the decisions of the Government 
and other authorities in administrative affairs reviewed by Regeringsratten is 
introduced. The new possibility of review is framed as complementary to
145 The Faculty of Law of the University of Upsala, on the other hand, recommended the 
proposals of the report as they stood, cf. Riksdagen, Proposition 1987/88:69, Bilaga 2, pp. 169, 
207 and 222.
144 Cf. Riksdagen, Proposition 1987/88:69, Bilaga 2, pp. 169 and 207.
141 Ibid., at pp. 174 ff.
141 Ibid., at pp. 175 and 201.
14’ Ibid., at pp. 193 and 201 ff.
150 Ibid.. at pp. 207 ff.
151 Ibid.. at pp. 211 ff.
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those possibilities of review already existing. The introduction of it will be 
followed up by partial overhauls of the legislation in the areas which are affected."152133
The Bill was drafted along the lines set forth in the report of the Ministry 
of Justice/ However, the scope of the review was extended in comparison 
with the one proposed in the report so that Regeringsrdtten could examine 
whether an administrative decision was "consistent with applicable legal 
rules". According to the explanation given in the explanatory memorandum 
accompanying the Bill,154 this meant that the review would not be limited 
to an examination of the application of the law as such, but would include 
an assessment of the facts which formed the basis of the application of the 
law.155 "On the other hand, the review... [should]... not bear upon an 
application of the Articles of the European Convention, since these do not 
form part of our domestic legal system, save that the content of the 
Convention may have significance for the interpretation of Swedish legal 
rules.”156157 Furthermore, it was suggested that the number of cases in 
which the proposed review would not be allowed to apply ahould be 
extended to certain other cases,15* and also that any petition to Rege- 
ringsrdtten should have no suspensive effect159 Finally, it was proposed 
that the Bill should contain a provision according to which the Act would 
only be applicable in the period from 1 May 1988 to the end of 1991 so that 
the experience gained in this period could be used as the basis for the final
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151 Cf. Riksdagen, Proposition 1987/88:69, p. 15.
153 [I syfte att sakersLalia att svensk r&u motsvarar europakonventionens krav pk ullging
till domstolspriWning infers en ny mdjlighet att f i beslut som regeringen och andra 
myndigheter meddelar i ftirvaltnings&renden prSvade i regeringsr&tten. Den nya prOvningsmbj- 
ligheten utformas som ett komplement till de prOvningsmdjligheter som finns i dag. 
Indftirandet av dot ffiljs upp genom omridevisa tfversyner av lagsdftningen p i de omriden 
som beriirs.j
154 Ibid.. at p. 23.
155 A draft Bill was submitted to the Council on Legislation, which considered that it met 
the requirements of the Convention. In particular, it noted that the scope of the judicial review 
as regards law and fact was similar to the one in Danish and Norwegian administrative law. 
cf. Riksdagen, Proposition 1987/88:69, Bilaga 4, p. 234.
IM Ibid., at p. 23.
157 [Daremot skall provntngen inte avse en tillampning av europakonventionens artiklar. 
eftersom dessa inte utgor nigon del av vir inhemska raltsordning, lit vara alt konventionens 
irmehAJi kan ha betydelse for tolkningen av svenska rtttsregler.]
>M Ibid., at pp. 2 and 21 ff.
Ibid., at pp. 25 ff.
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The Standing Committee on Constitutional Affairs, to which the Bill was 
referred, was of the opinion that the proposal for judicial review "... should 
be seen as an important part of the endeavours to secure that Swedish law 
corresponds, as soon as possible, to the requirements of the Conventi- 
on ..16U62 A minority of the Committee was not convinced that the Bill 
was in accordance with the Convention on all points. Accordingly, they 
proposed that the decisions of the above-mentioned quasi-judicial bodies 
should not be exempted from review, and that a public hearing should be 
held whenever one of the parties requested it.163
The Riksdag subsequendy passed the Bill (Act No. 1988:205) on the 
basis of the recommendation of the Constitutional Committee.164
In Applications Nos. 8588/79 and 8589/7916S (see infra section 18.3.2) 
the European Commission held that compulsory proceedings before three 
arbitrators without recourse to the ordinary courts in a case concerning a 
dispute over the prices of some shares, which the majority shareholder was 
legally entitled to buy, did not meet the requirements of Article 6(1) of the 
Convention.
The Swedish Government therefore subsequendy introduced a Bill for the 
Amendment of the Stock Corporations Act of 1975. The Bill provided that 
a party not satisfied with a decision of the arbitrators could petition the 
ordinary courts. In the explanatory memorandum accompanying the Bill it 
was explained.
"In a case against Sweden before the European Commission of Human Rights, the 
question has arisen whether the Swedish rules about arbitration in case of dispute 
about the compulsory purchase procedure relative to minority shares does satisfy the 
requirement in the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, that the determination of civil rights shall take place in an independent 
and impartial tribunal in a public hearing. Personally I find this a fitting question, 
and I consider the matter as follows.
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framing of the legislation in this area.160
1,0 Ibid., at pp. 29 f.
141 Cf. Riksdagen, KU 1987/88:38. p. 6.
IH (... ses som ett viktigt led i strävandena alt s i snabbt som möjligt säkerslälla an svensk 
ritt motsvarar konventionens krav.]
Ibid., at pp. 13 ff.
144 Cf. Riksdagens Protokoll 1987/88:100, 14 aprii 1988.
145 Cf. 38 D.R.. pp. 31 ff.
The question that is most often in issue in connection with the compulsory 
purchase of minority shares concerns the size of the price. Since questions of 
evaluation often require particular expertise, it seems proper that such disputes should 
be handled by arbitrators. In Swedish company law, the principle prevails since a 
long time that disputes about compulsory purchase, at least in the first instance, shall 
be determined by arbitrators. In my view there are strong reasons for keeping this 
procedure, which has worked well in practice, also in the future.
Nor can I find that there is any practical possibility to let arbitrators be appointed 
in any other way than the one now prevailing.
However, I advocate a return to the procedure that prevailed under the Stock 
Corporation Act of 1944, viz that the arbitration award should be subject to judicial 
review not only when errors of a procedural nature have occured in the arbitration, 
but also when a party is dissatisfied with the opinion of the arbitrators."1“
4.4. Conclusions.
The exposition in the previous sections suggests that the task of securing that 
domestic law conforms to the Convention is a manageable one. Although 
from time to time it may be difficult to predict the innovations of the 
European Court, it still seems possible to ensure that domestic law is com­
patible with the Convention without any real problems.
The political will to make sure that domestic law conforms to the 
requirements of the Convention seems to be very strong in Denmark; all 
(responsible) political parties usually agree on amendments aiming at 
bringing domestic law into line with the Convention. The same must be 
assumed to be the case in Norway, but the lack of explicitly discussed cases 
in the Storting does not allow for clear conclusions. However, some of the 
Danish examples discussed show that the quality of the amendments made 
has been affected by the eagerness to bring domestic law into line with the 
Convention as quickly as possible. In Sweden there seems to have been 
somewhat more debate on whether or not, and to what extent, decisions of 
the European Commission and Court should be implemented in domestic law. 
This has basically applied to the question of the lack of judicial review of all 
kinds administrative decisions. This may be explained by two facts. First, 
these decisions have concerned a question where there has been a strong 
historical tradition for letting the Government (originally the King-in-Council) 
be the final instance in administrative matters with political implications. 
Second, the fact that many of the cases in which Sweden has been found
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Here cited in English from Jacob W.F. Sundberg: Human Rights in Sweden. The 
Annual Reports 1982-J9S4. Stockholm (1985), p. 67.
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Conclusions
guilty of a violation of Article 6(1) of the Convention have concerned what 
could be characterized as welfare-state legislation. This has rendered it pos­
sible to use the Convention as an argument in the general political debate on 
this legislation. Thus the right-wing parties in opposition usually argue for a 
stronger position of the Convention in Swedish law.
Apart from the impact of decisions of the Commission and Court to 
which the State has been a party, the Convention itself plays a certain role 
in the preparation of legislation. It is possible to find examples where the 
Convention or decisions directed against other states have been the principle 
reason for amending domestic legislation. Moreover, it is also interesting to 
observe that it is to a very large extent within exactly the same fields of law 
that the Scandinavian expert committees have discussed the Convention: 
aliens legislation, coercive measures in the psychiatry, the principle o f 
legality within criminal law etc. The scope of these considerations varies con­
siderably, however, from committee to committee.
79

PART III
The Application of the European Convention 
in Domestic Scandinavian Law

CHAPTER 5
Introductory Remarks: the Incorporation of Inter­
national Law into Domestic Law
5.1. General Reservations relating to International Law.
International law that needs to be incorporated into domestic law is normally 
reformulated, but only that part of the treaty which needs to be implemented, 
either by the promulgation of a statute or in the form of an administrative 
regulation (depending on whether or not it changes existing legislation). 
However, it happens that a treaty is adopted completely and embodied in a 
statute by which all the provisions of the treaty come into force in domestic 
law.1 Moreover, some statutes contain a provision that the statute itself shall 
be applied subject to reservations following from international law. In the 
latter situations one could - in accordance with the terminology introduced 
by Jan Erik Helgesen - talk about "sector-monism"2 That is to say that to 
the extent specified in either the statute adopting the treaty into domestic law, 
or in the provision containing the general reservation, international law is 
applied directly in domestic law. A few examples of such sector-monism 
should be mentioned here:
According to section 12 of the Danish Penal Code, the provisions in 
sections 6-8 of the Code on jurisdiction in criminal cases are generally 
limited by "... the exceptions recognized in international law”.5 An example 
of the application of this provision is UfR 1955.571. An American engineer 
who carried out work for the Danish Air Force had been convicted for a 
traffic offence in the City Court. The Public Prosecutor appealed for acquittal 
since the engineer, according to a statement from the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, held the same position, as regards exterritoriality, as the clerical staff 
at an embassy.4
1 Sec for example Act No. 252 of 16 June 1968 on Diplomatic Relations which adopts the 
1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations into domestic Danish law.
2 Cf. Helgesen (1982), pp. 53 f.
3 [... ved de i folkereucn anerkcndte undtagelser.]
' See also UfR 1941.963 where Den sarlige Klageret [the Special Court of Revision)
granted a re-opnening of a case on the basis of a statement from the Ministry of Internal
Section 1 of the Danish Act No. 395 of 12 July 1946 on Penalty for War 
Criminals laid down that a person who,"... under violation of applicable laws 
and customs of international law concerning occupation and warfare",5 has 
committed a criminal offence under Danish law, or to the detriment of 
Danish interests, should be punished.
The question of whether or not certain actions carried out by German 
officials during the occupation were lawful under international law was raised 
in relation to the application of this act in a number of cases before Danish 
courts.6 The crucial preliminary questions for the courts in these cases7 were 
the scope of internationally lawful reprisals carried out against the Danish 
civil population during the occupation and the scope of lawful self-defence 
for the occupation authorities under international law. Although the courts in 
these cases had to apply international law to a greater extent than usual at 
that time, they did not seem to have any difficulties in interpreting inter­
national law in this respect; except on one count, the actions carried out by 
the accused were all found unlawful under international law.1
The Norwegian Act of Criminal Procedure lays down in section 4 that 
the Act shall be applied ”... with the restrictions which are recognized under 
international law or follow from an agreement with a foreign state.”9 That 
the provision talks about "restrictions” is somewhat misleading. As regards 
human rights conventions it may be more appropriate to say "in accordance 
with", since these conventions in fact put certain requirements on the criminal 
procedural system within the Contracting States.10 This in fact means that 
the ECHR within criminal procedure is incorporated into domestic Norwegian
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Affairs on the applicability of a treaty between Denmark and Poland in the case at issue.
5 [Under kr*nkelse af de for beszttelse og krig gaeldende folkeretlige love og szdvaner.]
* On the measures taken against German war criminals in Denmark, see Ditlev Tamm: 
Fetsopgpret efter besccttelsen [The Purge After the Occupation], Copenhagen (1984), Vol. 2, 
pp. 621 ff.
7 Cf. UflR 1945.189, UfR 1948.1326, UfR 1949.833, UfR 1950.453, and UfR 1950.565. 
The cases are discussed by Ditlev Tamm, op.ciu pp. 650 fT.
1 See UfR 1949.833. In UfR 1950.453 there was some difference of opinion in relation 
to the scope of lawful reprisals under international law between the High Court and the 
Hpjesteret.
’ [... med de begrensninger som er anerkjent i folkeretten eller folger av overenskomst 
med fremmed stat.]
10 See Hans Christian Bjerke & Erik Keiserud (eds.): Straffeprocessloven med kommen- 
tarer, [The Act of Criminal Procedure with Comments], Oslo (1*86/87), pp. 35 ff.
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law.11 As will be seen in section 8.2, the Hoyesterett has on a number of 
occasions dealt with the question of the impact of the Convention on 
Norwegian criminal procedure without section 4 being as much as mentioned; 
the Court has instead based its reasoning on general principles of the 
application of international law in domestic law.
An example of considerations as to this provision is NRt. 1973.1480 in 
which the H0yesterett’s Interlocutory Appeals Committee dealt with the 
question of whether or not, under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic 
Relations or under general principles of international law, there existed a 
principle according to which a person who does not possess diplomatic im­
munity himself, but who has been arrested, suspected of having committed 
serious crimes, in an area subjected to diplomatic immunity, could be taken 
into custody. However, the Committee did not find that such principle existed 
and, consequently, the case was decided solely on the basis of domestic law.
Another Norwegian example is section 14 of the Norwegian Penal Code 
which contains a provision similar to section 12 of the Danish Penal Code.
Finally, it should be mentioned that section 407 of the Norwegian Code 
of Civil Procedure and section 391(2) of the Act of Criminal Procedure 
provide for the re-opening of cases in which the decision ”... is assumed, 
directly or indirectly, to be based on an understanding of international law 
under a treaty which deviates from the understanding an international court 
in a similar case establishes as binding upon Norway, and this understanding 
is considered to result in a different decision."12
The Swedish Penal Code contains in Chapter 2, section 7, a provision 
laying down that the application of the Code as well as the jurisdiction of the 
Swedish courts in general are limited by what ”... follows from generally re­
cognized principles in international public law”.13 According to Chapter 22, 
section 11, of the Code, a person who under warfare acts in a way which is
General Reservations relating to International Law
11 Cf. Torkel Opsahl: Menneskerettigheterne i straffeprocessen, [Human Rights in Criminal 
Procedure], in Lov og Frihet. Festshrift til Johs. Andeneespd 70-drsdagen, 7. September ¡982, 
Oslo (1982), pp. 487 ff., at p. 489, with a general discussion of human rights in Norwegian 
criminal procedure; and Jargen Aall: Siktedes rett til vitne-eksaminasjon etter den europeiska 
menneskerettighetskonvensjon og etter norsk rett, [The Accused's Right to question Witnesses 
under the European Convention on Human Rights and under Norwegian Law], Lov og Rett 
1988. pp. 478 ff., at pp. 479 f.
12 [... antas direkte eller indirekte i  bygge pi en forstielse av folkeretten etter en traktat 
som avviker fra den forstielse en intemasjonal domstol i samme saksforhold slir fast som 
bindende for Norge, og denne forstielse antas i  burde fare til en annen avgjarelse.]
13 [... som följer av allmänt erkända folkrättsiiga gnmdsatser.]
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contrary to, inter alia, principles of international law shall be sentenced for 
a crime of international law. However, it has not been possible to find any 
examples of the application of these provisions.
In areas covered by sector-monism, international law is, at least from a 
theoretical point of view, per se compatible with domestic law; the courts 
formally apply the statutes which incorporate international law into domestic 
law, although often the crucial question in the case at issue is one of inter­
national law. The decision of the cases brought before the Court often 
presupposes that a stand on a preliminary question of international law has 
already been adopted; in this case the application of the domestic rule fre­
quently becomes very simple. However, court practice concerning the 
application of international law within the sphere of sector-monism is quite 
scarce and does not seem to have given rise to any specific problems.
5.2. Incorporation of Restricted Obligations of International Law.
5.2.1. Incorporation through Statutes.
As mentioned in section 2.1, the most common way of incorporating treaties 
into domestic Scandinavian law is by reformulating them (transformation) in 
a specific statute. If, later on, a divergence or even a clear conflict between 
the treaty and the statute incorporating it into domestic law is found, it will 
be natural to interpret the domestic rule in the light of the treaty, unless it is 
otherwise clearly indicated. One is here facing cases where it is relatively 
uncomplicated to establish the purpose of the statute. Therefore, it is 
particularly well-founded to pay special attention to the travaux préparatoires 
of the statute - including the treaty itself • and thus employ a so-called 
subjective interpretation14 or - as it is known as in English law - purposive 
construction since the purpose of enacting the domestic rule is, it may be 
assumed, to incorporate the treaty into domestic law. In other words, the trea­
ty is an important part of the travaux préparatoires of the statute incorporat­
ing it into domestic law.
This view appears clearly from a couple of the H0jesteret's decisions. In 
UfR 1975.30 the H0jesteret made Danmarks Radio [the Danish Broadcasting
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14 See Eilschou Holm (1981), p. 127. On subjective interpretation and the weight of the 
travaux préparatoires in the application of Scandinavian law in general, see for example 
Eckhoff (1987), pp. 57 ff. and 126 ff.; Ross (1958), pp. 142 ff.. 152 and 157; Per Augdahl: 
Rettskilder (Sources of Law], 3rd edition. Oslo (1973), pp. 83 ff.; and Preben Stuer Lauridsen; 
RetsUtren [The Jurisprudence], Copenhagen (1977), pp. 275 ff.
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Company] stick to its previously adopted interpretation of the Copyright Act 
and overruled a more recent practice which, though undisputed in the case, 
was contrary to the Bem Convention. The Bern Convention had been ratified 
by Denmark without reservation and it was incorporated into domestic law 
by the Copyright Act. While the case was pending, an amendment of the 
Copyright Act was passed which, according to the explanatory memorandum 
accompanying the bill, was intended to redress the divergence between the 
wording of the Act and the Convention. The defendant before the H0jesteret, 
a private publisher whose copyright had been infringed, maintained that his 
copyright was already protected under the existing legislation.15 The Court 
did not make explicit references to the Convention in its judgment, nor was 
the Convention discussed in Justice Jorgen Trolle's extrajudicial comment16 
on the judgment. In this comment, however, it was stated in more general 
terms that "... there will be a natural tendency to understand a statute as 
fulfilling our international obligations rather than understand it [the statute] 
as being contrary to them [the international obligations]".1718 On the other 
hand, the Court did not consider the appellant’s argument that, notwithst­
anding the accession to and the ratification of the Convention, these treaties 
could not be regarded as a part of Danish law and, consequently, the pro- 
vison at issue could not be interpreted restrictively contrary to the intentions 
of the Legislature.
In UfR 1975.263 it was stated in the explanatory memorandum 
accompanying a bill incorporating the CMR Convention into domestic 
Danish law that "... this provision rightly belongs under the Road Traffic Act 
and will be included in a subsequent amendment of this act". This statement
15 Frederik Harhoff: Sktnheden^og Udyret, [The Beauty and the Beast], in Retsviden- 
skabeligt Institut B, Studier nr. 18, Arsberetning 1986, Copenhagen (1987), pp. 69 ff., at pp. 
77 f„ does not find that a situation of interpretation was present in this case because the 
amendment of the Copyrights Act was considered a confirmation of the already applicable 
legal position.
16 Extrajudicial comments on Hejesteret decisions are commonly used in Denmark. Such 
comments are not official notifications from the Court, nor are they supplements to the judg­
ment, but they may be viewed as the individual judges' remarks on the decision on the basis 
of their participation in deciding the case. See e.g. Torben Jensen: Htjeslerets arbejdsform, 
(The Supreme Court's Method of Work], Scernummer af UfR i ardedmng a f Hcj ester els 325 
irs  jubilceum, Copenhagen (1986), pp. 115 ff., at p. 141.
17 (... vil der v*re en naturlig tilbejelighed til at forsti en lov som opfyldende vore 
folkeretlige pitagne forpligtelser fremfor at forsti dem som vaerende i strid med dem.)
'* Cf. Jörgen Trolle: Forfatterret - Kunstnerret - Fjemsynets ret, [Copyright - Artistic 
Copyright - The Television's Right], UfR 1975 B, pp. 108 ft., at p. 112.
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in the travaux préparatoires was considered by the Ostre Landsret a clear 
indication that the Legislature did not want to incorporate the CMR Conven­
tion completely (for the time being) into domestic law (see infra section 6.2). 
However, this decision appears to be the only Scandinavian example of a 
case in which a court has found that it was clearly indicated that a conflict 
between a treaty and the statute incorporating it into domestic law was 
intended. Although this statement in the travaux préparatoires was not that 
clear regarding the Legislature’s intention not to incorporate the Convention 
completely, it may on the basis of this judgment, in conjunction with the 
subsequent UfR 1990.13 (see infra section 8.4), be concluded that it shall 
appear clearly in unambiguous terms from the travaux préparatoires that the 
Legislature did not want to incorporate the treaty completely if the courts are 
to consider it clearly indicated that this is the case.
The H0jesteret’s in the HT Case in UfR 1986.898 concerned a case in 
which only a part of the ECHR had been incorporated into domestic Danish 
law. The plaintiffs in the case were eight bus drivers who had resigned from 
their trade unions. These resignations had caused extensive work stoppages 
and boycotts. Consequently, the Metropolitan Council dismissed the drivers, 
although a statute prohibiting dismissals on the basis of membership of an 
association was in force when the drivers were dismissed. As a consequence 
of the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights in the British Rail 
Case,19 this statute had been enacted in order to fulfil Denmark's obligations 
under the Convention. The plaintiffs argued that the dismissals were not only 
contrary to the Act but also to Article 11 of the Convention.
On the relationship to the Convention the H0jesteret stated:
"The invoked provision in Article 11 of the Human Rights Convention cannot be 
applied directly, but the judgment of the dismissals should be carried out on the basis 
of Act No. 285 of 9 June 1982 on Protection Against Dismissal on the Grounds of 
Association Relations, which was passed in order to fulfil Denmark's obligations 
under Article 11 of the Convention’’ (emphasis added).20
Then, it was stated that the dismissals were contrary to the domestic statute
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” Cf. Eur. Court H.R., Case o f Young, James and Webster, Series A. Vol. 44 (1981).
10 [Den piberibte bestemmelse i Menneskerettighedskonveimonens art 11 kan ikke 
anvendes direkte, men bedommelsen af afskedigelseme mâ ske efter lov nr. 285 af 9. juni 
1982 om beskyttelse mod afskedigelse p i gnmd foreningsforhold, der blev vcd taget for at op- 
fylde Danmarks forpiigtelser efter konventionens art 11.]
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and the plaintiffs were awarded damages, since the statute did not provide for 
reinstatement.
In an extrajudicial comment on the judgment Justice Erik Riis discussed 
the application of the Convention in the case:21
"The H0jesteret did not find that the European Convention on Human Rights was 
directly applicable in this case. It is probably very doubtful whether significance can 
be ascribed to a convention that is even older than the 1953 Constitution in the 
laying down of the contents of the Constitution. To this must be added that Act No. 
285 of 9 June 1982 on Protection against Dismissals on the Grounds of Association 
Relations was passed in order to fulfil Denmark's obligations under Article 11 of the 
Convention. This statute was not found to leave any doubt which could be clarified 
by reference to the Human Rights Convention" (emphasis added).2223
21 Cf. Erik Riis: Offentlige myndigheders afskedigelse af uorganiserede chaufffirer, [Public 
Authorities’ Dismissals of Non-Unionized Drivers], UfR 1987 B, pp. 50 ff., at p. 54.
22 [Hdjesteret fandt ikke, at den europziske menneskerettighedskonvention kunne anvendes 
direkte i denne sag. Det er vist yderst tvivlsomt, om en konvention, der endda er aeldre end 
emndloven fra 1953, kan tillaegees betydning ved fastlaeggelsen af indholdet af forfatningen. 
Hertil kom, at lov nr. 285 af 9. juni 1982 om beskyttelse mod afskedigelse pA grund af 
foreningsforhold blev vedtaget for at opfylde konvendonens artikel 11. Denne lov fandtes ikke 
at efterlade tvivl, som menneskerettignedskonventionen kunne bidrage til aiklaring af.]
23 Erik Riis, op.ciL, p. 54, stated in more general terms regarding the position of interna­
tional law in domestic Danish law: ’The European Convention on Human Rights is a treaty 
which the Danish Government under the rules of international law is obliged to observe and 
fulfil. It is, however, not by a general statute transformed to form a part of the law applicable 
in this country. The significance of the Convention on the laying down of the law applicable 
in this country is, accordingly (...] as a starting point solely that the domestic law, if it is 
ambiguous, shall be interpreted in the way which best brings it into line with international law. 
and that the courts by and large must be entitled to assume that it has not been the intention 
of the Government and the Folketing to lay down rules which would be contrary to Denmark's 
international obligations and hence to entail the State’s responsibility under international law.
In a recent article Professor Claus Gulmann has put forward the view that "... these legal 
writers [in favour of regarding international law as a source of law in domestic law] reveal, 
in my opinion, a correct tendency to give also non-incorporated treaties a stronger position in 
Danish law than the one which possiblv follows from a strict application of the criteria men­
tioned by Erik RiisM, cf. Gulmann (1988), p. 288.
[Den europaeiske menneskerettighedskonvention er en traktat, som den danske regering efter 
folkerettens regler er forpligtet til at overholde oe opfylde. Den er imidlertid ikke ved generel 
lov transformer« til at udgore en bestanddel af den her i landet gsldende nationale reL Kon- 
ventionens betydning ved fastlaeggelsen af den her i landet gaeldende nationale ret er herefter... 
som udgangspunkt alene, at den nationale ret ret, hvis den er tvetydig, skal fortoikes pA den 
mAde, der bedst bringer den i overenstemmelse med folkeretten, og at domstolene i det hele 
taget mA vaere berettigede til at antage, at det ikke kan have vaeret regerings og folketingets 
hensigt at fasts*tte regler, der ville stride mod Danmarks intemationale forpligtelser og 
dermed pAfore staten et folkeretligt ansvar.]
[Der er hos flere af forfatteme en, efter min mening, rigtig tendens til at give ogsA ikke- 
incorporerede traktater en stacrkere stilling i dansk ret end den, der mAske falger af en strikt 
anvendelse af de kriterier, som nacvnes af Erik Riis.]
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Thus, it seems that the H0jesteret was of the opinion that the Act on Protec­
tion against Dismissals on the Grounds of Association Relations should be 
considered as a partial incorporation of the Convention into domestic law, 
and that there was no conflict between the Convention and the domestic sta­
tute.24 Since it was found that this statute did not give rise to any doubt as 
to its interpretation, strictly speaking it is only natural that the decision 
should have been based on the domestic legal rule, insofar as it was not 
assumed that the domestic provision was contrary to the Convention.25
The case was later brought before the European Commission of Human Rights which 
declared it inadmissable because the bus drivers could not be regarded as "victims" 
within the meaning of the Convention.26 This was the case both in relation to the 
claim for reinstatement and the claim for greater damages. On the one hand, the 
Commission considered the possibility of obtaining damages in certain cases as an 
effective remedy against an infringement of the individual's rights under the 
Convention. On the other hand, the Commission insisted that damages are not always 
a sufficient remedy if the Member States have not taken proper measures in order 
to fulfil its obligations under the Convention. Since the available circumstances made 
it unlikely that it was general practice that public authorities disregard their 
obligations under the Act on Protection against Dismissals on the Grounds of Asso­
ciation Relations and solely pay damages, the Commission found that Denmark had 
adopted proper measures to fiilfil its obligations under Article 11 of the Convention.
Erik Riis’ statement that "... it is probably very doubtful whether significance 
can be ascribed to a convention that is even older than the 1953 Constitution 
in the laying down of the contents of the Constitution” does not reflect the 
general conception of law in this field, nor is it supported by judicial prac­
tice. Thus this view seems, as the Director of the Danish Center of Human 
Rights Lars Adam Rehof, has put it "... to presuppose a new variant of the 
rule of interpretation, according to which this rule should not be applicable 
to constitutional provisions or other rules of a constitutional character".272*
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* Cf. Peter Germer Indledning til folkeretten [Introduction to Public International Law], 
Copenhagen (1989), p 67.
15 Frederik Harhoff, op.cit., p. 82, criticizes the decision strongly for not taking the 
Convention properly into account.
“  Application No. 12719/1987.
v  [Synspunktet synes at forudsætte en ny variant af fortolkningsreglen, hvorefter denne 
regel ikke skulle kurtne finde anvendeise p i grundlovsbestenunelser eller andre regler af forfat- 
ningsmxssig karakter.]
“  Cf. Lars Adam Rehof: Afskedigelse som menneskerettighedsproblem [Dismissal as
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It was hardly the intention of the fathers of the 1953 amendment of the 
Danish Constitution that the Constitution in Denmark, "which" - as 
emphasized by the Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Folketing in connection 
with obtaining the consent of the Folketing to the ratification for the Conven­
tion - "so clearly professes the principles of which the Convention is the 
expression", should deviate from the Convention.29 Besides, in this case 
there was no conflict between the Convention and the Constitution. Finally, 
Erik Riis’ view is in clear contrast to the Norwegian H0yesterett's judgment 
in NRL 1966.935 (see infra section 8.4) and the Swedish Hôgsta Domstolen’s 
judgment in NJA 1981.1205 (see infra section 7.2) and NJA 1989.131 (see 
infra section 8.3) in which it was stated that the Convention is an important 
means of interpretation of the national constitutions.
5.2.2. incorporation through Administrative Action.
In some cases it is not necessary to incorporate treaties by passing legislation; 
the incorporation can be carried out solely by an administrative act. This can 
be possible due to already existing statutory authorization in which the 
administration is empowered to conclude treaties and to incorporate them into 
domestic law by issuing administrative regulations. In other cases the autho­
rization is provided for directly in the government prerogatives listed in the 
Constitution. Should divergences or conflicts between the treaty and the ad­
ministrative regulations emerge, they must be solved on the basis of the prin­
ciples relating to the cases in which the treaty is incorporated into domestic 
law by statute. The arguments outlined above have the same validity in 
relation to incorporation through an administrative act as through legislation.
This view is clearly expressed in a Danish High Court decision in UfR 1970.885 in 
which the defendant argued that an administrative regulation, issued pursuant to 
authorization in a statute which incorporated binding resolutions of the United 
Nation’s Security Council concerning economic sanctions against Rhodesia, did not 
have the sufficient statutory authority. The Court turned down this view stating that, 
through its membership of the United Nations, Denmark was obliged to follow the 
binding resolutions of the Security Council and, since the regulation was based on 
such a binding resolution, it must be considered applicable.
In chapter 9, it will be discussed whether, and if so, to what extent and in
Human Rights Problem], UfR B 1987, pp. 193 ff., at p. 197.
29 Cf. RT 1952-53, Folketinget, col. 1389.
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what situations administrative authorities not only may, but also should 
include treaties (international law) in the exercise of their discretionary 
powers.
5.23. Tentative Conclusions.
When a treaty is incorporated into domestic law by being reformulated in a 
statute, the treaty itself is an important factor in the interpretation of the 
statute, unless it is clearly indicated that the Legislature has deliberately 
intended not to incorporate the treaty completely. This appears clearly from 
a number of Danish cases. Although this question is not seen to have 
appeared before Norwegian and Swedish courts, there can be no doubt that 
these courts will follow the line laid down by the Danish courts in this field. 
It is especially in this context that the principle o f presumption is applicable. 
The travaux préparatoires of statutes, generally speaking, have a very strong 
and a more or less similar impact on the interpretation of statutes in the 
Scandinavian countries. This applies also to treaties which are incorporated 
into domestic law by an administrative act: they should be regarded as an 
important part of the travaux préparatoires, not only of the regulation itself, 
but also of the statute which empowers the administration to issue the regu­
lation. The same must be assumed to apply to administrative regulations 
which are issued with the authorization of a Government prerogative as stated 
in the Constitution.30
However, this applies not only to treaties. In Scandinavian law the 
travaux préparatoires of a statute carry considerable weight, especially if the 
wording of the provisions is unclear and ambiguous.31 But it is even 
possible to find examples in which the Danish H0jesteret has overridden 
even clear provisions in a statute.32 From the cases discussed in this section 
it is difficult to conclude whether or not the treaties which have been incor-
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30 On this type of administrative regulation as a means of incorporating treaties, see 
Espersen (1970), pp. 217 ff.
31 In one of the most recent Scandinavian work on the sources of law, W.E. von Eyben 
(ed.): Juridisk Grundbog [Legal Fundamental Book], 4th edition, Copenhagen (1988), Vol. 1. 
p. 14, it is stated as regards Danish law that "if one purely statistically wants to illustrate the 
significance of the different sources of law, in recent time there is no doubt that the travaux 
préparatoires of statutes, the motives, occupy the first position."
[Hvis man rent statistisk vil illustrere betydningen af de forskellige retskilder, er der i nutiden 
nzppe tvivl om, at lovbestemmelsemes forhistorie, motiverne, indtager en forste plads.]
11 See, for instance, Preben Sluer Lauridsen, op.cit.
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porated into domestic law by a specific act have played a more prominent 
part in the interpretation of domestic law than travaux préparatoires do in 
relation to the application of "pure" domestic law.
Tentative Conclusions
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CHAPTER 6
Conflicts between the European Convention and 
Domestic Law before Domestic Courts
6.1. Introduction.
As was seen in chapter 3, the ECHR has been passively incorporated into 
domestic Scandinavian law, i.e. the Convention does not possess the status 
of domestic law. Thus one might think that the number of cases in which a 
conflict between the Convention and domestic law have arisen would be 
overwhelming, but these have actually been surprisingly low if one considers 
that the Convention does not enjoy formal domestic status.1 However, in 
several cases brought before the European Commission the Convention has 
not been invoked before the domestic courts.2
Furthermore, in spite of the "dualist" point of departure governing the 
application of international law in domestic law, laid down in the principle 
o f the supremacy o f domestic law, in Scandinavian law hardly any cases exist 
in which it is clearly held that, in the case of a conflict between the ECHR 
and domestic law, precedence should be given to domestic law. Similarly, as 
regards treaties other than the ECHR, in recent times only a few existing 
reported judgments can be viewed as examples of cases in which the 
domestic rule, in conflict with a treaty provision, prevailed over the treaty 
provision. However, some Swedish decisions from the 1970’s contain state­
ments which have subsequently been viewed as a judicial affirmation of the 
so-called transformation theory or even as constitutional of this theory.3 It 
shall, however, be argued, that these cases provide less authorization for the 
transformation theory than what is usually assumed in legal writings.
It follows from this practice that a preliminary, but not less important, 
question in this context is under what circumstances the courts establish that 
there is a conflict between the treaty provision and domestic law? Is it
' Justice Frants Thygesen: Bestand und Bedeutung der Grundrechte. EuGRZ 1978, p. 440, 
has explained this scarcity of cases involving human rights with the existence of the 
Ombudsmen in Scandinavia: "Er führt im Aufträge des Parlaments die Aufsicht über die Be­
hörden um zu sichern, dass die Grundsätze der gesetzmässigen Verwaltung befolgt werden."
2 Cf. Sztucki (1986), p. 225.
3 See Sundberg (1988/2), p. 411.
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possible to point at some criteria which the courts apply when deciding 
whether or not there is a conflict between the ECHR and domestic law in the 
case at issue.
In order to attempt to answer these questions, in this chapter the cases in 
which (1) the courts have established that in the case at issue there is a 
conflict between the ECHR and domestic law and, on the other hand, (2) 
cases in which the courts have explicitly stated that there exists no such 
conflict will be analyzed. Between these two extremities there is, of course, 
a middle ground in which the courts apply the Convention as a means of 
interpretation or directly (under the presumption that the Legislature did not 
want to legislate contrary to the Convention had it been aware of the 
divergence or conflict). The latter situations will be discussed in chapters 7 
and 8.
The aim of this analysis is threefold. First, in section the extent to which 
the courts have in fact let domestic law prevail over the ECHR and other 
treaties in their case-law will be described. To what extent does court practice 
reflect the traditional "dualist" view on the relationship between treaties and 
domestic law laid down in the principle o f the supremacy o f domestic law or
- in Swedish terminology - the transformation theory? Second, in section 6.3, 
the case-law at the opposite end of the scale where the courts have explicitly 
stated that, in their view, there is no conflict between the ECHR and 
domestic law in the case at issue will be examined and discussed. In other 
words, what is implied in ascertaining that no conflict exists between the 
ECHR and domestic law? Is such ascertainment just a way of avoiding taking 
a stand on how a conflict between the Convention and domestic law should 
be resolved, or is it in itself a direct application of the Convention in 
domestic law? Third, in section 6.4, on the basis of the available case-law 
regarding the extremities in this context, it will be considered whether the 
available case-law provides a sufficient basis for formulating some general 
criteria governing, or at least influencing, the courts’ decisions in establishing 
whether or not there is a conflict between the ECHR and domestic law.
6.2. Establishing a Conflict between the European Convention and 
Domestic Law: Domestic Law prevails.
UfR 1974.263 is an example of a case in which it was considered clearly 
indicated that the Legislature did not want to implement the provisions of a 
treaty completely into domestic law. In the case at issue the question was
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whether a claim for the damage of goods should be judged on the basis of 
section 65 of the Danish Road Traffic Act or on the basis of a more recent 
provision of the CMR Act (Act No. 47 of 10 March 1965). In the travaux 
préparatoires of the relevant section of the CMR Act, attention had been paid 
to the fact that fulfilment of the CMR Convention would require an a- 
mendment to section 65 of the Road Traffic Act. A provision relating to this 
in the draft bill was omitted when the bill was introduced because, as it is 
said in the explanatory memorandom accompanying the bill, "... this provi­
sion rightly belongs under the Road Traffic Act and will be included in a 
subsequent amendment of this Act"4.
The 0stre Landsret stated that it was not sufficiently clear from the 
genesis o f the CMR Act that the implementation of this statute meant that the 
provisions in section 65 of the Road Traffic Act should cease to apply to the 
liability of the carrier. Accordingly, the case was decided on the basis of 
section 65 in the Road Traffic Act.
The decision is remarkable, since it appears to be the only recent case in 
which a Danish court has explicitly acknowledged the existence o f a conflict 
between a treaty and a domestic Danish provision.5 The High Court chose 
to resolve the conflict in favour of the domestic provision which, in view of 
the travaux préparatoires of the CMR Act, hardly comes as a surprise. Had 
the provision in the CMR Act been applied, the provision in section 65 of the 
Road Traffic Act would have been deprived of its real substance as regards 
international road transport.6 On the other hand, the Government had 
announced that it would try to bring the domestic legislation into line with 
the CMR Convention. Thus, one could claim that there was a real presump­
tion that the Legislature would not legislate in a manner that was contrary to 
the CMR Convention. This may be interpreted as meaning that the rule of 
presumption is not applicable in cases where the international rule would 
infringe upon a contemplated reformulation of it in a domestic statute.7
In the HT Case in UfR 1986.898 (see supra section 5.2) the H0jesteret 
did not find that the Act on Protection against Dismissals on the Grounds of
Establishing a Conflict: Domestic Law prevails
4 Cf. FT 1964/65. Tiling A. col. 839.
5 Cf. Gulmann (1987), p. 33.
‘ See Madsen (1986). pp. 39 f.
7 Cf. Zahle (1989), Vol. 2. p. 98.
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Association Relations was contrary to the ECHR, but stated nevertheless that 
the Convention could not be applied directly.
Against this background, it is remarkable that the Hfijesteret - as an 
obiter dictum - should refuse to review the compatibility of the domestic rule 
with the Convention in such relatively strong terms. The case did not give 
rise to any such statement. The Danish H0jesteret has traditionally avoided 
making such strong statements on matters to which the case at issue did not 
give rise.* It is obvious that this decision showed that the H0jesteret sought 
to avoid being involved in the political dispute raging at that time, partly on 
the passing of the Act on Protection against Dismissals on the Grounds of 
Association Relations and partly on the very delicate question of freedom of 
association in the Danish labour market. Thus the H0jesteret might have felt 
a strong need to emphasize that its decision was based solely on a domestic 
Danish provision. This is confirmed by the fact that in subsequent cases the 
Court has once more discussed the compatibility of domestic law with the 
Convention. Accordingly, this judgment certainly cannot be regarded as a 
precedent for the principle o f the supremacy o f domestic law.9
In a ruling of 1 November 198910 the 0stre Landsret held:
"Provisions of an international convention to which Denmark has acceeded is not in 
itself part of valid Danish law, unless similar rules are found in Danish law or can 
be construed to be included herein. The question concerning the continued upholding 
of the Danish detention on remand should therefore be decided according to the rules 
of the Administration of Justice Act hereon..."11
However, in its concrete application of the law the Court discussed the com­
patibility of the Convention with domestic law, and the Court reached the 
conclusion that there was no conflict between the Convention and upholding 
detention on remand, i.e. the Court’s general statement on the application of 
the Convention in domestic Danish law is an obiter dictum. It should be
'  See Torben Jensen: Domstolenes retsskabtnde, retsudfyldende og responderende 
virksomhed, [The Courts’ Law-Making, Law-Interpreting and Opinion-Giving Activity], UfR 
1990 B, pp. 441 ff„ at p. 443.
’ Cf. Zahle (1989), Vol. 3. pp. 236 f.
10 Case No. 17. afd. kasre nr. 406/1989.
11 [Bestemmelser i en af Danmark tilträdt international konvention er ikke i sig selv 
bestanddele af gzldende dansk ret, medmindre tilsvarende regier findes i dansk ret eller kan 
indfortolkes hen. Spwgsm&let om fortsat opretholdelse af den danske varetzgtsfxngsling 
findes derfor at mitte afgeres efter retsplejelovens regier herom.]
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noted that the very same day the Hfijesteret decided the case in UfR 1990.13 
(see infra section 8.4) in which it came the opposite result and accorded 
considerable significance to the Convention.
There exist no Norwegian decisions in which the courts have suggested 
that the ECHR, when conflicting with domestic law, should yield.12The 
H0yesterett’s decision in NRt. 1957.942 seems to be the only Norwegian case 
in which it was held that domestic law should prevail over international 
law.13 An elderly German was engaged in carrying freight in a small vessel 
he owned. During the war his home was bombed and he took the remainder 
of his possessions on board his vessel. At the time of surrender in 1945 he 
was transporting coal along the Norwegian coast. After the surrendering he 
continued his transport activities in obedience to orders from the allied autho­
rities. But in May 1946 the vessel was seized, the German and his wife 
forcibly removed and sent to Germany, allowed to take with them nothing 
but the clothes they were wearing. The man later brought a suit against the 
Norwegian State and, inter alia, claimed compensation for the chattels on 
board, including things like clothes, toilet articles, ordinary equipment, 
kitchen utensils, etc. The appropriation had been carried out in accordance 
with the Norwegian statute relating to enemy property, in which its definition 
of enemy property included with no possible exceptions chattels found in the 
Realm.
Both the Byret and a majority in the Lagmannsrett therefore found that 
they could not not go beyond the clear provisions of the statute, but stated 
that it was desirable that the German should be indemnified by an ex gratia 
compensation for at least part of the loss. However, a single judge in the 
Lagmannsrett dissented. He first discussed the problem in relation to interna­
tional law and found on the basis of an interpretation of the Regulations of 
Land-Warfare that the appropriation of the chattels was contrary to inter­
national law. He went on to discuss whether it was possible to subject the 
wording of the statute to certain general limitations the the aim of the statute. 
He found, however, that he must reject this approach. But he then continued:
"When, nevertheless, I remain of the opinion that the appropriation of Koppelmann’s 
chattels was not lawfully autorized, it is for the following considerations:
It seems to me a debasement of our Western culture that when recognized rules
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11 See Smith (1980), p. 310.
'* The case is discussed by Fleischer (1984), pp. 254 f.; Smith (1962), pp. 200 f.; Smith 
(1968), pp. 186 ff.; and Smith & Smith (1982), pp. 142 ff.
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of international law adopted with binding force in a convention are put to the test, 
they are swept aside as mere paper provisions. The courts must be especially on their 
guard in the extreme exceptional cases in which the result would be particularly 
unjust and objectionable • in order to safeguard as far as possible the cultural values 
that should be gained."14
The Hcyesterett found, however, the wording of the statute conclusive, 
associating itself at the same time with the recommendation of an ex gratia 
indemnification.
Compared to the Hfiyesterett's decisions in other cases deriving from the 
purge after the German occupation, the reasoning in this case is somewhat 
restricted vis-à-vis the application of international law.15 In particular, 
because one is here outside the scope of the principle o f legality, an applica­
tion of international law in favour of the German in such a way that the State 
should not have appropriated his chattels would not have violated the 
principle o f legality}6 Given this lack of openness vis-à-vis international 
law. Professor Carsten Smith characterizes it as a “somewhat disappointing 
judgment".17
It cannot therefore be maintained, as a consequence of the practice laid 
down after the two world wars, that the Regulations of Land-Warfare offer 
any general protection to private enemy property in a hostile country.1* The 
appropriation in the case in question was more or less total, and in this case 
the courts seem at any rate to have gone to as far as possible in relation to 
what may be considered lawful under international law.19 Therefore, it is 
reasonable to wonder why in this particular case the courts found themselves 
unable to depart from the wording of the domestic statute, since (1) the 
outcome would give rise to grave doubts as to its lawfulness under intema-
14 Here cited in English from Smith (1968), p. 187.
15 However, two exceptions from the general open attitude vis-à-vis international law 
which in general characterizes the cases deriving from the German occupation are the 
judgments in NRt 1945.13 and NRt. 1945.232. In these decisions one can find statements 
which may be viewed as suppon for the principle o f the supremacy of domestic law, but these 
statements do not seem to have been decisive for the conclusions reached.
'* Cf. Fleischer (1984), p. 255.
17 Cf. Smith (1968), p. 187.
'* Ibid.; and Smith (1962), p. 201.
19 Helgesen (1982), pp. 43 f„ expresses doubts as to whether the decision could be 
regarded as one in which the H ty  ester ell let domestic law prevail over international law.
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tionai law; (2) the courts themselves found the result so unjust and objec­
tionable that they recommanded an ex gratia payment; and (3) in this claim 
the courts were indeed confronted with an exceptional case, since it was 
almost accidental that these articles were in Norway rather than in Germany.
In the Case o f Swedish Engine Drivers’ Union™ the Swedish Engine 
Drivers’ Union claimed that the Swedish National Collective Bargaining 
Office, by refusing to conclude a new collective agreement with it, had not 
only violated certain sections of a 1936 Act regarding the right to organize 
and to negotiate, but also a number of international conventions including 
Articles 11, 13 and 14 of the ECHR. Arbetsdomstolen [the Labour Court] re­
jected this view. As regards the application of the invoked treaty provisions, 
the Court stated:
"With specific regard to the provisions of international agreements as touched upon 
earlier, it is the accepted view in Sweden that such provisions - insofar as they do not 
already have their counterparts in our legislation or customary law - do not become 
applicable Swedish law except through the medium of legislation. They can, however, 
clarify the meaning of laws enacted in Sweden, which must be assumed to be in 
conformity with Sweden's international undertakings. However, the submissions made 
in the case in this respect do not in any way cause the Labour Court to change its 
judgment of the question in dispute between the parties."21
Arbetsdomstolen’s statements give rise to a number of questions as to its 
general interpretation of the law as well as its concrete application of it in the 
case at issue.
First, it seems as if the Court simply affirmed the transformation theory, 
but the reference to this as "the accepted view in Sweden" at that time is not 
convincing. In that period Swedish legal scholars were - and indeed to some 
extent still are - divided on the question of whether incorporation was needed 
before treaties could be applied in domestic law. The transformation theory 
first established itself as the prevailing view only subsequendy, inter alia, as 
a consequence of Arbetsdomstolen’s decision in this case. Moreover, it was 
formerly the view that treaties were directly applicable in domestic Swedish
Establishing a Conflict: Domestic Law prevails
“  Reported in AD 1972. No. 5. The case is discussed by Almering (1973), pp. 786 f.; 
Danelius (1984), p. 56; MalmlSf & Mellqvist (1982), pp. 47 ff.; Sundberg (1988), p. 200; 
Sundberg (1988/2), p. 411; and Szlucki (1986), p. 226.
21 Here cited in English from Drzemczewski (1983), p. 139.
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law.22
Second, the Court’s statement th a t"... the submissions made in the case 
in this respect do not in any way cause the Labour Court to change its 
judgment...” indicates, on the other hand, that the Court in fact reviewed the 
compatibility of the invoked international conventions with domestic Swedish 
law.23
Third, the Court affirmed the principle o f presumption since, as it is 
stated in the judgment, international conventions "... can [...] clarify the 
meaning of laws enacted in Sweden, which must be assumed to be in 
conformity with Sweden’s international undertakings.”
Fourth, to the extent that this decision is viewed as authority for the 
transformation theory, it may further be questioned whether a decision from 
Arbetsdomstolen has any value as a precedent, insofar as the decision 
concerns a question which lies outside its competence proper. Although the 
stare decisis doctrine is not formally recognized in Scandinavian law, 
decisions from the highest instances are nevertheless regarded as having a 
considerable value as precedents. Arbetsdomstolan has only subject-matter 
jurisdiction in cases concerning labour law in which cases the ordinary 
courts, on the contrary, have no subject-matter jurisdiction. Since Arbetsdom­
stolen is thus not part of the normal court hierarchy, it is probably fair to 
assume that it cannot create precedents outside the field of labour law, i.e. its 
judgments cannot be precedents for the ordinary courts.24 A further proof 
of this is that Regeringsrdtten in rA  1974.121 (see infra) only referred to
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a  Cf. SOU 1974: 100, p. 45 note 1, and Espersen (1968), pp. 260 f. See also the 
permanent under-secretary’s statement in the explanatory memorandum accompanying a Bill 
on certain restrictions of the application of Swedish law and the authority of Swedish courts, 
in which it was stated: "That agreements on these parts has not been reflected in specific 
legislative measures must be explained by the fact that the agreements as such at the time of 
their origin were considered part of the legal regulation within the Realm. In this way of 
looking at things, the restriction on the application of Swedish law and the authority of the 
Swedish courts, which the immunity constitutes, should apply - and still exists • without the 
support of any other enactments than the provisions of the agreement", cf. Riksdagen. Propo­
sition 1964:90.
[Att dverenskommelser i dessa delar ej kommit att iterspeglas i s&skilda lagstiftingsltgarder 
m&ste foklaras med att ttverenskommelsema sAsom sidana vid tiden for deras tillkomst ansetts 
bli en del av den legala regleringen i riket. Med dette betraktelsesdtt skulle den inskr&ikning
i svensk lags tillamplighed och svensk domstols behorighei som immuniteten utgor gall a - och 
alltjamt besti - utan stfid an andra stadgan in fttrskriftema i dverenskommelsen.]
B Cf. Almering (1973), pp. 786 f.; and Malmlfif & Mellqvist (1982), p. 48 note 88.
24 Cf. Malmlfif & Mellqvist (1982), pp. 48 f.
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Hogsta Domstolen’s judgment in NJA 1973.423. Thus, Regeringsratten 
apparently did not consider Arbetsdomstolen’ decision a precedent.
Thus, both the transformation theory and the principle o f presumption 
were, in general statements, emphasized by Arbetsdomstolen. However, in its 
concrete application of the law, the Court did not act in accordance with its 
general statements on the transformation theory, since it in fact reviewed the 
compatability of the invoked conventions with domestic law, i.e. these 
general statements appear to be an obiter dictum.
The case was later brought before the European Court of Human Rights which 
(apparently) found Arbetsdomstolen's argumentation in conformity with the Conven­
tion. The Court referred to the above-cited statement and declared that ”... a reading 
of the judgment of 18 February 1972 reveals that the Labour Court carefully ex­
amined the complaints brought before it in the light of legislation in force and not 
without taking into account Sweden's international undertakings".23
In the Sandstrom Case in NJA 1973.423 Hogsta Domstolen held that a 
retroactive clause in a collective agreement was not improper or unfair either 
in itself or in its specific application to the plaintiff.26 This case concerned 
the legal validity and effect of a clause which was included in a collective 
agreement between the National Collective Bargaining Office and four 
federations of trade unions representing state employees, and which stipulated 
that increased salaries were not to be given retrospectively to members of 
trade unions who had been on strike during a part of the period of negotia­
tions. Since the plaintiff was a member of a trade union which had been on 
strike and thus not a party to the agreement, he was not entitled to receive 
retroactive benefits in spite of the retroactivity clause provided in the 
collective agreement. Before the courts in all instances he made references 
to, inter alia, Articles 11,13 and 14 of the ECHR.
Under the proceedings the Government pleaded that "... even if the 
Articles of the European Convention [...] are found to form a directly 
applicable Swedish source of law, they should not, as it appears from their
Establishing a Conflict: Domestic Law prevails
25 Cf. Eur. Court H.R., Case o f Swedish Engine Drivers' Union, Series A, Vol. 20 (1976), 
para. 50. The case is discussed by Olaf Bergqvist: Sverige infor den europeiska domstolen i 
Strasbourg, [Sweden before the European Court in Strasoourg], SvJT 1976, pp. 399 ff.
24 The case is discussed by Almering (1973), pp. 787 f. (the Kammmarrdtt's judgment);
Danelius (1984), p. 55; Malmlof & Mellqvist (1982), p. 49 f.; Sundberg (1988). p. 200; Sund-
berg (1988/2), pp. 411 f.; and Sztucki (1986), p. 226.
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formulation, be considered applicable in this case".27 Thus, the Government 
did not exclude the possibility of the Convention being directly applicable in 
Swedish law, even if this did not necessarily affect the outcome.
The Tingsràtt did not discuss the impact on Swedish law on the conven­
tions referred to on Swedish law. The Hovrâtt expressed itself in accordance 
with Arbetsdomstolen in the above-discussed case, Le, it laid down that both 
the transformation theory and the principle o f presumption were part of 
Swedish law. As regards the latter, the Court stated:
"This does not exclude that convention provisions, above all with regard to the text 
of a ratified convention, can fill a gap in the domestic law. This appears particularly 
natural when, as is the case with the European Convention on Human Rights, Sweden 
has even acceeded to the Convention..." and recognized the competence of the Euro­
pean Court of Human Rights.28
The Hovrâtt did not find, however, that the said Articles of the ECHR should 
be interpreted as contended by Mr Sandstrôm and, consequently, there was 
no conflict between the Convention and Swedish law.29 Hôgsta Domstolen 
emphasized, on the other hand, only the requirement of transformation:
"Even if Sweden had assented to an international agreement, this would not be 
applicable for the state within the existing application of the law. To the extent that 
the agreement gives expression to principles which have not earlier prevailed here 
in this country, corresponding legislation ("transformation") will be necessary. Such 
legislation had, however, not been considered necessary when Sweden ratified the 
agreements referred to by Mr. Sandstrûm. In that respect it should be noticed, that 
these agreements cannot be considered as having the content to which Mr. Sandstrôm 
refers.
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27 [... även om aztiklama i Europakonventionen [...] finge anses utgöra en direkt tillämplig 
svensk rätskälla, skulle de för övrigt, sAsom fr am gär av deras lydelse icke äga tillämpning i 
förevarande fall.]
21 [Detta utesluter ej an konventionsbestemmeiser framföraltt dä dct gällar ratificerad 
konventionstext, kan verka tili uttfyllnad av den inhemska rätten. Säskilt framstär detta som 
naturligt när, sisom är fallet med Europaridets konvention ang&ende mänskliga rettighetema 
och de grundläggande frihetema, Sverige även biträtt konventionen.]
29 Almering (1973), p. 788, has pointed out that the Hovrätt's decision was based on an 
independent interpretation of the invoked Articles of the ECHR so that the plaintiff was not 
left in a suite of uncertainty as to what weight should be ascribed to the provisions of the 
invoked conventions. Moreover, Almering asserts that these provisions influenced the Court 
just as if they were domestic sources of law.
30 Here cited in English from Drzemczewski (1983), p. 140.
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Since the Hovratt had emphasized the principle o f presumption, Hogsta 
Domstolen's silence in this respect may be interpreted to mean that the Court 
dissociated itself from the Hovrdtt's view that this principle was part of 
Swedish law. This is, however, probably not the case since the question at 
issue could undoubtedly have been resolved without giving a general 
statement on the principle o f presumption. Similarly, it has been asserted that 
Hogsta Domstolen’s statement should be viewed as only concerning the 
direct application of the Convention, whereas the Hovrdtt's statement con­
cerned an indirect application of the Convention, i.e. the principle of 
presumption.3l
The argumentation in the cited passage of the judgment is, however, not 
consistent. On the one hand, the Court stressed that transformation is neces­
sary if a treaty is to have binding force in domestic law. On the other hand, 
it said that the invoked international agreements did not have the content 
which Mr Sandstrdm claimed, i.e. the Court - apparently after having re­
viewed the compatibility of the invoked provisions of the Convention with 
Swedish law - was of the opinion that there was no conflict between in­
ternational law and domestic Swedish law.32 In that case the emphasis on 
the need for transformation appears to be an obiter dictum, having therefore 
little value as a precedent. Similarly, Hogsta Domstolen’s possible dis­
sociation from the principle o f presumption also appears to be an obiter 
dictum.
Thus, neither this decision, nor the case of Swedish Engine Driver’s 
Union can be viewed as absolute support for the transformation theory,33
Regeringsrdtten’s decision in the Rdned Case in RA 1974.121 went one 
step further in its emphasis on the transformation t h e o r y The question 
before the Court was whether a municipal authority was under legal obliga­
tion to apply Article 2 of the First Protocol in a case in which the parents of 
a child had asked the local School Board to prohibit the display of posters 
containing any form of violence or sex.
Regeringsrdtten did not assume that such a legal obligation on ad-
Establishing a Conflict: Domestic Law prevails
51 Cf. Sundberg (1976), p. 506.
”  Cf. Rolf H. Lindholm: Manskliga rdttigheter i Sverige, (Human Rights in Sweden], 
SvJT 1987, pp. 12 ff.. at p. 16; Malmiflf & Mellqvist (1982), p. 50; and Melander (1984), p. 
67.
>J Ibid., at p. 48.
34 The case is discussed by Danelius (1984), pp. 55 f.; Malmlof & Mellqvist (1982), pp.
50 ff.; Sundberg (1988), p. 201; Sundberg (1988/2), p. 412; and Sztucki (1986). p. 226.
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ministrative authorities existed:
"An international treaty to which Sweden has acceded is not directly applicable in the 
domestic application of justice in our country, but the legal principles which have 
been expressed in the treaty must, if required, be included in a corresponding 
Swedish law (transformation) before they become applicable law in Sweden. No 
transformation law corresponding to Article 2 of the Additional Protocol of 20 March 
1952, to the Convention of the Council of Europe for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms has been enacted. Consequently no obligation has 
been created for the School Board to observe the rules of the Additional Protocol in 
its activities."35
The decision thus went as far as to suggest that administrative authorities 
should not be under legal obligation to exercise their powers with respect to 
Sweden's international undertakings, and it should undoubtedly be viewed as 
a judicial affirmation of the transformation theory?6 It was subsequently 
heavily criticized in legal writings. Thus, Professor Jerry Sztucki charac­
terized the decision as "unique in its apparant indifference to the substance 
of the Convention";37 Professor Lars Hjerner added that "... statements of 
the kind made in the Rine& Case (RA 1974.121) are, contrariwise, only likely 
to cause annoyance and should therefore be avoided”;3839 and Professor 
Jacob W.F. Sundberg called the decision an "error of judgment''.40
The very sharp criticism to which this decision was subsequently sub­
jected seems, as will be seen in the following chapters, to have made the 
Swedish courts rethink their attitude vis-d-vis the Convention.41
35 Here cited in English from Sundberg (1988), p. 201.
* Cf. Rolf H. Lindholm, op.cit, p. 16; and Malmltff & MeUqvist (1982), p. 54.
57 Cf. Sztucki (1986), p. 227.
* [Uttalanden som det i R&ne&fallet (RA 1974.121) kan d&remot biott vicka fbrargelse 
och borde cUrfar undvikas.)
39 Cf. Hilding Eek. Ove Bring & Lars Hjerner. Foikrdtten [The Public International Law], 
4th edition, Stockholm (1984), p. 261.
40 Cf. Sundberg (1976), p. 506 note 44.
41 However, in Bostadsdomstolen's [the Housing and Tenancy Court's] judgment of 2 
April 1984 (Case No. BD 547/83-04) it was decided to reject postponement of the decision 
or the case until the European Commission and Court of Human Rights had decided whether 
or not the Convention had been violated on previous stages of the proceedings.
Moreover, from the European Court of Human Rigts* subsequent judgment in the case it 
appears that the applicant invoked Articles 6, 11 and 13 of the Convention before Bos­
tadsdomstolen [the Housing and Tenancy Court], cf. Eur. Court H.R.. Langborger Case, Series 
A, Vol. 155 (1989), para. 12. However, this does not appear from Bostadsdomstolen s [the
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6.3. Establishing that there is no Conflict between the European Conven­
tion and Domestic Law: follow the Line of least Resistance or apply the 
Convention directly?
In a number of cases it has been stated that, in the Court’s view, there was 
no conflict between the ECHR and the way in which domestic law was 
applied. However, the extent to which the courts have discussed the rela­
tionship between the Convention and domestic law varies from case to case. 
This is undoubtedly due to the fact that in some cases the question of the 
compatibility of domestic law with the Convention was only one among 
many questions in the case, whereas in some recent cases this issue has 
constituted the actual dispute in question.
In UfR 1986.1080 two accused were sentenced 4 and 7 years imprison­
ment by the 0stre Landsret, sitting with a jury, for, inter alia, attempted 
robbery. They pleaded before the H0jesteret to have the sentence rescinded 
and remitted for retrial because a reading of evidence before the High Court, 
which prior to the High Court hearing had been given in the K0benhavns 
Byret, was contrary to Article 6(3)(d) of the Convention. The evidence was 
read before the High Court because the witness had died before the hearing. 
The H0jesteret established that the reading of the evidence before the High 
Court could take place, inter alia, because the counsel for the defence had 
been present and had had the right to cross-examine the witness in the City 
Court, and that this was lawful under section 877(2)(3) of the Danish Ad­
ministration of Justice Act. Then, it was stated that "... Article 6(3)(d) o f the 
European Convention on Human Rights is not shown to have been encroac­
hed upon" (emphasis added).42
The case seems to be the first in which the Danish H0jesteret discussed 
the relationship between the Convention and domestic law explicidy. With 
this reference to the Convention, it must be presumed that the H0jesteret 
wished -to indicate that it had interpreted the Convention independently and 
then compared it with domestic Danish law. As mentioned earlier, the result 
was that it was not assumed that domestic law was incompatible with the 
Convention, but this is not the decisive point as regards the application of the 
Convention. Against this background, it is difficult to view the decision as
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Housing and Tenency Court's] own judgment in the case.
42 [... at Menneskerettighedskonveniionens artikel 6, stk. 3, litra d, ikke ses at v»re 
lilsidesai.)
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anything other than a direct application of the Convention.43 On the other 
hand, from the judgment nothing certain can be concluded on how the Court 
would have decided the case if it had assumed that there was a conflict
between domestic law and the Convention.
/
Moreover, the decision is a good illustration of the point that the doubts in domestic 
law which are presupposed in the rule of interpretation, is sometimes due solely to 
the existence of international law. The interpretation of the domestic provision left 
no doubt; it was quite clear that the conditions for reading the evidence before the 
Court as laid down in section 877(2)(3) of the Administration of Justice Act had 
been fulfilled, since the request concerned the reading out of the (courts’) records as 
well as the witness had died in the meantime. The doubt first emerged when the 
Convention was taken into account44
The willingness to review the compatibility of domestic law with the 
Convention was confirmed in UfR 1987.440, in which the H0jesteret's 
Interlocutory Appeals Committee confirmed a decision made by the President 
of the 0stre Landsret. In this case the President had assigned a counsel for 
the defence in a case where the accused himself had not been able to find a 
counsel who would plead the case within a reasonable time. Before the 
H0jesteret the accused pleaded to have the assignment rescinded with 
reference to Article 6 of the ECHR. In a statement submitted to the 
H0jesteret, the President of the 0stre Landsret stuck to his original decision 
and added that "... Article 6(3)(c) o f the European Convention on Human 
Rights cannot be considered infringed..."45 (emphasis added) since the two 
counsels assigned to the accused were counsels who had often been assigned 
to accused by the State from a list of legal aid counsels, and furthermore they 
were willing to take the case on. Thus, this case must also be considered as 
a direct application of the Convention in domestic Danish law.44 But again, 
it is difficult to say what the result would have been, had the Court found
°  Cf. Holst-Christensen (1989), p. 50; and AsbjBm Jensen: Incorporation o f the European 
Convention Seen from a Danish Point o f View in Rehof & Gulmann (1989), pp. 161 ff., at p. 
169.
44 Cf. Zahle (1989), Vol. 2, p. 97.
45 [... kan artikel 6. stk. 3, liera c, i Den europsiske Meimeskerettighedskonvention ikke 
anses for overtrâdt ved...]
44 Cf. Asbjotn Jensen, op.cit., p. 169.
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that there was a conflict between domestic law and the Convention.47
The Norwegian H0yesterett's decision in NRt. 1954.478 is to a large 
extent very expressive of the reasoning of the Norwegian courts in cases in 
which there is a potential conflict between international law and domestic 
Norwegian law. In the case, contrary to section 5a of the Norwegian Whaling 
Act, a whaler had participated in a Dutch whaling expedition in the South 
Seas. Section 5a of the Norwegian Whaling Act prohibited Norwegian 
nationals from participating, directly or indirectly, in the whaling industry 
under a foreign flag. Consequently, in the Byrett he was sentenced for 
violating the Whaling Act. Before the H0yesterett he pleaded that a literal 
interpretation of the Whaling Act would, inter alia, conflict with Norway’s 
international obligations vis-à-vis foreign states and especially the Nether­
lands. Justice Berger, speaking for a unanimous court on this point, discussed 
whether section 5a of the Whaling Act was contrary to international law but 
reached the conclusion that this was not the case. He continued "... (i]n my 
view, then, I do not need to deal with the question of the consequences of a 
statute being contrary to an obligation under international law."48
In an extrajudicial comment on another case Justice Gaarder, inter alia, 
referred to the decision in NRt. 1954.4784’ and to an article by Edvard 
Hambro in which it was pointed out that the H0yesterett in this judgment had 
embarked on discussing international law:30
"However, I would like to point out to Hambro that even when in this judgment the 
H0yesterett discussed Norway's obligations under a treaty and found that the Whaling 
Act was not contrary to such obligations, hardly proves more than under the 
circumstances this was the easiest conclusion to draw. The courts - as Ilium [a 
Danish professor of law] has expressed it - generally follow the line of least resis-
» „  _  ^  m5itance.
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47 Sec also Hillerpd Kriminalret’s judgment of 19 June 1989 (Case No. 236/1988) where 
Article 8 of the Convention not was found applicable.
41 [Jeg beh0ver etter mitt syn ikke ä komme inn pi sp0rsmilet om fclgeme av at en lov 
kommer i strid med en folkerettslig forpligtelse.]
49 Cf. Karsten Gaarder: Fra den norke H6yesteretts praksis i 1954, [From the Norwegian 
Supreme Court’s Practice in 1954], TfR 1955, p. 535.
50 Cf. Edvard Hambro: Folkerettsanvendelse ved norske domstoler, [The Application of 
International Law in Norwegian Courts], TfR 1955, pp. 48 ff., at p. 53.
51 [Jeg vil imidlertid til Hambro bemerke at när Hoyesteret i denne dom har draftet Norges
traktatmessige forpligtelser og fundet at hvalfangstloven ikke stred mot noen slike forpligtelser, 
ligger heri neppe mer enn at dette etter omstendigheteme var den snareste veien til resultatet.
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This is quite a remarkable statement. What Justice Gaarder is in fact saying 
is that it was easier to examine whether the disputed Norwegian statute was 
contrary to international law than to maintain that the Court at any rate 
should yield to Norwegian law, even though this is contrary to international 
law.52
The first Norwegian case explicitly involving the ECHR was the Iversen 
Case in NRt. 1961.1350, which concerned the question whether a provision 
of a provisional act on compulsory civilian service for dentists violated 
Article 4 of the Convention In the H0yesterett Justice Hiorthoy, speaking for 
the majority, ruled:
"It seems hardly doubtful to me that the prohibition in the Convention against 
subjecting anyone to perform "forced and compulsory labour" cannot reasonably be 
given such a wide construction that it includes instructions to perform public service 
of the kind in question here. The present case concerns brief, well-paid work in one’s 
own profession in immediate connection with completed professional training. Al­
though such injunctions may in many cases be in conflict with the interests of the 
individual as he sees them in the moment, I find it manifest that they cannot with 
any justification be characterized as an encroachment on. still less a violation of any 
human right Accordingly, as I cannot see that there is any contradiction between the 
Convention and the Norwegian act in question, I need not enter into the question as 
to which of these shall prevail in the event of conflict."”
Thus, the majority in the H0yesterett did not assume that there was any 
conflict between the Convention and domestic Norwegian law. Consequently, 
it did not need to consider how such a conflict should be solved.54 On the 
other hand, it should be observed that the H0yesterett here considered the 
Convention as an important source of law in domestic law.55
Similarly, in NRt. 1974.935 both the majority and the minority were, 
though on different premises, of the opinion that there was no conflict 
between the domestic provision and the Convention. The case concerned the
Domstolene plier jo - som Ilium har uttrykt det - gjeme 1 hoppe over der hvor gjerdet er 
lavest.]
”  Cf. Smith & Smith (1982), pp. 169 f.
55 Here cited in English from Drzemczewski (1983), p. 134.
54 The case was later brought before the European Commission of Human Rights 
(Application No. 1468/62) which declared it inadmissible since it was found to be manifestly 
ill-founded.
55 Cf. Trond Dolva: Internasjonale menneskerettighetskonvertsjoner og intern norsk rett. 
[International Human Rights Conventions and Domestic Norwegian Law], TfR 1990, p. 129.
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question whether a mental patient could be a litigant within criminal proce­
dure, or whether such a status belonged exclusively to the committee. The 
majority did not find that Article 6 of the Convention should be interpreted 
as pleaded by the plaintiff, and the minority was of the opinion that the 
domestic provision did not have the content which the State pleaded and, 
consequcndy, that there was no conflict with the Convention.
The compatibility of a provision of an act on pensions to seamen with 
Articles 14(7) and 26 of the UN-Covenant was discussed extensively by the 
H0yesterett in NRt. 1977.1207.54 The Seaman's Pension Act was passed in 
1948. Under the Act it was, as a general rule, possible to include terms of 
service prior to the adoption of the Act on the basis of which the pension 
was calculated. However, in section 23 of the Act it was laid down that this 
did not apply to seamen who had been convicted under the Norwegian 
legislation for collaborating with the enemy under the German occupation. 
In the case at issue, the plaintiff who had been convicted of violating of the 
legislation on collaborationism claimed that section 23 of the Seaman’s 
Pension Act was contrary to the said provisions of the UN-Covenant.
Neither the Byrett nor the H0yesterett found that there was any conflict 
between the domestic provision and the invoked articles of the Covenant. 
Justice Schweigaard Selmer, speaking for a unanimous court, explained:
"I do not find either that there is any conflict between section 23(1) of the Seaman’s 
Pension Act and the principles which are expressed in Article 14(7), laying down that 
no person shall be punished once more for the same count, and Article 26, laying 
down that the legislation shall prohibit any discrimination against, inter alia. 
"political or other views", of the UN’s Covenant of 19 December 1966, ratified by 
Norway on 13 September 1972, on Civil and Political Rights. The application of Ihe 
rule in section 23(1) in my opinion does not result in any additional punishment [...] 
Nor does the rule imply any discrimination on the grounds of political views. The 
exception from including terms of service prior to the Act’s coming into force on the 
basis of which the pension is calculated applies to persons who have been convicted 
for certain serious crimes and regardless of the motivation behind the offences. It is 
not the political view that is the reason for the discrimination but the criminal act the 
person in question is guilty of. The principle of equality in Article 26 cannot be 
considered violated by such a rule which has also an objective basis."57
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54 See also NRt. 1978.662 in which the compatibility of a domestic Norwegian provision,
laying down criminal responsibility for failing to turn up for military service, with Article
14(7) of the UN-Covenant was discussed by the Htyesterett.
57 (Heller ikke finner jeg at det foreligger noen motstrid mellom sjemannspensjonslovens 
§ 23 f0rste ledd og de prinsipper som er kommet til uurykk i F.N.’s konvensjon av 19. 
desember 1966, ratifisert av Norge 13. September 1972. om sivile og politiske rettigheter
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In NRt. 1981.770, concerning commitment to a mental hospital, it was 
pleaded that the conditions within the mental hospital were so poor that they 
were contrary to the minimum standard laid down in Articles 7, 9 and 10 of 
the UN;Covenant Though the H0yesterett admitted that the conditions within 
the hospital were not optimal, it did not, on the other hand, find that they 
infringed the Covenant.58
The well-known Alta Case59 in NRt. 1982.241 concerned the legality - 
partly under domestic Norwegian law and partly under international law, 
inter alia, Article 14 of ECHR and Article 1 of the First Protocol - of an 
administrative decision on the construction of a hydroelectric power station 
on the Alta river in an area inhabited by Sami people. As regards its 
relationship to the Convention (and the other invoked rules of international 
law), Justice Christiansen, speaking for a unanimous H0yesterett, sitting in 
plenum, established that there was no conflict between the domestic rules of 
law and the invoked international obligations (p. 299). However, previously 
in the judgment, he stated (p. 257 f):
’What I said about the limits of judicial review needs to be qualified. In the present 
case it has been argued that the Sami people are protected against such interferences 
with their interest as follows from the regulation of the Alta river by virtue or rules 
of international law which are binding upon Norway. The rules concerning the
artikkel 14 punkt 7 om at ingen skal kunne straffes pk ny for samme forhold og artikkel 26 
om at lovgivningen skal forby enhver forskjellsbehandling, blant annet p i gnwmlag av 
“politisk eller annen oppfatning". Anvendelsen av reglen i § 23 forste ledd medforer etter mit 
syn ingen tilleggsstraf [...] Heller ikke mnebacrer regelen at noen forskjellsbehandles p& grunn 
av sin politiske oppfattning. Unntaket fra 4 f& medregnet, som pensjonsgivende fartsud f0r 
lovcens ikrafttreden gjelder for personer som er straffedamt for visse aivorligere forbrytelser, 
og uansett motivasjonen for overtredelseme. Det er ikke den politiske oppfatning som 
begrunner forskjellsbehandl ingen, men den forbryterske handling vedkommende har gjort seg 
skyldig i. Prinsippet om likebehandling i artikkel 26 kan ikke anses krenket ved en slik regel 
som ogsA har sin saklige begrunnelse.j
M See also the Htyesterett's judgment in NRt. 1984.1359 where it was laid down that 
Articles 9 and 10 of the ECHR and Articles 18 and 19 of the UN-Covenant were not an 
obstacle for criminalizing discrimatory statements on homosexuals, and the Hpyesterett’s 
Appeals Committee’s decisions in NRt. 1985.1444 and NRt. 1987.1285 in which the 
Committee, without entering into any discussion, stated that the provisions of the Norwegian 
Act of Criminal Procedure on detention on remand were compatible with Article 5(1 Xc) of 
the Convention.
It should, however, be noted that the Norwegian Act of Criminal Procedure in section 4 
(before 1 January 1986, section 5) contains a provision laying down that the Act should be 
interpreted with the reservations deriving from international law, i.e. the decisions concern, 
strictly speaking, questions which lie wiihin the sphere of sector-monism.
59 A brief account of the case can be found in Applications Nos. 9278/81 and 9415/81, 
cf. 35 D.R., pp. 30 ff. (see infra section 18.2).
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court’s power to review the validity of administrative acts do not prevent the Court 
from fully and comprehensively considering whether the expansion works violate 
rules of international law [the Convention and the UN-Covenant]."60
Since it was found that there was no conflict between the invoked conven­
tions and domestic law, this statement is an obiter dictum. However, this may 
be interpreted as meaning that the H0yesterett, without actually having to do 
so, felt a stronger need to express its view on the relationship between human 
rights conventions and domestic Norwegian law than it had on earlier oc­
casions. In this respect, one should note the very clear formulation ”... do not 
prevent the courts from fully and comprehensively considering whether the 
expansion works violate rules of international law" (emphasis added). 
Normally, however, it is assumed that Norwegian courts are not entitled to 
review the administration’s exercise of the so-called "free discretion". Thus 
the rules of international law do not form part of the "free discretion" which 
the administration itself controls. Consequently, Norwegian administrative 
authorities should be considered under a legal obligation to exercise their 
discretionary powers in such a way that their decisions conform with 
undertaken international human rights obligations.
One may wonder whether this decision contains further implications than 
the above-mentioned as to the domestic status of human rights conventions. 
Professor Carsten Smith has viewed ”... this decision as the definitive break­
through for the principle of the precedence of international law before 
Norwegian courts”.6162 It is, however, hardly possible to draw such a far- 
reaching conclusion from the decision since no conflict between the conven­
tions and domestic law was actually recognized.63 But the decision certainly 
lays down that, though not in the traditional form of a precedent, the courts 
are entitled to review whether administrative decisions are lawful under
Establishing no Conflict: Direct Application o f the EC HR?
“  Here cited in English from Eur. Court H.R:, Case of E m. Norway, Series A, Vol. 181 
(1990), para. 42.
61 [... denne avejorelsen som det endelige gjennombrud for prinsippet om folkerettens 
forrang ved norske domstoler.)
“  Cf. Smith & Smith (1982). p. 229.
6’ Cf. Fleischer (1984), p. 256. See also Rainer Hofmann in EuGRZ 1985, p. 120, who 
concludes: "Sicherlich ist in dieser Aussage, die ohnehin eher als obiter dictum zu werten ist, 
kein Präjudiz für den Vorrang des Völkrechts gegenüber nationalem Recht zu sehen. Dies gilt 
schon deshalb, weil das Gericht letzlich keine solche Verletzung annahm."
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human rights conventions.64
In the H0yesteretis Interlocutory Appeals Committee’s ruling of 16 
March 199045 concerning the extension of security measures under section 
39 of the Penal Code, the appellant submitted that the term of security 
measures could not be extended unless the convicted person has committed 
new criminal acts. This view was based on Article 4(1) of Seventh Protocol 
which came into force in Norway on 1 January 1989. According to Article 
4(1) of the Protocol no person shall be "tried or punished" for a felony of 
which he has already been convicted. A remand in custody and security 
measures were deemed to be "punishment" within the meaning of the 
Protocol, and, it was submitted, section 39(3) of the Penal Code as well as 
section 171 of the Act of Criminal Procedure must be so interpreted that they 
conform with the Protocol. Moreover, the appellant invoked Articles 3 and 
6 of the Convention itself.
The Interlocutory Appeals Committee unanimously explained that 
pursuant to section 39(3)(2) of the Penal Code the Court shall in deciding on 
security measures "... fix a maximum period beyond which precautions must 
not be applied without the consent of the Court". A decision to the effect that 
the term of security measures shall be extended does not mean that the con­
victed person in question is convicted or sentenced anew for the acts that 
provide the basis for the sentence of security measures. That these acts 
provide grounds for the application of preventive measures has already been 
decided by the sentence of security measures. Conclusive of the question 
whether the term of security measures shall be extended beyond the 
maximum period originally fixed will be an assessment of the other 
circumstances that justify the application of preventive measures, the 
convicted person’s mental faculties and the risk of a repetition of criminal 
acts. That the term of preventive detention may be extended if reasons for so 
doing are found after such an assessment follows from the sentence of 
security measures in conjunction with the provision in section 39(3)(2). The 
Committee then continued:
"Accordingly, it does not appear that the High Court has relied on an erroneous 
interpretation of the provisions in Article 4, item 1, of Additional Protocol No. 7of 
the European Convention on Human Rights in assuming that an extension of the term
“  Cf. Helgesen (1982). p. 51.
45 Case No. Inr 471/1990. jnr 289/1990.
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of preventive supervision [security measures] in accordance with section 39, item 3 
second paragraph, of the Penal Code is not contrary to (he provision of the Conven­
tion.
Nor does it appear to the Interlocutory Appeals Committee that the High Court’s 
decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of Articles 3 ard 6 of the 
Convention on Human Rights."44
In two decisions of 29 March 199067 the H0yesterett found that the reading 
of evidence in the form of the police’s reports containing the interrogation 
of two witnesses was in accordance with Article 6(1) and (3)(d) of the 
Convention and in particular the judgments of the European Court of Human 
Rights in the Unterpertinger Case“  and the Kostovski Case.69 Both rulings 
discussed in detail how the judgments should be interpreted, as well as it 
being per se taken for granted that domestic Norwegian law should be 
interpreted in such way that it conform with the Convention. In the first case, 
to which reference was made in the second, Justice Cj0lstad, speaking for a 
unanimous court, held:
"In the evaluation of the weight of the different elements it is in my opinion of 
significance to look at what follows from the Human Rights Convention in relation 
to the convicted person’s right to question witnesses. It is a generally accepted 
starting point that Norwegian law must be presupposed to be in accordance with 
treaties by which Norway is bound.1,70
After having discussed the Unterpertinger and the Koskovski Cases, the 
Justice concluded:
"The views which the judgments are expressive of harmonize well in my opinion 
with a reasonable understanding of the principle of proportionality set forth in section 
297 of the Act of Criminal Procedure in the light of which principles our criminal 
procedure is founded. If it concerns a wholly central witness, whom it is possible to 
question before the hearing court, the consideration for the defendant’s legal rights
Establishing no Conflict: Direct Application o f the ECHR?
64 Here cited in English from Eur. Court H.R., Case o f E v. Norway, Series A, Vol. 181 
(1990), Doc. Cour (90) 64 rev.
47 Case No. Inr 48B/1990, snr 266/1989, and Case No. lnr 49B/1990, snr 303/1989.
“  Cf. Eur. Court H.R., Unterpertinger Case, Series A, Vol. 110 (1987).
M Cf. Eur. Court H.R., Kostovski Case, Series A  Vol. 166 (1989).
70 [Ved vurderingen av de forskjellige momenters vekt er det etter min mening av 
betydrang & se p i hva som felger av Menneskerettighetskonvensjonen nlr det gjelder 
domfeltes rett til i  eksaminere vitner. Det er et akmirmelig akseptert utgangspunkt at norsk 
lov mi forutsettes I  v*re i samsvar med traktater som Norge er bundet av.)
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should frequently be given priority over the cost of the expenses and inconveniences 
by an adjournment of the case."
In the cases at issue it was found that the reading of a police report contain­
ing a statement of one out of seven witnesses to a traffic accident, and the 
refusal of a new interrogation on the initiative of the counsel for the defence 
of a child in a case concerning a sexual crime respectively, did not violate 
Article 6 of the Convention. Consequently, there was no conflict between the 
Convention and domestic law which the Court had to resolve.
As mentioned, the very sharp criticism to which Regeringsratten's 
decision in the Râneâ Case in RÂ 1974.121 was subsequently subjected 
seems to have made the Swedish courts rethink their attitude vis-à-vis the 
ECHR.
Thus a first step in that direction was probably Regeringsratten’s decision 
in RÂ 1981 2:14 in which the Court seems to have dissociated itself from its 
previous strong statements on the relationship between the Convention and 
domestic law in the Râneâ Case. In this case some parents lodged a com­
plaint that the Stockholm School Board had decided that the pupils in the 
primary schools in Stockholm were obliged to stay in school in addition to 
the normal teaching hours in order to participate in other activities. This was, 
according to the parents, neither lawful under the Instrument of Government 
nor under Articles 8 and 14 of the Convention. On the impact of the Conven­
tion on Swedish law, the County Government Board of Stockholm, which 
decided the case in the first instance, repeated literally Regeringsratten’s 
statements in the Râneâ Case. Regeringsràtten discussed, on the other hand, 
whether domestic law and the way it was applied in the case at issue was 
compatible with the Convention and concluded that there was no conflict 
between domestic law and the Convention. However, no general statements 
on neither the transformation theory nor the principle o f presumption were 
made.72 As will be seen in chapters 7 and 8, in subsequent cases the 
Swedish courts have again turned towards a more open attitude vis-à-vis the
71 [De synspunkter dommene gir uttrykk for, harmonerer etter min mening godt med en 
rimelig forstlelse av forholdsmzssighetskriteriet i scraffeprosesslovens § 297 i lys av de 
prinsipper ogsA v Jr straffeprosess bygger pi. Hvis det dreier seg om helt sentrale vitner. som 
det er mulig i  fare for den ctommende rett, m i hensynet til ciltalces rettssikkerhet regelmessig 
sli lgjennom i forhold til utgifter og ulemper ved en utsetteise av saken.]
72 See also RA 1978:2 in which one of the judges, in his concurring opinion, considered 
whether domestic law conformed with Article 6 of the International Convention on the 
Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination.
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Convention.
In the Kammarratt's judgment of 31 October 198873 in the third set of 
proceedings challenging the prohibition on removal of the child from her 
foster parents to the biological mother in the Eriksson Case,74 it was held 
that there was no violation of either the mother’s nor the child’s right to 
family life under Article 8 of the Convention. This interpretation proved later 
to be wrong since the European Court held that there had been a violation of 
Article 8 of the Convention. The Lànsràtt, which decided the case in the first 
instance75, explained its application of the Convention in a very illustrative 
way:
"In Sweden the system is applied that the Court on the first hand seeks guidance in 
the wording of the Act. If the wording of the Act does not give any answer to the 
case at issue, the travaux préparatoires and legal practice may assist If neither of 
these nor any other domestic source of law give requisite guidance, then the question 
of the significance of the European Convention on Human Rights arises.
It is not the question whether the Lànsràtt, from the Convention or principially 
the case-law which in connection thereto the Strasbourg Court has developed, should 
include new legal rules in Swedish law. Instead it is a question to what extent the 
Lànsràtt should observe the weight of the grounds on which the decisions in similar 
disputes before the European Court have been based. As regards the Swedish doctrine 
on the sources of law and the so-called transformation theory this involves, on the 
one hand, that to the degree the grounds of such decisions conflict with Swedish law, 
it is the Swedish Legislature which is given a pointer as to which measures should 
be taken regarding Sweden s commitment to the Convention. On the other hand, this 
implies that the grounds of a decision that is not contrary to Swedish law, laid down 
with assistance of the Swedish doctrine of sources of law, may be observed when a 
Swedish court is deciding a similar case. The Convention may, therefore, fill the 
Swedish sources of law when the Swedish sources of law no longer provide gui­
dance."76
73 Case No. 4050/4051-1988.
74 Cf. Eur. Court H.R., Eriksson Case„ Series A, Vol. 156 (1989).
75 Judgment of 15 June 1988 (Case No. 0  1257-87/0 1376-87).
76 [I Sverige tillampas den ordningen att domstolen i forsta hand soker ledning i lagtexten. 
Om lagtexten inte ger svar f6r det sarskilda fallet si kan ftirarbeten och rauspraxis vara 
behjalpliga. Nir inte heller dessa eller andra inhemska rattsk&llor ger erfordelig vagledning 
uppkommer numera frlga om Europakonventionens betydelse som nationell rattskalla.
Det ar inte frAga om att lansratten urifrAn konventionen, eller framst den rattspraxis som 
domstolen i Strasbourg i anslutning dartill utvecklat, skall intolka nya rattsregler i den svenska 
ratten. Det &r istallet frAga om i vilken utstrackning lansratten btfr beakta cyngdan av de skal 
som legat till grund far avgCranden av liknande tvister i europadomstolen. Med hansyn till den 
svenska rattskallelaren ocn den s k transformationsteorin iimebar detta A den ena sidan att i 
den mAn skalen vid sAdanna avg&randen strider mot den svenska rattan sA ar det den svenske 
lagstifteran som getts en pekepinne om vad som bor Atgardas med hansyn dU Sveriges
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However, the fact that the Ldnsratt did not consider decisions from the 
European Court of Human Rights as precedents proper in domestic law is 
probably not correct, since Hogsta Domstolen in the subsequent judgment in 
NJA 1988.572 has in fact regarded a decision from the European Court as a 
precedent in domestic law (see infra section 8.4).
6.4. Tentative Conclusions.
No reported Danish or Norwegian case-law exist in which it is established 
that in the case at issue there is a conflict between the ECHR and domestic 
law. Consequently, Danish and Norwegian courts have avoided taking a stand 
on how a conflict between the Convention and domestic law should be 
resolved. This applies also to the HT Case, although the judgment contains 
obiter dicta statements which could be interpreted in the opposite way. On 
the contrary, Danish courts have, though wiihout phrasing it in explicit teims 
of a conflict, on at least two occasions, in effect, let the Convention prevail 
over domestic Danish law.77 The cases concerning treaties other than the 
ECHR do not give much guidance as to how the courts should resolve 
conflicts between the Convention and domestic law. It may be deduced from 
UfR 1974.263 that the rule o f presumption is not applicable in cases where 
the international rule would infringe upon a contemplated reformulation in 
a domestic statute. But this situation is not likely to take place frequently. 
Nor does the case in NRt. 1957.942 give much guidance in this respect since 
the circumstances were indeed extraordinary, and it is also disputable whether 
or not there was actually a conflict between international law and domestic 
law in the case.
The three Swedish cases discussed in section 6.2 have subsequently been 
viewed as a judicial affirmation of the transformation theory.1* However, 
only RA 1974.121 can be viewed as a clear precedent for the transformation 
theory.19 Although the judgments in the Swedish Engine Drivers’ Union
konventionsitagande. A andra sidan innebär detta ait skälen för ett avgörande som inte strider 
mot den svenska rätten. bestämd med hjilp av svensk rättskälllära, kan beaktes när en svensk 
domstol har act avgöra ett liknande fall. Konventionen kan därför i vissa fall utfylla de svenska 
rättsreglama när de svenska rättskälloma inte längre lämnar väglcdning.]
71 See the Ktbenhavns Byret's judgment of 25 April 1966 (see infra section 8.2.2) and 
UfR 1990.13 (see infra section 8.4).
* See. for example, Danelius (1984), p. 56; and Sztucki (1986), p. 227.
”  Cf. Malmlöf & Mellqvist (1982). p. 56.
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Case and NJA 1973.423 contain obiter dicta statements in favour of the 
transformation theory, these statements cannot under the generally accepted 
Scandinavian doctrine on the sources of law be considered as having much, 
if any, value as precedents.
Consequently, in Scandinavian law there exists only one case in which 
the courts, in the case of a conflict between the Convention and domestic 
law, have made domestic law prevail over the ECHR. This is quite 
remarkable and can certainly not be regarded a proper judicial affirmation of 
the traditional "dualist" approach to the question of the relationship between 
international law and domestic law embodied in the principle o f the 
supremacy o f domestic law which has been set forth in legal writings.
On the contrary, in a number of cases it is held that there is no conflict 
between domestic law and the Convention as interpreted by the Court. 
Reaching such conclusion presupposes that the Court has interpreted the 
Convention independently and then compared this interpretation with 
domestic law. Under a "dualist" system, strictly speaking, such a laying down 
that in the case at issue there is no conflict between the Convention and 
domestic law whould seem unnecessary. However, on the basis of the case- 
law discussed in section 6.3, there can be no doubt that the courts prefer to 
pass judgments from which it appears that they have actually considered the 
relationship with the ECHR. From an analytical point of view this establish­
ment of conformity of domestic law with the Convention may undoubtedly 
be regarded as a direct application of the Convention, because the Convention 
in such cases has formed a integrated part of the Court’s reasoning. In other 
words, the Convention has been applied as a source o f law. However, this 
does not exclude that the courts from time to time base their decisions on an 
interpretation of the Convention which subsequently proves to have been er­
roneous and is overruled by the European Commission or Court of Human 
Rights.
This leads to another, and in this context more interesting, question: 
What weight should be accorded to the Convention as a domestic source of 
law? It shall not be attempted to answer this question here since the case-law 
discussed in this chapter does not provide sufficient information in this 
respect. The question will be discussed further in chapters 7, 8 and 10.
Finally, one may ask whether or not it is possible, on the basis of the 
discussed case-law to formulate some criteria governing when the courts 
prefer to establish that there is a conflict between the Convention and
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domestic law and when this is not the case.
With the Râneâ Case as an exception, it is manifest that the courts do 
not recognize conflicts between the Convention, as they interpret this, and 
domestic law. Consequently, they can avoid and have actually avoided taking 
a stand on how such conflicts should be resolved.
It is, on the other hand, difficult to find any specific reasons which made 
Regeringsràtten refuse to pay attention to the Convention in the Râneâ Case. 
Apart from an emerging tendency in legal writings to accept and put forward 
the transformation theory as valid law, there was no specific criterion which 
seems to have influenced the Court decisively in this respect.
However, the fact that it was explicitly stated in the travaux prépara­
toires to the CMR Act that the Legislature had been aware of the potential 
conflict between the CMR Convention and domestic Danish law may explain 
why the Court chose to let the domestic provision prevail in UfR 1974.263. 
In other words, it was clearly indicated that the Legislature (for the time 
being) did not want to fulfil the treaty obligation completely.
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The European Convention as a Means of 
Interpretation
7.1. Introduction.
It follows from the Scandinavian concept of a source o f law that factors of 
a general nature on which the Court shall or may rely when deciding a cace 
are considered sources o f law. Accordingly, insofar as international law is in 
the process of influencing the courts - be it as a means of interpretation or 
by a direct application - it may be considered to be a source of law. 
However, as mentioned in section 2.4, in common usage the concept source 
o f law is probably applied in a more narrow sense.
Based on practical considerations the available case-law is divided into 
cases in which international law is either applied as a means o f interpretation 
relating to the domestic rule of law or where it would be more appropriate 
to talk about a direct application of international law in general, and the 
ECHR in particular, there is no sharp delimitation between these two "ways" 
of applying international law. The latter cases will be discussed in chapter 8. 
It should, however, be stressed that this distinction serves no analytical 
purposes. Under the definition of sources o f law employed in this study it 
would from a analytical point of view per se be impossible to make such a 
distinction.
The principle o f presumption lays down that, if domestic law provides 
for more than one interpretation, the interpretation that will best comply with 
international law should be preferred. Furthermore, domestic law is presumed 
to be compatible with international law, that is to say, the law-enforcing 
authorities may act on the presumption that the Legislature did not intend to 
legislate contrary to undertaken international obligations. The aim of this 
principle is, of course, to avoid accidentally infringing international law. Thus 
the principle o f presumption applies primarily to situations in which interna­
tional law lays down clear requirements on domestic law. However, as 
pointed out by Professor Carsten Smith, there also exists a more positive 
interaction between international law and domestic law in the choice between 
several solutions valid under international law: "the influence of international 
law is not limited to providing a justification for the elimination of certain
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solutions".1
Although the majority of cases in this chapter does not concern the 
ECHR, the discussed case-law is nevertheless relevant in connection with the 
application of the ECHR. First, the cases show that the courts are open to 
arguments deriving from international law and, accordingly, also from the 
ECHR. Second, generally speaking, the international instruments applied in 
the cases at issue must be assumed to be of a character less strong than the 
ECHR (see infra section 10.2). Accordingly, there are reasons to believe that 
the courts will pay at least as much attention to the Convention as they have 
paid to the treaties which were relevant in the cases to be discussed.
7.2. International Law lays down Clear Requirements on Domestic Law.
The classic example o f the application o f international customary law in 
Denmark is the decision in UfR 1942.1002 where the 0stre Landsret upheld 
an order from the Court of Execution that refused to undertake an interim 
injunction ["arrest") of a ship which belonged to the Russian state-owned 
shipping company and was therefore the property of a foreign state. Unlike 
the Penal Code, the Danish Administration of Justice Act contained, and still 
contains, no provision to the effect that it should be applied with the neces­
sary reservations deriving from international law. Likewise, in NRt. 1938.584 
the Norwegian H&yesteretf s Interlocutory Appeals Committee annulled an 
interim injunction of a ship referring to the rules of international law relating 
to the immunity of state ships, despite the fact that these rules were not 
incorporated into domestic Norwegian legislation at that time.2 On that 
occassion the Committee stressed strongly that domestic Norwegian law must 
be presumed to conform with the rules of international law. In NJA 1942.65 
the Swedish Hogsta Domstolen has likewise held this view.
In UfR 1979.332 the question was whether a provision of the CMR Act 
which incorporated the CMR Convention into domestic Danish law, should
1 Cf. Smith (1968). p. 160.
2 The Court referred to a convention on immunity of slate vessels which at the time of the 
decision had only been signed but neither ratified nor implemented by any Norwegian statute. 
This reference to the treaty should probably be regarded as a link in the justification for 
establishing a general international norm.
In NRt. 1908.749 the Byrett dealt with a dispute which had arisen between the captain and 
one of his crew. The Hpyesterett annulled this decision by referring to an assumed prevailing 
international custom that disputes arising on ships abroad cannot be brought before the Court 
of the foreign State but lie within the jurisdiction of the national consular representation on 
the spot.
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prevail over a provision of the Promissory Notes Act as regards rates of 
interest in cases where an action had been brought before the Court. In its 
decision the H0jesteret emphasized that the provision of the CMR Act was 
"... elaborated in accordance with an international convention" (emphasis 
added)3 and ruled, consequently, that the provision of the CMR Act should 
prevail.
In an editorial note on the case, reference was made to the explanatory 
memorandum accompanying the bill amending the Promissory Notes Act 
Since the travaux préparatoires did not clearly indicate that the Legislature 
consciously intended to overrule the provision of the CMR Convention, the 
case was decided on the basis of the older, but special provision of the CMR 
Act, i.e. according to the lex specialis principle, but contrary to the lex 
posterior derogat legi priori principle *
In a recent judgment of 15 October 1990 in a case concerning the 
reading of evidence under the trial pursuant to section 877(3) of the ad­
ministration of Justice Act, the H0jesteret held that ”... the H&jesteret concurs 
that the reading of the explanation given in court and of the letter, at least 
under these circumstances, was not contrary to section 877(3) of the 
Administration of Justice Act, thus as this provision must be interpreted with 
regard to Article 6(3)(d) the [EuropeanJ Convention on Human Rights" 
(emphasis added).5 "These circumstances" were that the woman who had 
been questioned in court under the preliminary examination had died before 
the trial. The letter had been written to a friend and touched upon the case. 
Neither the explanation given in court nor the letter were considered as main 
evidence in the case. Moreover, the value as proof of both the explanation 
and the letter had been assessed according to the fact that the woman had 
been charged in the case and that the counsel for the defence had not had the 
possibility to question her, this had been emphasized by the presiding judge 
in his charge to the jury. The decision is thus in line with the Court’s
J [...der er udformet i overensstemmelse med en international konvention.J
4 Madsen (1986), p. 38. views this case as expressive of the application of the rule of 
presumption, Fredetik Harhoff: Sktnheden og udyret, [The Beauty and the Beast], Rets- 
vidcnskabeligt Institut B, Studier nr. 18, Arsberetning 1986, Copenhagen (1987), pp. 69 ff., 
at p. 78, claims that no situation of interpretation was present in this case; should it take credit 
as any rule, this must, in the view of Frederik Harhoff, be the rule of presumption.
5 [Hojesteret tiltrxder, at dokumentationen af den indenretlige forklaring og af brevet i 
hvert fald under disse omstxndigheder ikke var i strid med med retsplejelovens § 877. stk. 3, 
siledes som denne bestemmelse mi fortolkes under hensyn til artikel 6, stk. 3, litra d, i 
menneskcretti ghedskonvention. ]
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previous decision in UfR 1985.1080 (see supra section 6.3) and two unpub­
lished decisions of the Vestre Landsret (see infra section 8.2.2) in which the 
latter court expressed itself in accordance with the European Court in the 
Unterpertinger Case.6
A curious example of the application of the ECHR as a means of 
interpretation is that of Retten i Slagelse's judgment of 30 November 1985 
in a case concerning tax fraud.7 In the judgment it was assumed that an 
investigation of 10 years altogether, inter alia, was contrary to the ECHR. 
This could, in the Court’s view, "... possibly justify employing a suspended 
sanction or remission of the sentence" but not that the time-limit for prose­
cution had expired.® However, in its judgment of 17 December 1984’ the 
same court had recognized that in certain cases the Convention may influence 
the Court’s decision of whether or not the time-limit for prosecution has 
expired.
In NJA 1963.284 the Svea Hovràtt acquitted a person convicted by the 
Tingsràtt for violating tax laws referring to the prescription limit which was 
in force at the time of the alleged violation, although it had been extended 
at the moment of indictment. The Court based its decision on domestic law, 
but found it nevertheless appropriate to refer, in brackets, to Article 7 of the 
ECHR. Hôgsta Domstolen subsequently upheld the decision, but solely on the 
basis of domestic Swedish law and did not make any reference to the 
Convention.
In 1962 three persons were convicted by the Tingsràtt for disorderly 
conduct ["fôrargelsesvàckande beteende") for having displayed balloons with 
the text "Algérie française" during a demonstration organized by people of 
other political convictions.10 In 1964 the three men were acquitted by the 
Svea Hovràtt, which stated that under Swedish law their behaviour was not 
a crime without further specification. However, in his concurring opinion, 
one of the judges (now professor) Jacob W.F. Sundberg, explained that, by 
ratifying the ECHR, Sweden ”... let it be understood that the Swedish criminal
6 Cf. Eur. Court H.R., Unterpertinger Case, Series A, Vol. 110 (1987), para. 33.
7 Case No. ss 163/1976 and ss 384/1979, reported as Landsforeningen af Benificerede 
Advokaters Meddeielse 21/1986.
' [... muligt [kunne] begründe anvendelse af betinget ?anktion eller strafbortfaid.]
’ Case No. ps 575/1984 and ps 590/1984. See also Rehof & Trier (1990), p. 89.
10 Reported in SvJT 1964.19.
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law was not an obstacle to the validity within the realm of the principles on 
freedom of expression, set out in Article 10, among which is to be found the 
freedom to disseminate information and ideas without interference by public 
authority."“
Hogsta Domstolen seems in NJA 1981.1205 to have become more atten­
tive to the ECHR and did in fact apply the Convention as an important 
means of interpretation. The case concerned, inter alia, the question of the 
validity of an arbitration clause which was part of the terms of a group life 
insurance based on a collective agreement. The plaintiff claimed that, due to 
the arbitration clause, she was prevented from having her case tried by a 
court. In this respect she invoked, inter alia. Chapter 11, section 3, of the 
Instrument of Government, which lays down that legal disputes between 
individuals shall not be decided by any authority other than the courts except 
if laid down by law, and Article 6 of the ECHR. Hogsta Domstolen 
maintained that transformation is required if concluded treaties are to have 
direct domestic effect. As regards the principle o f presumption, the Court 
said:
"It should, however, be presupposed that the provisions of the Instrument of 
Government, which was passed after Sweden's ratification of the European 
Convention, are in accordance with its requirements and, besides, the lauer can 
illustrate the content of the provisions of the Instrument of Government.1,12
Then, it was stated that Chapter 11, section 3, of the Instrument of Govern­
ment, interpreted in the light of the Convention, did not prevent individuals 
from making arbitration agreements such as the one in question.
The interesting aspect of this judgment is that Hogsta Domstolen stated, 
like the Norwegian Hfiyesterett in NRt. 1966.935 (see infra section 8.4), that 
the principle o f presumption also applies to the Instrument of Government 
and not only to ordinary legislation. The consequence of this view is that, in 
relation to the impact of the Convention on the interpretation of the 
Instrument of Government, it makes no difference whether or not the
11 Here cited in English from Sundberg (1988), p. 197.
11 (Del fir emeilertid forutsattes, att bestimmelsema i regeringsformen, som tillkommit 
efter Sveriges ratifikation av Europeiska konventionen, stir i Cverensstammelse med dennas 
foreskrifter, och de sen are kan darjamte belysa innebtirdan av bestammelsema i regeringsfor­
men.]
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Convention is incorporated into domestic law by a statute. In all events the 
Convention will be regarded as a means of interpretation to the Con­
stitution.13 This view has been affirmed and developed further by Hôgsta 
Domstolen in the subsequent NJA 1989.121 (see infra section 8.3)
7.3. International Law does not lay down Clear Requirements on 
Domestic Law.
The application of international law by domestic courts represents a form of 
enforcement of international law. Different domestic solutions may give dif­
ferent degrees of effect to corresponding international rules. The domestic 
rules may be formulated in such a way as to support the international norms. 
This can be brought about if the domestic solutions counteract or reduce the 
effect of internationally illegal solutions, on the one hand, and if they 
facilitate the carrying out of transactions that are in accordance with the 
purpose of the international rules, on the other. The choice of the domestic 
solution to be adopted may therefore have international relevance even if one 
finds oneself outside the range of international sanctions.14
In UfR 1964.624 the H0jesteret seems first of all to have reached its 
decision through an interpretation of international law. The case concerned 
the distribution among Danish nationals of a global compensation which 
Czechoslovakia had made avaible as compensation for the nationalization of 
Danish property in Czechoslovakia. A woman who held both Czechoslovak 
and Danish citizenship put forward a claim for her own part of this 
compensation to the tribunal in charge of distributing the global compensa­
tion in Denmark. However, the tribunal rejected her claim referring to her 
double citizenship. For the High Court it was undisputed between the parties 
that under international law a double citizenship prevents both states of which 
the individual is a citizen from protecting the person concerned against the 
other state. The crucial question was then whether international law was at 
all relevant for the tribunal which was distributing the compensation. Accord­
ing to the agreement with Czechoslovakia it was up to the Danish Govem-
11 Cf. Brunfelter (1986), p. 37.
“ Cf. Smith (1968), p. 161.
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mcnt to distribute the compensation, and the High Court awarded the woman 
compensation ex gratia.
The H0jesteret scrutinized the travaux préparatoires of the agreement 
with Czeckoslovakia as well as the travaux préparatoires of the statute incor­
porating it into domestic Danish law and overruled the High Court’s decision 
on the following grounds:
"According to the available facts, the compensation paid by the Czechoslovakian 
State should serve as settlement of the claims that Danish citizens under the rules 
of international law might have in consequence of the implemented nationalizations.
According to information received on the implications of the agreement and the 
negotiations that have taken place prior to this, as well as [the woman’s] citizenship 
in Czechoslovakia and her connection respectively with this State and with Denmark, 
she is not found, on the basis of her Danish citizenship, to have any claim under [the 
agreement on the distribution of the global compensation!" (emphasis added).15
It appears from Justice Jörgen Trolle's extrajudicial comment on the case that 
the Hojesteret was of the opinion that the statute which incorporated the 
agreement with Czechoslovakia into domestic law (Act No. 179 of 7 June 
1958) could only be interpreted as implying that compensation should be paid 
solely when this was required under international law.16 Consequently, the 
crucial question was the interpretation of international law in this field. After 
having discussed the position of international law, J0rgen Trolle concluded 
that "... it will be seen that the Italian-American case17 is to a considerable 
extent similar to the one adjudicated by the H0jesteret, and that the
15 [Efter det foreliggende har den af den czekoslovakiske stat ydede globalerstatning 
skullet tjene til dækning af de krav, som danske statsborgere efter folkerettens regier màue 
have i anledning af de skete nationaliseringer.
Nâr henses til, hvad der er oplyst om overenskomstens forudsætnmger og de stedfundne 
forhandlinger forud for denne, samt til [kvindens] statsborgerskab i i Czekoslovakiet og hendes 
tilknytning til denne stat og til Danmark, fmdes hun ikke pâ sit danske statsborgerskab at have 
kunnet stottet noget krav pâ [overenskomsten om fordelingen af globalerstamingen.]
16 Jörgen Trolle: Folkeret - Nalionalisering - Spûrgsmâl om ret til andel i "global­
er stat ning” for en person med dobbelt statsborgerret i det erstainingsbetalende og 
ers tat ning smodtagenae land - Har fordelingsruzvnets afgprelse karakzer af en administrativ 
sktnsudtvelse? [International Law - Nationalization - Question of the right to a part in "global 
compensation** for a person with Double Citizenship in the Country Paying the Compensation 
and the Recipient Country - Do the Decision of the Tribunal Distributing the Global compen­
sation Have the Character of Administrative Exercise of Discretion?], UfR 1964 B, pp. 276 
ff.. at p. 278.
17 The Mergé Claim, cf. Italian-United States Conciliation Commmission; 1955, cf. 
International Law Reports 1955, pp. 443 ff.
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H0jesteret is in line with the Conciliation Commission."18
The case has been quoted as an example of the application of both the 
rule o f interpretation and the rule o f presumption.19 It is, however, probably 
more.consistent to regard the decision as one in which the H0jesteret applied 
international law directly. International law did not seem to provide a specific 
solution in this case20, yet, according to Jfirgen Trolle's comment, the 
H0jesteret examined the position of international law in detail. This is an 
interesting aspect of the case, and it may be viewed as an attempt to enforce 
the rules o f international law by applying them directly in domestic law.21
In the more recent Danish UfR 1972.600 international law seems to have 
been enforced to the detriment of the rule of law. The authorities of the Fede­
ral Republic of Germany had requested the seizure of some book-keeping 
material in Denmark belonging to a Danish citizen living in Italy; a German 
court needed it for use in a trial for tax fraud against the Danish citizen in 
Germany. In 1931 Denmark and Germany had concluded an agreement con­
cerning mutual assistance in the administration of justice in criminal cases. 
The agreement was not incorporated into domestic Danish law and the 
Administration of Justice Act did not explicitly provide authorization to seize 
material in Denmark for use in trials abroad. In the case, the Ministry of 
Justice presented a memorandum stating that in connection with the ratifi­
cation of the European Convention on Mutual Assistance in the Ad­
ministration of Law - which had not been ratified by the Federal Republic - 
it was assumed that the said requests could be carried out in Denmark on the 
basis of analogies with the relevant provisions of the Administration of 
Justice Act
The High Court was to turn down the request based on an analogy of the
"  [... det vil ses, at den italiensk-amerikanske sag i mangt og meget minder om den af 
ffojesteret pSdemte, og at Hajesteret har lagt sig p i linie med forligsncvnet.]
19 See Ross, Andersen. Lehmann & Magid (1984), p. 77.
*  Cf. Madsen (1986), p. 37, note 12.
11 Zahle (1989), Vol. 2, p. 102, regards the judgment as one in which the Court has 
”harmonized" domestic law with international law rather than enforced international law by 
applying it in domestic law: "International law may be relevant, even though a violation is not 
imminent The domestic application of law is adapted [to] • harmonized • with the 
international rule." However, in substance the employed terminology is probably only 
reflecting a difference in degree.
[International ret kan vasre relevant, selv om et brud ikke er truende. Den national 
retsanvendelse tilpasses - harmoniseres - med den internationale regel.]
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provisions in the Administration of Justice Act, because (1) the Ad­
ministration of Justice Act contained provisions providing for the questioning 
of witnesses in Denmark for the use in trials abroad, which did not cover the 
request for seizure; and (2) such an extensive infingement would require ex­
plicit statutory authorization. The H0jesteret was, however, willing to accept 
the seizure since i t "... was embraced by the provision of section 745 (1) in 
the Administration of Justice Act, or, by analogy with this provision."22
The fact that the Ministry of Justice on an earlier occasion had deemed 
it unnecessary to amend the Administration of Justice Act in order to fulfil 
the European Convention on Mutual Assistance in the Administration of Law 
seems to have had a considerable impact in this case. On the basis of this 
decision it may be concluded that the courts, in cases in which the Legis­
lature has incorporated a treaty passively and this subsequendy proves to be 
an insufficient fulfilment of the treaty, will grant the administration a margin 
of appreciation in the sense that in their application of domestic law the 
courts will follow the interpretation on the basis of which it was considered 
unnecessary to incorporate the treaty.23 Since the ECHR was passively 
incoiporated into domestic Danish, it is thus likely that the courts in the 
application of the Convention will follow the practice set forth in this 
judgment.
Insofar as the decision was motivated by a desire not to breach interna­
tional law, the Hojesteret seems to have gone very far in explaining away the 
conflict between international law and domestic law. Niels Madsen charac­
terizes the decision as ”... remarkable when one recalls that the starting point 
[...] is that treaty provisions cannot substitute the lack of authorization under 
Danish law in cases where this is required as the basis for Danish authorities’ 
activity.."2423 In reality, the decision was pronounced on such a slender 
basis that it is doubtful whether the requirements as to the authorization, 
contained in the principle o f legality, were fulfilled.26 One may wonder why
n  [... omfattet af retsplejelovens § 745, stk. 1, eller derme bestemmelses analogi.] 
a  Cf. Eilschou Holm (1981). p. 130.
24 Cf. Madsen (1986). p. 39.
25 [... bemxrkelsesvssrdig, n4r man erindrer, at udgangspunktet er [...] at Craktatbes- 
temmelser ikke kan erstatte en manglende hjenunel i dansk ret i tilfzlde, hvor en sAdan er 
krsves som grundlag for danske myndigheders virksomhed.]
"  Zahle (1989). p. 107, seems to have a somewhat ambiguous attitude to the compatibility
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the H&jesteret in this case was willing to order seizure on such a slender 
basis; it was hardly obvious that to turn down the request would have 
constituted a breach of the Danish-German agreement.27
In a large number of cases concerning postliminium after the German 
occupation, Danish and Norwegian courts had, to a considerable extent, to 
decide what weight should be accorded to the international law basis for the 
measures imposed by the occupation authorities. Here there were scarcely any 
international limitations upon domestic law when the case to be judged was 
one between citizens or between the State and citizens.
A fundamental question in this context was whether or not the acts of the 
occupying authorities were in conformity with international law. As will be 
seen, the attention paid to an effective implementation of the international 
rules on occupation was significant. This approach was adopted by the courts 
both in their interpretation of the restitution provisions, in their harmonization 
of these provisions with other legislation, and in their more free formulation 
of rules.28
A large number of Norwegian cases could be mentioned in this respect. 
Since international law, unlike the ECHR, did not lay down clear re­
quirements on domestic law, these decisions illustrate a general open attitude 
vis-à-vis international law rather than showing a direct impact on the
of this judgment with the principle o f legality. On the one hand, he maintains that a treaty 
cannot serve as authority for those acts which under domestic law, according to the principle 
of legality, may be carried out only when authorized by statutory law. On the other hand, he 
(now) seems to accept this judgment as not infringing upon the principle o f legality, but as 
functioning solely as an example of a case in which the treaty was applied in support of a 
result which due to other reasons (than the treaty) was well-founded. This is certainly a change 
in Zahle’s view since in the preliminary edition of the book, Zahle stated, with specific 
reference to this case that ”... the eagerness to observe international obligations cannot permit 
that domestic principles of the application of law moreover are set aside", cf. Zahle (1986), 
p. 130.
[Iveren for at overholde intemationale forpligtelser kan ikke tillade, at nationale principper for 
retsanvendelse i 0vrigt tilsidesxttes.]
v  In the relevant provisions of the agreement (Regulation No. 276 of 4 November 1931) 
it was stated that the Danish and the German governments had undertaken obligations "to 
guarantee reciprocity in the sense that advancing a request for [...] the extradition of objects 
or for assistance in the administration of justice in other respects, should, inter alia, be 
regarded as containing an undertaking, in the opposite case and, on request, to render the other 
party the requested assistance in the administration of justice."
(... at garantere gensidighed i den forstand, at fremsxtielse af en begxring om [...] udlevering 
af genstande eller om retshjxlp i avrigt uden videre betragtes som indeholdende et tilsagn om
i det omvendte tilfxlde p i begxring at ville yde den anden part den onskede retshjxlp.]
* See Smith (1968), p. 162.
130
No Clear Requirements on Domestic Law
domestic application of the Convention. Moreover, the situation was indeed 
extraordinary. Accordingly, only a selected number of the most important 
cases in this respect will be discussed in this section.
A number of judgments concerning the seizure of claims contrary to 
international law is of special interest, partly because the enforcement of the 
rules of international law was expressed with particular clarity, and partly 
because the courts had no support in the Norwegian restitution legislation on 
this point.29 In cases where the occupying authorities had confiscated a 
claim and then enforced payment (of it) by duress, the question arose whether 
the loss should fall on the creditor or the debtor. There was a great deal to 
be said for allowing the loss to rest with the creditor by virtue of the con­
sideration - for which some support was found in international legal theory - 
that the illegitimate measure was directed against him and his property. Con­
trariwise, however, an argument also deriving from international law could 
be put forward, as laid down in the Hoyesterett’s decision in NRt. 1947.235. 
The circumstances were as follows:
After the assets of the Norwegian Shipowners’ Association had been 
confiscated by the occupation authorities, the Gestapo, contrary to inter­
national law, demanded payment out of the Association’s deposits in two 
banks. Subjected to pressure, the banks found it necessary to yield to this 
demand. After the war the question then arose whether the banks were 
obliged to pay the depositor as well, or whether the latter would have to bear 
the consequences of the exaction that had occured.
The H0yesterett first referred to the ordinary contractual rule that a debtor 
who pays a person who is neither entitled nor authorized to receive payment 
is not discharged from his obligation to the rightful creditor, even if the 
payment is made under duress. The Court then considered the question 
whether this rule should also apply in the special circumstances of a case 
where the pressure had been exerted by the occupying power. It answered 
this question in the affirmative. Certainly the Court was open to the idea that 
the ordinary rules for discharging a debt might be departed from in such 
extraordinary circumstances, and indeed this point was expressly mentioned. 
Moreover, the Court did not content itself with the purely negative approach 
that there was no reason in this case to make any exception from this general 
rule. It found a positive basis for its decision by referring to the rules of
* Ibid.. at p. 163.
131
Chapter 7: the EC HR as a Means o f Interpretation
international law in this field.30
In the first opinion delivered, Justice Schei stated that it is "... in the 
interest of the community that the ordinary rules should be followed in cases 
of this kind, because that course of action will have an influence on the 
maintenance of the rules in this field laid down in international law for the 
protection of an occupied country when the debtor has to reckon with being 
obliged to bear the loss himself if he accedes to a demand for payment 
contrary to international law from the occupying power".31
In one of the subsequent opinions delivered. Justice Schelderup 
developed this view further, stating that in deciding "... this question, which 
is in its character purely one of legal policy", he would
"... accord decisive weight to (the factor) that after a war such as we have just lived 
through it is perhaps more important than ever to strengthen such tendencies as serve 
to counteract the appalling contempt for the international legal rules of warfare that 
we in our country constantly witnessed. For this reason I should regard it as 
especially unfonunate if the Supreme Court were, by its decision in this case, to 
proceed to alter our law as now in force to the extent that pressure exerted contrary 
to international law would be accorded the effect of an excuse comparable to force 
majeure when a borrower [...] has paid out to an occupying power a sum of money 
corresponding in amount to the sum standing to the creditor’s account which the said 
power was unlawfully trying to appropriate. Should such a legal conception be 
adopted today [...] the risk that a borrower has hitherto run of being obliged to pay 
twice, to the usurper and to the lender, would then be eliminated. In other words, his 
incentive to create the greatest possible difficulties in his own interest, inter alia to 
protest that the usurper’s conduct is contrary to international law, would be 
weakened. Even in the last war one had to experience that protests not infrequently 
attained their object A change [...] would, to put it in another way, countenance and 
even encourage a passive attitude on the part of the debtor under threat, and would 
thereby positively serve to increase the belligerent’s inclination for, and facilitate his 
execution of, this kind of exaction contrary to international law. It would also ill 
accord with modem tendency to increase the respect for, and the effectiveness of, the 
precepts of intematinal law...''32
Thus the principal point of view was that the H0yesterett must reach a 
decision that was in accordance "... with the modem tendency to increase the 
respect for, and the effectiveness of, the precepts of international law”. The 
internationally illegal character of the demand for payment was accorded
30 Ibid.. at p. 164.
n Here cited in English from Smith (1968), p. 164.
12 Ibid., at pp. 164 f.
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essential weight in assessing the domestic effect of the payment. The 
H0yesterett chose the solution which would most effectively counteract 
measures imposed contrary to international law, and which nullified the 
domestic effects of the internationally illegal transactions.33 This can 
certainly be viewed as an attempt to enforce international law by applying it 
in domestic law;34 and a stronger attempt than expressed in the two above- 
mentioned Danish cases.
Seen from the individual’s point of view a more positive consequence of 
the application of international law in this field was that the legal dispositions 
of the occupation authorities were given full domestic effect insofar as they 
were considered lawful under the rules of international law. This is illustrated 
very clearly in the decision in NRt. 1950.84:35
A public official who had been appointed by the Nazi authorities was 
dismissed after the war. He then claimed repayment of the amount he had 
contributed to the pension fund while he was in the public service. The 
statutory rules contained no provision that was applicable to this claim. The 
question was then whether international law offered any guidance. A minority 
in the H0yesterett was in favour of rejecting the claim. In their opinion it was 
of no significance whether or not the appointment was contrary to inter­
national law. For international law made no demands on the domestic law as 
regards the more detailed settlements in respect of unreceived salary and 
similar claims from the occupation period, including pension contributions. 
In other words, since the State was not bound by international law in this 
field, there was no further reason to accord any weight to the intemational- 
law aspect of the case.
However, the majority chose another line. Justice Gaarder, delivering the 
first opinion, as a representative of the majority, began by tracing the general 
guideline that, when Norwegian domestic provisions are lacking, the precepts 
of international law will be an essential factor in the judgment. It was further
”  In the decisions in NRt. 1949.357, NRt. 1951.523, NRt. 1951.727 and NRl 1951.905 
further conclusions were in several aspects drawn from the principles laid down in the above- 
discussed decision.
"  Cf. Fleischer (1984). p. 254; Smith (1964), pp. 191 ff.; Smith (1968). pp. 163 ff.; and 
Smith & Smith (1982), pp. 55 ff.
35 See also the decisions in ND 1953.568 and in NRt. 195636 (the minority) in which it 
was accorded decisive weight that certain acts carried out by the occupying authorities were 
lawful under international law.
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stated that, in the absence of any provision to the contrary, Norwegian law 
must be assumed to be in harmony with the general principles of inter­
national law in this field. The principle of international law that the judge 
then applied was the provision in Article 43 of the Regulations of Land- 
Warfare laying down that the occupant shall take all steps in his power to re­
establish and ensure, as far as possible, public order and public life in 
accordance with the law of the country. From this it follows, said the judge, 
th a t"... when the occupying power sees to it that [...] vacant posts are filled 
in accordance with the statutes of the occupied country, this measure is [...] 
legitimate both in relation to the international law and in relation to the law 
of the occupied country - i.e. Norway - and it must in the present context be 
equated with normal exercise of administrative power".36
A similar, though less pronounced, tendency to enforce international law 
by applying it directly in domestic law can be found in some Danish cases 
deriving from the purge after the German occupation involving the question 
of the position of The Regulations of Land Warfare37 in domestic Danish 
law.3* In 1948.83739 the H0jesteret upheld a decision from the Vestre 
Landsret. In its grounds, the High Court stated that the provisions in The 
Regulations of Land Warfare meant that a horse which had come into the 
possession of the Danish State via the British forces, could not be subject to 
extinction after being commandeered by the occupying power. In the Re­
gulations of Land-Warfare it was laid down that the occupying power is 
entitled to commandeer, inter alia, means of conveyance, but the latter shall 
be restituted when peace is concluded. It was undisputed in the proceedings 
that The Regulations of Land Warfare were applicable to the case. Thus, the
34 Here cited in English from Smith (1968), p. 168.
57 The Regulations respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land annexed to the 
Convention IV of the second Peace Conference of 1907 in The Hague. The regulations are 
proclaimed in Regulation No. 37 of 20 January 1910, but no specific act has been passed to
incorporate the regulations.
”  Cf. Espersen (1970). p. 396.
w See also the decision of the Vestre Landsret in UfR 1947.772; and a decision of the 
Ostre Landsret in UfR 1931.211. In both cases a similar interpretation of the status of The 
Regulations of Land-Warfare was expressed.
In UfR 1948.1237, in which a British shipowner had claimed compensation for the 
commandeering of a ship in a Danish shipyard by the Germans, 5#- og Handelsretten (the 
Admiralty and Commercial Court] to a large extent based its decision on the Regulations of 
Land Warfare, whereas the H6jesteret referred to principles of contract law. The case is 
commented by Justice A. Drachmann Bentzon in TfR 1949, p. 208.
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Court seemed to be of the opinion that public authorities are obliged to apply 
the domestic rules of extinction in such a way as to be in harmony with 
concluded treaties. In an extrajudicial comment on the judgment Justice A. 
Drachmann Bentzon stated that "... it is certain that the claimant [the oc­
cupying power] and those who directly or indirectly draw their right from 
him, cannot be put in a better position than under The Regulations of Land 
Warfare.”4041
Hogsta Domstolen’s decision in NJA 1929.592 has been cited as an 
example of a case in which a treaty was applied directly in domestic Swedish 
law.42 The case concerned a German shipper who was charged before a 
Swedish court with unlawful fishing in the Laholm Golf on the basis of the 
argument that the Laholm Golf was Swedish territorial waters.
The crucial question in the case was whether the Laholm Golf was part 
of Swedish territorial waters. Sweden maintained that the extent of the 
territorial waters was determined by a Royal Command to the Neutrality 
Fleet of 1779 concerning foreign privateering, and the Command set the limit 
at 4 nautical miles. Applying the 4 mile limit, the Laholm Golf became clo­
sed waters. Apart from the Command there was at that time no Swedish 
enactment on how to draw the borderline in the water. However, a treaty 
between Sweden and Denmark of 14 July 1899 concerning the fishery in 
Swedish and Danish territorial waters had been concluded which included a 
provision that Danish fishermen were allowed to fish outside a straight line 
drawn across the Laholm Golf.
The Tingsrdtt stated, inter alia, that the fact that Denmark, which ”... 
more than any other foreign power had an interest in the opening of the 
Laholm Golf for fishery, had accepted the fore-mentioned starting point 
undeniably constituted a strong support for"43 the public prosecutor’s 
argument that the Laholm Golf was a so-called historic bay under Swedish 
jurisdiction. Accordingly, the shipper was convicted for unlawful fishing in 
Swedish territorial waters. This conviction was subsequently upheld, with
44 Cf. A. Drachmann Bentzon in TfR 1949, p. 206.
41 [Det er givet, ai rekvirenten (okkupationsmagten) og de, der direkte eller indirekte 
udleder deres ret fra ham, ikke kan vsre bedre stillede end efter landkrigsreglementet.]
42 Cf. Halvar G.F. Sundberg: Lag och Trakiat, [Law and Treaty], 3rd edition, Stockholm 
(1942), p. 51.
41 [... mera än nigon annan främmande makt haft intresse av Laholmbuktens öppen- 
hillande för fisket, godtagit förenännda utgängspunkt utgjorde unekligen eu stärkt stod för.]
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reference to its grounds, by both the Hovrdtt and Hdgsta Domstolen.
In this case there was, however, hardly any conflict between international 
law and domestic law. The treaty was applied solely to prove the content of 
domestic law.44 Thus, the decision does not really say anything on the 
relationship between international law and domestic Swedish law, and it can 
certainly not be taken as a proof that international law is part of domestic 
Swedish law.
7.4. Tentative Conclusions.
If there is an internal source of law which can be interpreted in several 
equally acceptable ways this is in principle a situation where the question 
whether or not there is a conflict between international and domestic law can 
be raised. Here it is established in legal writings and confirmed in judicial 
practice that the person or authority applying the law shall choose the inter­
pretation which corresponds with the international source of law, cf. section
7.2. This is generally regarded as a manifestation of the rule o f interpretation.
Moreover, it follows from the case-law discussed in section 7.3 that 
international law and the ECHR certainly play a more prominent role in 
judicial practice than presupposed in the principle o f presumption. Thus there 
exists a positive interaction between international law and domestic law 
which, inter alia, manifests itself in the fact that the courts, in particular Nor­
wegian courts, on a number of occasions have applied international law in 
cases in which there was no risk that domestic law would be contrary to 
international law. It should in particular be pointed out that in these cases the 
courts have applied domestic law in accordance with often quite unclear rules 
of international law. This may probably be most appropriate regarded as an 
attempt to enforce international law by applying it at the domestic level or 
as an attempt to harmonize international law and domestic law. This is in 
itself an interesting aspect of the issue since it shows that the principle o f 
presumption is not qualified to explain the process of the application of 
international law in domestic law and provide clear guidelines as to the 
resolving of such conflicts. As indicated in section 2.3, this is probably due 
to the fact that the principle has two different functions; it serves both as
44 Cf. Espersen (1968), pp. 289 f. See also Brynolf Eng: Tillämpningen av irUernalionella 
överenskommelser i intern svensk rätt, [The Application of International Agreements in 
Domestic Swedish Law], NTfIR 1938, pp. 94 ff„ at p. 107; and Stig Jägerskiold: Folkrätt och 
innomstatlig rätt, [International Law and Domestic law], Stockholm (1955), p. 206.
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legitimation for the application of international law in the domestic legal 
order and as a principle of interpretation for conflicts between international 
law and domestic law.
Finally, on the basis of UfR 1972.600 it may be concluded that, in cases 
in which the Legislature has incorporated a treaty passively and this subse­
quently proves to be an insufficient fulfilment of the treaty, the courts will 
grant the administration a margin of appreciation in the sense that in their 
application of domestic law the courts will follow the interpretation on the 
basis of which it was considered unnecessary to incorporate the treaty.
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CHAPTER 8
Direct Application of the European Convention
8.1. Introduction.
In chapter 7 the cases in which the ECHR and other international instruments 
were applied as a means of interpretation relating to the domestic rule at 
issue were discussed. To a large extent these cases were characterized by the 
fact that international law did not lay down clear requirements on domestic 
law. Accordingly, the question of how conflicts between international law 
and domestic law should be resolved played a fairly unobtrusive role. In this 
chapter, emphasis will be placed on the resolving of potential conflicts 
between international law and domestic law, and the cases in which the 
ECHR and international law in general have been applied directly will be 
discussed. By direct application of the Convention is understood the fact that 
Scandinavian courts rely on it per se and indeed apply and interpret its 
provisions qua its pursuasive force, although it has not formally been 
incorporated into domestic law (see supra section 2.4). It should be stressed 
once again that the distinction made here between international law as a 
means of interpretation and the direct application of it is based solely on 
practical considerations - namely the degree to which international law has 
been applied in domestic law in the case at issue - and thus does not reflect 
any analytical distinction.
It may be useful to make a few distinctions in this connection in order 
to emphasize certain characteristics as to the degree to which the ECHR has 
been applied in the different cases. Accordingly, in section 8.2 cases in which 
the ECHR and international law in general has been applied directly will be 
discussed. Section 8.3 is reserved for cases in which the domestic courts ex 
officio have made references to the Convention. In section 8.4 the cases in 
which a judgment from the European Court concerning the country at issue 
has had a major impact on the national Court’s reasoning as to the inter­
pretation of domestic law will be examined. Finally, in section 8.5 the case- 
law discussed in this chapter will be summed up and an attempt to draw 
some conclusions will be made.
8.2. Direct Application of International Sources of Law.
8.2.1. International Law in General.
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The cases discussed in this section may at a first glance seem to be very 
different, causing only a minor impact on the application of the ECHR at the 
domestic level. This is true as regards the kinds of the international 
instruments applied in these cases; none is as forceful an international 
instrument as the ECHR (see infra section 10.2). However, one point 
common to all the cases stands out: international law has been applied to a 
greater extent than can reasonably be explained solely by referring to the 
principle o f presumption.
In UfR 1982.1128, which concerned the immunity of states, an embassy 
had concluded a private law contract containing a provision that disputes sho­
uld be brought before a Danish court. In the proceedings the embassy 
nevertheless invoked its diplomatic immunity. This was turned down by the 
Ho jester et which stated that
"... neither under the provisions of the Vienna Convention,1 nor under the rules of 
international law concerning the immunity of states, is an embassy considered 
exempted from lawsuits when that embassy has concluded a private law contract 
which contains a stipulation that disputes shall be determined by the courts of the 
recipient country.”2
The difference between this case and the afore-mentioned UfR 1942.1002 and 
NRt. 1938.584 (see supra section 7.2) is presumably not due to changes in 
domestic law but to a development in international law. In this case the 
Hojesteret based its decision to a large extent on an interpretation of general 
principles of international law, since the (incorporated) Vienna Convention 
did not provide an answer to the question raised. Thus the Court seems to 
have presupposed that an embassy is normally immune, unless international 
law, as an exception, deprives it of this protection.3
The decision may be viewed as an example of the application of the rule
1 The Vienna Convention was adopted into domestic Danish law by Act No. 67 of 8 
March 1968 on Diplomatie Relations. As an example of the application of this convention, see 
UfR 1989.873.
2 [... hverken i henhold til Wienerkonventions bestemmelser eller de folkereilige regier om 
staters immunitet findes en ambassade fritaget for sogsmil p i grundlag af en af ambassaden
indgiet privatretiig kontrakt, der indeholder en bestemmelse om, at tvistigheder skai afgores
ved modtagerstatens domstole.)
5 See Madsen (1986), p. 36.
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of presumption.* This presupposes, however, that the provisions of the Admi­
nistration of Justice Act concerning the local jurisdiction of the courts as well 
as the provisions of the Vienna Convention were interpreted in the light of 
international law under the presumption that the Legislature had not intended 
to legislate in violation of this. It seems therefore more appropriate to regard 
the decision as a direct application of international law.5 The grounds of the 
judgment are, to a considerable extent, based on an interpretation of in­
ternational customary law and there seems to be no indication of considera­
tions concerning the application of domestic law, apart from the Vienna 
Convention.
Such a direct application of international law seems also to have been 
presupposed in the decision in UfR 1962.617 taken by the K0benhavns Byret 
in its capacity of court of execution in which it is stated that the Court ex of­
ficio  should see to it that execution did not violate the right of exterritoriality. 
Although the case is a City Court case, it should nevertheless be regarded as 
expressive of the legal position in this respect.6 The fact that this decision 
has been published - an exception with decisions from the City Courts - is 
further proof that it should be assumed to have general validity.
In UfR 19S3.S9S it was assumed that the provisions of an international convention 
on the conveyance of goods, which had been proclaimed in the Danish Law Gazette, 
were binding on Danish subjects, even though it derogated from the rules which 
under the State Railways Act applied to the conveyance of goods on the Danish State 
Railways’ own sections. The 0stre Landsret scrutinized the travaux préparatoires 
of the State Railways Act very carefully and - on the basis of a strained interpreta­
tion - came to the result that this statute could be regarded as providing sufficient 
authorization to bring such conventions into force in domestic law. Thus, the 
domestic provision was found to be in conformity with the convention. However, the 
City Court had had no doubts in applying the convention directly, since - as it 
intrepidly stated in its decision - it cannot ”... be decisive that the rules of the 
international agreement do not have the force of law or that they are published solely 
in the Danish Law Gazette, Section C.’7
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* Eilschou Holm (198IX P- 127. finds it more appropriate to regard the acceptance in 
Danish law of the mles of extraterritoriality of international law as based on legal custom 
rather than on a "flimsy" principle of interpretation.
5 Cf. Madsen (1986), p. 36.
‘ Byretterne, of which there are 82, are the lowest instances of law courts in Denmark.
7 [... heller ikke [kan] vxre afgerende, at regleme i den intemationale overenskomst ikke 
har lovfcraft, eller at de kim er optaget i Lovtidende C.]
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With regard to the Norwegian prosecution of war criminals, both the provi­
sional Royal ordinances issued during the war and the later statutory 
provisions referred directly to the laws and customs of warfare. Accordingly, 
it waS a condition for establishing criminal liability that the international rules 
of warfare had been violated. Moreover, the rules of international law were 
actively taken into consideration in the courts’ reasoning both in deciding the 
range of the Norwegian legislation and in meting out the punishment.
As regards the authority for pronouncing the death penalty, the 
H0jesteret, sitting in plenum, in NRt. 1946.198 in the Klinge Case8 had to 
deal with the question of retrospectivity. The background was an extension 
of the power to pass death sentences which had been made just before the 
end of the war by virtue of a provisional Royal ordinance of 4 May 1945. 
The H0yesterett held by a majority of 9 to 4 that a sentence of death could 
be passed despite the fact that this penalty was not authorized by Norwegian 
legislation relating to the crimes in question at the time they took place. A 
decisive link in the chain of reasoning for this decision, which was subse­
quently followed in similar cases, were the rules of international law. A 
group of seven members within the majority, who thus constituted a majority 
of the Court, grounded their decision expressly on the Norwegian Royal 
ordinance and found that it could apply to previous transgressions, despite the 
general constitutional prohibition against giving laws a retrospective effect, 
embodied in Article 97 of the Norwegian Constitution, because "... both the 
criminal liability and the extent of the penal sanction had already been 
established in the rules of international law regarding the laws and customs 
of warfare".
The international character of the prosecution of the war criminals 
constituted an important element in the reasoning of the judgment. Justice 
Skau delivering the first opinion, as a representative of this majority, main­
tained - prior to the Nuremberg judgment - that international law had 
established individual criminal responsibility in respect of the acts under 
discussion, and further, that according to international law the most severe 
penalties, including a sentence of death, could be inflicted for those war
* The case is discussed by Smith (1964). pp. 364 f.; Smith (1968), pp. 172 ff.; Carsten 
Smith: Grunnloven og folkeretten ved krigsforbrydelser, [The Constitution and International 
Law in Connection wiih War Crimes), in Statsliv og rettsteori, Oslo (1978), pp. 22 ff.; Rolf 
Normann Torgersen: Klinge-saken i Norges Hoyesterett, [The Klinge Case in the Norwegian 
Supreme Court], UfR 1946 B, pp. 192 ff.; and Alf Ross: Klingesagen, [The Klinge Case], UfR 
1946 B, pp. 247 ff.
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crimes.9 He then dealt with the question whether the constitutional provision 
against retrospective effect could prevent "... the incorporation of the 
international rules by way of the Royal ordinance of 1945 from having effect 
as regards the war crimes committed before the passing of the ordinance". 
His answer was in the negative, and his reasons were given in statements of 
this type:
"The foreign war criminals who are sentenced in Norway will not be sentenced for 
an act that was not previously punishable, nor be sentenced to a penalty that could 
not previously have been inflicted, even though one assumes that a Norwegian court 
could not have done without the Royal ordinance of 1945. But here, then, I accord 
decisive weight to the fact that what characterizes the acts now in question is not that 
they are crimes according to Norwegian law, but that they are war crimes. And I 
further emphasize the correspondingly international character of the proceedings 
against - and punishment of - the war criminals.”10
In a later passage it was underlined that the acts perpetrated by the defen­
dants
”... at the time when they were carried out, were crimes according to international 
law and were punishable with the most severe penalty [...] The passing of the Royal 
ordinance of 1945 was a link in - or a consequence of - Norway's agreement with 
the allied nations on punishment of the war criminals and on the sharing of these 
proceedings. The legal claim to such punishment on the part of the allied belligerent 
nations - including Norway - arose by virtue of the rules of international law 
regarding the laws and customs of warfare, and with a substance determined by 
these, the very moment the war crimes were committed."11
The effect of the Royal ordinance of 1945 was then in reality only that, with 
respect to the requirement in the Norwegian constitution, any punishment 
must be authorized by Norwegian law,12 and it opened the way for Nor­
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* In a comment on the case, Alf Ross, op.ciL, asserted that this was an erroneous 
interpretation of international law. There was, according to Ross, no norm of international law 
which “prohibited war crimes” and inflicted a penalty for them on individuals. The states have 
in this respect an extended jurisdiction to prosecute war criminals, but this is certainly not the 
same as saying that punishment for war crimes is directly criminalized under international law.
10 Here cited in English from Smith (1968), p. 173.
n Ibid.
12 See Article 96 of the Norwegian Constitution which reads: “No one must be convicted 
except according to law, or be punished except according to judicial sentence. Interrogation 
by torture must not take place", cf. Albert P. Blaustein & Gisbert H. Flanz (eds.): Constitu­
tions o f the Countries of the World, Binder XI, June 1988, p. 7.
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wegian courts to give effect to "the legal claim to punishment previously 
acquired".
The other group within the majority of the Court avoided the question of 
retroactive effect, for the two judges in question considered it unnecessary to 
found their judgments on the Norwegian ordinance, but held that the 
defendants could be sentenced by virtue of a direct application of the 
universal rules of warfare, which were immediately binding upon him.13
Some Norwegian scholars, including Professor Carsten Smith, have had 
difficulty in accepting this decision and its application of international law, 
since the application in this instance worked to the detriment of the 
defendants and did so in relation to some of the most important guarantees 
of justice embodied in the Norwegian constitution.14 It can also be asserted 
that, as regards the main and decisive view taken, one is faced with an 
application of international law that is aimed primarily at extending and 
giving effect to some of the national legal rules. However, at the same time 
it must be recognized that this decision reflects the same main guideline for 
the application of international law as in the majority of cases of the 
Norwegian purge after the German occupation: an interpretation of Nor­
wegian law with the aim of granting the greatest possible domestic effect to 
the rules that the H0yesterett regarded as the applicable rules of international
13 This point was partly specified to the effect that the Norwegian ordinance of 194S was 
to be understod as providing mere rules of interpretation, and partly to the effect that enemies 
invading the country stand outside the Norwegian legal community. In a later Htyesterett 
decision in NRl 1947.434 this line was developed in greater detail in a seperate opinion by 
Justice Schelderup, in which the constitutional requirement as to Norwegian authority for a 
punishment was subjected to a more thorough analysis. It was submitted here, that in a legal 
field such as the one under discussion, where penal provisions could not, by virtue of the 
circumstances, have crystallized into statutory form, it must suffice that this penal rule was 
sufficiently clear with regard to the nature of the act and the threat of punishment.
14 In a statement of 29 June 1945, submitted to the Committee of Justice in the Storting, 
when passing a bill on a contemporary statute upholding, inter alia, the Royal Ordinance of
4 May 1945, Professor Frede Castberg and Professor Johs. Anden«s stated that applying the 
Royal Ordinance of 4 May 1945 is ”...clearly contrary to Article 97 of the Constitution
Their reasons for submitting the statement to the parliamentary committee was that "... 
when we have felt it our duty to cry off, this has first and foremost been caused by the 
consideration for the lasting interests which the preservation of our Norwegian legal tradition 
represents. With the indignation which today rightly reigns towards the conduct of the war 
criminals, perhaps there are many who would accord less weight to the constitutional 
considerations. One must reckon that in the future the view will change/
[... i klar strid med Grunnlovens § 97.] [NAr vi har folt det som vAr plikt A si fra, sky Ides det 
forst og fremmest hensvnet til de varige interesser som bevarelsen av vAr norske rettstradition 
rcpresenterer. Under den indignasjon som i dag med rette tiersker over krigsforbrytemes 
fremfxrd er det kanskje mange som vil legge mindre vekt p i de grunnlovsmessige hensyn. 
Men en mA regne med at ettertidens syn vil va^e et andet.]
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law.
It seems that Regeringsrduen in RA 1969.K 1020 has presupposed that international 
law can be applied direcdy. However, the case is very special and one should 
probably be careful of not viewing it as an ultimate precedent in this field.
The creauon of the common Scandinavian aircraft carrier Scandinavian Airlines 
System forced the regulating bodies in Denmark, Norway and Sweden to establish 
a parallel co-operation, manifested in the so-called Government Agreement of 21 
December 1951. Under this agreement a joint administrative body, the OPS- 
Committee, was established which was charged with planning the line inspection of 
the three authorities and dealing with common questions.
At a meeting in November 1967, the OPS Committee dealt with the question of 
restricting flying certificates rights on medical grounds. At a meeting in April 1968 
it was decided that the principles already discussed and drafted in the previous meet­
ing should apply in Denmark, Norway and Sweden.
Being faced with an application for renewal of the flying certificate from a pilot, 
the Swedish Civil Aviation Agency decided on 29 August 1968 to refuse renewal on 
medical grounds. The applicant then appealed against the decision. He argued that 
it was all very well that the principles followed harmonized with the rules followed 
in international practice, but that such rules could be followed ”... only on condition 
that they are determined by the Swedish authorities which are to issue the rules in 
question". This meant, he said, that a constant Swedish practice could not be changed 
in any other way except by new Swedish enactments. The decision of the Civil Avia­
tion Agency was therefore not founded on a medical examination of the health of the 
applicant, ”... but on an erroneous [...] decision of principle, taken by the OPS 
Committee.”15 The Agency replied that it was out of the question that it should 
refuse to accept a majority decision taken in these matters by the OTS Committee.
Thereupon, Regeringsrdtten rejected the appeal.
8.2.2. The European Convention.
In an unreported Danish case16 in which an Algerian citizen had been 
convicted of a penal traffic offence, the K0benhavns Byret held th a t"... the 
cost of the interpreter must be borne by the State, cf. Article 6(3)(e) o f the 
Convention for the Protection o f Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 
which have been ratified by Denmark, Regulation No. 20 of 11 January 
1953" (emphasis added). The decision should be seen in connection with 
section 1008 of the Danish Administration of Justice Act, which stipulates 
that "[i]f the accused is convicted [...] he shall be required to pay the State 
the necessary expenses of the trial."17 The case is now considered a leading
15 Cited in English from Sundberg (1988), p. 195.
14 Judgment of 25 April 1966, Case No. 21472/1965, I.
17 [Findes sigtede skyldig (...] er han pligtig at erstatte det offentlige de nodvendige
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case in the application of the the Convention;1* it was followed by a circular 
from the Ministry of Justice to public prosecutors and courts stating that the 
costs of interpretation were to be bome by the State.19
The case is remarkable on two points. First, references to the Convention 
are made in judgment. This is in itself noteworthy since there was at that 
time no tradition for making references to unincorporated treaties in Danish 
judgments. Second, the decision is based on an original interpretation of 
Article 6 of the Convention. The question of the interpretation of Article 6 
in relation to the costs of inteipreters in criminal trials was first decided by 
the European Court in 1978.20
Thus, the case illustrates that an underlying treaty obligation may have 
a considerable impact on the interpretation of a domestic provision which 
was in force at the time of the ratification of the treaty and which was not, 
at that time, considered to be contrary to the treaty obligations.21 One 
should, however, note that there was no question of setting aside a domestic 
statutory provision; the domestic rule was interpreted in the light of the 
Convention which, consequently, produced the effect that a circular was set 
aside. Moreover, it should be noted that the application of the Convention in 
the case resulted in a better legal position for the individual than provided for 
within the domestic legal order. In such cases the tendency to apply non-in- 
corporated treaties must be assumed to be more pronounced.22
In a recently published article,23 reference was made to an unreported case from the
udgifter, som er medgSet til sagens behandling.]
'* Cf. Eilschou Holm (1981), p. 129; and Carl Aage Nargaard: Den europeeiske 
menneskerettigheds¡convention og dansk ret (The European Convention on Human Rights and 
Danish Law], UfR 1987 B, pp. 73 ff., at p. 75.
19 Circular No. 77 of 9 May 1967, which repealed the older circular No. 299 of 23 
November 1922.
The 1967 circular has now been repealed and substituted by the Ministry of Justice's 
circular of 7 July 1989 on the application to the payment of the costs of interpretation in 
which it is laid down that the costs of interpretation in some specified civil cases are also to 
be bome by the State. This change was necissitated by the European Court of Human Rights' 
Judgment in the Oitiirk. Case (cf. Eur. Court H.R., Oztiirk Case, Series A. Vol. 73 (1984)), cf. 
The Ministry of Justice's letter of 7 July 1989 (j.nr. 1989-1001-51) to the courts.
10 See Eur. Court H.R., Case o f Luedicke, Belkacem, and Koc, Series A. Vol. 29 (1978).
21 Compare UfR 1972.600 (see supra section 7.3).
21 Cf. Madsen (1986), p. 39; and Zahle (1989), Vol. 2. p. 108.
°  Cf. Holst-Christensen (1989), pp. 55 ff.
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Vestre Landsret24 concerning the smuggling of big quantities of hashish into 
Denmark in which the Convention should have had a considerable impact, although 
this does not appear from the Court’s ruling. The circumstances were as follows:
The public prosecutor asked for permission to read evidence in the form of two 
policemen’s reports which contained the interrogation of two witnesses carried out 
in Belgium. Alternatively the public prosecutor asked for permission to cross-exami- 
ne the two detective inspectors who had carried out the interrogation in Belgium. In 
support of this request it was alleged that the persons in question, charged with 
trading hashish, had been called as witnesses but had not wanted to appear before the 
Court and that, under Belgian law, it was not possible to cross-examine the two 
witnesses in Belgium in the presence of the defence counsels.
The High Court rejected both requests on the following grounds: 'The 
application of policemen’s reports as evidence instead of cross-examination before 
the court of the person who has made a statement contained in the policeman’s report 
involves considerable doubt as to the rule of law, particularly because the counsel for 
the defence is prevented from addressing questions to the witnesses.
The doubts are, in particular, considerable in a case like the present one where 
the policeman’s report does not concern a minor count but must be assumed to serve 
as essential evidence of what quantities of hashish the accused [...] had bought."23
It is hereinafter stated in the article that in its ruling the Court paid special 
attention to the Unterpertinger Case before the European Court. In this case the 
European Court expressed itself as follows: "In itself, the reading out of statements 
in this way cannot be regarded as being inconsistent with Article 6(1) and 3(d) of the 
Convention, but the use made of them as evidence must nevertheless comply with 
the rights of the defence [...] However, it is clear from the judgment of 4 June 1980 
that the Court of Appeal based the applicant’s conviction mainly on the statements 
made by [...] to the police. It did not treat these simply as items o f information but 
as proof o f the truth of the accusations made by the woman at the time" (emphasis 
added). Then, the Court held that Article 6(3Xd) of the Convention had been 
violated.
Thus, the High Court was in line with the European Court’s argumentation in the 
case, but an explicit reference to the Convention or the judgment was, as mentioned, 
not made. The impact of the Convention must be assumed to have been considerable, 
since section 877(3) of the Administration of Justice Act contains no guidelines as 
to which situations would enable the Court, as an exception, to permit the reading
* Judgment of 20 September 1988, Case No. V.L. S 1249/1988.
23 [Anvendelse af politirapporter som bevismiddel i stedet for vidneafharing i retten af den. 
der har afgivet forklaring til politirapporten, er forbundet med vassentlige retssikker- 
hedsm*ssige betxnkeligheder, navnlig fordi liltaltes forsvarer afskaeres fra muligheden for at 
stille sporgsmil til vidnet.
Betxnkelighedeme er saerlig store i et tilfelde som det foreliggende, hvor politirapporten 
ikke vedr0rer forhold af underordnet betydning, men mi antages at skulle tjene som et vcsent-
ligt bevis for, hvilke kvanta hash tiltalte [...] har aftaget]
26 Cf. Eur. Court H.R., Unterpertinger Case, Series A, Vol. 110 (1987), para. 33.
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of documents embraced by the provision.27
In a subsequent ruling of 2 February 19892* in a similar case the Vestre 
Landsret literally repeated its reasoning in the above-mentioned case. However, in 
this case reference to Article 6(1) and (3Xd) of the Convention was made in the 
ruling.*9
In these cases, like in UfR 1985.1080 and UfR 1988.440 (see supra section 
6.3), the Danish courts have showed themselves to be even more willing to 
discuss explicitly whether a Danish provision is compatible with the Conven­
tion. The Danish Attorney General and former head of the Law Department 
of the Danish Ministry of Justice, Asbjcrn Jensen, has recently characterized 
the situation as follows:
"In such cases, the courts will often apply the direct test' Whether the step or de­
cision taken is contrary to any provision of the Convention. In other words, the 
courts apply the European Convention on Human Rights as a true source of law 
when they determine the concrete legal contents of their decisions" (emphasis 
added).30
If the decision in the HT Case raises any doubts as to the Hfijesteret’s will­
ingness to apply the Convention directly, a series of decisions from both the 
Hojesteret and the 0stre Landsret in 1989 seems to have gone one step 
further in the application of the Convention. These decisions manifestly 
presuppose that the Convention is a source o f law in domestic Danish law, 
and that the courts are entitled to review the compatibility o f the Convention 
with domestic law.
The first case in this series was UfR 1989.302 which concerned the ques­
tion of whether the detention of an applicant for asylum, whose identity was 
not adequately established, was in accordance with Article 5 of the Conven­
tion. After having laid down that the detention was authorized under Danish 
law, the Kpbenhavns Byret stated in its order "... that such a detention under 
section 37, cf. section 36, of the Aliens Act lies within the framework which
71 See also the 0stre Landsret's ruling of 14 September 1987 (Case No. 0 L  1. afd, kasre 
nr. 246/87), reported as Landsforeningen af Benificerede Advokaters Meddelse No. 143/87.
* Case No. V.L. S 2581/1988.
”  See also the Vestre Landsret’s ruling of 24 April 1990 (Case No. V.L. S 25/1990) in 
a fairly similar case.
30 Cf. Asbj0m Jensen: incorporation o f the European Convention seen from a Danish 
Point o f View in Rehof & Gulmann (1989), pp. 161 ftM at p. 169.
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has been laid down by Art. 5(l)(f) o f the European Convention o f Human 
Rights" (emphasis added).31
The High Court subsequently upheld this order with reference to its 
grounds - after having cited extensive pans of the parties’ submissions before 
the High Court as regards the compatibility of domestic law with the 
Convention.
Whereas the question of the compatibility of domestic law with the Con­
vention in the above-mentioned cases was one of several other questions 
which the Court had to decide, in this case it was, in effect, the only question 
to be decided.
Similarly, in the H0jester et's decision on the merits in UfR 1990.13 the 
relationship between domestic law and the Convention was, in effect, the 
only question to be decided.32
In NRt. 1984.1175 the question at issue was whether a person who had 
been committed to mental hospital under section 39(l)(e) of the Norwegian 
Criminal Code, could also invoke the provision in section 9 a of the Mentally 
111 Persons Act and, on this basis, claim judicial review of the compulsory 
means. Both the Byrett and subsequently the Lagmannsrett were to reject the 
case since, in their view, the courts had no subject-matter jurisdiction in the 
case, because the compulsory means was authorized also under the Penal 
Code and not solely under the Mentally 111 Persons Act. Before the 
H0yesterett the appellant (in the interlocutory proceedings) invoked Article 
5 of the Convention and made specific reference to the Winterwerp Case,33 
the Case o f X  v. the United Kingdom34 and the Case o f Y v. the United 
K in g d o m As regards the general application of the law in the case. Justice 
R0stad, speaking for a unanimous Court, first observed that neither the 
wording in the Act of 1961 - such as this reads after the amendment in 1969
- nor the travaux préparatoires give direct guidance as to whether the access
Jl [... at en sidan frihedsberovelse efter udlaendingelovens § 37, jf. § 36, ligger indenfor 
de rammer, som er fasdagt ved artikel 5, stk. 1, litra f, i Den europ*iske Menneskeret- 
tighedskonvendon.]
”  See also the Htjesteret's judgment in UfR 1989.928 (see infra section 8.3) and the 
Ostre Landsret's judgment in UfR 1989.775 (see infra chapter 9).
”  Cf. Eur. Court H.R.. Winterwerp Case, Series A. Vol. 33 (1980).
M Cf. Eur. Court H.R., Case o fX  v. the United Kingdom, Series A, Vol. 46 (1982).
55 Application No. 6870/75 Rights, cf. D.R., pp. 37 ff.
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to claim juducial review is also open for the one who is committed to mental 
hospital on the basis of a judgment. He then continued:
The decision to be taken must accordingly take into account all relevant con­
siderations, in particular the consideration that Norwegian law, as far as possible, 
should be presupposed to be in accordance with treaties to which Norway are bound
- in this case the European Convention on Human Rights of 4 November 1950" 
(emphasis added).3*
Then, the judge discussed, quite extensively, the invoked case-law from the 
European Commission and Court and concluded that the Mentally 111 Persons 
Act should be interpreted in such a way as to reflect the view put forward by 
the Strasbourg organs. Accordingly, he found that the courts had subject- 
matter jurisdiction in such cases, and the case at issue was rescinded and 
remitted to retrial.
Although the case apparently, in the Hpyesteretf s opinion, concerned a 
question to which domestic law did not provide a clear answer, and could 
thus be viewed as an example of an very extensive application of the 
principle o f presumption, it is nevertheless of much interest regarding the 
application of the Convention.37 First, it was generally stated that domestic 
Norwegian law should be presupposed to comply with international law; the 
legal doctrine has traditionally expressed itself in somewhat more guarded 
terms and laid down that domestic law should be presumed to be compatible 
with international law. Thus the principle o f presumption seems to have been 
tightened in this case. Second, the extensive discussion of the interpretation 
of the Strasbourg case-law, in which Norway had not been involved, seems 
not only to be the first example of such in-depth discussion of Strasbourg 
case-law in Scandinavia, but also reflects how seriously the Convention is 
taken in the Hpyesterett. Third, in its concrete application of the law the
* [Avgjerelsen m i treffes ut fra de reelle hensyn som her gjer sig geldende, herunder det 
hensyn at norsk lov s i vidt mulig mi forutsettes A vaere i samsvar med traktater som Norge 
er bundet av - i dene tilfelle Den europeiske menneskerettighetskonvensjon av 4. november 
1950.]
37 It should be noted that the Norwegian Act of Criminal Procedure in section 4 (before
1 January 1986, section 5) contains a provision laying down that the Act should be interpreted 
with the reservations deriving from international law.
However, neither the Htyesterett nor the parties seem to have been aware of this fact. 
Thus the Htyesterett's argumentation in this case should be viewed as regarding a 'non- 
incorporated' treaty although, strictly speaking, one is here within the sphere of sector- 
monism, cf. Eivind Smith: Domstolskontroll med fovgivning i Norge etter ca. ¡970, [Judicial 
Control of Legislation in Norway approximatly after 1970), TfR 1990, p. 106 note 17.
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H&yesterett paid so much attention to the Convention that it seems to be 
more appropriate to view the decision as one in which the provision in 
section 39 of the Penal Code, in effect, was set aside as a result of the 
conflict with the Convention.38
In his partly concurring opinion in NRt. 1989.1327 Professor Carsten 
Smith, acting as temporary appointed justice in the H0yesterett, found it 
necessary to disapprove a statement made in a dissenting opinion in the 
Lagmannsrett to the effect that no judicial review would have been possible 
of the prosecuting authority’s decisions regarding security measures under 
section 39 of the Penal Code:
"In reply [...] it should be pointed out that the Supreme Court has decided [in NRt. 
1984.1175], amongst other things on the basis of Article 5 § 4 of the... [Conven­
tion]... as interpreted by the Court and Commission, that a person subject to security 
measures and also detained in a mental hospital has the right to obtain a decision at 
reasonable intervals as to whether continued detention is lawful. I maintain that this 
right to judicial review which is enschrined in Article 5 § 4 and which the Supreme 
Court has established for one category of persons subject to security measures, must 
be applied by the courts also in relation to other persons subject to such measures 
who are deprived of their liberty in other institutions."39
The majority of the H0yesterett did not find that the case gave cause to rule 
on this point. Accordingly, Professor Smith’s opinion appears to be an obiter 
dictum.40
“  Cf. Aall (1989), p. 635; and Eivind Smith. op.ciL, p. 106. See also Eckhoff (1987), p.
268.
”  Here cited in English from Eur. Court H.R., Case of E v. Norway, Series A, Vol. 181 
(1990), para. 42.
40 Another interesting obiter dictum was given by Justice Acts land in NRt. 1983.1004 in 
a case which touched upon the question of the relationship between the Norwegian Abortion 
Act and the Convention: "Although there are strong indications that the case could have been 
decided on the grounds argued here by the Government with reference to the Appeal Court’s 
judgment, I find it unsatisfactory under the circumstances to ignore the question of the legal 
validity of the Abortion Act [..,11 start with the question of international law, where the provi­
sion of Article 2 of the European Human Rights Convention is particularly important. This 
Convention, to which Norway has acceded, is legally binding on the contracting States. A 
somewhat controversial question in the literature on international law is whether and to what 
extent the provision of Article 2 imposes requirements as to the contents of abortion laws. The 
Austrian Constitutional Court has in a decision of 11 October 1974 considered that the 
provision according to its contents does not comprise the unborn. I for my part do not find it 
necessary to decide whether it is justified to rely on such an absolute interpretation. In any 
case the provision must be regarded as not imposing any far-reaching restrictions on the 
legislator s right to set the conditions for abortion. The Norwegian Act, under which the 
woman herself makes the final decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy provided 
the operation can be made before the end of the twelfth week of pregnancy, is similar to the
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In a ruling of 16 March 199041 the Hpyesterett’s Interlocutory Appeals 
Committee seems to have paid decisive attention to the Hauschildt Case,42 
although this does not appear clearly from the ruling. The circumstances were 
as follows:
By an order of the Byrett in its capacity of court of examination and 
summary jurisdiction the appellant was remanded in custody for a specific 
period. The appellant brought an interlocutory appeal against the said order 
to the Lagmannsrett and further to the Interlocutory Appeals Committee of 
the Supreme Court.43 The appellant contended that the judge who had 
pronounced the said order for remand in custody in the Court of Examination 
and Summary Jurisdiction was disqualified from being president of the Court 
in the case relating to an extension of the term of security measures. More 
specifically the appellant contended that by making the order for a remand 
in custody, the judge had made up his mind as regards the veiy issues that 
relate to the conditions for an extension of the term of security measures. He 
had made up his mind as regards the relationship to Article 4(1) of the 
Seventh Protocol, and the risk of recidivism, it was asserted, and he had 
considered it probable that the case would end in an extension of the term of 
security measures. The judge had therefore considered so many aspects of the 
case that he must be regarded as disqualified to hear the case, cf. section 108 
of the Courts of Justice Act and Article 6 of the Convention. In particular, 
the Hauschildt Judgment was invoked.
The Committee first ruled that according to section 171(1)(3) of the Act 
of Criminal Procedure it is a condition that remand in custody "... is deemed 
to be necessary in order to prevent him from again committing a criminal 
act” It appeared from the travaux préparatoires of the Act that this provision 
means that there must be "... a high degree of preponderance of probability" 
that the convicted person will commit new felonies if he is released before
legislation of a number of countries belonging to the same culture, countries which also have 
acceded to the European Human Rights Convention. This is hardly immaterial to the 
considerations of a matter of international law.” Here cited in English nom Application No. 
11045/84, cf. 42 D.R., pp. 251 f., which application the Commission declared inadmissible.
“  Case No. Inr 470/1990, jnr 247/1990.
41 Cf. Eur. Court H.R., Hauschildt Case, Series A, Vol. 154 (1989) (see infra section 8.4
and chapter 16).
41 See the ruling of the Hpyesterett's Interlocutory Appeals Committee of 16 March 1990 
(Case No. Inr 471/1990, jnr 289/1990) (see supra section 6.3).
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the case is decided.44 In the order for a remand in custody this condition 
had been found to be satisfied. It stated that there was "a great preponderance 
of probability" of new criminal acts being committed. The Committee then 
went on:
"The question whether there is a risk of recidivism must be a crucial factor in 
deciding whether there are grounds for continued preventive supervision [security 
measures]. Since the examining judge has in the remand proceedings already had to 
decide whether there is a strong risk of recidivism and has found this to be the case, 
this will make it difficult for him not to proceed on the basis that a risk of recidivism 
exists which provides grounds for continued preventive supervision in a subsequent 
case relating to preventive supervision.
The Interlocutory Appeals Commiuee has therefore concluded that the district 
judge should withdraw from the case relating to preventive supervision, cf. section 
108 of the Courts of Justice Act.”45
The ruling is to a very large extent similar to the Danish Supreme Court’s 
ruling in UfR 1990.13 which was pronounced a few months before (see infra 
section 8.4). What is common for the rulings is that they both give a broad 
interpretation of the Hauschildt Judgment and apply this broad interpretation 
of the judgment when construing domestic law. In this ruling it seems to 
have been so much a matter of course for the Committee the Hauschildt 
Judgment should be applied directly that it did not mention it at all. When 
one compares the reasoning of the Committee with para. 52 of the Hauschildt 
Judgment it is not difficult to see from where the Committee got its 
inspiration.
8.3. "Ex Officio" References to the European Convention.
Although the cases discussed in section 8.2.2 have gone quite far in their 
application of the Convention in domestic law, this has usually taken place 
on the basis of the parties’ submissions. However, in some recent cases it 
appears as the Court ex officio has made references to the Convention. Since 
in criminal cases the courts are not bound by the parties’ submissions as to 
the law of the case, it is disputable whether or not one should regard the 
courts’ ex officio application of the Convention as the expression of an even
44 Cf. Kongeriket Norges Stortings Forhandlinger, Odelstings Proposition No. 53 (1983- 
84), pp. 164 f.
45 Here cited in English from Eur. Court H.R., Case o f E v. Norway, Series A. Vol. 181 
(1990), Doc. Cour (90) 64 rev.
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greater willingness to apply the Convention than that which follows from 
cases in which a party has invoked one or more of its provisions. On the 
other hand, such ex officio reference to the Convention shows at any rate that 
the courts regard the Convention, when relevant to the case at issue, as a 
source of law which they must include in their reasoning together with other 
relevant domestic sources of law,
UfR 1989.928 concerned the question of whether or not the courts had 
subject-matter jurisdiction to review certain legal questions, related to the 
social authorities* decisions to remove children from their homes without the 
consent of the holders) of parental rights.44 The majority of the High Court 
had, on the basis of an interpretation of the Social Assistance Act (Act No. 
333 of 19 June 1974), established that it had subject matter jurisdiction to 
review the questions raised in the case at issue. A unanimous H0jesteret 
upheld this decision with reference to its grounds but added that, apparently 
ex officio, the provisions in Chapter VII of the Social Assistance Act should 
be interpreted in accordance with the European Court’s decisions on similar 
questions.
In NJA 1984.903 Hogsta Domstolen seems definitely to have dissociated 
itself from, inter alia, its own previously strong obiter dicta statements on the 
transformation theory.*1 The question at issue was a request from the Italian 
authorities for the extradition of a Canadian citizen who had been convicted 
in absentia in Italy. It appears from the decision that the Court ex officio 
discussed whether the trial in Italy was in accordance with the guarantees 
stipulated in Article 6(3) of the Convention. On the relationship between the 
Convention and domestic Swedish law, the Court stated:
"Although the Conventions thus have not been incorporated into domestic law, 
Sweden’s affiliation to them should... be assumed to underline the importance of 
Sweden not accepting, in the course of applying Swedish law concerning extradition, 
a judgment in absentia which was produced under conditions that are irreconcilable 
with fundamental principles of the legal order in the Realm and furthermore 
irreconcilable with Sweden's obligations under the said provisions" (emphasis 
added).4®
44 The High Court’s decision is reported seperately in UfR 1988.404.
47 Cf. Sundberg (1988), p. 202.
a  [Ehuru slledes konventionema inte infdrlivats med svensk lag fir Sveriges ansluming 
till desamma [...] anses understryka vikten av att Sverige vid tillSmpning av svensk lag rorande 
utl&nning inte godkftmer en utevarodotn som tilkommit under fttrnAllanden som i i  ofOrenliga
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This attitude seems to be a return to a more open attitude vis-à-vis the 
Convention in domestic Swedish law. Thus, the judgment shows that before 
Swedish courts it is of great importance to know and invoke the Conven­
tion.49 Hogsta Domstolen has in two subsequent decisions confirmed this 
view.
In NJA 1989.131 the crucial question was, briefly speaking, what should 
be understood by "deprivation of liberty" under Chapter 2, section 9, of the 
Instrument of Government. To answer this question the Court got con­
siderable guidance from the Convention:
"In this connection certain provisions of the European Convention are also of [some] 
interest; even though the Convention does not form part of Swedish law, it is natural 
that its position in questions of rights influences the interpretation of the Instrument 
of Government [...]
Some guidance for the judgment could be derived from the European Court’s 
practice regarding the meaning of the conception of deprivation of liberty, something 
which has decisive significance also for the application of the Convention in a case 
like the present one" (emphasis added).50
The Court then went on to discuss the case-law of the European Court, in 
particular the Guzzardi Case? 1 and concluded on this basis that there was 
no "deprivation of liberty" within the meaning of Chapter 2, section 9, of the 
Instrument of Government in this case. Accordingly, it follows from the 
Court’s line of reasoning that the Convention was ascribed considerable, 
possibly decisive, significance in the interpretation of the relevant domestic 
constitutional provision.52
"Ex Officio" References to the ECHR
med grundlMggande princippcr for ràttsordningen hàr i riket och tillika ofòrenliga med Sveriges 
à tag an den enligt nàmnda konventioner.]
49 Cf. Tomas Nilsson: Mdnskliga ràttigheter i Hogsta Domstolan, [Human Rights in the 
Supreme Court), Advokaten 1985, pp. 171 ff.
50 [I detta sammanhang ar ocksà vissa bestammelser i europakonventionen av intresse; 
àven om konventionen inte utgòr svensk ràtt àr det naturligt att dess stàndpunkt i ràt- 
tighetsfràgor pàverkar tolkningen av regeringsformen [...]
En viss ledning fòr innebòrden av begreppet kan hamtas fràn Europadomstolens praxis 
angàende innebòrden av begreppet frihetsberóvande, nAgot som fAr avgjòrande betydelse ocksà 
for konventionens tillàmplighet i fall som det aktuella.]
51 Cf. Eur. Court H.R., Guzzardi Case, Series A, Vol. 39 (1981).
52 In Hogsta Domstolen’s judgment of 11 May 1990 (Case No. 93/90) the minority, in its 
dissenting opinion, referred to the European Court’s decision in the Unterpertinger and 
Kostovsfu cases in the same way as to a domestic precedent.
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8.4. Judgments from the European Court of Human Rights as Precedents 
in Domestic Law.
When the European Commission or Court has decided a case to which the 
Danish. Norwegian or Swedish State has been a party the question of what 
significance should be ascribed to the decision in the domestic application of 
law arises. Article 53 of the Convention prescribes that the judgments of the 
European Court shall be considered binding in respect to the Respondent 
State and only with regard to the specific factual situation at issue in the case 
in question. But what is the situation if no measures have been taken on the 
legislative or administrative level? Are judgments of the Court considered 
precedents in domestic law?53 How can the normative effects of the 
judgment in subsequent cases before the Scandinavian courts be described? 
This question is first and foremost interesting when the State is found to have 
violated the Convention, yet it may also provide the Court with an argument 
in its application of domestic law in cases in which the State is not found to 
have violated the Convention. Scandinavian case-law is not particularly rich 
in cases which illustrate the impact of a judgment from the European Court 
on domestic law, but a few very recent decisions are certainly interesting in 
this respect.
After the operation of the provisional act on compulsory civilian service 
for dentists in Norway mentioned in NRl 1961.1350 (see supra section 6.3) 
had been prolonged, the Norwegian Association of Dentists launched a (new) 
case on the constitutionality of the Act and its compatibility with Article 4 
of the Convention. In the Htyesterett’s decision in NRl 1966.935 Justice 
Heiberg, speaking for a unanimous court, held:
"The Provisional Act of 21 June 1956 relating to compulsory public service by 
dentists is contrary neither to section 105 of the Constitution, nor to Article 4 of the 
Convention, which prohibits forced or compulsory labour. In this connection, the 
Court refers to the grounds on which, on 17 December 1963, a majority of the 
European Commission of Human Rights declared inadmissible, as manifestly ill- 
founded, application no. 1468/62 by Iversen against Norway. Since the Acts of 29 
June 1962 and 25 June 1965, which are complementary to the Provisional Act of 
1956 (relating to compulsory public service for dentists) do not differ from it in this 
respect, but merely prolong its operation for successive three-year periods, they 
cannot be regarded as constituting a violation of the aforesaid Article 4 of the
53 For further information on the question of the precedent value of the European Court, 
see, for example, Fredrik G.E. Sundberg: The European Experience o f Human Rights 
Proceedings: the Precedent value of the European Court’s Decisions, 20 Akron Law Review 
(1987), pp. 629 ff.
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Convention.... Then, there is no reason for me to deal with the question whether the 
Convention would take precedence over the act in the case that a conflict between 
these had existed."54
Thus the Court made strong efforts to establish that there was no conflict 
between domestic law and the Convention. The comprehensive discussion of 
the Convention shows that it was considered a domestic source of law, even 
though the domestic statute left no doubt as to its interpretation.
Moreover, it was stated that the Convention should also be considered as 
a means for interpreting the Constitution. This is an interesting statement; in 
particular if one compares this statement with the general statements in the 
subsequent NRt. 1976.1. In this case, concerning the constitutionality of an 
act on compensation for expropriation, both the majority and the minority in 
the Hoyesterett stated that the exercise of judicial review of legislation should 
vary in intensity depending on what kind of rights the case at issue concerns. 
Justice Blom, who delivered the majority opinion, said:
"However, there are differences of opinion as to how much is required before the 
Courts may set aside an Act of legislation as being in breach of the Constitution. I 
do not feel called upon to discuss this issue in general terms. The solution will to 
some extent depend on which constitutional provisions we are dealing with. If we are 
concerned with provisions protecting the personal freedom of the individual or his 
security, I assume that the supremacy of the Constitution must prevail. If, on the 
other hand, we are concerned with constitutional provisions regulating the way the 
other Powers of State have organized their administrative procedure or internal 
sphere of competence, I agree [...] that the Courts must to a large extent respect the 
particular views of the Storting (Parliament) itself. Constitutional provisions 
protecting economic rights must by and large occupy a middle position between these 
two examples/155
Thus the impact of individual and political rights was considered to be 
stronger on the Legislature’s margin of appreciation than the impact of 
economic rights, i.e. as reflecting what in constitutional theory is known as 
the preferred position principle,56
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54 Here cited in English from Drzemczewski (1983), p. 310.
55 Here cited in English from Rolv Ryssdal: The Relation between the Judiciary and the 
Legislative and Executive Branches of the Government in Norway, North Dakota Law review
1981, pp. 527, at p. 533.
* The case is discussed by Johs. Andenses: Grundlovtolkning, domstoler og polinkk. 
Randbemerkninger til en htyesterettsdom, [Constitutional Interpretation, Courts and Politics. 
Marginal Notes on a Supreme Court Judgment], in Festskrift til Kristen Andersen, Oslo (
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In NJA 1988.572 Hdgsta Domstolen’s line of reasoning was to a large 
extent founded on the European Court’s judgment in the Ekbatani Case57 
to which Sweden had been a party. The circumstances were as follows. 
Under Chapter 51, section 21, of the Swedish Code of Judicial Procedure 
the Hovrdtt may, under certain specified circumstances, dispose of an appeal 
without a hearing. 
In the Ekbatani case the European Court had held:
”31. The Court has on a number of occasions held that, provided there has been a 
public hearing at first instance, the absence of "public hearings” before a second or 
third instance may be justified by the special features of the proceedings at issue [...]
32. Here, the Court of Appeal was called upon to examine the case as the facts and 
the law. In particular, it had to make a full assessment of the question of the appli­
cant’s guilt or innocence [...] The only limitation on its jurisdiction was that it did 
not have the power to increase the sentence imposed by the City Court.
However, the above-mentioned question was the main issue for determination 
also before the Court of Appeal. In the circumstances of the present case that 
question could not, as a matter of fair trial, have been properly determined without 
a direct assessment of the evidence given in person by the applicant - who claimed 
that he had not committed the act alleged to constitute the criminal offence [...] • and 
by the complainant. Accordingly, the Court of Appeal’s re-examination of Mr. Ek­
batani's conviction at first instance ought to have comprised a full rehearing of the 
applicant and the complainant.
The limitations on the Court of Appeal’s powers as a result of the prohibition of 
reformatio in pejus related only to sentencing. They cannot be considered to be 
relevant to the principal issue before the Court of Appeal, namely the question of 
guilt or innocence. Neither can the fact that the case-file was available to the public.
33. Having regard to the entirety of the proceedings before the Swedish courts, to the 
role of the Court of Appeal, and to the nature of the issue submitted to it, the Court 
reaches the conclusion that there were no special features to justify a denial of a 
public hearing and of the applicant’s right to be heard in person. Accordingly, there 
has been a violation of Article 6 § I."
In the case at issue the appellant, who was not present at the hearing in the 
Tingsratt, was sentenced to 30 day fines. He appealed against this judgment 
and requested "... to have a public counsel for the defence from the legal aid
), pp. 19 ff. The preferred position principle in Danish and Norwegian law is discussed by 
Seren S ten de nip Jensen: Om grundlovsfortolkning, [On Constitutional Interpretation], 4 Justitia 
1984, pp. 5 ff.; and Carsten Smith: Domstolene og reltsutvikiingen, [The Courts and the 
Development of Law], Lov og Rett 1975, pp. 292 ff.
57 Cf. Eur. Court H.R., Ekbatani Case, Series A, Vol. 134 (1988).
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appointed for the hearing before the Gota HovrattM.58 The Court of Appeal 
rejected this request and decided the case without a hearing. Hogsta 
Domstolen subsequently overruled the Court of Appeal’s ruling as to not 
having granted a hearing and, consequendy, remitted the case to retrial before 
the Court of Appeal on the following grounds:
’’The mentioned rule [Chapter 51, section 21 of the Swedish Code of Judicial 
Procedure] is founded on the view that a party’s wish for a hearing should, in 
principle, be respected. Therefore, there ought to be required strong reasons for 
considering it manifestly unnecessary to hold a hearing when such one has been 
requested. Hence a particular restraint in the interpretation of the rule is required with 
regard to the fact that in its judgment of 26 May 1988 in a case against the Swedish 
State the European Court [of Human Rights] has considered it contrary to Article 6 
of the European Convention of Human Rights that in its application of Chapter 51, 
section 21, of the Code of Judicial Procedure in its wording applicable until 1 July 
1984,59 a Hovratt has decided a criminal case without a hearing, despite the fact 
that the accused had requested such a hearing (Ekbatani Case...)."60
The fact that Sweden was found guilty of having violated the Convention in 
the Ekbatani Case seems to have had such impact on Hogsta Domstolen that 
it was willing to revise its previous practice; in the Ekbatani Case the Court 
had upheld the Hovratt*s decision to decide the case without a hearing. 
However, this did not require that any domestic statutory rule was set aside, 
so it is probably most appropriate to view the decision as expressive of a 
very extensive application of the principle o f presumption.
On the other hand, there can be little doubt that the Court treated the 
judgment from the European Court in the Ekbatani Case as a true precedent, 
i.e. the decision - and consequently the Convention - was given direct effect
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51 [... att f£ offentlig försvarere enligt rättshjälpen till förhandling i Göta hovratt].
59 On this point, Högsta Domstolen is probably mistaken since the European Court 
emphasized that it was reviewing the compatibility of Chapter 51, section 21, in its wording 
after the amendment in 1984 with the Convention, cf. Eur. Court H.R. Ekbatani case, Series 
A, Vol. 134 (1988), para. 19.
60 [Den angivna regeln bygger p i uppfattningen att parts önskemil om huvudförhandiing 
i princip skall respekteras. Det bör därför fordras starka skäl för att anse det uppenbart 
obehövligt att häUa huvudförhandiing när sädan har begärts. En särskild restriktivitet vid 
tolkningen av regeln är numera pAkallad med hänsyn tili att Europadomstolen genom dom den 
26 maj 1988 i ett mil mot svenska staten ansett det stridande mor artikel 6 i Europankon- 
ventionen om de mänskliga rättigheter att en hovrätt, med tillämpning av 51 kap 21 § 
rättegängsbalkan i dess före den 1 juli 1984 gällande lydelse, avgjort ett brottmil utan 
huvudförhandiing, oaktet den tilltalade begärt sädan förhandling (Ekbatani case...]
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in domestic Swedish law.
Whether or not a decision of an international court could be implemented 
in Swedish law without passing legislation was debated strongly in the so- 
called Boll Case Discussion in the late 1950’s and early 1960’s.61 As a 
consequence of this discussion, the question was raised in the Riksdag and 
sent to a parliamentary committee which consulted a number of bodies for 
their opinion in the matter. On the basis of testimony received, the Commit­
tee concluded that judgments from the European Court should be respected 
in domestic judicial practice in the same way as judgments from domestic 
instances like Hogsta Domstolen and Regeringsrdtten:
"According to the judgment of the Committee it may be taken for granted that a 
decision from a competent international court, whereby a domestic decision taken by 
a court or other authority is reversed, should at any rate be attached as much 
significance for the continued application of law as is ascribed to domestic decisions 
taken by the final instances. In particular the passing of legislation is accordingly not 
necessary in order to ensure that international decisions are duly taken into account 
as guiding for [judicial] practice/’6263
Justitiekansleren has on one occasion64 held that the fact that the European 
Court has found a violation of the Convention in a case against Sweden is not 
in itself sufficient to substantiate a claim for damages under the Tort Liability 
Act of 1972. The applicants, who had been awarded damages in the amount
41 Sec Sture Petrén: Barnavârdslagen och formynderskapskonventionen, [The Children’s 
Welfare Act and the Convention regulating Guardianship of Minors], SvJT 1959, pp. 201 ff.; 
Hilding Eek: Fullgorande av traktatsforpligtelser, [Fulfilment of Treaty Obligations], SvJT 
1959, pp. 561; and Stig J&gerskiold: Folkrattsliga plikter och innomstatliga avgôranden. Om 
resning, prcjudikat och skadesstând, [International Law Obligations and Domestic Decisions. 
On the Re-opening of Cases, Precedent and Damages], SvJT 1961, pp. 689 ff. For a survey 
of the discussion, see Sundberg (1986/2), passim.
42 Cf. Fôrsta lagutskottets utlâtande nr. 38, 1961, p. 10. Erik Holmberg & Nils Stjemquist: 
Vdr forfaitning, [Our Constitution], 7th edition, Stockholm (1988), p. 181, note that this 
statement is not in accordance with the prevailing transformation theory. However, the 
statement seems rather to show that the transformation theory was not in accordance with the 
parliamentary practice of the early 1960s.
43 [Enligt utskottes bedômmande kan det tagas for vist, att en behôrig internationell 
domstols utslag, varigennom ett intemt svensk avgôrande av domstol eiler annan myndighet 
underkànts, skulla komma ait tilimitas âtminstone lika stor betydelse fôr den fotsatta 
râttstillàmpningen som tillkommer interna avgôranden i slutinstansema. Sërskild lagstiftning 
synes alltsâ ej erforderlig fôr att tillfôrsâkra intemationella avgôranden tillbôrligt inflytande 
som vâgledande fôr praxis.]
44 Decision of 5 December 1988 (Case No. Dnr 3239-88-40).
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of 200.000 SEK by the European Court,65 submitted that the domestic 
courts had taken decisions contrary to the requirements of the Convention, 
and that it as a matter of course is incumbent upon the courts to see to it that 
the Convention is not violated. Accordingly, the judges had rendered 
themselves guilty of negligence in their exercise of office. Justitiekansleren 
noted that the fact that the European Court has found a specific application 
of domestic law to be contrary to the Convention does not mean that the 
domestic decision is repealed or changed: Sweden is under international law 
obliged to bring its domestic legislation in accordance with the Convention.
In the recent UfR 1990.13 the Danish H0jesteret, including Justice Erik 
Riis, certainly followed the previous line of paying ever more attention to the 
Convention and dissociated itself from its general statements in the HT Case. 
The circumstances were as follows:
Under section 762 of the Danish Administration of Justice Act
"... (2) [a] suspect may furthermore be detained on remand when there is a par­
ticularly confirmed suspicion ["sjerlig bestyrket mistanke"] that he has committed
1. an offence which is subject to public prosecution and which may under the law 
result in imprisonment for 6 years or more and when respect for the public interest 
according to the information received about the gravity of the case is judged to 
require that the suspect should not be at liberty, or ..." (emphasis added).“
The challenge of a judge was, inter alia, governed by section 60 of the Ad­
ministration of Justice Act. This provision stipulated in sub-sections 2 and 3:
"(2) No one shall act as judge in the trial if, at an earlier stage of the proceedings, 
he has ordered the person concerned to be remanded into custody solely under 
section 762(2), unless the case is tried under section 925 or section 925 a [as a case 
in which the accused pleads guilty].
(3) The fact that the judge may previously have had to deal with a case as a result 
of his holding several official functions shall not disqualify him, when there is no 
ground, in the circumstance of the case, to presume that he has any special interest 
in the outcome of the case” (emphasis added).67
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45 Cf. Eur. Court H.R., Olssort Case, Series A, Vol. 130 (1988), para. 102.
44 Here cited in English from Eur. Court H.R., Hauschildt Case, Series A. Vol. 154
(1989). para. 33.
47 Ibid.. at para. 28.
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Moreover, the Administration of Justice Act contained in section 62(1) a 
general clause as to the disqualification of judges:
"(1) The parties cannot only demand that a judge withdraw from sitting in the 
instances referred to in section 60 but may also object to a judge hearing a case 
when other circumstances are capable of raising doubt about his complete 
impartiality. In such instances the judge, too, if he fears that the parties cannot trust 
him fully, may withdraw from sitting even when no objection is lodged against him. 
Where a case is heard by several judges, any one of them may raise the question 
whether any of the judges on tlie bench should step down on account of the 
circumstances described above."4*
The provision in section 60(2) was introduced by an amendment to the 
Administration of Justice Act (Act No. 386 of 10 June 1987), passed as a 
consequence of the European Commission’s decision on the admissibility of 
the application of 9 October 1986 in the Hauschildt Case in order to fulfil 
the obligations under Article 6 of the Convention.49 The question at issue 
was whether the fact that a trial judge had taken decisions concerning 
detention on remand in itself justified fears as to his impartiality. However, 
in its decision on the merits the Commission did not find that Denmark had 
violated Article 6(1) of the Convention. On the contrary, in its judgment of 
24 may 1989 the European Court found that Denmark had violated Article 
6(1) of the Convention:70
”50(3). In the Court’s view, therefore, the mere fact that a trial judge or an appeal 
judge, in a system like the Danish one, has also made pre-trial decisions in the case, 
including those concerning detention on remand, cannot be held as in itself justifying 
fears as to his impartiality.
51. Nevertheless, special circumstances may in a given case be such as to warrant 
a different conclusion. In the instant case, the Court cannot but attach particular 
importance to the fact that in nine of the decisions continuing Mr Hauschild’s 
detention on remand. Judge Larsen relied specifically on section 762(2) of the Act 
[...] Similarly, when deciding, before the opening of the trial on appeal, to prolong 
the applicant’s detention on remand, the judges who eventually took part in deciding 
the case on appeal relied specifically on the same provision on a number of 
occasions [...]
“ Ibid.
** Application No. 10486/83.
70 Cf. Eur. Court H.R., Hauschildt Case, Series A, Vol. 154 (1989).
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32. The application of section 762(2) of the Act requires, inter alia, that the judge 
be satisfied that there is a particularly confirmed suspicion that the accused has com­
mitted the crime(s) with which he is charged. This wording has been officially 
explained as meaning that the judge has to be convinced that there is "a very high 
degree of clarity" as to the question of guilt [...] Thus the difference between the 
issue the judge has to settle when applying this section and the issue he will have to 
settle when giving judgment at the trial becomes tenuous.
The Court is therefore of the view that in the circumstances of the case the 
impartiality of the said tribunals was capable of appearing to be open to doubt and 
that the applicant’s fears in this respect can be considered objectively justified" 
(emphasis added).
In UfR 1990.13 the question was whether the fact that a judge had taken 
decisions concerning detention on remand, under both sub-section 1 and 2 of 
section 762 of the Administration of Justice Act, disqualified him from 
hearing the case as trial judge. As mentioned, in section 60(2) of the 
Administration of Justice Act it is laid down that if a judge has ordered 
detention on remand solely under section 762(2) of the Act, he cannot hear 
the case as trial judge. The majority in the Vestre Landsret and a unanimous 
Hojesteret were of the opinion that the European Court’s judgment in the 
Hauschildt Case should be construed in such a way that in general it would 
be incompatible with Article 6(1) of the Convention if the trial judge had 
taken decisions concerning detention on remand at a pretrial stage of the 
case, irrespective of whether the decision has been taken solely under sub­
section (2) or in connection with sub-section (1). The crucial question was 
then what weight should be accorded to the European Court’s judgment in 
the Hauschildt Case compared to the provision in section 60(2) of the.. 
Administration of Justice Act.
In the High Court one of the three judges established that section 60(2) 
of the Administration of Justice Act had been passed in order to fulfil 
Denmark’s obligations under the Convention. However, in this judge’s view 
the result was that this provision had been worded in a way that made it 
meaningless in relation to the aim that the Danish legislation should fulfil 
obligations under the Convention. Consequently, this judge held that Article 
6(1) of the Convention, as interpreted by the European Court in the Haus­
childt Case, should prevail over the domestic provision in section 60(2) of 
the Administration of Justice Act.
The second judge interpreted section 60(2) of the Administration of 
Justice Act in the light of Article 6(1) of the Convention as interpreted in the 
Hauschildt Case. Consequently, he also found that a judge, having taken
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pretrial decisions concerning detention on remand, was disqualified from 
hearing the case as trial judge.
The last judge in the High Court would not deviate from the clear word­
ing of the domestic provision in section 60(2) of the Administration of Jus­
tice Act. He found that the Legislature had consciously included the word 
"solely" in section 60(2) of the Administration of Justice Act in order to 
exclude cases in which a decision concerning detention on remand had been 
taken under both sub-section 1 and 2 of section 762 of the Administration of 
Justice Act. In other words, he found that it was clearly indicated that the 
Legislature did not want to incorporate Article 6(1) of the Convention 
completely. Finally, on the general relationship between the Convention and 
domestic Danish law he agreed with Erik Riis' statements in the extrajudicial 
comment on the HT Case.
Consequently, the High Court found that the judge who had taken pretrial 
decisions concerning detention on remand was disqualified from hearing the 
case as trial judge.
A unanimous H0jesteret upheld this ruling:
"According to the travaux préparatoires of the provision [section 60(2) of the 
Administration of Justice Act] the Folketing was aware of the fact that the European 
Commission of Human Rights in its decision of 9 October 1986 in the Hauschildt 
Case had unanimously indicated that the present Danish system posed serious 
questions as to the interpretation and application of Article 6 of the Convention.
Hence there is no basis for establishing that section 60(2) of the Administration 
of Justice Act aims at an exhaustive regulation of the question of a judge’s 
disqualification because during the preparation of the case he has taken decisions 
concerning detention on remand under section 762(2) of the Administration of Justice 
Act.
Sections 60(2) and 62(1) of the Act should be interpreted in accordance with the 
principles laid down in the Court of Human Rights’ judgment. Although the 
judgment is based on concrete grounds and particularly refers to the number of 
detentions, which the City Court judge, under the investigation, ordered under section 
762(2), the judgment must be interpreted in such a way that it will ordinarily not be 
consistent with Article 6(1) of the Convention that a judge, who prior to the trial has 
ordered detention under section 762(2), either solely or in connection with other 
grounds for detention, participates at the hearing of the case. In orders of 21 January, 
22 January and 4 February 1988 Judge Henrik Stamp based the detentions on 
reference, inter alia, to this provision and should therefore be regarded disqualified 
under section 62(1) of the Administration of Justice Act."71
71 (Efter forar bejdeme til bestemmelsen var Folkednget opmærksom pâ, at Den europæiske 
Menneskerettighedskommission af 9. oktober 1986 i Hauschildt-sagen enstemmigt havde givet 
udtryk for, at den gzldende danske ordning rejste alvorlige spergsmìl med hensyn til
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Thus the Hfijesteret discussed the relationship to the Convention and the 
Hauschildt Case in more explicit terms than it had done on any other pre­
vious occasion. What is particularly interesting is that the Court discussed in 
detail how the European Court’s judgment in the Hauschildt Case should be 
interpreted. This is in itself remarkable since the H0jesxeret very rarely enters 
into such discussions. Moreover, the Court paid considerable attention to the 
Convention, as interpreted in the Hauschildt Case, when interpreting 
domestic law. The provision in section 60(2) of the Administration of Justice 
Act had a very clear wording, but the Court was nervertheless willing to dis­
regard this clear domestic provision in order to apply the Convention 
properly.72 As pointed out by Asbj0rn Jensen, it had otherwise been very 
easy for the Court to refer to the fact that the European Court generally had 
approved the Danish procedural system as to detention on remand73 and in 
the case at issue to hold that the judge was not qualified.74 On the other 
hand, as Justice Torben Jensen put it in an extrajudicial comment on the 
case, "[i]t made the decision easier that section 62 (now section 61) is a legal
fortolkningen og bruecn af art. 6 i konventionen.
Der er herefter ikke grundlag for at fastsll, at retsplejelovens § 60, stk. 2, tilsigter en 
udtommende regulering af spergsmilet om en dommers inhabilitet som folge af, at ban under 
sagens forberedelse har taget stilling til begaeringer om varetegtsfacngsling efter retsplejelovens 
§ 762, stk. 2.
Lovens §§ 60, stk. 2, og 62, stk. 1, mi fortolkes i overensstemmelse med de principper, 
der er lagt til grund i Menneskerettighedsdomstolens dom. Selvom dommen er konkret 
begründet og navnlig henviser til antallet af facngslingskendelser, som byretsdommeren under 
efterforskningen afsagde efter § 762, stk. 2, m& dommen opfattes sAledes, at det saedvanligvis 
ikke vil vacre stemmende med konventionens art 6, stk. 1, at en dommer, der for domsfor- 
handlingen har truffet bestemmelse om faengsling efter § 762, stk. 2, enten alene ell er i 
forbindelse med andre fmgslingsgrunde, medvirker ved sagens pdd0mmelse. Dommer Henrik 
Stamp har i kendelser af 21. januar, 22. januar og 11. februar 1988 begründet fengslinger med 
henvisning bl.a. dl denne bestemmelse og m& derfor anses for inhabil efter retsplejelovens § 
62, stk. 1.]
72 In a ruling of 24 October 1989 (Case No. 3. afd. N nr. 188/1989), i.e. a week before 
the Hfjesteret’s decision in this case, in a similar case the 0stre Landsret had found that the 
wording of section 60(2) was so clear that ”... the European Court of Human Right’s judgment 
of 24 May 1989 [was] found to be without significance for the understanding of the clear 
wording” of the said provision.
[Den europaeiske Menneskerettighedsdomstols dom af 24. maj 1989 findes at vsre uden 
betydning for forstielsen af den klare ordlyd af bestemmelsen.]
73 Cf. Eur. Court H.R., Hauschildt Case, Series A, Vol. 154 (1989), para. 50.
74 Cf. Asbj0m Jensen: Den europaiske Menneskerettighedskcnventions betydning for 
strofferetsplejen i Danmark, [The Impact of the European Convention on Human Rights on 
Criminal Procedure in Denmark], in Anklagemyndighedens Arsberetning 1989, Copenhagen 
(1990), pp. 7 ff., at pp. 11 f.
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standard without sharp contours."7574
It appears from the decision that the H0jesteret in general terms 
emphasized the principle o f presumption very strongly:"... the decision was 
made on the basis of an interpretation of sections 60(2) and 62 as primary 
sources of law, but in consideration of the international law obligation."777* 
Nevertheless, in its concrete application of the law the Hfijesteret went 
considerably further and, in effect, disregarded the clear provision in section 
60(2) of the Admininistration of Justice Act. Justice Torben Jensen has 
explained that
"[although it was clear that a change of the practice up till now would entail serious 
interference in Danish courts’ organization of legal work and cause organizational 
changes and additional expenditure for the judiciary, the H0jest ere t found itself 
obliged to follow the decision of the (EuropeanI Court of Human Rights" (emphasis 
added).7*0
Thus this case should undoubtedly be regarded as the Hfijesteret’s dissocia­
tion not only from its statements in the HT Case, but also its decision in UfR 
1988.307 in which it came to the conclusion that a trial judge who at a 
previous stage of the proceedings had ordered detention on remand was not 
disqualified from hearing the case as trial judge.81
Against this background it is probably fair to view this decision as the 
definitive break-through for the application of the Convention in domestic
71 Cf. Torben Jensen: Domstolenes retsskabende, retsudfyldende o f responderende
virksomhed, [The Courts* Law-Making, Law-Interpretating and Opinion-Giving Activity], UfR
1990 B, pp. 441 ff., at p. 446. The exposition has the form of an article on the courts* law­
making activity, but is, in effect, an extrajudicial comment on UfR 1990.13 and UfR 1990.181
(see infra).
76 [Det lettede afg0relsen, at § 62 (nu § 61) er en retsstandard uden skarpe konturer.]
77 Ibid.
71 [.„ blev afgprelsen truffet ved en fortolkning af retsplejelovens §§ 60, stk. 2, og 62 som 
primzre retskilder, med hensyntagen til den folkeretlige forpligtelse.]
19 Ibid.
*° [Selv om det var klart, at en zndring af hidtidig retspraksis ville medfore et alvorligt 
indgreb i danske domstoles tilrettelxggelse af retsarbeidet og medfere organisatoriske 
forandringen med merudgifter for justitsvacsenent, fandt H0jesteret sig nedsaget til at folge 
M enneskere ui ghedsdoms to lens afg0relse op.]
11 In the subsequent UfR 1990.634 the Htjcsteret found, without making express 
references to the Convention, that a judge, who in a telephone conversation with the counsel 
for the defence concerning the appointment of the trial had mentioned the possibility of 
remanding the accused in custody, was disqualified from hearing the case as trial judge.
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Danish law.
Only a few months later in UfR 1990.181 the H0jesteret was again faced 
with question of the impact of the Hauschildt Case on domestic Danish law. 
In this case the problem was whether the fact that, in a complex of criminal 
cases concerning the same group of persons, a judge who had heard the case 
as a trial judge against one of the accused subsequently was disqualified from 
hearing the case as trial judge against another accused (on the same counts) 
in the same complex of cases. In addition, before the H0jesteret it was 
further submitted that, since the judge who heard the case as a trial judge had 
previously taken decisions on detention on remand relying on both sub­
section 1 and 2 of section 762 of the Administration of Justice Act, she was 
disqualified from hearing the case as a trial judge. However, it should be 
observed that both the City Court and the High Court’s rulings that they were 
not disqualified to hear the case were passed before the European Court had 
decided the Hauschildt Case.
In its unanimous judgment the H&jesteret first laid down that in Denmark 
it had so far been considered entirely adequate that the same judge deals with 
a case at all stages of the proceedings. In this way the judge was obtaining 
a sufficient knowledge of the case in order to pass a correct judgment. In 
addition, this way of organizing the work within the courts was both time 
and work-saving. This applied in particular to cases concerning a large 
number of crimes and/or accused. Insofar as such cases were not joined into 
one case, it sometimes happened that facts established in the first case 
adjudicated, once more were subjected to the assessment of evidence in a 
subsequent case. The fact that a judge who heard the first case as a trial 
judge subsequently heard a case against another accused in the complex of 
cases had in Danish law not been considered a circumstance which in itself 
could raise doubts as to the judge’s impartiality and thus disqualify him from 
hearing the case, cf. section 62 of the Administration of Justice Act. The 
Court then went on:
"In the light of the European Court of Human Rights’ judgment of 24 May 1989 in 
the Hauschildt Case it may be questionable whether this practice is in accordance 
with Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights. In consideration of the 
very far-reaching consequences for the judiciary in this country, which such an inter­
pretation would cause, notably as far as it concerns single-judge courts, the 
H0jesteret considers, however, that it ought to be left to the Legislature to take a 
position on this question. It should hereby be observed that there is not seen to exist 
any decision on the part of the Human Rights Commmission or Court which takes 
a position on the question of the competence to act in a case as the present one, and
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that the doubts which has been raised in any case, under the present circumstances, 
cannot bring about the annulment of the judgments, where, before the High Court, 
a complete new hearing has taken place, cf. section 96S a of the Administration of 
Justice Act, with the participation of judges to whose impartiality no objections have 
been raised" (emphasis added)*2.
The H0jesteret's reasoning in the cited passage is indeed interesting. 
Although the Hfijesteret expressed doubts as to the compatibility in general 
of this particular area of domestic procedural law with Article 6 of the 
Convention, it follows from the last sentence that, under the present 
circumstances, the H0jesteret did not find that there was any conflict between 
the Convention and the way in which domestic law was applied. Both as 
regards the fact that the trial judge had previously heard cases against other 
accused in the complex of cases and the fact that she had relied on both sub­
section 1 and 2 in section 762 of the Administration of Justice Act when 
ordering detention on remand, the H0jesteret held that any possible violation 
of Article 6(2) of the Convention in the first instance should be considered 
"repaired" by the complete new hearing before the High Court. This is 
probably a valid interpretation of Article 6(2) of the Convention and the 
Hauschildt Case, since it is difficult to judge the exact scope of this judgment 
in relation to similar cases.83 Nevertheless, the Court chose to adress the 
question of the compatibility of domestic law with Article 6(2) of the 
Convention to the Legislature. Although the H0jesteret on a few previous 
occasions had explicitly adressed questions to the Legislature, it was rare that 
the Court decided to do so. This seems to have taken place in cases in which 
the H0jesteret has considered the Folketing a more appropriate forum for 
dealing with the question at issue.84 Thus it seemed as if the H0jesteret, on
n  (I lyset af Den Europciske Menneskerettighedsdomslols dom af 24. maj 1989 i 
Hauschildt-sagen m i det stille sig tvivlsomt, om denne praksis er i overensstemmelse med art.
6 i Den Europziske Menneskerettighedskonvention. Under hensyn til de meget vidstrckkende 
konsekvenser for domstolsorganisadonen her i landet, som en sidan fortolkmng vilie medfare. 
navnlig for s i vidt angir enedommerembeder, finder Hajesieret imidlertid, at det bor overlades 
til lovgivningsmagten at tage stilling til dette spares mil. Det bemerkes herved, at der ikke ses 
at foreligge nogen afgarelse fra Menneskereuighedskommissionen eller —domstolen, som eager 
stilling til habilitetssp0rgsmilet i en sag som den foreliggende, og at den tvivl, som er rejst 
i hvert fald ikke kan medfare en ophcvelse af dommene under de foreliggende omsuendig- 
heder, hvor der i landsretten har fundet fuldsuendig ny domsforhandling sted, jf. rets- 
plejelovens § 965 a, under medvirken af dommere, mod hvis upartiskhed der ikke er rejst 
indvendinger].
"  Cf. Torben Jensen, op.cit, p. 447.
“  Another example of a case in which the Htjesteret explicitly adressed a question to the
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the basis of its own interpretation of the Convention and the Hauschildt 
Case, predicted that in the future the European Court would pass judgments 
according to which it would be questioned whether the Danish procedural 
system is compatible with the Convention. The H0jesteret therefore 
recommended that the question of judges’ competence to act, due to "the far- 
reaching consequences for the judiciary”, be considered by the Legislature 
before Denmark actually became party to a case involving the question.
The fact that the H0jesteret chose to adress to the Legislature the 
question of judges’ competence to act did not prevent it from applying the 
Convention directly in the case at issue. Strictly speaking, the Court’s doubts 
as to the compatibility of Danish law with the Convention in general as 
regards the judges’ competence to act in complexes of cases then appears to 
be an obiter dictum. This obiter dictum is both wise and relevant here. In a 
legal system such as the Danish one with a very large number of single-judge 
courts85 it would require a fundamental change of the judiciary if judges 
were only considered competent to act in one case within a complex of 
cases.86
A comparison between the decisions in UfR 1990.13 and UfR 1990.181 
gives an idea of how far the Danish courts consider themselves entitled to go 
in their application of the Convention.87 UfR 1990.13 concerned a question 
fairly similar to the one adjudicated in the Hauschildt Case, which required 
that the judge at issue should be considered disqualified from hearing the 
case as trial judge. This had some serious consequences for the organization 
of the work of the Judiciary, but these consequences were, however, 
manageable. The impact of the Hauschildt Judgment on a situation as the one 
in UfR 1990.181 would not, on the other hand, have been obvious, nor 
would the complications for the Judiciary have been manageable, had the 
Court found that a judge could only hear one case in a complex of cases. A 
question with such far-reaching consequences is, of course, more suited for 
legislation than for judge-made law. At any rate it is probably fair to
Judgments from the European Court as Precedents in Domestic Law
Legislature is UfR 1975.763 which concerned the question of open files regarding medical 
journals.
15 Single-judge courts constitute 67 of the 82 jurisdictions in Denmark, where, according 
to the Administration of Justice Act, there is only one judge for the trial of criminal cases.
u  Cf. Ole Agersnap: Anmeldelse af kommenteret retsplejelav, 4. udgave, [Review of the 
Administration of Justice Act With Comments, 4th edition], UfR 1990 B, p. 24.
87 Cf. Torben Jensen, op.ciL, p. 447.
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conclude from UfR 1990.13 and UfR 1990.181 that Danish courts are 
obliged to apply procedural rules in accordance with not only the rules of the 
Convention, but also the inteipietation of these rules following from the 
European Court’s judgments.“
8.5. Tentative Conclusions.
Scandinavian courts have on a number of occasions applied directly interna­
tional law in general and the Convention in particular. The intensity of this 
application of international law varies from ascertaining that a specific 
interpretation of domestic law is not contrary to the Convention, to regarding 
international law as sufficient authority for pronouncing the death penalty. 
However, the very fact that the courts embark upon discussing the relation­
ship between domestic law and international law shows that international law 
is regarded a source o f law in domestic law. That the courts on some 
occasions (the K#benhavns Byret’s judgment of 25 April 1966, UfR 1990.13 
and NRt. 1984.1175), in the case of a conflict between the Convention and 
domestic law have, in effect, made the Convention prevail over domestic law 
is not only further proof that the courts regard the Convention a source of 
law in domestic law, but also that the position of the Convention in the 
domestic norm-hierarchy is significant. This question will be elaborated in 
section 10.2.
Recently, in some cases the courts have made ex officio references to the 
Convention when dealing with a question of domestic law. This probably 
demonstrates stronger than anything else that the courts consider the 
Convention a source of law in domestic law.19 Similarly, the courts have 
recently become extremely aware of the European Court’s judgments 
involving the country at issue. Thus the courts have discussed and interpreted 
Strasbourg case-law more explicitly than they have ever done with domestic 
precedents. Therefore, there can be no doubt that the courts feel very bound 
by these judgments, and both the Danish Htjesteret and the Swedish Hogsta 
Domstolen have been willing to revise their own case-law as a consequence 
of the judgments from the European Court.
"  Cf. Asbj0fn Jensen, op.cit„ p. 13. 
"  Cf. Rehof & Trier (1990), p. 90.
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CHAPTER 9
The Position of the European Convention in Relation 
to the Exercise of Discretionary Powers by Ad­
ministrative Authorities
9.1. Introduction.
In the preceding chapters an examination has been mad of the courts’ 
applicadon of the Convention and international law in general. However, 
from a practical point of view it is the decision-making of the administrative 
authorities which is far more voluminous than that of the courts. Accordingly, 
it may be assumed that these make decisions touching upon rights guaranteed 
by the Convention more frequently. It is obvious that they, with some minor 
modifications deriving from the principle o f legality (see infra section 10.2), 
are obliged to follow the general principles on the relationship between 
domestic law and the Convention set forth by the courts. The question is, 
however, whether administrative authorities have further obligations as 
regards the Convention.1
In section 2.2 it was stated that the strong emphasis in Denmark on the 
administrative authorities’ obligation to exercise their discretionary powers 
in accordance with undertaken international obligations (the rule o f 
instruction) is not found in Norway and Sweden to the same extent. In this 
chapter the position of the Convention in relation to administrative decision­
making is examined further. Since there are some significant differences 
between Denmark, Norway and Sweden in this respect, each country is 
examined seperately.
9.2. Denmark.
In the above-mentioned memorandum from the Danish Ministry of Justice
1 It should be noted that in this context the Ombudsman Institutions, which are empowered 
to supervise administrative authorities’ exercise of their powers, play a particularly prominent 
role. For a discussion of the interaction between the Scandinavian Ombudsmen and the 
European Commission, see Eilschou Holm (1986); Gaukur Gûrundsson: Den nordiske 
ombudsmandsinstitution og Den europceiske Menneskerettighedskonventions organer, [The 
Nordic Ombudsman Institution and the Organs of the European Convention on Human 
Rights], paper presented at the 32nd Nordic Meeting of Lawyers. Reykjavik 1990; and The 
Danish Ombudsman. Material in English, published by the Danish Ombudsman, Copenhagen
(1990).
on constitutional problems raised by accession to the EEC (see infra section 
2.2) it was stated, although in vague terms, that administrative authorities 
should excercise their discretionary powers in such a way that administrative 
acts, whether they be specific decisions or general regulations, conform to 
validly contracted international obligations.2 This is now known as the rule 
o f instruction.
In support of this assumption on general regulations, reference was made 
to section 5(1) of the Act on Legal Responsibility of Ministers . Under this 
provision it is an offence for a Minister if he willfully or by gross neg­
ligence disregards the obligations incumbent upon him under the Constitu­
tion, under statutory law or by virtue of his office."34 The carrying out of 
appropriate measures, aiming at preventing the State of Denmark from 
violating international law in the application of international law at the 
domestic level, would normally seem to be an obligation incumbent upon any 
minister "by virtue of his office", provided that the measures concerned are 
authorized by law, and that the risk of infringements occuring as a result of 
an omission to make the necessary adjustments cannot be dismissed as re­
mote.5
On a similar basis, any minister should be held under a legal obligation 
to refrain from employing his rule-making powers, including his power to 
amend existing administrative regulations, in a manner that, in effect, would 
make the continuous implementation of an international commitment impos­
sible in the domestic legal order. This obligation should be considered enfor­
ceable also under Article 63 of the Constitution6, setting aside, if necessary, 
the domestic provision found to be incompatible with a duly contracted
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* Cf. the Ministry of Justice (1971), p. 78. This view was originally introduced by Ole 
Espersen (1970). pp. 380 ff.
3 Cases against ministers are only indictible in impeachment proceedings before Rigsretten 
[the High Court of the Realm], composed of all the Justices of the Hejester et and an equal 
number (IS) of lay assessors, the latter elected by the Folketing for 6 years at a time. cf. 
Articles 59 and 60 of the Danish Constitution.
4 {... hvis han forssetligt eller af grov uagtsomhed tils ides «etter de pligter, der pShviler ham 
efter gnmdloven eller lovgivningen i evngt eller efter hans stil lings beskaffenhed.]
5 Cf. the Ministry of Justice (1971). pp. 75 ff.
* Under Article 63 of the Danish Constitution "... the courts of justice shall be entitled to 
dccide any question bearing upon the scope of the authority of the executive power", cf. 
Blaustein & Flanz, Binder IV, October 1990, p. 22.
172
Denmark
From a practical point of view, however, it is of greater interest to 
consider what the position is when the exercise of discretionary powers 
relates to making decisions in individual cases. As mentioned, the Ministry 
of Justice assumed that also in individual cases administrative authorities 
were required to exercise their discretionary powers in such a way that these 
decisions were compatible with concluded, but not incorporated, treaties. This 
view was illustrated by the following example:
"Under section 5 of the Act of 1952 [now repealed (see supra section 4.2.1)] on Ali­
ens’s Entry into and Residence in Denmark, an alien might be expelled by adminis­
trative order under conditions in items (1) to (5) and also "...when his circumstances 
otherwise justify it". This provision delegated to the Danish Ministry of Justice a 
fairly wide discretionary power to take decisions on the expulsion of aliens. 
However, an unrestricted exercise of that power might in certain circumstances be 
held to be in conflict with Denmark’s obligations under Article 8 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights, which provides that "everyone has the right to respect 
for his family life, his home and his correspondance". At any rate, the European 
Commission of Human Rights has examined several cases in order to decide whether 
the expulsion of an alien married to a national of a specific country which results in 
a separation of the spouses, was justified by consideration of ordre public and 
national security, which under Article 8(2) may justify interferences with family life. 
Under the doctrine outlined above, the Danish Ministry of Justice should be held 
legally bound under domestic law to exercise its discretionary power of expulsion 
with respect inter alia to any limitations inherent in Article 8 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights."8
The courts had until recently not had a chance to decide definitively whether 
and, if so to what extent, ministers and administrative authorities were limited 
under Danish law in. the exercise of their discretionary powers by concluded, 
but not incorporated, treaties. However, the available case-law contained 
statements suggesting that the courts would accept the view put forward by 
legal scholars and the Ministry of Justice.
In the unreported case of the Kobenhavns Byret from 1966, a circular 
which contained an interpretation of a provision in the Administration of 
Justice Act was set aside by the Court on the basis of an interpretation of Ar­
ticle 6(3)(e) of the ECHR (see supra section 8.2.2). In UfR 1948.837, which
international obligation.7
7 Cf. the Ministry of Justice (1971), p. 81 note 39.
* See the Ministry of Justice (1971), pp. 77 f. Here cited in English from Eilschou Holm
(1986), p. 92.
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concerned the extinction of a horse commandeered by the German occupying 
power during World War II, it was established that public authorities are 
obliged to apply domestic rules of extinction in accordance with undertaken 
international obligations (see supra section 7.3). Similarly, in UfR 1975.30, 
the H0jesteret found that the Danish Broadcasting Company was under a 
legal obligation to apply the Copyright Act in a way which conformed to the 
Bern Convention (see supra section 5.2).
Although these decisions did not explicitly state that administrative 
authorities were under a legal obligation to exercise their discretionary 
powers in conformity with undertaken international obligations, it seems fair 
to interpret them as expressive of the existence of such a duty.
However, the recent decision from the 0stre Landsret in UfR 1989.775 
seems finally to have established that administrative authorities are under a 
legal obligation to exercise their discretionary powers in accordance with 
undertaken international obligations.
Under section 9(3) of the present Act on Alien’s Entry into and 
Residence in Denmark the Directorate of Aliens is, when granting a residence 
permit to a relative of a person living in Denmark with status as refugee, 
entitled to demand as a condition for granting the residence permit that the 
person in Denmark with status as refugee undertake the maintenance of the 
relative. However, under the said provision, this can only be demanded on 
the basis of a concrete discretion in each individual case.
In the case at issue, the Directorate of Aliens had found that an Iranian 
family consisting of a mother and two grown up sons being educated in 
Denmark, all of whom were living on supplementary benefits and student 
grants, would not be able to support the applicant who was the mother of the 
woman. Accordingly, the Directorate refused to grant her a residence permit 
in Denmark. This decision was subsequently upheld by the Ministry of 
Justice on appeal. However, in the period in which the applicant had been in 
Denmark, the family had actually maintained her, just as they were willing 
to continue to maintain her. In both instances the applicant pleaded that the 
Directorate of Aliens was under a legal obligation to exercise its discretionary 
powers with respect to Denmark’s international obligations, including Article 
8 of the ECHR and a number of recommendations from the UNCHR.
Retten i Korsfir expressed itself very clearly as to the Directorate of 
Aliens’ obligation to exercise its discretionary powers in accordance with 
undertaken international obligations saying that
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"... it cannot be assumed that the rule should be administrated in a such way that 
here-living refugees, solely on the grounds of lack of economic means, should be 
prevented from being reunited with their parents, since this would be inconsistent 
with those humanitarian considerations, recommended by the UN, and the respect of 
the individual’s rights, which is embodied in Article 8 of the European Convention 
on Human Rights, since refugees have no other countries than the country of resi­
dence in which they can enjoy these rights.”9
Subsequently, it was laid down that demanding that the family in Denmark 
should undertake maintenance of the applicant was unwarranted. The Court 
was therefore apparently of the opinion that there existed a conflict between 
the Convention and Danish law as interpreted by the Directorate of Aliens.
The 0stre Landsret upheld this latter ruling, but on different grounds. 
Unlike the City Court, the High Court did not find that the invoked interna­
tional obligation, generally speaking, should hinder a demand that refugees 
in Denmark undertake the maintenance of their relatives. Since the available 
information showed that it was a firm practice that the Directorate of Aliens 
demanded that refugees should undertake the support of relatives applying for 
a residence permit in Denmark, no individual discretion had been exercised 
in the case at issue. Consequently, the Directorate’s decision was unlawful 
under Danish law.
The High Court seems to have decided the case on the basis of domestic 
law. On the other hand, it did not dissociate itself from the City Court's 
statements of the Directorate’s duties as to the administration of section 9(3) 
of the Aliens Act. Accordingly, this case may, in effect, be considered a judi­
cial affirmation of the view that Danish administrative authorities are under 
legal obligation to exercise their discretionary powers in conformity with 
undertaken international obligations.
Folketingets Ombudsmand has on different occasions and in different 
forms held quite clearly that administrative authorities are under a legal 
obligation to exercise their discretionary powers in accordance with the 
Convention.
"In this context, it is”, as pointed out by Dr. Niels Eilschou Holm, 
"recalled that the Ombudsman performs a dual function: that of passing on
’ [... det kan ikke antages at reglen skal administreres p i en sàdan mSde, at herboende 
flygtninge alene p.g.a. mang tende 0konomisk evne skal vaere afskàret fra farruliesammenfermg 
med forxldre, idet dette strìde mod de humanitxre hensyn som FN anbefaler og den respekt 
for individets reuigheder, som er nedfzidet i den europxiske menneskerettighedskonveniions 
artikel 8, idet flygtninge ikke har andre lande end opholdslandet at nyde disse reuigheder i.]
175
individual complaints aimed at contended errors or other shortcomings on the 
part of administrative authorities; and that of setting and/or promoting new 
standards aimed at enhancing the protection of the individual in his dealings 
with those authorities. The Ombudsman is not, in his exercise of either of 
these functions, bound to follow those strictly legal considerations, which 
may make the quarry, or parts of it, off-limits to judges."10
The latter fact suggests that the Ombudsman also holds a more free 
position than the courts in relation to the application of the Convention. Thus 
the Ombudsman has stated in general terms that
”[i]t is unobjectionable for the Ombudsman to make use of this freedom [...] Those 
principle views on the relationship between the State and the individual, which 
formed the basis of the implementation of the European Convention on Human 
Rights, and which are reflected in the subsequent development of the individual 
provisions of the Convention, are to a large extent simply identical to those 
considerations which underlay the creation of the office of Folketingets Ombudsmand 
when the Constitution was amended in 1953, and which the activity of the office 
aims constantly at considering.’1112
Accordingly, the Ombudsman must also in the exercise of his functions 
review whether the provisions of the Convention, when relevant to the case 
at issue, "... have formed part of the relevant administrative authority 
decision-making process with the weight which valid Danish law provides 
for.”1314 This view is reflected in some of the Ombudsman’s decisions in 
concrete cases.15 Moreover, the Ombudsman has on some occasions
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10 Cf. Niels Eilschou Holm: The Ombudsman and Human Rights, Report presented at the 
Third International Ombudsman Conference, Stockholm 1984, p. 47.
11 Cf. Folketingets ombudsmands beretning, [Annual Report of the Parliamentary 
Ombudsman], 1986, p. 12.
12 [Det er ubetcnkeligt at g0re brug af denne frihed [...] De principielle synspunkter pi 
forholdet mellem statsmagten og den enkelte, der dannede grundlag for gennemrorelsen af den 
europxiske menneskerettighedskonevcnion, og som afspejles i den videreudvikling af 
konventions enkelte bestemmelser, som finder sted i konventionsorganemes praksis. er 
simpelthen sammenfaldende med de hensyn, der 11 bag oprettelsen af embedet som 
folketingets ombudsmand ved grundlovsrevisionen af 1953, og som embedets virksomhed 
fortsat tilstriber at tilgodese.]
” Ibid.
14 [... er indgäet i den pigaeldende forvaltningsmyndigheds beslutningsproces med den 
vxgt, sbm gzldende dansk ret giver mulighed for.]
r
15 See Folketingets ombudsmands beretning, [Report of the Parliamentary Ombudsman],
1982, p. 9, cf. p. 156; and 1988. p. 93.
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recommended that a statutory or administratively issued provision is brought 
into harmony with the obligations deriving from the Convention.16
Finally, it should be noted that on a number of occasions the Danish 
Government has maintained that administrative authorities are under a legal 
obligation to exercise their discretionary powers in accordance with the the 
obligations following from the Convention. In, for example, the initial report 
of the Danish Government under Article 40 of the UN-Covenant the follow­
ing statement was made:
"The principle of equality before the law though expressly embodied in its general 
form in neither the Constitutional Act nor in any other enactment, is regarded as a 
general principle of Danish law. It serves, in particular, to restrict the exercise of 
discretionary powers by administrative authorities, central and local. However, 
Danish law on the effect in general on domestic law of a validly concluded treaty 
implies inter alia that administrative authorities in their exercise of discretionary 
powers shall ensure that administrative acts - whether in the form of decisions or 
general regulations - conform to validly contracted international commitments. That 
is deemed to be a legal obligation enforceable by judicial review under Section 63 
of the Constitutional Act, according to which the courts of justice are entitled to 
decide any question bearing upon the scope of the Executive. To that extent Article 
26 of the Covenant can be regarded as having been "incorporated’' into domestic 
Danish law.”17
9.3. Norway.
In the Alta Case in NRt. 1982.241 (see supra section 6.3) it was established 
that Norwegian administrative authorities are obliged to excercise their 
discretionary powers in accordance with undertaken, but not incorporated, 
human rights conventions. Furthermore, in this case the H0yesterett stated 
that "... the rules concerning the courts* power to review the validity of 
administrative acts do not prevent the Court from fully and comprehensively 
considering whether the expansion works violate rules of international law." 
As mentioned, it is normally assumed that Norwegian courts are not entitled 
to review the administration’s exercise of so-called "free discretion". 
Accordingly, the rules of international law do not form part of "free 
discretion" which are the exclusive competence of the administration. It is
14 See Folketingets ombudsmands beretning, [Report of the Parliamentary Ombudsman], 
1984, p. 205; and 1987, p. 147.
17 Cf. UN-doc. CCPR/C/1 Add. 51 (concerning the principle of equality before the law 
under Article 26 of the Covenant). See also the Danish Governments pleadings on the 
admissibility in the Case of Kjeldsen, Busk Madsen and Pedersen (see infra section 17.2.1).
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probably realistic to view this statement as implying that Norwegian 
administrative authorities are under a legal duty to exercise their discretionary 
powers not only in accordance with undertaken international obligations in 
the field of human rights, but in accordance with international law in general. 
In the Case o f E v. Norway before the European Court (see infra chapter 16 
and section 18.4), the Norwegian Government pleaded strongly that if 
administrative authorities have not included the Convention when taking 
discretionary decisions, the courts can set aside such decisions.
Accordingly, Professor Carl August Fleischer has suggested that in an 
administrative situation in which lower authorities need an order from a 
superior authority as the basis for their actions, the very information from the 
superior authority that a specific treaty has been entered into is in itself a 
command within the chain-of-command equivalent of a more formal order.18
Stortingets ombudsmann for forvaltningen has neither in general terms 
nor in concrete cases stated anything on the legal position of the Convention 
in relation to the exercise of discretionary powers by administrative 
authorities.19
9.4. Sweden.
Regeringsrattens decision in the Rdned Case in RA 1974.121 (see supra 
section 6.2) laid down that administrative authorities were under no legal 
obligation to exercise their discretionary powers in accordance with 
undertaken, but not incorporated, international obligations. As mentioned, this 
decision was subsequently subjected to strong critique by legal scholars (see 
supra section 6.2). Thus Professor Hilding Eek commented upon the decision 
more indirectly; in a new edition of a book on the sources of law he wrote:
"From the point of view of both international and national interests, it is of course 
important that it is made clear to the authorities which apply the law that the rules 
of law which are to be valid within the country pursuant to a treaty that is binding 
upon the state, are to be applied by them on the same level and under the same 
conditions as "domestic law", as well as what these rules contain. A successful 
handling of this information activity is, of course, not only of great practical value, 
but may also be apt to remove a possible existing imagination among these autho­
rities that they should be under duty not to apply a treaty which had been ratified by 
Sweden and which had entered into force, but which had not been "transformed".
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"  Cf. Fleischer (1984). p. 256.
” Cf. letter to the author of 15 January 1991 (Lnr. 292/90 OO/th).
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thereby exposing the realm as such to responsibility for breach of international 
law."
The decision in the Râneâ Case seems not to have been challenged in subse­
quent judicial practice as regards administrative authorities’ obligations in 
relation to the Convention. However, it may be assumed that the fact that 
Swedish courts recently have become more favourably disposed towards to 
Convention in general (see supra chapter 8) will also have an impact on how 
the courts view administrative authorities’ obligations in this respect. Further­
more, a development away from the restricted view on the possibility of 
administrative authorities applying the Convention can be found in other con­
texts.
In the Skoogstrôm Settlement it was, inter alia, laid down that
"... the Government has seen to it that the National Board'of the Judiciary 
[Domstolsverket] and the Chief Prosecutor [Rigsdklagaren] will publish a summary 
of the Commission's report so as to enable the judiciary and the prosecutors to avoid 
repeating in the daily performance of their duties situations which have been found 
by the Commission to constitute a violation of the said Article."21
In order to implement the undertaking that the National Board of the 
Judiciary and the Chief Prosecutor were to publish a summary of the 
European Commission’s report for the purpose of avoiding future similar 
violations, Mr Peter Lofmarck from the Department of Justice wrote an 
article under his own name about the Skoogstrôm Case in Strasbourg and the 
Swedish rules on arrest and detention.22 In this article, inter alia, published 
in the official publications of the National Board of the Judiciary and the 
Chief Prosecutor,23 it was said:
"The determination by the European Commission only adresses the question whether 
in an individual case of violation of the Convention has taken place, there is not any 
determination whether the legislation in a country is reconcilable with the Conven­
tion. One will have to conclude, however, from the cases now reported that the
“  Cf. Hilding Eek et alii: Juridikens kallmaterial [The Sources of Law Material], 8th 
edition, Stockholm (1975), p. 56. Here cited in English from Sundberg (1988), p. 201.
J1 Cf. Eur. Court H.R.. Case of Skoogstrom & Case of McCoff, Series A, Vol. 83 (1984), 
p. 9.
22 For further information, see Hans Corell: Incorporation o f the European Convention of 
Human Rights from a Swedish Point o f View in Rehof & Gulmann (1989), pp. 156 f.
°  Cf. Domstolsverket informerer. 1984:4, and RA-nytt, 1984:4 respectively.
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Swedish rules, at least in the way they are often applied in practice, cannot be 
reconciled with the Convention. Consequently the rules have to be changed.
The work of the [Swedw/j] commission is now carried on with a view to 
regulating of the coercive measures against persons in a way that satisfies the 
requirements of the Convention.
In the meantime it is desirable that the authorities apply the present rules, as far 
as possible, in such way that there will be no conflict with the European Convention 
[...] As matters now stand, however, one will nevertheless, within the framework of 
the present rules, have to try to arrive at an adaptation as close as possible to the 
requirements of the Convention [...]
It is important, however, that the authorities charged with the application make 
themselves familiar, as soon as possible, with what the decision of the European 
Commission means in their case. It may then be useful that the authorities consult 
each other at a local level in order to arrive at a common system that will work in 
practice. The more the police, the prosecutors and the courts take into consideration 
the standards insisted upon by the European Convention when they apply the present 
rules, the more supple will be the transition to a new system.”24
Since the article was part of a friendly settlement between the applicant and 
the State of Sweden, supervised by the European Court, and thus undoubtedly 
expressive of the Government’s view, although strictly related to the case at 
issue, it is probably fair to view the cited statements as having a more 
general validity. It was, on the one hand, laid down that treaties, as a general 
rule, must be incorporated into domestic Swedish law in order to have 
domestic effects. To the extent that such incorporation has not taken place, 
it was suggested that administrative authorities were, on the other hand, under 
a legal obligation to exercise their discretionary powers in accordance with 
undertaken international obligations.
In a handbook on administrative rule-making,23 published by the 
Cabinet Office subsequent to the Skoogstrdm Settlementt it is stated:
"... that the possibilities of an authority to determine rules freely may be restricted 
also by the undertakings which Sweden has assumed by international agreements [...] 
Those undertakings that follow from an international agreement do not as such mean 
any limitaion in the formal sense of rule-making powers to the authorities. Rules that 
have been issued in conflict with an international agreement which has not been 
incorporated into Swedish law are therefore not per se null. Another matter is that 
Sweden may be guilty of a violation of its international obligations by making 
regulations by means of its internal rule-making which are in violation of the
Chapter 9: the ECHR and the Exercise o f Discretionary Powers
24 Here cited in English from Jacob W.F. Sundberg: Human Rights in Sweden. The Annual 
Reports 1982-84, Stockholm (1985), p. 74.
25 Cf. Statsrddsberedningen. Myndigheternesfdreskrifter. Handbok i forfattningsskrivning, 
Stockholm (1986).
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country’s international agreements. This may mean the risk of counter-action by other 
countries or may incur their disapproval."
This statement, seen in connection with the Skoogstrdm Settlement, has led 
Professor Jacob W.F. Sundberg to the conclusion that ”... in summary, should 
a governmental authority deviate from the Europen Convention in the 
exercise of its discretion, the decision may well suffer revision by being 
taken up to the Government by appeal, but the Government will not criticize 
the lower authorities but simply change the decision.”27
Justitiekansleren has not taken any decisions regarding the obligation of 
administrative authorities to include the Convention in the exercise of their 
discretionary powers.2*
In a recent decision of 26 September 199029 one of Rigsdagens 
Ombudsman, Hans Regnemalm, confirmed that an administrative authority 
cannot, generally speaking, be crticized for not having included the 
Convention in the exercise of its discretionary powers. In the case, the 
Ombudsman held that Swedish law within the field at issue fulfils "with a 
good margin" the Committee of Ministers’ Recommendation No. R (85) 13. 
However, the Ombudsman used the case at issue as an opportunity to give 
a general statement on the Convention’s status in relation to administrative 
authorities’ exercise of their administrative powers.
It follows from Chapter 12, Article 6, of the Instrument of Government 
that the main task of Rigsdagens Ombudsman is the supervision of the 
application in public service of laws and other statutes. Hence the question 
is, briefly speaking, whether the Convention should be considered as a "law 
or other statute". The Ombudsman answered this question in the negative:
"Under Swedish law it is not the business of Swedish courts or administrative 
authorities to apply the provisions of conventions directly, except when they have 
been incorporated into the Swedish legal order by means of domestic rule-making in 
accordance with Chapter 8 of the Instrument of Government; another case is that - 
since a certain scope for interpretation or filling up of a domestic regulation exists - 
as far as possible one seeks to reach a result which lies in line with international law 
obligations of the country. Thus Rigsdagens Ombudsman cannot criticize an authority
26 Here cited in English from Sundberg (1988), p. 206.
17 Ibid.
a  Cf. letter to the author of 28 December 1990 (Dnr 3663-90-19).
* Case No. Dnr 2477-1990.
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that it has not, by disregarding Swedish law, applied the provisions of the Convention 
[...] The responsibility for the fulfilment of the obligations under the Convention lies 
primarily with the highest state organs which are exempted from the supervision of 
Rigsdagens Ombudsmen, Riksdagen and the Government, which through rule-making
• directly or indirectly - have to incorporate the commands of the Convention in the 
domestic legal order and thus harmonize this one with the Convention/3031
Accordingly, the Ombudsman cannot criticize an authority for not having 
applied the Convention directly,32 since the authority is not under a legal 
obligation to review the compatibility of the statute at issue with the 
Convention. This statement is simply a confirmation of the transformation 
theory and the principle o f presumption in relation to administrative decision­
making. As regards the specific question of whether or not administrative 
authorities are under a legal obligation to include the Convention in the 
exercise of their discretionary powers, it is probably fair to conclude that no 
such obligation exists in Sweden in the view of the Ombudsman.33 The 
emphasis put on the principle o f presumption suggests, however, that 
administrative authorities within Swedish law have firm possibilities of using 
the Convention in the exercise of their discretionary powers. In comparison 
with the most recent court practice on the application of the Convention in 
Sweden (see supra chapter 8) this view seems to be somewhat restricted.
On the other hand, the Ombudsman emphasized that he has the power to 
draw the attention of the Riksdag to any divergence between Swedish law and
30 Ibid., at pp. 4 f.
31 [Det ankommer enligt svensk rätt inte svenska domstoiar eller förvaltningsmyndigheter 
att direkt tillämpa konventionsbestämmelser, utan dessa mäste genom normgivnmg enligt 8 
kap. RF först ha införlivats med den svenska rättsordningen; en annan sak är, att man - d i 
visst utrymme för tolkning eller utfyllnad av en inhemsk föreskrift föreligger - i görligaste 
män söker nä et resultat, som Ligger i linje med landets folkrättsliga förplietelser. JO kan alltsä 
inte kritisera en myndighet för att den inte med Isidosättande av svensk lag tillämpat kon­
ventionsbestämmelser [...] Ansvaret för att förpligtelsema enligt konventionen fullgöres ivilar
i första hand de frin JO:s dllsyn undantagna högsta ststasorganen, riksdagen och regeringen, 
som geimom normgivning har att - direkt eller indirekt - införliva konventionens bud i den 
inhemska förfatmingsregleringen och sllunda harmonisera denna med konventionen.]
32 Ibid., at p. 5.
33 Fredrik G.E. Sundberg: Om ingripanden mot administrativt frihetsberövande i eti
räuighetsperspektiv, [On Interference against Persons Administratively deprived of their 
Liberty - in a Rights Perspective], Förvaltningsrättslig ddskrift 1983, pp. 200 rf., at p. 202 ff., 
advocates that administrative authorities should be considered under a legal obligation to 
include the Convention in their decision-making. Similarly, Hilding Eek, C>ve Bring & Lars 
Hjemer: Folkrätt, [Public International Law], 4th edition, Stockholm (1984), p. 261, who 
moreover assume that administrative authorities in fact use international treaties in the 
performance of their duties. ,
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the Convention, and that in fact he does so from time to time.34
9.5. Tentative Conclusions.
It follows from the discussion in this chapter that Danish and Norwegian 
administrative authorities are under a legal obligation to include the 
Convention, whenever relevant to the case at issue, in the exercise of their 
discretionary powers. This obligation is subject to judicial review under 
Article 63 of the Danish Constitution and the unwritten Norwegian principle 
of judicial review of administrative action. Compared to Denmark and 
Norway the legal position in Sweden in this respect is less clear. However, 
the tendency seems to be, as in the other Swedish cases concerning the 
ECHR, to pay more attention to the Convention now than previously. On the 
other hand, it is not possible to say in clear terms that under Swedish law a 
dministrative authorities are under a legal obligation to exercise their 
discretionary powers in accordance with the Convention; the decision of 26 
September 1990 of Ombudsman Hans Regnemalm does not suggest that such 
an obligation exists.
* Ibid.
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Conclusions to Part III
CHAPTER 10
10.1. The Application of the European Convention in Domestic Law: a 
Brief Survey.
From the case-law discussed in chapters 5-9 it follows that Scandinavian 
courts frequently apply international law - and in particular the ECHR - when 
deciding a case. These decisions concern a number of very different 
questions, and international law has been applied to a different extent in the 
individual cases. However, one common feature is manifest: the courts do not 
recognize conflicts between international law, as they interpret this, and 
domestic law. Consequently, with a few exceptions, the courts have managed 
to avoid taking a stand on how a (clear-cut) conflict between international 
law, including the Convention, and domestic law should be resolved. These 
exceptions have, however, to a very large extent been obiter dicta statements; 
it appears that the courts have in only three instances (UfR 1974.263 in 
Denmark, NRt. 1957.942 in Norway and RA 1974.121 in Sweden) expressly 
let domestic law prevail over the treaty provision as part of the ratio 
decidendi of the judgment. And of these three instances did only R3 
1974.121 concern the ECHR. This is quite remarkable. In spite of this, the 
courts have on a number of occasions in substance and, in the most recent 
cases also in form, or explicit terms, applied the Convention directly. Where 
there was previously a tendency only to ascertain that the domestic solution 
found did not violate the Convention (international law), there is now a 
tendency to embark on discussions on the application of the Convention and 
Strasbourg case-law. There can be no doubt that the Convention is an interna­
tional instrument, with considerable and substantial force at the domestic 
level also. Even so, the number of reported cases in which the Convention 
has been referred to is in absolute terms low, although in comparison with 
other international instruments it is by far the most applied treaty in domestic 
law.
With the exception of the Swedish judgments in AD 1972 No. 5, NJA 
1973.423 and RA 1974.121 and the Danish judgment in UfR 1986.898 (see 
supra section 6.2) there is, generally speaking, a firm practice of paying more 
and more attention to the Convention in domestic legal decisions from the 
highest instances. Thus the cases in which most significance has been
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ascribed to the Convention are from 1988 onwards.
However, in the period from 1974 and to Hógsta Domstolen's judgment 
in NJA 1984.903, Regeringsrdtten’s decision in the Ràneà Case in RÀ
1974.121, which was the judicial affirmation of the transformation theory, 
was the leading precedent concerning the application of the Convention in 
Sweden. Under this theory the impact of the Convention on domestic Swedish 
law was quite insignificant. In 1981, the year in which Sweden was found to 
have violated the Convention in the Sporrong and Lonnroth Case (see infra 
sections 18.2 and 18.3), Regeringsràtten examined in RÀ 1981 2:14 (see 
supra section 6.3) whether domestic law was compatible with the re­
quirements of the Convention and seems thus to have become more open vis- 
à-vis the Convention.1
It is difficult to say whether it was the Sporrong and Lonnroth Case, the 
increase of Swedish complaints to the European Commission, or a com­
bination of different factors, which motivated this change of attitude within 
the Judiciary. Professor Jacob. W.F. Sundberg has explained this change by 
a combination of different factors: (1) "grievances accumulated” in the 
Swedish society under the Social Democratic Goverment of Mr Oluf Palme; 
and (2) "breaking the bureaucratic wall" by different "break-in tools" such as 
breaking "citation cartels", breaking the "media wall", establishing a "human 
rights law moot court competition", "friendly settlements", the Sporrong and 
Lonnroth Case, the "European limelight", "advocate pleading" and the ac­
tivity of the Council of Legislation.2 Whether or not this observation 
accurately reflects the change in the Swedish legal practice lies outside the 
framework of the present study.
The Norwegian courts appeared, until recently, to have been more willing 
to apply the Convention than its Danish and Swedish counterparts, but the 
Danish and Swedish courts now tend to show a more or less similar will­
ingness to apply the Convention (see supra section 8.4). This applies in 
particular to the Danish courts which at the moment seem to be very 
determined to give the Convention a stronger position in domestic law.
1 In these years, the number of complaints (provisional files) directed against Sweden to 
the European Commission rose from 42 in 1981 to 72 in 1982, 240 in 1983, 192 in 1984 and 
168 in 1985. The number of registered files were in the same period 8 in 1981, 18 in 198Z
46 in 1983, 51 in 1984 and 64 in 1985, cf. European Commission of Human Rights: Stock- 
Taking on the European Convention on Human Rights, 1954-1984 and 1986.
2 Cf. Jacob W.F. Sundberg: The Swedish Experience of the European Convention: the 
View from beneath, 24 Akron Law Review (1987), pp. 649 ff.
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Apart from the above observations, the available case-law can hardly be 
said to be a basis for drawing clear and unambiguous conclusions on the ap­
plication of international law in general and the ECHR in particular in 
domestic Scandinavian law. However, it is certainly possible to point to some 
trends in the practice of the courts:
(1) In deciding a case the courts apply international law as law and not 
as facts?
(2) There is apparently no difference in the courts’ application of 
customary international law and treaties.
(3) The distinction between the rule of interpretation and the rule o f 
presumption, in an analytical sense, does not reflect practice. This applies to 
both the criterion for making the distinction between the rules and the 
assumption that the rule o f presumption cannot be applied to treaties which 
are more recent than the statute in question.4 Thus, in UfR 1972.600 the 
H0jesteret has applied a treaty which was more recent than the Administra­
tion of Justice Act. Nevertheless, from a more practical point of view it may 
be useful to use this distinction because, in spite of all, it highlights whether 
the vague principle o f presumption is applied as a principle of interpretation 
or as the legitimation for deviating from the wording of a domestic legal rule.
(4) In some cases the courts have applied international law to a greater 
extent than international law has itself required. This has been designated as 
enforcing international law in domestic law. The question of international 
law as a source o f law in domestic law is very interesting since an applica­
tion of this type goes considerably farther than what is presupposed in the 
principle o f presumption.
(5) In Denmark and Norway it is clearly established that administrative 
authorities are under a legal obligation to exercise their discretionary powers 
in accordance with undertaken international obligations - be they incorporated 
or not - whereas in contemporary Swedish law there seems to be only a 
tendency to recognize such obligations.
Against this background it may be concluded that the European Conven­
The Application o f the ECHR in Domestic Law: a Brief Survey
3 Cf. Espersen (1970), p. 396; and Smith (1968). pp. 183 f.
4 Cf. Rehof & Trier (1990), p. 85 note 73, with reference to S0ren Stenderup Jensen: 
Folkeretten som retskilde i dansk ret, [International Law as a Source of Law in Domestic 
Danish Law], UfR 1990 B, pp. 1 ff., at p. 9.
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tion on Human Rights is a source o f law in domestic Scandinavian law? 
However, this source of law appears at the moment to be slightly more 
forceful in Denmark and Norway than in Sweden.6
Thus the Convention has not, as Judge Pierre Pescatore has put it, "... 
remained a dead letter, at least judicially,” in the Scandinavian countries.7
Hence the relevant question is what weight should be accorded to the 
ECHR when in conflict with domestic law? This question will be discussed 
in section 10.2.
One could, however, have wished that considerations regarding the rela­
tionship between international law and domestic law, which in individual 
cases undoubtedly support the assumption that domestic law should conform 
to international law, had been expressed more clearly in the judgments. This 
(previous) lack of explicit discussion of the position of the ECHR in 
domestic law seems to have caused some doubt as to the domestic fulfilment 
of the obligations under the Convention. However, in the most recent case- 
law the courts seem to have changed their attitude and in fact discussed and 
applied the Convention.
5 Cf. Trond Dolva: lnternasjonale menneskerettigheterskonvensjoner og intern norsk rett, 
[International Human Rights Conventions and Domestic Norwegian Law], TfR 1990, pp. 121 
ff, at p. 128; Gulmann (1983). p. 51; and Smith (1968), p. 183.
Gulmann, Bernhard & Lehmann (1989), p. 95, state: There is solid background in legal 
[DanishJ practice for such a view.” Similarly, Aall (1989), p. 637, who concludes as regards 
Norwegian law: 'Today it is completely unproblematic to establish that human rights 
conventions are relevant sources of law (factors) in our domestic application of law."
Fleischer (1984), p. 251, recognizes that international law is a source of law in domestic 
law but considers it nevertheless more appropriate to stick to the traditional terminology. The 
fact that international law has only significance in domestic law through the principle c f 
presumption expresses, in Fleischer's opinion, an important reality.
Opsahl (1979), p. 176, on the other hand, in a 1979 article held that "[a]t present this 
power [to apply international obligations directly] is very questionable, and indeed is not 
clearly established in practice in any Nordic country, despite recommendations in legal writing 
and certain suave but non-committal statements by persons in important positions."
For an opposite view, see Ole Espersen: Den europceiske Menneskerettigheds forhold til 
dansk ret, [Tne relationship between ¿ie European Convention on Human Rights and Danish 
Law], Juristen 1966, pp. 401 ff., at p. 412.
[Der er i retspraksis solid baggrund for en sidan opfattelse.][Det er i dag helt uproblematisk
4 si A fast at menneskerettighetskonvensjonene er relev ante rettskildefaktorer i vir nasjonale 
rettsanvendelse.]
6 For a somewhat different view, see Berdl Bengtsson: Om domare och rdttskMlor, [On 
Judges and Sources of Law], TfR 1989, pp. 686 ff., at p. 691, who explains that it is not 
possible to find any concrete example that the Convention should have influenced Hogsta 
Domstolen in any significant way, although there is an increasing tendency to invoke the 
Convention before the Court.
7 Cf. Pierre Pescatore; Conclusion in Jacobs & Roberts (1987), pp. ? ff., at p. 278.
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Finally, it should be mentioned that the terminology in this particular 
field of law de lege feranda in itself has some impact on the application of 
the Convention and other treaties. This is explained clearly by Professor 
Claus Gulmann,
"... there can, however, be no doubt that the acceptance of international law as a 
source of law may have a psychological effect. It may help to change the general 
auitude of lawyers towards international law. It may help to make them understand 
that they cannot limit themselves to an examination of domestic sources of law. They 
will have to broaden their search for pertinent rules to the international sphere. An 
acceptance may also help to form a new conceptual basis for a broader application 
of non-incorporated international law within the Danish legal order."*
10.2. The Weight of the International Sources of Law.
Since in nearly all the available Scandinavian judgments no conflict between 
international law and domestic law was assumed, it is not possible, in general 
terms, to draw conclusions as to the weight of the sources of international 
law which arc not unambiguous. However, a few indications (some of them 
concerning the ECHR) of how the courts may be expected to resolve such 
conflicts have emerged from the individual cases. Thus, in UfR 1974.263, 
NRt. 1957.942 and RA 1974.121 (see supra section 6.2), the courts let a 
treaty provision yield to a domestic statutory provision, whereas a circular 
was, in effect, set aside in the unpublished decision of 25 April 1966 from 
the Kobenhavns Byret (see supra section 8.2.2). In UfR 1990.13 (see supra 
section 8.4) a clear statutory domestic provision was disregarded, and this 
was probably also the case in NRt. 1984.1175 (see supra section 8.2.2). 
Finally, in UfR 1986.898, the Hpjesteret refused to review directly whether 
domestic rules were compatible with the European Convention (see supra 
sections 5.2.1 and 6.2). Likewise, Swedish courts have in a number of obiter 
dicta stated that non-incorporated international law must yield to domestic 
statutory law (see supra section 6.2). But these indications do not provide 
any basis for general guidelines in the solution of conflicts between interna­
tional law and domestic law.
The writers who have asserted that international law is a source of law 
in domestic Danish law have assumed that, with regard to its position within 
the domestic norm-hierarchy, it should only yield to a domestic statutory pro­
vision if regard for it means that the Legislature’s intentions are not being
The Application of the ECHR in Domestic Law: a Brief Survey
'  Cf. Gulmann (1987), p. 34.
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carried out.9 However, this view leaves ample room for the interpretation of 
the Legislature’s intentions and says in fact only a little about how such con­
flicts should be solved.
In principle it is probably possible to go one step further and recognize 
that nothing unambiguous can be concluded from Article 19 of the Danish 
Constitution, from Article 26 of the Norwegian Constitution and from the 
Chapter 10, section 2, of the Swedish Instrument of Government on whether 
international law can be applied directly.10 The only fundamental restriction 
on the law-enforcing authorities ' application of international law is the 
principle o f legality: international law cannot substitute the requirement of 
statutory authorization laid down in this principle.11 This view has reaso­
nable support in the available case-law.
Hence the question is how strong is the impact of the principle of legality 
in this context?
With the exception of Sweden, the principle o f legality is unwritten in 
Scandinavian law. In Chapter 8, section 3, of the Swedish Instrument of 
Government the principle is expressed in the following way:
"Provisions concerning the relation between private subjects and the community 
which regard obligations incumbent upon private subjects or which otherwise 
interfere in the personal or economic affairs of private subjects shall be laid down 
by law.
Such provisions are, inter alia: Provisions regarding criminal acts and the legal 
consequence of such acts, provisions regarding taxes payable to the State, and 
provisions regarding requisition and other such dispositions."11
The principle has a slightly different scope depending on whether it is 
applied by administrative authorities or by the courts.
In making decisions administrative authorities are bound by the principle 
o f legality in such a way that any administrative act must be based on law
9 Cf. Espersen (1970), p. 388; Gulmsm (1987), p. 34; and Holst-Christensen (1989), p.
49.
Zahie (1986), Vol. 3, p. 129, puts forward a principle of primacy of the statute and states 
in this connection that this principle applies solely to recognized conflicts between interna­
tional law and domestic law; that it only applies to the legislation; and that the principle of 
legality must be fulfilled.
10 Cf. Zahle (1986), Vol. 3. p. 113.
" Cf. Smith (1968), p. 183.
12 Cf. Constitutional Documents of Sweden, published by the Swedish Riksdag, Stockholm 
(1981).
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understood as valid law and must not be contrary to formal law, i.e. legisla­
tion.13 From a more practical point of view one can say that, as a general 
rule, administrative acts shall have positive authorization in a source of law. 
This applies to both the factual and legal aspects of the administration’s 
activity. As regards measures which infringe upon the rights of the in­
dividual, it is laid down in the principle that statutory authorization is 
required. In practice, general administrative regulations are issued with 
statutory authorization.
The exact scope of the principle is not clear, nor is the requirement as to 
the character and strength of the statutory authorization well-defined. It is 
probably fair to say that the more heavy-handed an encroachment is upon the 
individual, the more distinct is the requirement for clear statutory authoriza­
tion.
Consequently, the principle o f legality may limit the administrative 
authorities* application of international law. International law cannot sub­
stitute statutory authorization in cases in which obligations are imposed on 
the individual. When it is a question of extending the rights of the individual, 
as is the case with the ECHR, the scope of the principle of legality is 
probably more limited.14 Jan Erik Helgesen has expressed the impact of the 
principle o f legality in the application of international law on the domestic 
level in the following way:
’Even if one goes further, but adheres to this point of departure, it is established that 
the principle of legality does not prevent intervention to the advantage of the citizen 
or intervention in "the State’s own sphere of activity” [rettsomrdde]. Thus, according 
to this, an international law provision which protects the citizen against the State is 
relevant without having having been incorporated into Norwegian law. In such cases, 
it has also been held that the international law provision should take precedence, that
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13 Sec, for instance, Andenaes (1986), pp. 215 ff.; The Ministry of Justice (1971), p. 70; 
Kirsten Ketscher & Steen Ransholdt: Retsanvendelse og retssikkerhed - en introduktion, [The 
Application of Law and the Rule of Law - an Introduction], Copenhagen (1987), p. 22; Bent 
Christensen: Forvaltningsret. Hiemmelssp0rgsmäl% [Administrative Law. Questions of Legali­
ty], Copenhagen (1980), pp. 35 ff.; Jorgen Mathiassen: Forvaltningsakten in Juridisk Grundbog 
[Fundamental Legal Book], 3rd edition, Copenhagen 1975, § 9; Zahle (1986), Vol. 3, pp. 18 
ff.; Ross (1980), Vol. 1, pp. 233 ff.; Max Sorensen: Dansk statsforfatningsret, [Danish 
Constitutional Law], 2nd edition by Peter Germer, Copenhagen (1973), p. 233, p. 210, p. 342, 
p. 363, p. 399 and p. 414; Gorm Toftegaard Nielsen: III. Constitutional and Administrative 
Law in Hans Gammeltoft-Hansen, Bernhard Gomard & Allan Philip: Danish Law. A General 
Survey, Copenhagen (1982), p. 49 and p. 51; Opsahl (1979), p. 165; Smith (1968), p. 183; 
Erik Holmberg &. Nils Stjemquist: Vdr nya författning [Our New Constitution], 2nd edition, 
Stockholm (1976) p. 124 ff.; and Hikon Strömberg, (1989), pp. 14 f. and 95 f.
14 See Smith (1968), p. 183; Gulmann (1983), pp. 49 f.; and Madsen (1986), p. 39.
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it should be accorded particularly great weight."13
However, the European Court has established that some of the provisions of 
the ECHR have Drittwirkung,16 i.e. these provisions of the Convention do 
not only protect the individual against the State but also against the actions 
of other private persons. Thus, the State is under obligation to shape the rule 
of law in such a manner that no violation of the substantial provisions of the 
Convention occur in mutual relations between its citizens. Insofar as no 
domestic measures have been taken in order to incorporate provisions of the 
Convention having Drittwirkung, Scandinavian courts cannot, due to the 
principle o f legality, give full domestic effect to such provisions. In addition, 
it should be observed that it is doubtful whether an incorporation of the 
Convention in itself would fulfil the requirements as to the clarity of statutory 
authorization laid down in this respect in the principle o f legality} 1
On the other hand, administrative authorities are considered legally bound 
to exercise their discretionary powers in such a way that individual decisions 
conform to exisdng international obligations (see supra chapter 9).
The principle o f legality also applies to the courts, albeit with slightly 
different scope. Generally speaking, the courts do not need an explicit 
statutory authorization as a basis for their decisions to the same extent as the 
administrative authorities; they consider themselves entitled to base their de­
cisions on the law understood as the sources o f law}*
Within specific areas - such as criminal law and criminal procedure - it 
is explicitly prescribed in constitutional or statutory provisions that certain 
encroachments upon the individual by the State can only take place with 
specific statutory authorization, see e.g. the above cited Chapter 8, section 3,
15 Cf. Helgesen (1982), p. 86. Here cited in English from Eur. Court H.R., Case o f E v. 
Norway, Series A, Vol. 181 (1990), Appendices to the Government's memorial.
“ For a brief account on the concept of Drittwirkung - or third-party applicability - see 
Everet Albert Alkema: The third-party applicability or "Drittwirkung" o f the European 
Convention on Human Rights in Matscher & Petzold (1988), pp. 33 ff.
17 See Asbjwn Jensen in Rehof and Guimann (1989), pp. 165 f.; and Holst-Christensen 
(1989), pp. 56 f.
11 Cf. The Ministry of Justice (1971), p. 71; NOU 1983:87 Straffelovgivningen under 
omformning, [The Penal Legislation under Conversion], p. 115; Ross (1980), pp. 543 f.; and 
Max Sorensen, op.cit, pp. 157 f.
See also Article 64 in the Danish Constitution; "In the performance of their duties the 
judges shall be directed solely by the law...", cf. Blaustein & rlanz, Binder IV, October 1990,
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of the Swedish Instrument of Government; Article 96 in the Norwegian 
Constitution and section 1 of the Danish Penal Code, which all express the 
maxim of nulla poena sine lege. Outside criminal law and criminal proce­
dure, interpreted in the broadest sense, it is not possible to find such 
examples.
The following conclusion from the Danish Ministry of Justice is probably 
representative for all Scandinavian countries:
"As far as it goes, it can be said that both administrative authorities and the courts 
must fulfil the requirement that decisions made shall be authorized in "valid law". 
It is hardly doubted that the courts in this country, if one excludes cases within the 
criminal procedure, are regarded as entitled to make decisions on a less distinct basis 
than what would be required of the administration in similar cases."19
Accordingly, the decisions in NRt. 1946.198, NRt. 1947.434 ( see supra 
section 8.2.1) and UfR 1972.600 (see supra section 7.3) go too far in the 
application of international law since in these cases obligations, including the 
death penalty, were imposed on the individual with authorization in inter­
national law only. This lack of domestic statutory authorization in these cases 
is definitely not in accordance with the principle o f legality.
Apart from the restrictions following from the principle o f legality, the 
view put forward here does not mean that international law, in the case of 
conflict with domestic law, should prevail absolutely. Such a conflict must 
be resolved on the basis of an overall evaluation of the facts of the case - 
including the different sources of law. As in other cases of conflict between, 
on the one hand, a statutory rule and, on the other, another source of the law, 
it is certain that the statutory rule will carry considerable weight. But the 
considerations pointing in the opposite direction may cany such weight that 
a total evaluation makes the international law rule prevail.
Thus, the lex specialis and the lex posterior derogat legi priori principles 
will give some guidance in resolving a conflict between international law and 
domestic law, whereas the lex superior principle will normally be applied in 
such a way that it is assumed that international law, by definition, is holding 
a lower position in the norm-hierarchy than legislation. This is expressed very
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19 [For sä vidt kan det sigcs, at der b4de for administrative myndigheder og for domstolene 
g*lder et krav om, at trufhe afgarelser skal have hjemmel i "gasldende ret”. Der er dog nsppe 
tvivl om, at domstolene her i landet, nir bortses fra sager indenfor strafferetsplejen. anses for 
berettigede til at treffe afgerelser p i et mindre klart hjemmel senmdlag end det, der i tilsva- 
rende ulfxlde ville blive krasvet af en administrativ myndighed.]
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strongly by Jan Erik Helgesen:
"I have, however, little use for the lex superior principle in the conflict between 
arguments of international law and arguments of domestic law, because this principle 
presupposes a relatively clear conception of the placing in the norm-hierarchy. And 
this is where the misunderstanding arises: the hieratic placing of the systems. That 
one has applied this principle of conflict of rules on this type of divergency is in my 
opinion the cardinal mistake."2021
Moreover, it is possible to point out some considerations which seem to have 
had specific significance in the resolving of conflicts between international 
law and domestic law. These considerations have to some extent been 
expressed, more or less explicitly, in the available case-law, but are also 
based on more common considerations:22
(1) Is the conflict of a total or of a partial nature? The more limited the 
conflict is, the easier it is to base the application of the rule of international 
law on the lex specictlis principle, cf. NRt. 1908.749, NRt. 1938.584, UfR 
1942.1002, UfR 19710.332 and UfR 1982.1128.
(2) The political and legal problems which might be involved in a breach 
of international law, cf. UfR 1942.1002 and UfR 1972.600.
(3) The strength and the clarity o f the international rule, including the 
degree of acceptance of the rule by the international community, (cf. the 
cases concerning the Regulations of Land Warfare and in particular the 
ECHR). There can be no doubt that the ECHR and other human rights 
conventions are treaties with a considerable impact on domestic law; this 
follows very clearly from the available case-law. The Convention is undoub­
tedly a forceful expression of a legal policy to which the Scandinavian 
countries profess to adhere.
Case-law from the European Court to which the country at issue has been 
a party has a particularly strong impact on domestic courts. Thus in UfR 
1990.13 the H0jesteret has been willing, in effect, to disregard a clear 
domestic provision in order to follow the interpretation of the Convention
20 [Lex superior-prinsippet har jeg derimot liten nytte av i kollisjonen melloni folkerettslige 
og intem-rettsiige argumenter, fordi dette prinsippet forutsetter relativi klare oppfatninger om 
tnnnheyden. Og her komm er misforstielsen - den hierarkiske plasering av systemene • inn 
med full tyngde. At man har kunnet finne anvendelse for dette kollisjonsprinsip pi denne type 
motstrid, er etter min mening selve kardinalfeilen.]
*' Cf. Helgesen (1982), p. 105.
22 See Smith (1968), pp. 188 ff.
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laid down by the European Court. Similarly, the Hogsta Domstolen has in 
such a case paid considerable attention to the Convention, although there has 
been no Question of disregarding the domestic provision.
The former Chief-Justice of the Hfiyesterett, Terje Wold, has asserted that 
since the Convention promises human rights to everybody who lives in the 
territory, everybody can claim fulfilment of the Convention as a subjective 
right regardless of the laws of the State. Consequently, the Convention is 
applicable directly in domestic law and prevails over domestic law in the 
case of a conflict23 Although Wold’s view de lege lata does not reflect the 
general view in this field, it nevertheless shows how forceful an international 
instrument the ECHR is considered to be.
Similarly, Wold’s successor as Chief Justice of the Hfiyesterett and Presi­
dent of the European Court of Human Rights, Rolv Ryssdal, has touched 
upon the question of how Norwegian courts would resolve a conflict between 
the Convention and domestic law:
"I would like to mention that some important human rights, which are not contained 
in the Norwegian Constitution, are now included in international binding conventions 
on human rights [International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 16 
December 1966 and the ECHR]. I am not aware of conflicts between existing 
national legislation and the provisions of the international conventions. If, however, 
such a conflict should arise, it would be for the courts to decide the conflict, and I 
think it could be argued that precedence should be given to the convention.1'24
(4) The strength and the clarity o f the domestic rule, cf. NRt. 1957.942, RA
1974.121, UfR 1974.263 and UfR 1986.898. It should, however, be recalled 
that the Swedish courts have emphasized as obiter dicta that incorporation is 
required if international law is to be applicable directly in domestic Swedish 
law. This may be interpreted as meaning that in Sweden domestic law is 
apparently per se regarded as having more strength than international law. 
But again, the question seems to be more complex; thus in some recent cases
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23 Cf. Tetje Wold: Den européiske menneskerettighedskonvensjon og Norge, [The 
European Convention on Human Rights and Norway], in Legal Essays. Festskrift til Frede 
Castberg, Oslo (1963). pp. 353 ff.
“  Cf. Rolf Ryssdal: The Relation between the Judiciary and the Legislative and Executive 
Branches erf the Government in Norway, North Dakota Law Review 1981, pp. 534 f. Similarly, 
Torstein Eckhoff: Alta-dommen, [The Alta Judgment], Lov og Rett 1982, pp. 339 ff.. at p. 
352; and Eckhoff (1987), p. 267.
See also Rolv Ryssdal: Bestand und Bedeutung der Grundrechte in Norwegen, EuGRZ 
1978, p. 459, in which he expresses himself in somewhat more guarded terms than in the 
passage cited above.
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Hogsta Domstolen has laid down that the Convention is an important means 
of interpretation regarding the Instrument of Government.
(5) The domestic rules’ position within the domestic norm-hierarchy, cf. 
Kobenhavns Byref s judgment of 25 April 1966. Thus Professor Carsten 
Smith has concluded that
"A special act of transformation cannot, contrary to the ordinary opinion, be 
considered necessary in principle as a condition for the application of international 
law. Such an act is required only to give the international rule the level in the muni­
cipal legal system appertaining to the transformation rule employed."25
As indicated previously, generally speaking, it is probably still fair to 
conclude that the Convention is regarded as being placed beneath legislation 
in the domestic norm-hierarchy. But in contemporary case-law there seems 
to be a tendency to give the Convention the same position in domestic law 
as legislation, cf. UfR 1990.13 and NRt. 1984.1175. However, one should 
probably be careful of not thinking too much in terms of a domestic norm- 
hierarchy when discussing the relationship between international law and 
domestic law.
(6) Is it possible to ascertain the Legislature's intentions? To the extent 
that these intentions can be ascertained, they will be ascribed considerable 
significance. This applies both when it is clear that the Legislature intended 
to fulfil an international obligation completely, cf. UfR 1955.595, UfR 1964.- 
624, UfR 1975.30, UfR 1979.332 and UfR 1990.13, or when it is clearly 
indicated that the Legislature did not want to implement a treaty obligation 
completely, cf. NRt. 1957.942 and UfR 1974.263.
The large number of cases in which it has been established that there was 
no conflict between domestic law and the Convention in particular indicates, 
however, that it may be questioned whether the very concept of a conflict o f 
rules reflects the process which leads the courts to the conclusion that, in the 
case at issue, there is no conflict between the domestic provision and the rule 
of international law.26 It appears quite clearly from the case-law discussed 
in this context that the interpretation of the domestic rule and the interpreta-
a  Cf. Smith (1968), p. 184.
“  Cf. Smith (1980), p. 308.
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tion of the international rule influence each other mutually. This means that 
the domestic and the international sources of law are harmonized into one 
process and in the majority of cases, as a result of this harmonazition, 
international law is not found to be in conflict with domestic law. Accor­
dingly, the considerations listed above probably establish more that no 
conflict exists between domestic and international sources of law than as a 
guideline for the resolving of such conflicts.
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PART IV
The Application of the European Convention 
in Domestic Scandinavian Law in a 
Comparative Perspective

CHAPTER 11
The Application of the European Convention in a 
"Dualist" System: the United Kingdom
11.1. Introduction.
The United Kingdom was one of the original signatories of the Convention 
on 4 November 1950, and its First Protocol on 8 March 1952. Prior to the 
ratification, the Convention was ordered "to lie upon the table" of the House 
of Commons on 23 January 1953. This was done in accordance with the so- 
called Ponsonby rule (a constitutional usage which is possibly a binding 
constitutional convention), whereby the texts of international agreements are 
laid before both Houses of Parliament for the duration of twenty-one days 
prior to ratification.1 On 5 February 1951, the Minister of Foreign Affairs 
stated that "... if no objections are raised, the instrument of ratification will 
be prepared on or after 21st February". The instruments of ratification of the 
Convention and subsequently of its First Protocol were deposited with the 
Secretary General of the Council of Europe on 8 March 1951 and 3 Novem­
ber 1952, respectively. A reservation was made with regard to Article 2 of 
the Protocol: the States’ duty to provide education facilities in accordance 
with parental convictions was "... accepted by the United Kingdom only in 
so far as it is compatible with the provisions of efficient instruction and 
training, and the avoidance of unreasonable expenditure". Declarations on the 
recognition of the compulsory jurisdiction of the European Court of Human 
Rights and the acceptance of the competence of the Commission to receive 
individual petitions were made on 14 January 1966.2
In accordance with well-established British constitutional practice based 
upon the concept of Parliamentary sovereignty, the provisions of international 
agreements ratified by the United Kingdom have no internal effect unless 
they are transformed into domestic law by an Act of Parliament (see infra 
section 11.3). Such implementing legislation was, as in the Scandinavian 
countries, not considered necessary in the case of the ratification of the
1 See, for example, E.C.S. Wade & A.W. Bradley: Constitutional and Administrative Law, 
10th edition. London and New York (1985), p. 321.
2 See 9 Yearbook (1966), pp. 8 and 14.
ECHR. At the time of ratification the Government assumed that domestic law 
was in full conformity with the Convention’s provisions, and successive go­
vernments have since expressed the opinion that the rights and freedoms 
enumerated are in all cases already secured by domestic law. As a conse­
quence, the Convention has not acquired a domestic status in the United 
Kingdom, and individuals cannot rely upon it directly before the courts (see 
infra section 12.3). However, the United Kingdom has on a number of 
occasions, usually as a consequence either of cases pending or "lost" before 
the European Commission and Court, amended existing or passed new 
legislation in order to comply with the Convention.3
11.2. The Effect of Treaties in Domestic Law.
For centuries customary international law has been regarded as part of the 
common law and as directly enforceable by English courts.4 But the British 
approach to treaties has always been distinctly "dualist”. As Lord Atkin put 
it in Attorney-General fo r Canada v. Attorney-General for Ontario: "Within 
the British Empire there is a well-established rule that the making of a treaty 
is an executive act, while the performance of its obligations, if they entail 
alteration of existing domestic law, requires legislative action."5 If no such 
legislation is passed, it is, as Lord Denning M.R. held in Blackburn v. 
Attorney-General, "... elementary that the courts take no notice of treaties as 
such. We take no notice of treaties until they are embodied in laws enacted 
in Parliament, and then only to the extent that Parliament tells us."6
The most common way of incorporating treaties into domestic English 
law is by the adoption method,7 i.e. the statute gives effect to the treaty as 
such. In these circumstances and to the extent specified in the statute, the
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3 For a general account on the impact of the Convention on the legislative process in the 
United Kingdom, see Clive Symmons: The Effect of the European Convention on Human 
Rights on the Preparation and Amendment of Legislation, Delegated Legislation and 
Administrative Rules in the United Kingdom, in M.P. Furmston, R. Kerridge & B.E. Sufrin 
(eds.): The Effect on English Domestic Law of Membership of the European Communities and 
o f the Ratification of the European Convention on Human Rights, The Hague (1983)* pp. 387 
ff.
4 See, for example. Lord McNair: The Law o f Treaties, Oxford (1961), pp. 81 f.; and 
E.C.S. Wade and A.W. Bradley, op.cit., p. 322.
5 Cf. [1937] A.C. 326, at p. 347.
6 Cf. [1971] 2 All E.R. 1380, at p. 1382.
7 On the terminology regarding the incorporation of treaties, see supra section 2.1.
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substantial part of the domestic legislation is the text of the treaty itself: it is 
the source of law. It happens, however, that treaties are incorporated by being 
reformulated in a domestic statute. "[BJecause the method of construction to 
some extent depends on the method of interpretation", Dr. FA. Mann has 
pointed out that the incorporation of treaties through reformulation, due to the 
variety of forms these may take, should be clearly distinguished.® Accor­
dingly, he classifies the ways in which treaties are reformulated into the fol­
lowing categories:9
(1) The statute does not refer to the treaty;
(2) The statute refers to the treaty, but implements it only in part;
(3) The statute refers to the treaty, but enacts its terms independently; and
(4) Independent enactment, with the treaty referred to being included as a schedule.
When a treaty has been incorporated into domestic law it is part of the law 
of the land in exactly the same way that other statutes are. The relationship 
of treaties to other statutes is, accordingly, the same as the relationship of any 
two statutes to each other,10 and the general principles aiming at solving 
conflicts between two different legal rules apply.
Nevertheless, both incorporated (irrespective of what form this incor­
poration has taken place in) and unincorporated treaties may under certain 
circumstances play a role in English courts. First of all through rules of 
statutory interpretation. There is a presumption that Parliament does not 
intend to legislate contrary to the United Kingdom's commitments under 
international law. According to this principle the courts will construe statutes 
so as to avoid conflicts with treaty obligations. This principle applies in par­
ticular to statutes which are intended to incoiporate a treaty, but it does not, 
generally speaking, limit itself to these situations (see infra section 11.3.2), 
although one may find cases which suggest this. It is possible to talk here 
about the principle o f interpretative presumption. This principle appears to 
be more similar to the Danish rule o f interpretation than the Scandinavian
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* Cf. F.A. Mann: Foreign Affairs in English Courts, Oxford (1986), p. 97.
* Ibid., at pp. 97 ff.
10 For a survey, see, for instance, R. Higgins: United Kingdom in Jacobs & Roberts
(1987), pp. 123 ff.. at p. 129.
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principle o f presumption (see supra sections 2.1 - 2.2), since it is only 
applicable when the domestic statutory provision is unclear and/or am­
biguous. In, for instance, Salomon v. Commissioners o f Customs and Excise 
this- was illustrated very clearly by Diplock LJ.:
"It has been argued that the terms of an international convention cannot be consulted 
to resolve ambiguities or obscurities in a statute unless the statute itself contains 
either in the enacting part or in the preamble an express reference to the international 
convention which it is the purpose of the statute to implement [...] I can see no 
reason in comity or common sense for imposing such a limitation upon the right and 
duty of the court to consult an international convention to resolve ambiguities and 
obscurities in a statutory enactment. If from extrinsic evidence it is plain that the 
enactment was intended to fulfil Her Majesty’s Government’s obligation under a 
particular convention, it mauers not that there is no express reference to the 
convention in the statute. One must not presume that Parliament intends to break an 
international convention merely because it does not say expressly that it is intending 
to observe it. Of course the court must not merely guess that the statute was intended 
to give effect to a particular convention. The intrinsic evidence of the connection 
must be cogent."“
On the other hand, this principle is only applicable where the words of the 
statute are unclear or ambiguous. If this is not the case, the text of a treaty 
cannot be taken into account by the courts, and they will have to disregard 
any potential conflict with international law. A preliminary, but no less 
important question, is when the courts can decide to establish that the words 
of the domestic statute are ambiguous. In fact, in many cases this question 
is the decisive criterion in relation to whether or not the treaty can be taken 
into account at all. Moreover, it has from time to time been qustioned in 
legal decisions whether the principle of interpretative presumption is 
applicable also when not related to statutes incorporating a treaty in one way 
or another. In British Airways v. Laker Airways, a fairly recent case, Lord 
Diplock, speaking of a treaty between the United Kingdom and the United 
States relating to air traffic, said, apparently in contrast to his statement in 
Salomon:
"The interpretation of treaties to which the United Kingdom is a party but the terms 
of which have not either expressly or by reference incorporated in English domestic 
law by legislation is not a matter that fails within the interpretative jurisdiction of an
Chapter 11: the ECHR in a "Dualist" System: the United Kingdom
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English court of law."12
This decision has been criticized for not having made a proper distinction 
between treaties as a cause o f action (where issues of justiciability may 
arise), and treaties as a means of interpretation in respect of a different cause 
of action.13 The fact that an unincorporated treaty is normally not justiciable 
has nothing to do with whether or not the treaty can otherwise be considered 
or interpreted. Moreover, in Pan-American World Airways v. Department of 
Trade, relating to the Civil Aviation Act 1949 which was enacted to give 
effect to the Chicago Convention, Lord Denning M.R., first rejected the 
relevance of the Bermuda Convention of 1946 between the United Kingdom 
and the United States to the problem in question (this was the treaty Lord 
Diplock had refused to take into account as a means of interpretation in 
Laker) to then immediately proceed to interpret it.14
To sum up the general position of treaties in domestic English law, it 
may be useful to quote the observations of an expert in the field, R. Higgins 
Q.C.:
"It has to be said that, from the perspective of counsel seeking to introduce treaties 
into the legal argument, the attitude of the British courts is a lottery. The approach 
will vary from judge to judge; and the case law to date shows striking and 
unacceptable inconsistency. There has been no inclination shown in the judgments 
to analyse exactly the nature of the treaty concerned, the functional purpose for 
which the treaty is invoked; and to draw the legal consequences therefrom. Instead, 
there are broad dicta offered, most usually unsupported by reasoning, and revealing 
no consistent practice."1*
11.3. The Application of the European Convention.
11.3.1. The Starting Point.
English courts have on a number of occasions held that the unincorporated 
ECHR cannot be enforced directly in domestic law, since it has not been 
incorporated into domestic law by an Act of Parliament This point is 
illustrated clearly in the following two decisions:
In Uppal v. Home Office, where the applicants, illegal immigrants,
12 Cf. [1985] A.C. 58, at pp. 85 f.
15 Cf. R. Higgins, op.cit., p. 133; and F.A. Mann, op.cit.. p. 94.
14 Cf. (1976) Lloyd's Rep. 257, at pp. 260 f.
15 Cf. R. Higgins, op.cit., p. 131.
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applied for declarations that they should not be deported from the United 
Kingdom until the European Commission had determined whether deportation 
would violate the right to respect for family life under Article 8 of the 
Convention, Sir Robert Megarry V.-C. held that "... obligations in inter­
national law which are not enforceable as English law cannot [...] be the 
subject of declaratory judgments and orders.”16 In the subsequent Malone 
v. Metropolitan Police Commisioner the Vice-Chancellor re-affirmed his 
decision in Uppal after full argument on this point, thus stating that the 
provisions of the Convention cannot be the source of legal rights enforceable 
in the United Kingdom, since "... that declarations will be made only in 
respect of matters justiciable in the courts; treaties are not justiciable in this 
way; the [European Convention is a treaty with nothing in it that takes it out 
of that category for this purpose".17
The plaintiff was tried on a number of offences of handling stolen 
property. During the trial it was revealed that the plaintiffs telephone had 
been tapped by the Post Office on behalf of the police on the authority of a 
warrant issued by the Secretary of State (the usual procedure). The plaintiff 
claimed, inter alia, that the Crown had no power, either under statute or at 
common law, to tap telephones, and that Article 8 of the Convention 
conferred upon him a right to have his "private and family life, his home and 
his correspondence" respected, or, if it did not confer a direct right, it was at 
least a guide to the interpretation and application of English law.
Both these arguments were rejected by the Court. Though considering in 
detail the Convention and the judgment of the European Court of Human 
Rights in the Klass Case18 as well as the procedure for telephone tapping 
in Britain,19 and though he doubted that the European Court would accept 
the British system,20 in accordance with his above-cited statement Sir Robert 
Megarry V.-C. refrained from ruling on the compatibility with the Conven­
tion. The Vice-Chancellor held that since telephone tapping could - as in this 
case - be carried out without any breach of the law (i.e. trespass), it did not
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'* Cf. 21 Yearbook (1978), p. 979. Here cited from Malone v. Metropolitan Police 
Commissioner, cf. [1979] 2 All E.R. 620, at pp. 627 f.
17 Ibid.. at p. 628.
"  Cf. Eur. Court H.R., Klass Case, Series A. Vol. 23 (1974).
” Cf. [1979] 2 All E.R. 620, at pp. 628 ff.
* Ibid., at p. 648.
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require any statutory or common law power to justify it.21
As a treaty which had not been incorporated, the Convention was not part 
of English law, and in this particular case it could not be used as a guide to 
interpretation either. The reason for this was that there was really no choice 
between the interpretations which were consistent and inconsistent with the 
Convention. There was an absence of legislation, but no gap in the law. Since 
Parliament had abstained from legislating on this point - which was clearly 
suitable for legislation - the courts could not (properly) and should not try to 
fill the gap. The European Court subsequently held that there had been a 
breach of Article 8 of the Convention in the case.22
In R. v. Secretary o f State for the Home Department, ex parte Brind, a 
more recent decision concerning the freedom of speech and Article 10 of the 
European Convention, Lord Donaldsen o f Lymington M.R.reaffirmed, 
although in other words, the view held by Sir Robert Megarry V.-C.. He first 
noted that the "... the Convention is contained in an international treaty to 
which the United Kingdom is a party [...] the duty of the English courts is to 
decide disputets with English domestic law as it is, and not as it would be if 
full effect were given to this country’s obligations under the treaty, assuming 
that there is any difference between the two."23 The consequence of this was 
in the Master of the Roll’s view
"... that in most cases the English courts will be wholly unconcerned with the terms 
of the convention. The sole exception is when the terms of primary legislation are 
fairly capable of bearing two or more meanings and the court, in pursuance of its 
duty to apply domestic law, is concerned to divine and define its true and only 
meaning. In that situations various prima facie rules of construction have to be 
applied, such as that, in the absence of very clear words indicating the contrary, 
legislation is not retrospective or penal in effect. To these can be added, in apprppri- 
ate cases, a presumption that Parliament has legislated in a manner consistent, rather 
than inconsistent, with the United Kingdom’s treaty obligations” (emphasis added).24
11.3.2. Statutory Interpretation.
The principle of interpretative presumption is of course also applicable to the
21 Ibid., at p. 649. Telephone tapping was. however, to some extent recognized by the Post 
Office Act 1969.
22 See Eur. Court H.R., Malone Case, Series A, Vol. 82 (1984).
23 Cf. [1990] 1 All E.R. 469, at p. 477.
24 Ibid.
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ECHR; it is probably of particular importance in the case of the Conven­
tion.25 In a large number of decisions this principle has been used to 
interpret ambiguous legislation in accordance with the Convention. However, 
as was the the case regarding treaties in general, the case-law concerning the 
application of the Convention is also not consistent.
The case of Waddington v. Miah was apparently the first reported case 
in which an English court actually relied on the Convention in the interpreta­
tion of a statute.26 In this case both the Court o f Appeal and the House of 
Lords concluded that certain words of section 34 (1) of the 1971 Immigration 
Act were ambiguous and that the penal legislation in question could not be 
retrospective, on the presumption that legislation is in accordance with treaty 
obligations. In support of this presumption Stephenson LJ. in the Court o f 
Appeal and Lord Reid in the House o f Lords made specific reference to 
Article 7 of the Convention, which expressly prohibits retrospective criminal 
legislation. As Lord Reid said, after having quoted Article 7, ”... [s]o it is 
hardly credible that any government department would promote or that 
Parliament would pass retrospective criminal legislation".27 Stephenson LJ. 
had also referred to the fact that the two Articles had "forbidden" retrospec­
tive penal legislation.28
Subsequently, in Ram Chand Birdi v. Secretary o f State fo r  Home Affairs, 
Lord Denning M.R. suggested, as an obiter dictum, that "... if an Act of 
Parliament did not conform to the Convention, I might be inclined to hold 
it invalid."29 The case concerned the unsuccessful appeal to the Court o f 
Appeal by an applicant who applied for a writ of habeas corpus on the 
ground that by virtue of his arrival in England before 1 January 1975, he was 
an illegal immigrant entitled to Her Majesty’s pardon because of an amnesty 
announced by the Home Secretary in April 1974. In the end, however, the 
appeal was dismissed on the merits.
However, in R. v. Secretary o f State fo r  Home Affairs, ex parte Bhajan
25 Cf. FA. Mann, op.ciu, p. 87.
* See Drzemczewski (1983), p. 179. However, in Broome v. Cassell & Co., cf. (1973) 
A.C. 1027, at p. 1133, Lord Kilbranden stated that a constitutional right of freedom of speech 
must be recognized in British law at least since the date on which the Convention was ratified 
by the United Kingdom.
r  Cf. [1974] 2 Ail E.R. 377, at p. 379 f. For an extract of the decision, see 17 Yearbook
(1974), pp. 680 ff.
“  Cf. [1974] 1 All E.R. 1110, at p. 1116.
”  Cf. 61 International Law Reports, p. 250.
208
Statutory interpretation
Singh, which was delivered shortly after Birdie, Lord Denning MR. 
moderated (or even repudiated) his earlier suggestion by describing his earlier 
statement as a "very tentative" one which "... went too far"; instead he 
restated the traditional rule that "... if an Act of Parliament contained any 
provision contrary to the (C)onvention, the Act of Parliament must pre­
vail."30 Previously in the judgment, the Master of Rolls had stated:
"What is the position of the Convention in our English law? I would not depart in 
the least from what I said in the recent case of Birdi v. Secretary o f State for Home 
Affairs. The courts can and should take the Convention into account.
They should take it into account whenever interpreting a statute which affects the 
rights and liberties of the individual. It is to be assumed that the Crown, in taking 
its part in legislation would do nothing which was in conflict with treaties."31
In the case in question, the Court o f Appeal rejected the argument of the 
applicant, an illegal immigrant, that he was entitled by virtue of Article 12 
of the Convention to be released from prison so that he could marry. The 
right to marry was unanimously held to be subject to ”... circumstances in 
which the parties are placed”32 and, since the applicant was lawfully 
detained under Article 5(1), he did not have the right to leave prison to get 
married. At any rate, the provisions of the Convention and their applicability 
to the question at issue were discussed at length. Since no conflict with the 
Convention was found, Lord Denning M.R.'s statements both appear to be 
obiter dicta.
In R. v. Secretary o f State for the Home Department, ex parte Phansop- 
kar, and ex parte Begum the Court o f Appeal allowed appeals by Mrs 
Phansopkar and Mrs Begum, both wives of patrials - whose countries of 
origin were India and Bangladesh - to obtain certificates of patriality in 
accordance with certain sections of the 1971 Immigration Act in order that 
they be permitted to enter the United Kingdom immediately and not sent back 
to Bombay and Dacca.33 In their judgments both Lord Denning M.R. and 
Scarman LJ. referred to Article 8 of the Convention which guarantees the
* Cf. [1975] 2 All E.R. 1081. at p. 1083. For an extract of the decision, see 18 Yearbook
(1975). pp. 436 ff.
11 Ibid.
52 Ibid.
M For further information, see Lord Denning: The Due Process c f Law, London (1980), 
pp. 168 ff.
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right to respect for family life, interference with this right being permitted 
only if made in accordance with the law and when considered to be 
necessary in a democratic society. In addition, Scarman LJ. went on to say:
"Delay of this order appears to me to infringe at least two human rights recognised, 
and therefore protected, by English law. Justice delayed is justice denied: "We will 
not deny or defer to any man either justice or right": Magna Carta. This hallowed 
principle of our law is now reinforced by the European Convention for the Protection 
of Human Rights 1950 to which it is now the duty of our public authorities in ad­
ministering the law, including the Immigration Act 1971, and of our courts in 
interpreting and applying the law, including the Act, to have regard: see R. v. 
Secretary of State for Home Affairs, ex parte Bhajan Singh in this court [...] It may, 
of course happen under our law, that the basic rights to justice undeferred and to 
respect for family and private life have to yield to express requirements of a statute. 
In my judgment it is the duty of the courts, so long as they do not defy or disregard 
clear and unequivocal provision, to construe statutes in a mannner which promotes, 
not endangers, those rights. Problems of ambiguity or omission, if they arise under 
the language of the Act should be resolved so as to give effect to, or at the very least 
so as not to derogate from, the rights recognised by Magna Carta and the European 
Convention."34
It is probably fair to view these judgments as having laid the foundation for 
the application of the Convention as a means of interpretation in English law. 
It is interesting to observe that just after these judgments had been passed. 
Dr. James Crawford ended a summary of the decisions in the following way: 
"Those advising immigrants, and others whose human rights as enumerated 
in the Convention are affected by administrative action, will no doubt be alert 
to the possibility of pleading the Convention before British courts; indeed, in 
the cases reviewed here, it could hardly have made a difference had the
>W« *
Convention been implemented in terms as parts of the local law. Whether this 
jurisprudence will become constante, however, remains to be seen."35
However, in Reg. v. Chief Immigration Officer, Heathrow Airport, ex 
parte Salamat Bibi, rendered not long after the above cases, Roskill LJ. 
described the statements of Scarman L J . as obiter dicta and as having gone 
too far in the passage of the Phansopkar judgment as well as some
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54 Cf. [1975] 3 All E.R. 497. at pp. 510 f.
M Cf. James Crawford: Decisions o f British Courts during 1974-75 Involving Questions 
of Public and Private International Law. A. Public International Law, in 47 British Yearbook 
of International Law (1974-1975), p. 361.
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statements in Pan American?6 Thus Roskill LJ, felt that Scarman L J .’s 
approach might need reconsideration hereafter.37 On the other hand. Lord 
Denning M.R., while "amending” certain statements in Bhajan Singh,3* said 
that
"... if there is any ambiguity in our statutes, or uncertainty in our law, then these 
courts can look to the Convention as an aid to clear up the ambiguity and uncertain­
ty, seeking always to bring it into harmony with it Furthermore, when Parliament 
is enacting a statute, or the Secretary of State is framing rules, the courts will assume 
that they had regard to the provisions of the Convention, and intended to make the 
enactment accord with the Convention; and will interpret them accordingly. But I 
would dispute altogether that the Convention is part of our law. Treaties and declara­
tions do not become law until they are made public by Parliament.”39
Geoffrey Lane LJ. concurred with the two other members of the Court.40
Compared to the previous cases, this decision seems to be a step 
backwards in taking the provisions of the Convention into account.41 Thus 
Dr. James Crawford modified his charactarization of the state of case-law 
involving the Convention made the year before: "But for the time being at 
least, the jurisprudence of the Court of Appeal in matters involving the 
European Convention is by no means constante.”42 This is also true 
regarding subsequent case-law.
36 Cf. Lloyd’s Rep. 257, at p. 261, where it was held: “Such a convention (the ECHR], 
especially a multilateral one, should then be considered by Courts even though no statute 
expressly or implicitly incorporates it into our law.”
37 Cf. [1976] 3 All E.R. 843, at p. 849.
M Ibid., at p. 847. Thus Lord Denning MA. said: "I desire, however, to amend one of the 
statements I made in... [Bhajan Singh]... I said then that immigration officers ought to bear 
in mind the principles stated in the [Clonvention. I think that would be asking too much of 
the immigration officers. They cannot be expected to know the [Convention.'
” Ibid.
40 In R. v. Secretary c f State for the Home Department, ex parte Fernandes, cf. the Times, 
21 November 1980, both Waller LJ. and Ackner L J . held that, in a case where an 
deportation order was challenged before the Court, as well as a petition had been lodged with 
the European Commission, the Secretary of the State (of the Home Department) in exercising 
his statutory powers is not obliged to take into account the provisions of the Convention which 
are not part of English law.
41 Cf. Michael Zander: A Bill of Rights, 3rd edition, London (1985), p. 34; and Peter 
Wallington and Jeremy McBride: Civil Liberties and a BUI of Rights, London (1976), p. 50.
42 Cf. James Crawford: Decisions of British Courts during 1976-77 Involving Questions 
of Public and Private International Law. A. Public International Law in 48 British Yearbook 
of International Law (1976-1977), pp. 351 ff.
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In Ahmed v. Inner London Education Authority a majority of the Court 
o f Appeal held that the Inner London Education Authority had not violated 
section 30 of the 1944 Education Act by requiring the appellant, a Muslim, 
to become part-time teacher, if he wanted time off every Friday for prayer.43 
Lord Denning M.R. saw "... nothing in the European Convention to give Mr 
Ahmed any right to manifest his religion on Friday afternoons in derogation 
of his contract of employment..."44 and in the judgment of O n  LJ. the 
freedom of religion guaranteed by the Convention could not "... be construed 
as entitling an employee to absent himself, for the purpose of religious 
worship, from his place of work, during working hours and in breach of his 
contract of employment."45 Scarmann LJ. did not, however, agree with the 
majority and, referring to "... modem British society, with its elaborate 
statutory protection of the individual from discrimination arising from race, 
colour, religion, sex, and against the background of the European Conven­
tion..."44 he considered that the choice which the Inner London Education 
Authority had forced upon Mr Ahmed was tantamount to dismissal from full 
time employment47 Moreover, he stated that "... against the backgriund of 
the European Convention, this is unacceptable, inconsistent with the policy 
of modem statute law and almost certainly a breach of our treaty obliga­
tions."4® This view turned out to be wrong. In its decision on the admis­
sibility in Application No. 8160/78, the European Commission declared the 
application inadmissible, quoting the limitations recognized in Article 9(2) 
and stating that no violation of Mr Ahmed’s right to freedom of religion 
under Article 9(1) of the Convention had taken place.49
Some cases either decided by courts in Northern Ireland or concerning 
events having taken place in Northern Ireland are of particular interest. In R. 
v. Deery the Northern Ireland Court o f Criminal Appeal referred to Article 
7 of the Convention in deciding that the 1969 Firearms Act (with subsequent
4J [1978] 1 All E.R. 574. For a summary of the decision, see 20 Yearbook (1977), pp. 818
ff.
44 Ibid., at p. 578.
45 Ibid.. at p. 581.
48 Ibid., at p. 585.
47 Ibid.. at p. 586.
“  Ibid., at p. 585.
4’ Cf. 22 D.R., pp. 27 ff., at p. 38. See also John A. Andrews: The European Jurispruden­
ce o f Human Rights, 43 Maryland Law review (1984). pp. 463, at pp. 483 f.
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amendments) did not operate retrospectively so as to increase the penalties 
available for offences committed before it was made. Having referred to the 
English cases where the Convention had been used as a means of interpreta­
tion, Lowry L.CJ. then held that "[i]n approaching the problem which this 
Court has to solve, the following principles can be stated:
1. There is a presumption that a law is not retrospective;
2. This presumption does not apply to procedure (including criminal procedure), but 
it does apply strongly to a law creating an offence or increasing the penalty for an 
existing offence;
3. Regulations purporting to have a retrospective effect are ultra vires unless such 
effect is authorised by statute;
4. Treaty obligations are not part of the law unless incorporated by statute into that 
law and there is no rule of law invalidating an Act which conflicts with treaty 
obligations or compelling a construction which will avoid that result: but
5. Treaty obligations are a strong guide to the meaning of ambiguous provisions, 
since the Government is presumed to intend to comply with such obligations;
6. Both the presumption against retrospection and the presumption of adherence to 
treaty obligations may be rebutted by clear express language or by necessary 
implication.”50
R. v. McCormick, another case from Northern Ireland, is perhaps the case in 
which a British court has paid most attention to the Convention: the judge 
found that the statutory provision in question had in fact incorporated the 
Convention’s text into domestic law.51 The question at issue before the 
Belfast City Commission concerned the'admissibility of statements made by 
the accused. Section 6 of the 1973 Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) 
Act had provided that, for certain listed offences, relevant statements made 
by the accused were to be admissible unless ”... prima facie evidence is 
adduced that the accused was subjected to torture or degrading treatment," in 
which case the section required evidence to be excluded "... unless the 
prosecution satisfies [the Court] that the statement was not so obtained." 
McConigal L J. considered that
50 Here cited from the extract in 20 Yearbook (1977), p. 829.
51 Cf. P.J. Duffy, op.cit., p. 589.
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"... the terms torture or inhuman or degrading conduct in section 6 [...] are taken 
from Article 3 [of the Convention] and Parliament in using these words was 
accepting as guidelines the standards laid down in the European Convention on 
Human Rigths [...] if the use of the terms in section 6(2) are derived, as I consider 
them to be, from Article 3, the meaning assigned to the terms by the European 
Commission on Human Rights is, at the very least, of very persuasive effect, if not 
definitive in determining the meaning to be given to these same terms as used in 
section 6."31
Thus this judgment contains a careful examination of the Commission’s case- 
law on Article 3 as well as a loyal application of this case-law in domestic 
law. The judgment indicates presumably, on the other hand, the absolute limit 
of British courts’ application of the Convention.
Guilfoyle v. Home Office concerned the question of whether or not a 
petition to the European Commission, though not yet declared admissible, 
made a prisoner "a party to any legal proceedings" within the meaning of 
rule 37A(1) of the Prison Rules 1964. This rule provided that, as a general 
principle, prisoners who were a party to any legal proceedings could 
correspond with their legal adviser in connection with the proceedings. AU 
three judges found that, at least at this stage of the proceedings before the 
Commission, the prisoner was not "a party to any legal proceedings"53. Of 
particular interest is that Lord Denning M.R. and O’Connor L J. to a large 
extent based their argumentation, which was otherwise one of domestic law, 
on the fact that an examination of a prisoner's correspondence with the 
Commission was contemplated by Article 3(2) of the European Agreement 
relating to Persons participating in Proceedings of the European Commission 
and Court of Human Rights of 1969.
The case in which the potential consequences for the applicant of the 
Court not taking the Convention into account have been the most serious, and 
where this was not actually done, seems so far to be R. v. Secretary o f State 
fo r  the Home Department, ex parte K ir k w o o d In 1982 the applicant, who 
was wanted in the State of California on a murder charge, was arrested in 
England. The United States Government requested his extradition. He was 
subsequently detained under section 10 of the Extradition Act 1971. The ap­
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52 Here cited from the exiract in 21 Yearbook (1978), pp. 789 ff., at p. 792.
”  Cf. [1981], 1 All E.R. 943.
54 [1984] 2 AH E.R. 390.
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plicant made no application for a writ of habeas corpus but applied to the 
European Commission, claiming that his extradition would violate Article 3 
of the Convention on the ground that, if he were convicted in California, he 
would be sentenced to death and the inordinance delay in carrying out the 
death penalty in that state would amount to inhuman and degrading 
treatment. The Commission indicated, under rule 36 of its Rules of 
Procedure, that he should not be extradited before December 1983. In accor­
dance with practice, the Secretary of State for the Home Department took no 
further action while the indication applied. The Commission did not renew 
the indication in December but intimated that it would consider the admis­
sibility of the application in March 1984. In February 1984 the Secretary of 
State issued a warrant, under section 11 of the 1870 Act, ordering the 
applicant to be surrendered to the United States’ authorities. Before the 
warrant was executed, the applicant applied ex parte for leave to apply for 
judicial review of the order on the grounds that the Secretary of State should 
not have acted while the application to the Commission was being con­
sidered. Such leave was granted as well as that the grant of leave should 
operate as a stay of proceedings on the warrant until the application for 
judicial review was determined. The Secretary of State then applied for the 
stay to be discharged.
Although Mann J. held that the stay of proceedings in these circumstan­
ces clearly had no authorization in domestic law, he also decided to express 
a view on its merits. Having cited a part of Ex parte Fernandes, he 
continued, "[accepting as I do that the consequences for the applicant are 
more serious than the consequences for Mrs Fernandes, I am quite unable to 
distinguish the decision in Ex p Fernandes on that ground. Accordingly, as 
it seems to me, the chances of success by way of judicial review are 
negligible."“
Although the Convention has been applied as a means of interpretation 
to statutes on a number of occasions, this number is certainly not overwhel­
mingly high. "Considering how many reported cases raise points of statutory 
interpretation", as P J . Duffy has pointed out, "the case law referring to the 
Convention is perhaps most conspicuous by its rarity.56 This is true even 
when one compares this case-law with that of the Scandinavian countries, 
which is also relatively rare. Moreover, it should be kept in mind that the
55 Ibid., at p. 395.
54 Cf. P.J. Duffy, op.cit., p. 596.
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case-law is far from consistent in this area. With these two reservations the 
available case-law regarding the application of the principle of interpretative 
presumption suggests some conclusions.
If the meaning of a statutory provision is clear and unambiguous, this 
interpretation must be applied even if it is contrary to the Convention. If, on 
the other hand, the meaning of legislation is unclear or ambiguous, the 
principle of interpretative presumption may be used. The available case-law 
reflects the idea that the principle should be applied in order to avoid con­
flicts with the more absolute provisions of the Convention rather than 
advancing the Convention rights in English law.57 Moreover, it follows from 
Wadding ton v. Miah that the principle is also applicable with regard to the 
Convention in cases where the legislation in question has neither expressly 
nor implicitly sought to incorporate it into domestic law. However, the degree 
to which the Convention has been used as a means of interpretation varies 
from case to case. This might be due to the fact that strong arguments have 
been put forward both for and against incorporation of the Convention into 
domestic law, and the differing evaluations of these arguments may explain 
the varying degrees of interest shown by individual judges vis-à-vis using the 
Convention in statutory interpretation.5®
The importance of the principle of interpretative presumption can be 
summed up as being a question of how readily judges are willing to find 
legislative provisions ambiguous. Thus there is ample room both for the 
judge who does not want to include the Convention in his reasoning as well 
as for the judge who does.
As in Scandinavia, it has been discussed whether the principle of 
interpretative presumption applies to statutes enacted prior to the ratification 
or signature of the Convention. Clearly Parliament could not at the time have 
had any intention of conforming to a non-existing international obligation. No 
case-law exists which decides the point definitively. The question arose in 
Williams v. Home Office (No. 2).59 When serving a prison sentence, the 
plaintiff had for a period of time been confined to a special control unit 
established as a means of containing and controlling troublemakers. After his 
release the plaintiff brought an action claiming damages for false imprison­
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"  Ibid., at. p. 591.
* [1981] 1 AU E.R. 1211. See also Ahmad (discussed supra).
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ment contending, inter alia, that he had been subject to "cruel and unusual 
punishments" contrary to the Bill of Rights 1688 and that this provision 
should be interpreted in accordance with Article 3 of the Convention. The 
defendant accepted this argument - so the problem was not raised - and 
Tudor Evans J. took the Convention into account when deciding the case, but 
he saw no conflict between the two provisions.60 In the end the Court did 
not think that the regime had been cruel.
It could be argued that the courts should apply the interpretative 
presumption regardless of the age of the statute in question, as it would be 
quite unrealistic to expect Parliament to attempt to discover and amend all 
legislative ambiguities which might be contrary to a newly-acquired 
international obligation, especially one of such a general nature as the 
Convention.61 In this way, the critique of the Scandinavian principle of 
presumption in general expressed in section 2.3 seems to be vali for English 
law also.
11.3.3. Establishing that there is no Conflict between the European 
Convention and Domestic Law.
In some, mainly recent, cases British courts have stated that in the case at 
issue they have not found any conflict between the provisions of the 
Convention, as incorporated by them, and domestic law.
In R. v. Secretary o f State for Home Affairs, ex parte Hosenball,62 
concerning the deportation of an alien on grounds of national security without 
informing him about what constituted the national security risk. Lord 
Denning M.R., by quoting a passage of the European Commission’s decision 
in Application No. 7729/76, stated that there was no conflict between the 
Convention and domestic English law.63
In Allgemeine Gold- und Silberscheideanstalt v. Customs and Excise 
Commissioners, concerning the forfeiture of some Krugerrand coins which 
had been attempted smuggled into the United Kingdom by three men who
40 However, the House of Lords Select Committee on a Bill of Rights expressed doubts 
as to whether the Convention should be used to interprete legislation enacted before it existed, 
cf. Report o f the Select Committee on a BUI o f Rights (1978), p. 28.
41 Ibid., at pp. 591 ff.
42 See also Ex parte Bhajan Singh (see supra section 11.3.2) where it was held that there 
was no conflict between the Convention and domestic law.
41 Cf. [1977] W.L.R. 766, at p. 779. For further information, see Lord Denning, op.cit..
had defrauded a German company of them, Lord Denning M.R. first cited 
Article 1 of the First Protocol and then held that "[i]n view of those 
exceptions [recognized by paragraph 2 of the Article], it is quite clear that 
there is nothing which impairs the right of a state to forfeit property which 
has been brought into the country in breach of its customs laws.’’64 More­
over, the Master of Rolls confirmed, though as an obiter dictum, that the 
Convention ”... is not part of our English law. But we do pay attention to the 
Convention as it stands."“
Another interesting case is Re K.D. where the House o f Lords found that 
a decision to the effect that a natural mother should cease to have access to 
her child, which was placed in a long-term foster home, conformed to the 
requirements set forth in Article 8 of the Convention.66 Lord Templeman 
explained very clearly why, in his opinion, there was no divergence between 
the Convention and "English common law and statute":
"In my opinion there is no inconsistency of principle or application between the 
English rule and the [Convention rule. The best person to bring up a child is the 
natural parent [...] Public authorities exercise a supervisory role and interfere to 
rescue a child when the parental tie is broken by abuse or separation. In terms of the 
English rule the court decides whether and to what extent the welfare of the child 
requires that the child shall be protected against harm caused by the parent, including 
harm which could be caused by the resumption of parental care after separation has 
broken the parental tie. In terms of the [Cjonvention rule the court decides whether 
and to what extent the child’s health or morals require protection from the parent and 
whether and to what extent the family life of parent and child has been supplanted 
by some other relationship which has become the essential family life for the 
child."*7
Lord Oliver o f Aylmerton put much effort into establishing that domestic law, 
as well as the way in which it was applied in the case at issue, was in 
harmony with the Convention.6* In particular he quoted from the judgment 
of the European Court in the Case o f R v. the United Kingdom,69 where the 
United Kingdom was found to have violated Article 8 of the Convention, and
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** Cf. [1980J 1 A.C. 391, at p. 404.
45 Ibid., at p. 403.
“  Cf. [1988] 1 All E.R. 577.
47 Ibid., at p. 578.
“  Ibid., at pp. 587 f.
M Cf. Eur. Court H.R.. Case o f R v. the United Kingdom, Series A, Vol. 121 (1987). 
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concluded that nor this decision "contradicted" the principle deriving from the 
English case-law.
In Hone and McCartan v. Maze Prison Board o f Visitors'0 the House 
o f Lords held that there was no conflict between the Convention and 
domestic law. Two prisoners serving long sentences were charged with 
assault of prison officers. At inquiries held by the Board of Visitors the 
charges were found proved and the prisoners were awarded, inter alia, 
cellular confinement. Both prisoners applied for judicial review claiming that 
they had a right to legal representation before the Board of Visitors and that 
they had been denied this right.
Rule 30(2) of the Prison Rules (Northern Ireland) 1982 provided that a 
prisoner should be given "full opportunity [...] of presenting his own case". 
Lord Goff o f Chieveley, speaking for a unanimous House o f Lords, first 
looked to the available domestic case-law and concluded that the position in 
English law - up to then - had been that, before a board of visitors, a prisoner 
charged with a disciplinary offence had had no right to legal representation, 
but that the Board had a discretion to grant representation. He then con­
sidered Article 6(3) of the Convention and discussed the cases where the 
European Court of Human Rights had interpreted this Article.71 Lord Goff 
concluded that there were no inconsistencies between the European Court’s 
interpretation of the expression "criminal offence" in Article 6(3) and English 
law. Consequently, "[t]he absolute right to legal representation now claimed 
by the appellants is not, as I understand the position, required by the 
[C]onvention any more than it is required by English law.,,7i
There seems to be a rising tendency in the British case-law to establish, 
after having discussed, the interpretation of the Convention, that no conflict 
exist between the Convention and domestic law. In this way the courts, like 
their Scandinavian counterparts, avoid stating explicitly that domestic law is 
in conflict with the Convention, and that the former has to prevail, thus 
encouraging applicants to file applications with the European Commission.
11.3.4. The Position o f the European Convention in Relation to the Exercise
No Conflicts between the EC HR and Domestic Law
70 [1988] 1 AU E.R. 321.
71 Cf. Eur. Court H.R., Case of Engels and Others, Series A, Vol. 22 (1976); and Case 
o f Campell and Fell, Series A, Vol. 80 (1984).
71 Cf. [1988] 1 AU E.R. 321. at p. 329.
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o f Discretionary Powers by Administrative Authorities.
Some of the decisions discussed above have touched upon whether or not 
administrative authorities are allowed or are even under a legal obligation to 
exercise their discretionary powers in accordance with the requirements of the 
Convention. When a power vested in a public authority is exceeded, acts 
done in excess of the power are under English law invalid as being ultra 
vires.73 Moreover, the courts may intervene to prevent powers being 
abused?* Hence the question is whether the Convention constitutes any 
limits which administrative authorities cannot exceed.
Some case-law exists on this point but virtually only in the context of the 
immigration rules and deportation. In Ex parte Bhajan Singh, Lord Denning 
M.R. held, inter alia, that ”... the immigration officers and the Secretary of 
State in exercising their duties ought to bear in mind the principles stated in 
the Convention. They ought consciously or unconsciously to have regard to 
the principles in it - because, after all, the principles stated in the Convention 
are only a statement of the principles of fair dealing; and it is their duty to 
act fairiy."75 However, in Ex parte Bibi the Master of the Rolls modified or, 
in his own words, "amended" this statement by saying that the immigration 
officers "... cannot be expected to know or to apply the Convention. They 
must go simply by the immigration rules laid down by the Secretary of State 
and not by the Convention."76 This line was followed in the subsequent 
judgments in Ex parte Hosenball, Ex parte Fernandes and Ex parte Kirkwood 
(see supra section 11.3.2) with even more emphasis on that the Secretary of 
State was under no obligation to take the Convention into account in the 
exercise of his discretionary powers.
Dr. F A . Mann has summarized the legal position in this respect in the 
following way:
"In short, while the unincorporated treaty cannot be the sole or decisive basis for the 
Executive’s decision, it should be allowed to reinforce a decision founded on other 
grounds. To put it negatively, arguments derived from the treaty should not be be 
excluded on the ground of absence of incorporation, for the treaty imposes an inter­
national obligation which, within the limits of prevailing English law, should be 
fulfilled. This may be a difficult path to follow, but the difficulty is created, not by 
the law, but by the Executive’s failure to adopt the route prescribed by a basic
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principle of constitutional law.-77
How well-founded this view may be de sententia ferenda, it seems not to 
have been accepted in practice. In Ex parte Brind (see supra section 11 .3.1), 
after having accepted the principle of interpretative presumption for statutes, 
Lord Donaldson o f Lymington M.R. held:
"Thus far I have referred only to primary legislation, but it is also necessary to 
consider subordinate legislation and executive action, whether it be the authority of 
primary or secondary legislation. Counsel for the applicants submits that, where there 
is any ambiguity in primary legislation and it may accordingly be appropriate to 
consider the terms of the convention, the ambiguity may sometimes be resolved by 
imputing an intention to Parliament that the delegated power to legislate or, as the 
case may be, the authority to take executive action, shall be subject to the limitation 
that it be consistent with the terms of the Convention. This I unhesitatingly and 
unreservedly reject, because it involves imputing to parliament an intention to import 
the convention into domestic law by the back door, when it has quite clear refrained 
from doing so by the front door" (emphasis added).7*
As regards the case at issue, the master of the rolls did not find any 
ambiguity in the provisions concerned. "It follows that whilst the Home 
Secretary, in deciding whether or not to issue a directive and the terms of 
that directive, is free to take account of the terms of the convention, as at 
some stage he undoubtedly did, he was under no obligation to do so. It 
follows that the terms of the convention are quite irrelevant to our decision 
and that the Divisional Court erred in considering them, even though in the 
end it concluded that it derived no assistance from this decision."79
11.3.5. The European Convention as Part o f Common Law.
It has been discussed whether the Convention could be said to be part of 
English law as part of common law. P J . Dufffy lists three ways in which this 
could possibly happen.80
As already mentioned, customary international law is part of the common 
law without the need to incorporate legislation. Although treaties do not 
normally constitute customary international law, it is to some extent accepted
11 Cf. F.A. Mann, op.cit., p. 96. For a similar view, see P.J. Duffy, op.cit., pp. 598 f. 
n  Cf. [1990] 1 All E.R. 469. at pp. 477 f. 
w Ibid.. at p. 478.
"  Cf. PJ. Duffy, op.cit., pp. 599 ff.
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that they do so when there are evidence of a general practice as law.*1 
Hence the problem in this connection is to what extent the Convention can 
be said to represent customary international law, i.e. to exist independently 
of the Convention itself as an obligation of international law.
Since the Convention was not made as a codification of existing rules of 
international law, there is clearly a presumption against this theory which is 
not supported by the available case-law.®2 Although agreeing that a few 
provisions of the Convention, in particular Article 3 prohibiting torture and 
inhuman or degrading treatment, may be said to represent customary 
international law, PJ. Duffy concludes that it is very unlikely that such a 
theory will be accepted by the courts.*3
The second possibility, and so far the one with the best prospect of being 
accepted by the courts, for the Convention to enter common law is as a 
public policy.84 The contents of public policy vary over the years, and the 
question is therefore whether the standards of the Convention have now 
acquired this status. The House o f Lords had an opportunity to rule on this 
question in Blathwayt v. Lord Cawley concerning religious discrimination. 
Lord Vilberforce stated on that occasion, referring to the Convention:
"It was said that the law of England was not set against discrimination on a number 
of grounds including religious grounds and appeal was made to... [inter alia]... the 
European Convention of Human Rights of 1950, which refers to freedom of religion 
and to enjoyment of that freedom without discrimination on grounds of religion. My 
Lords, I do not doubt that conceptions of public policy should move with the times 
and that widely accepted treaties and statutes may point the direction in which such 
conceptions, as applied by the courts, ought to move."*5
Thus, the House o f Lords seems at least in principle to accept the possibility, 
but the claim in this case failed on the merits and for this reason does not 
provide an example of the application of this principle.
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"  See, for instance. Article 38(1 )(6) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice. 
”  No such case concerning the Convention appears to exist.
”  Cf. P.J. Duffy, op.cit., pp. 604 f. For a different view, see Andrew Drzemczewslu: The 
application o f Customary International Human Rights in the English Legal System, 1975 
Human Rights Journal, pp. 71 ff.
** For a general account of public policy in relation to foreign affairs in English courts, 
see F.A. Mann, op.cit.. pp. 148 ff.
“  [1975] 3 All E.R. 625, at p. 636.
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In R. v. Lemon & Gay News Ltd., in which the House o f Lords 
reaffirmed the conviction of the appellants for publishing a blasphemous 
libel, it is of interest to note that Lord Scarmann referred to Articles 9 and 
10 of the Convention in order to justify the Court’s reasoning according to 
which the character of the words published and not the motive of the author 
or publisher was considered to be the necessary ingredient to secure a convic­
tion.86 Lord Diplock, on the other hand, considered that by rejecting the so- 
called subjective test of the accused’s intention, blasphemous libel would 
revert to the exceptional category of crimes of strict liability, and that such 
a retrogade step could not be justified by any considerations of public 
policy.87
In G leaves v. Deakin & Others, rendered only a few months later. Lord 
Diplock considered the Convention to be of undoubted authority. In this case 
a private citizen instigated a prosecution alleging that the criminal offence of 
defamatory libel had been committed against him. The defendants claimed 
that they should have been able to provide evidence of the generally bad 
reputation of the prosecutor before the magistrate at committal proceedings, 
although their appeal on this point failed both before the Court o f Appeal and 
the House o f Lords. In expressing his concern about the unsatisfactory state 
of affairs in the English legal system. Lord Diplock was of the opinion that 
the criminal offence of defamatory libel retained anomalies involving serious 
departure from accepted principles upon which the modem criminal law of 
England is based and which was also difficult to reconcile with the United 
Kingdom’s international obligations under the Convention. He explained that
"... under art 10(2) of the European Convention, the exercise of the right of freedom 
of expression may be subjected to restrictions or penalties by a contracting state, 
only to the extent that those restrictions or penalties are necessary in a democratic 
society for the protection of what (apart from the reputation of individuals and the 
protection of information received in confidence) may generally be described as the 
public interest. In contrast to this truth of defamatory statement is not in itself a 
defence to a charge of defamatory libel under our criminal law; so here is a 
restriction on the freedom to impart information which states that are parties to the 
Convention have expressly undertaken to secure to everyone within their jurisdiction. 
No onus lies on the prosecution to show that the defamatory matter was of a kind 
that is necessary in a democratic society to suppress or penalise in order to protect 
the public interest On the contrary, even though no public interest can be shown to 
be injuriously affected by imparting to others accurate information about seriously
"  Cf. [1979] 1 All E.R. 898. at p. 927.
*7 Ibid., at p. 905.
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descreditable conduct of an individual, the publisher of the information must be 
convicted unless he himself can prove to the satisfaction of a jury that the publication 
of it was for the public benefit. This is to turn art. 10 o f the Convention on its head. 
Under our criminal law a person’s freedom of expression, wherever it involves 
exposing seriously discreditable conduct of others is to be repressed by public autho­
rity unless he can convince a jury ex post facto that the particular exercise of the 
freedom was for the public benefit, whereas art 10 requires that freedom of 
expression shall be untrammelled by public authority except where its interference 
to repress a particular exercise of the freedom of expression is necessary for the 
protection of the public interest” (emphasis added).'1
Lord Diplock then went on to suggest that in order to "avoid the risk of our 
failing to comply with our international obligations under the European 
Convention" the consent of the Attorney-General should be required before 
a prosecution for criminal libel is instituted, and that in deciding whether to 
grant his consent in a specific instance "... the Attorney-General could then 
consider whether the prosecution was necessary on any of the grounds spe­
cified in Article 10(2) of the Convention and unless satisfied that it was, he 
should refuse his consent."89
In the more recent Cheall v. APEX it was submitted that there exists a 
rule of public policy according to which the individual has the right to join 
and remain a member of a trade union of his choice, and that the unions 
themselves were not entitled, as was the situation in the case at issue, to put 
restrictions on this right. This rule, it was claimed, had now been reinforced 
by the accession of the United Kingdom to the Convention. In the House o f 
Lords, Lord Diplock, after having quoted Article 11 of the Convention, stated 
as a general principle th a t"... freedom of association can only be mutual; 
there can be no right of an individual to associate with other individuals who 
are not willing to associate with him."90. As regards the alleged rule of 
public policy, Lord Diplock expressed himself very clearly:
"But I know of no existing rule of public policy that would prevent trade unions 
from entering into arrangements with one another which they consider to be in the 
interest of their members in promoting order in industrial relations and enhancing 
their member’s bargaining power with their employers; nor do I think a permissible 
exercise of your Lordships’ judicial power to create a new rule of public policy to
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"  Cf. [1979] 2 AU E.R. 497. at pp. 498 f. 
”  Ibid.
*’ Cf. [1983] 1 AU E.R. 1130, at p. 1136. 
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that effect. If this is to be done at all it must be done by Parliament."91
In order to implicitly distinguish this case from the situation in the British 
Rail Case before the European Court,92 Lord Diplock held that "[different 
considerations might apply if the effect of Cheall’s expulsion from APEX 
were to have put his job in jeopardy1,93
In conclusion it can be said that the public policy argument seems to 
carry some weight. Nevertheless, one should probably be careful of not 
overstating the significance of this argument: public policy does not in 
general and without any reservations require compliance with the standards 
embodied in the Convention.
The third possibility of viewing the Convention as a part of the common 
law mentioned by PJ. Duffy94 is when no clear precedent exists. According 
to this view the Convention should be used to resolve ambiguous precedents 
of fill lacunae in the common law to the extent that the Convention 
constitutes customary international law. However, as has already been seen, 
it raises in itself great difficulties to argue that the Convention represents 
customary international law, as well as the Convention in no reported case 
has been used as such. On the other hand, the courts do not seem to have 
clearly ruled out the possibility of using the Convention to resolve ambiguous 
precedents and fill lacunae in common law.
However, the Malone case contains statements illustrating that this is 
probably not a practicable path for introducing the Convention as a part of 
common law. In the case it was argued quite strongly that the Convention, 
as interpreted in the Klass Case, should be used by the Court when deciding 
whether the challenged practice was legal. (The facts of the case are outlined 
above in section 11.2.1). Sir Robert Megary V.-C. rejected these arguments 
stating, inter alia:
"I readily accept that if the question before me were one of construing a statute 
enacted with the purpose of giving effect to obligations imposed by the [C]onvention, 
the court would readily seek to construe the legislation in a way that would effectuate 
the [Convention rather than frustrate i t  However, no relevant legislation of that sort
*' Ibid.
”  Cf. Eur. Court H.R., Case of Young, James and Webster, Series A, Vol. 44 (1981).
”  Cf. [1983] 1 All E.R. 1130. at p. 1136.
** Cf. P.J. Duffy, op.cit., pp. 607 ff.
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is in existance. It seems to me that where Parliament has abstained from legislating 
on a point that is plainly suitable for legislation, it is indeed difficult for the court to 
lay down new rules of common law or equity that will carry out the Crown’s treaty 
obligations, or to discover for the first time that such rules have always existed [...] 
It appears to me that to decide this case in the way that counsel for the plaintiff 
seeks would carry- me far beyond any possible function of the [C]onvention as 
influencing English law that has ever been suggested; and it would be most 
undesirable. Any regulation of so complex a matter as telephone tapping is 
essentially a matter for Parliament, not the courts; and neither the [Convention nor 
the Klass case can, I think, play any proper part in deciding the issue before me."”
M Cf. [1979) 2 AU E.R. 620, at pp. 647 ff. 
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CHAPTER 12
The Application of the European Convention in a 
"Dualist" System into which it has been incorpo­
rated: Italy
12.1. Introduction.
Italy was one of the original signatories of the European Convention on 4 
November 1950. In accordance with Article 80 of the Italian Constitution 
(see infra section 12.2), the Government obtained consent from Parliament 
in the form of an ordinary law (Act No. 848 of 4 August 1955) before the 
Convention was ratified on 26 October 1955. Declarations on the recognition 
of the compulsory jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights and 
the acceptance of the right of individual petition were made, effective from 
1 August 1973.' Italy has made no reservations to the Convention.
Apart from embodying the consent of Parliament to the ratification of the 
Convention, Law No. 848 of 4 August 1955 was also a legislative act of 
incorporation [ordine di esecuzione] which ordered the execution of the 
Convention into domestic Italian law, Section 2 of this act stipulates: "Full 
and entire execution shall be given to the treaty”.2 Thus the Convention was 
adopted into domestic law by means of mere references to the provisions of 
the Convention. A copy of the French text of the Convention and the First 
Protocol followed the Act.
Accordingly, the Convention possesses the status of domestic law in 
Italy.
12.2. The Effect of Treaties in Domestic Law.
12.2.1. General Principles.
The Italian Constitution contains no express provision as to the effect of 
treaties on domestic law. The general legal principles governing this question 
are, like in the Scandinavian countries, quite clear. The following provisions 
touch upon the relationship between internal Italian law and international law
1 For further information, see Vincenzo Starace: Italian Acceptance of the Optional 
Clauses of the European Convention on Human Rights, 1 IYIL (19/5), pp. 42 ff.
1 Here cited in English from Drzemczewski (1983), p. 146 note 14.
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generally:
"Article 10(1)- Italy's legal system conforms with the generally recognized principles
of international law.
/
Article 11. Italy condemns war as an instrument of aggression against the liberties 
of other peoples and as a means for settling international controversies; it agrees, on 
condidons of equality with other states, to such limitation of sovereignty as may be 
necessary for a system calculated to ensure peace and justice between Nations: it 
promotes and encourages international organizations having such ends in view.
Article 80. The Chambers authorize, by law, ratification of international treaties of 
a political nature, or which provide for arbitration or judicial regulation, or imply 
modifications to the nation’s territory or financial burdens or to laws.
Article 87(1). The President of the Republic is the Head of the State and represents 
the unity of the Nation.
[...]
(8) He (...] ratifies treaties, provided they be authorized by the Parliament whenever 
such authorization is necessary."3
Article 10(1) provides for an automatic incorporation of "generally recog­
nized principles of international law" in the sense that internal legislation 
which conflicts with these principles of international law is considered to be 
unconstitutional and subject to the review of the Corte Costituzionale 
[Constitutional Court].4 It follows, however, from the wording of Article 
10(1) that this provision confínes itself to the field of customary international 
law and thus does not cover treaties. This is confirmed by the fact that a few 
provisions in the Constitution, which would otherwise have been superfluous, 
refer specifically to treaties.5 Moreover, the travaux préparatoires suggest 
that treaties are not included among the norms which are incorporated into 
Italian law by virtue of Article 10(1); this would, as Professor Antonio 
Cassese has put it, "... in the first place be contrary to the clear intent of the
1 Cf. Blaustein & Flanz, Binder VIII, October 1990, pp. 49, 66 and 68.
4 For a further elaboration on this point, see Antonio La Pergola & Patrick Del Duca:
Community Law, International Law and ¡he Italian Constitution, 79 American Journal of
International Law (1983), pp. 398 ff., at pp. 602 ff.
5 See, for instance. Articles 7(2), 10(2) and 35(3) of the Constitution.
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Constituent Assembly."67 This is also the opinion held by the majority of 
Italian legal scholars.8
The Corte Costituzionale has held the same view on a number of 
occasions. The first instance appears to be decision No. 32/1960, Regione 
Trentino-Alto Adige v. Presidente del Consiglio dei ministri. In this decision 
the Corte Costituzionale rejected the contention that a legislative act 
concerning the use of the German language in the Province of Bolzano was 
unconstitutional because it had allegedly been made in violation of a treaty 
between Austria and Italy. The Court held:
"With regard to Article 10 of the Constitution it must be noted that this provision 
refers to generally recognized rules of international law and not to specific 
commitments undertaken by the State on the international level: this clearly appears 
from the text of Article 10 and may also be drawn from the preparatory works."*
In the more recent decision No. 188/1980, re Lintrami, when dealing with a 
question of constitutionality which had been raised with reference to the 
ECHR and the UN-Covenant, the Corte Costituzionale confirmed its previous 
case-law according to which treaty provisions are not considered to be 
covered by Article 10 of the Constitution (see infra section 12.3).
In decision No. 144/1970, re Farri, the Corte Costituzionale rejected a 
question of constitutionality that had been raised with regard to Articles 2, 
3 and 10 of the Constitution and some provisions of the ECHR simply by 
saying that under the circumstances there was no need for a detailed analysis 
"... either of the provisions of the Constitution or of those of the European 
Convention", nor was it necessary to examine "... the strength of resistance 
which the latter are alleged to possess."10 It has been asserted that this 
decision might indicate that the Court was willing to reach another conclu­
sion regarding the ECHR. Nothing suggests, however, that this was the case.
* Cf. Antonio Cassese: Lo stato e la comunità internazionale, in Giuseppe Branca (ed.): 
Commentario della costituzione, Bologna/Roma (1975). pp. 461 ff., at p. 493.
1 fin primo luego, essa contrasta con il chiaro intento del costituente.]
* For a recent survey, see Roberto Bin; Art. 10, co. 1° in Vezio Crisafulli & Livio Paladin 
(eds.): Commentario breve alla costituzione, Padova (1990), pp. 59 ff.
’ Cf. 43 Rivista di Diritto intemazionale (1960), pp. 519 ff., at p. 522. Here cited in
English from Giorgio Gaja: Italy in Jacobs & Roberts (1987), pp. 87 ff., at p. 89.
10 Cf. 55 Rivista di Diritto intemazionale (1972), pp. 279 ff., at p. 280. Here cited in
English from Giorgio Gaja, op.cit, p. 89 note 9.
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What the Court did in this case was simply to rule that in its opinion there 
was no conflict between the Convention and domestic law. Moreover, in both 
previous and subsequent decisions the Court has confirmed that Article 10(1) 
is only applicable to international customary law.11
Against this background it may be concluded that treaties - including the 
ECHR - are not covered by Article 10(1) of the Italian Constitution. 
Accordingly, only to the extent to which the Convention embodies "generally 
recognized principles of international law”, is it automatically incorporated 
into domestic Italian law by virtue of Article 10(1).12 However, Italian 
courts also have implicitly rejected the idea that the Convention is the 
expression of generally recognized principles of international law. For 
instance, in decision No. 69/1976, Zennaro, the Corte Costituzionale held that 
the principle ne bis in idem, embodied in Article 14(7) of the UN-Covenant 
but not in the ECHR, could not ”... be considered, with regard to foreign 
judgments, as a general principle of law traceable to the category of generally 
recognized norms of international law which automatically become part of 
the law of the land within the meaning of Art. 10 ... [of the Constitu­
tion]..."13 This was in the Court’s view "... bome out by the fact that only 
recently has this principle formed the object of international agreements, and 
that its affirmation even on the conventional plane has so far met with 
manifold difficulties, even in its limited application to judgments in criminal 
matters..."14
Hence the question is which rules do then govern the relationship 
between treaties and domestic Italian law.
On the basis of the Corte Costituzionale’s decision No. 170/1984, S.p.A. Granital v. 
Amministrazione finanziaria,l> it has been asserted that it ”... [m]ight even be 
argued that treaties in general should be accorded superiority over subsequent 
national law and that this superiority should be enforced through decentralized review
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" See decisions Nos. 68/1961. 135/1963. 48/1967, 104/1969, 69/1976, 48/1979, 96/1982 
and 153/1987.
12 Cf. Drzemczewski (1983). p. 153.
15 Cf. 59 Rivista di Diriuo intemazionale (1976), pp. 584 ff., at p. 587. Here cited in 
English from 3 IYIL (1977), p. 301.
14 Ibid.
15 Cf. 29 Giurisprudenza costituzionale (1984), pp. 1098 ff. An English translation of 
paragraphs 2-8 of the decision with an annotation by Giorgio Gaja can be found in 21 
Common Market Law Review (1984), pp. 756 ff.
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by ordinary judges rather than by centralized constitutional review."16
This case concerned the application of Article 11 of the Constitution in relation 
to Community law and marked the temporary end of the longstanding controversy 
between the Court of Justice and the Italian Corte Costituzionale. Briefly speaking, 
the case involved a conflict between Italian law, which provided that certain import 
duties were not retroactively applicable, and Community law, which provided that 
they were. The Court concluded that Community law ought to apply in preference 
to both prior and subsequent conflicting laws without the need - and this is the real 
novelty of the decision - for resort to constitutional review. Consequently, specific 
questions concerning the applicability of Community law are in principle no longer 
referable to the Corte Costituzionale. However, the Corte Costituzionale reserved the 
right to review the conformity of Community law with the fundamental rights of the 
Constitution, as well as of those laws which prejudice the observance of the Treaty 
when the system itself or its basic principles are involved.
It seems somewhat doubtful, on the basis of this decision, which strictly concerns 
Community law, that is be possible to extend the principle of giving treaties super­
iority over subsequently enacted legislation, or to enforce decentralized review of 
other areas of international law in general and of treaties in particular. Article 11 
does not concern treaties in general, nor does the Court’s reasoning involve any con­
siderations as to treaties in general. Moreover, legal practice does not seem to reflect 
any such development (see infra section 12.3). Therefore, it may be concluded that 
no further consequences for treaties in general can be drawn from S.pA. Granital v. 
Amministrazione finanziaria.
No other provision in the Italian Constitution regulates the effects of treaties 
on domestic law. However, like the Scandinavian constitutional provisions 
governing the treaty-making power, Article 80 of the Italian Constitution 
implicitly makes a distinction between, on the one hand, the conclusion of 
treaties and, on the other, the incorporation of treaties into domestic law. 
Thus one might argue that this suggests that under Italian law the provisions 
of a treaty are not, generally speaking, directly enforceable by domestic law- 
enforcing authorities without an ordine di esecuzione. Consequently, any 
treaty provision which is to have domestic legislative effects must be 
incorporated into domestic law by a domestic legal act, as was the case with 
the European Convention. This is also the position held by most Italian legal 
scholars, albeit on slightly different grounds. The main reason for reaching 
this conclusion seems to be an (implied) in contrario deduction from Article 
10( 1).
16 Cf. Antonio La Pergola and Patrick Del Duca, op.cit., p. 621. For a similar view, though 
on the basis of the Constitutional Court’s decision No. 183/1975, Frontini v. Ministro delle 
Finanze, reported in Giurisprudenza costituzionale 1973, pp. 2401 ff, see Drzemczewski 
(1983), p. 153, who suggests that the said decision "... indicates that Italian courts may m 
certain circumstances give treaty provisions a hierarchially superior status to statute law...
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This approach was explained very clearly by the Corte Suprema di 
Cassazione [Supreme Court of Cassation] in judgment No. 867/1972, Unione 
Manifatture v. Ministero delle Finanze, concerning a commercial treaty 
between Italy and Syria which had not been incorporated into domestic law:
"[A]s regards specific rules of international law, that is to say, international rules 
contained in international conventions, the reception into our system is carried out 
by means of implementation ("Ordine di esecuzione") which must emanate from a 
law if the area in question is reserved to legislation by the internal constitutional 
system. It is not therefore sufficient that those bodies competent to represent the 
State in international affairs should express the consent to implement the international 
convention since this would modify the internal system.”17
In relation to the above-mentioned attempts in legal writings to reach another 
conclusion on the relationship between international treaties and domestic 
law, the Court commented on these views in the following way:
"In truth, there have been some doctrinal attempts aimed at accepting automatic 
reception in all cases and even in so far as concerns treaties, but this has been an 
isolated trend clearly in contrast with our internal system, as has been also held by 
the Corte Costituzionale (see decisions of 18 May 1960 No. 32; 22 December 1961 
No. 68."
Accordingly, it is firm legislative practice to adopt international treaties into 
domestic law by means of an execution (or implementation) order [ordine di 
esecuzione], that is, stating in a statute, or subordinate legislative act depen­
ding on whether or not the consent of Parliament is required under Article 
80 of the Constitution, or whether existing legislation needs to be modified, 
that the provisions of the treaty, or part of it, shall be adopted into domestic 
law from the date on which it enters into force for Italy.1*
As was the case with the ECHR, it happens quite often that such an 
execution order is embodied in the same act as the one which authorizes the 
President of the Republic to ratify the treaty and is, for obvious reasons, 
enacted before the ratification of the treaty. It is rare that treaties are 
incorporated into domestic law by being reformulated (or transformed) into
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17 Here cited in English from 1 IYIL (1975). p. 288. See also the Corte Suprema di 
Cassazione’s decisions Nos. 1196/1972 and 1773/1972.
" On the terminology regarding the incorporation of treaties, see supra section 2.1.
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In cases where the treaty is adopted into domestic law and to the extent 
specified in the domestic legal instrument, the provisions of the treaty are 
directly applicable under domestic law. This direct applicability is, however, 
conditional upon the existence of the domestic provision adopting the treaty 
into internal law. Formally speaking, the courts apply this provision but, 
judged on the basis of the language used in judicial decisions, nothing 
suggests that this formal application of domestic law reflects the way in 
which the courts actually apply treaty provisions. The courts simply seem to 
consider the execution order as a condition for applying the treaty provisions 
and not, as Professor Giorgio Gaja has put i t , "... as a legislative act that im­
plies the formation of a series of unwritten norms to be ascertained through 
a comparative analysis of previously existing legislation and of treaty 
provisions.”20
Since treaties are normally adopted into domestic Italian law by an 
ordinary statute, they hold the same rank within the domestic norm-hierarchy 
as ordinary legislation. The same is the case with reformulated treaties. This 
means that statutes which conflict with adopted treaties are not per se con­
sidered unconstitutional as was the case with customary international law. 
Thus in the re Limtrami Case the Corte Costituzionale held:
"The Court shares the opinion, prevailing among writers and in judicial decisions, 
that - in the absence of a specific constitutional provision - treaty provisions 
implemented in Italy have the same force as ordinary statutes. Therefore, the very 
possibility of raising, under this aspect, a question of constitutionality is barred, even 
more so when... treaty provisions are invoked as tests for the constitutionality of 
statutory provisions.”
This means that, according to the Corte Costituzionale, a statute may be 
defined as unconstitutional only if it conflicts with a treaty coming under the 
special categories referred to in specific constitutional provisions such as 
Article 10(2) providing a special safeguard for treaties concerning the 
treatment of aliens, Article 35(3) for treaties protecting labour and by Article 
7(2) for agreements between Italy and the Holy See. Accordingly, it could 
be argued that the ECHR takes precedence over conflicting legislation insofar
a domestic legislative act.19
'* Cf. Giorgio Gaja, op.cit., p. 90.
20 Ibid.
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as it affects the treatment of aliens.21
If and when a conflict arises between the incorporated provisions of a 
treaty and subsequent legislation, the well-established rule of lex posterior 
derogat legi priori would appear to apply, thus giving priority to the 
domestic rule. If the conflict is instead one between a treaty and previous 
legislation the treaty will, according to the same principle, take precedence. 
It is within the competence of the ordinary courts to ascertain whether there 
is a conflict between an incorporated treaty and domestic (subsequently 
passed) legislation, as well as to resolve such a conflict.
12.2.2. Specific Principles o f interpretation.
In order to avoid any breach of international treaties, the Italian courts have 
generally endeavoured to rule out that subsequent legislation affect the 
application of previously implemented treaties. Two methods have generally 
been used to this effect:
(1) Most frequently, legislation incorporating treaties or the treaties 
themselves are defined as special provisions in order to consider them as 
remaining in force in spite of the enactment of subsequent statutes, which are 
regarded as containing provisions of a more general character. This notion is 
very similar, if not identical, with the lex specialis principle widely applied 
in Scandinavia (see supra section 10.2). The special element is provided by 
the fact that treaties are adopted through an execution order. The fact that 
treaties are usually incorporated in this way makes it difficult to ascertain 
what courts really have in mind when they define a treaty or its incorporating 
statute as special in this context. However, in the absence of any elaboration 
- in judicial decisions with regard to the special character of execution orders, 
it seems reasonable to conclude that courts intend to refer, as in other cases 
when speciality is invoked in defining the relations between statutes, to the 
fact that special provisions cover a more limited subject-matter. This criterion 
is far from precise. In fact, it happens only infrequently in practice that the 
courts are faced with a so-called total-partial inconsistency to which the lex 
specialis principle is, from a logical point of view, applicable.22 As the 
following examples show, the inconsistency is usually one of a partial-partial 
character where the lex specialis principle does not provide any guidance as
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21 See Antonio Cassese, op.cit., pp. 520 f.
a  Cf. Ross (1958), pp. 128 ff.
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to the resolving of the conflict between adopted treaty and a subsequent 
enacted statute - other than supplying the legitimation for a solution based on 
other considerations.
As an example of the application of this principle could be mentioned 
decision No. 5274/1979, Bianco v. Soc. Andreas Kufferath KG and others, 
in which the Corte Suprema di Cassazione stated that
"... the provisions of the international conventions regarding matters regulated by 
domestic law rules take precedence over the latter because of their special character, 
independendy of whether they came into existence before or after.”21
A more recent example of the use of the lex specialis principle is decision 
No. 2643/1984, Comesar S.pA. v. Carniti & C. S.pA, in which the Corte 
Suprema di Cassazione held that Article 4(5) of the 1924 Brussels Conven­
tion on Bills on Lading "... does not find a limit to its validity and its effects 
in the Italian legal system, in which the said Convention was adopted as 
special law."24
(2) In Italian law there exists also a principle o f presumption. According 
to this principle the courts interpret apparently conflicting statutes subse­
quently enacted in a way that is consistent with treaty obligations. For 
instance, in decision No. 699 of 1980, Ministero delle finanze v. Michelin 
Italiana S.pA., the Corte Suprema di Cassazione denied that a subsequent 
statute could be interpreted as derogating from the statute incorporating the 
GATT:
"In the present case, such intention to derogate would involve also the intention [...] 
to violate the international agreement which was implemented almost simultaneously 
in the municipal legal order. It is necessary, therefore, also to account for the 
derogation from the principle according to which there is to be presumed the 
intention to conform with the rule of international law which requires the observance 
of international treaties and conventions. The intention to the contrary must be based 
on sound reasoning and valid arguments [...] It is clear that the only criterion which 
can resolve these doubts arising from a reading of the rule is exactiy that of the 
presumption of conformity to the nonabrogated (in the relevant part) international
Specific Principles o f Interpretation
23 Cf. 16 Rivista di Diritto intemazionale privato e processuale (1980), pp. 82 ff., at p. 88. 
Here cited in English from 5 IYIL (1980-81), p. 266.
24 Cf. 137 Giurisprudenza Italiana I, 1, pp. 183 ff., at p. 186 f. Here cited in English from 
Giorgio Gaja, op.cit, p. 100.
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convention just a few days after its implementation.”“
When trying to reconcile statutes with the requirements of treaties, the courts 
do not seem to look for the Legislature’s actual intentions since, on the 
contrary, it is implied in the principle itself that the Legislature was not 
aware of the potential conflict.24 This may be illustrated by the following 
statement contained in decision No. 3616/1976, Ministero delle finanze v. 
Società Compagnia di navigazione Marsud, where the Corte Suprema di Cas­
sazione held:
"Use must [...] be made of the principle of interpretation which requires that, failing 
written provision to the contrary, the State must, when enacting a provision, be 
presumed to have intended to honour rather than to breach international commit­
ments. The fact that, as the preparatory work on the provision makes clear, the 
Legislature (wrongly) considered the introduction of the new charge to be compatible 
with the agreement and on that account intended it to apply to the GATT-originated 
goods as well, is in no sense a conclusive reason ft»- the adoption of an interpretation 
consonant with that intent.”27
Compared to the Scandinavian principle of presumption which applies both 
in relation to unincorporated and incorporated treaties, the Italian principle 
seems to have a less wide range: it is only applicable to conflicts between 
adopted treaties and subsequent legislation. However, if the principle purports 
to avoid the breach of international obligations arising under a treaty, its 
application should not depend on the existence of a statute or other legislative 
act incorporating the treaty.21
The Corte Suprema di Cassazione's judgment No. 5274/1979, Bianco v. 
Istituto Nazionale della Previdenza Sociale and Istituto Nazionale per 
l’Assicurazione contro le malattie, can be mentioned as an example of a case 
in which both the lex specialis principle and principle o f presumption were 
applied in the same decision. The Court held in this case:
a Cf. 35 Foro Padano (1980), pp. 37 ff., at p. 48 ff. Here cited in English from 5 IYIL 
(1980-81). pp. 267 f.
* Giorgio Gaja, op.cit., p. 100, talks about "an unwritten principle governing the 
interpretation of statutes" which the courts apply in these cases. What is meant by this 
reference to an "unwritten principle” remains, however, unclear.
v  Cf. 100 Foro Italiano I (1977), pp. 1243 ff., at p. 1248. Here cited in English from 3 
IYIL (1977), p. 364.
“  Cf. Giorgio Gaja, op.cit., p. 101.
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’’Not without, after all, considering that, even if as mere hypothesis, one wanted to 
accept the possibility of this argument, the provisions of the international conventions 
regarding matters regulated by domestic law rules take precedence over the latter 
because o f their special character, independently of whether they came into existence 
before or after [...] Besides, since in case of uncertainty or ambiguety, the interpreter 
must follow the criterion that the State meant to conform to its binding international 
commitment, in order not to incur the relative responsibility for material breach vis-à- 
vis the other States parties to the convention which envisages such commitment, we 
must as a principle exclude, in the absence of an ambigues legislative provision to 
the contrary, that the abrogating effect of the legal rules contained in a duly ratified 
convention be attributed to an ordinary law..." (emphasis added).29
12.2.3. The Review o f the Constitutionality o f Statutes Incorporating Treaties 
into Domestic Law.
Statutes incorporating treaties into domestic law are, like other ordinary 
statutes, subject to constitutionality review by the Corte Costituzionale on the 
basis of a reference by an ordinary court.30 Under Article 134 of the 
Constitution only statutes and legislative acts of the same level come under 
the Corte Costituzionale's jurisdiction. Accordingly, the Corte Costituzionale 
has ruled that the constitutionality of treaties may be reviewed only in­
directly, i.e. through the challenge of statutes implementing them. As the 
Court specified in decision No. 132/1985, Coccia v. Turkish Airways: "... The 
Court’s ruling exclusively concerns the statutory provisions that have 
implemented in Italy the treaty provisions under review."31
There is a fairly clear practice that, while declaring that questions of 
constitutionality of statutes incorporating treaties are admissible, the Corte 
Costituzionale has taken the attitude of undervaluing conflicts between 
treaties and the Constitution. One example of this practice is decision No. 
109/1971, Giacomazzo v. INPS, which summarily rejected the idea of a 
conflict between a treaty with Libya and the constitutional provisions
29 Cf. 16 Rivista di Diritto Intemazionale Privato e Processuale (1980), pp. 82 ff. Here 
cited in English from 5 IYIL (1980*81), p. 266.
30 For a general account on the Corte Costituzionale, see G. Astuti: Bestand und 
Bedeutung der Grundrechte in Italien, 9 EuGRZ (1981), pp. 77 ff.; Malcolm Evans: The 
Italian Constitutional Court, 17 International and Comparative Law Quarterly (1968), pp. 602 
ff.; and Alessandro Pizzorusso: Cour constitutionnelle italienne, 33 Revue international de 
droit comparé (1981), pp. 395 ff.
31 Cf. 68 Rivista di Diritto intemazionale (1985), pp. 888 ff., at p. 900. Here cited in
English from Giorgio Gaja, op.ciL, p. 101.
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requiring equality of treatment and protection of Italian workers.32 The 
treaty had provided for the transfer from an Italian to a Libyan institution of 
social insurance for Italian nationals residing in Libya in 1957, with the 
predictable consequence that these people were later entitled to a much lower 
pensions than would have been the case if no transfer had been made.
The Corte Costituzionale seems only on two occasions to have taken 
another position on the question of the constitutionality of a statute 
incorporating the treaty.31 In both cases the circumstances were rather 
special in that new treaties substituting those which had indirectly been 
considered unconstitutional had been drafted or even ratified; moreover, in 
one of the cases the conflict was between a more than 100 year old treaty 
and the prohibition against the death penalty embodied in Article 27(4) of the 
Constitution. Accordingly, these two decisions must be considered as 
exceptions to the general trend of the Corte Costituzionale in its endeavour 
to avoid establishing conflicts between adopted treaties and the Constitution.
12.2.4. Self-Executing Treaty Provisions.
The question whether or not the provisions of a treaty are self-executing is 
in Italian law, due to the frequent use of adopting international treaties into 
domestic law, of comparatively great significance.34 Only to the extent to 
which an adopted treaty provision can be considered self-executing, is it 
possible to apply it on the domestic level. Hence the question of self­
executing force is examined with regard to the provisions of the treaty. This 
does not mean that the question is resolved only through an examination of 
the treaty as an international instrument The self-executing character of a 
treaty provision rather appears to courts as the result of the incorporation of 
the treaty into the Italian legal system within the context of rules and 
principles that are applicable otherwise.
There is no clear statement in the available case-law concerning the ele­
ments that are regarded as necessary for a treaty provision to be considered 
as self-executing. The basic idea expressed by courts is that a provision is
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51 Cf. 54 Rivista di Diritto intemazionale (1971), pp. 688 ff.
”  See decision No. 54/1979, re Cuillier, reported in 62 Rivista di Diritto intemazionale
(1979). pp. 803 ff, at p. 809, and decision No. 132/1985, Coccia v. Turkish Airways, reported 
in 68 Rivista di Diritto intemazionale (1985), pp. 888 ff.. at p. 900.
54 For an in-depth analysis of this question, see Luigi Condorelli: Il giudice italiano e i
trattatti internazionali. Padova (1974), pp. 49 ff.
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self-executing when it does not need to be specified or integrated by other 
provisions or is "complete".35 Neither of these criteria are particularly clear. 
In fact, the very concept of "self-executing provisions" provides the courts 
with a legitimate reason for not applying adopted treaties if this, for one 
reason or another, is not desired by the Court.
Italian courts have, compared to the courts of other countries, from time 
to time ruled quite strangely on the self-executing character of adopted treaty 
provisions. In relation to G. A.T.T., for example, Italian courts have, contrary 
to the courts of other European countries and the Court of Justice, ruled that 
its provisions are self-executing,36 whereas the provisions of the UN- 
Covenant were not found to be self-executing (see infra section 12.3). Since 
in its decision of 14 July 1982, re laglietti, the Corte Suprema di Cassazione, 
has stated in general terms that "... the norms of the European Convention on 
Human Rights - apart obviously from those provisions the content of which, 
after the use of the habitual methods of interpretation, is to be considered so 
general that it does not express sufficiently specific rules - are directly 
applicable in Italy" (emphasis added),37 there is no need for a comparative 
analysis to elaborate further on the question of self-executing provisions.
12.3. The Application of the European Convention.
The application of the ECHR in domestic Italian law follows, generally 
speaking, the pattern outlined in the previous sections.3* Although the 
Convention has been referred to on a large number of occasions, its
35 For the latter case, see, for example, decision No. 103/1976, Ministero del tesoro v. 
Mander Brothers Ltd., where the Corte Suprema di Cassazione noted that there was a "... 
direct legal relation of a binding character" between the Italian State and the alien who had 
suffered injuries or damage and said that M... such relation, complete in all its essential ele­
ments, is immediately effective in the domestic legal system, without the further requirement 
of a normative integration or of implementation, and therefore, as was pointed out by the 
Sezioni Unite of this Supreme Court, it is actionable by the same citizens before Italian co­
urts." Reported in 99 Foro Italiano I (1976), pp. 2464 ff., at p. 2465. Here cited in English 
from 3 IYIL (1977), p. 350.
* See Giorgio Sacerdoti: Application of G A T T , by Domestic Courts: European and 
Italian Case-law, 2 IYIL (1976), pp. 224 ff.
37 Cf. 69 Rivista di Diritto intemazionale (1986), pp. 143 ff., at p. 145.
31 Extracts and summaries in English and French of Italian case-law regarding the 
application of the Convention in domestic law can be found in 17 Yearbook (19/4), pp. 663 
ff.; 19 Yearbook (1976), pp. 1132 ff.; 20 Yearbook (1977), pp. 767 f.; 21 Yearbook (1978). 
pp. 760 ff.; 22 Yearbook (1979), pp. 525 ff.; 24 Yearbook (1981), pp. 530 ff.; and 27 
Yearbook (1984), pp. 352 f.
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application has frequently been as an additional argument and it does not 
seem to have given cause for the creation of specific principles of interpreta­
tion regarding human rights instruments. Moreover, as will be seen, the 
Convention has been taken into account to a greater or lesser extent in the 
different cases. In fact, it is difficult to trace a clear practice in the Italian 
courts’ application of the Convention. This applies both to the case-law of the 
different courts as well as the practice of the Cone Costituzionale. In this 
section, a few examples of the application of the Convention in domestic 
Italian law will be given.
The Italian Constitution contains a catalogue of fundamental rights which 
to a great extent overlap with and in some instances go even farther than the 
provisions of the ECHR. This fact may explain why the Italian courts tend 
to apply the Convention only as an additional means of interpretation of 
domestic law: in raising questions of constitutionality, reference is frequently 
made to both the Constitution and the Convention.39 As the Italian Govern­
ment explained in its pleadings before the European Commission in the 
Pfunders (Austria v. Italy) Case:
"Since the date of ratification by Italy (26th October 1955), the Convention 
constitutes an integral part of the Italian legal system because Article 2 of Law No. 
848 of 4th August 1955 makes it compulsory to observe the Convention and to cause 
it to be observed as "law of the land"; that, as a result, the provisions of the Conven­
tion are to be invoked before Italian courts in the same way as the Constitution, the 
Codes and many other municipal law, ignorance of the law and, consequently, of the 
Convention being no valid excuse...”40
It follows from Article 134 of the Italian Constitution that the jurisdiction of 
the Corte Costituzionale, insofar as human rights are concerned, is limited to 
cases referred to it by the ordinary courts in matters specifically falling 
within the ambit of the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution. 
Thus there exists no Recurso de Amparo in Italian constitutional law (see 
infra section 13.2). To the extent that alleged conflicts between the 
Convention and domestic law have no constitutional implications, the 
ordinary courts are competent to rule on the matters themselves.
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* Cf. Valerio Grementieri & Nicolo Trocker: The Protection of Human Rights in 
Constitutional Law: Italy in Italian National Reports to the IXth International Congress of 
Comparative Law, Tehran 1974, Milano (1974), pp. 491 ff., at p. 494.
40 Cf. 4 Yearbook (1961), p. 154.
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12.3.1. The Position o f the European Convention in the Domestic Norm- 
Hierarchy.
Since the Convention is essentially a normal treaty, it holds the position of 
an ordinary treaty adopted into domestic law within the domestic norm- 
hierarchy. This was made very clear in decision No. 188/1980, re Limtrami, 
where the Corte Costituzionale stated th a t"... the Court cannot but reassert 
its settled case-law41 which rules out treaty provisions, even if general, from 
the scope of Article 10 of the Constitution..."42 Moreover, the Court held 
that Article 11 of the Constitution "... cannot even be taken into account, as 
one cannot single out any limitation to national sovereignty with regard to the 
specific treaty provisions in question."43
The Court’s statement that conventions on human rights do not affect 
sovereignty is not convincing. It probably intended to say that Article 11 of 
the Constitution considers limitations of sovereignty which are linked with 
the functioning of international organizations,44 that is, that the Court was 
not prepared to accept the ECHR and the UN-Covenant as falling within the 
scope of Article 12. The Court’s reference to "general" international treaty 
provisions may indicate that the Court simply confirmed its previous case-law 
in specific relation to human rights treaties: these international instruments 
should be applied in exactly the same way as other treaties. This is confirmed 
by the fact that in its judgment the Court also ruled that the provisions of the 
ECHR and the UN-Covenant could not be invoked as a means of testing the 
constitutionality of statutes.
Regarding the concrete application of the Convention in this case, the 
Court referred to two decisions of the European Commission. Both decisions 
provided, however, only an additional ground for rejecting the question of 
unconstitutionality of the statute in question:
"This provision purports to contribute to the definition of what has to be considered 
a "fair trial", based - among other elements - on the equality of the parties (on 
"equality of weapons", in the words of the European Commission of Human Rights). 
The said Commission had the opportunity for asserting that an accused person’s right
The Position o f the ECHR in the Domestic Norm-Hierarchy
41 The Court here referred to its decisions Nos. 48/1979, 32/1960, 104/1969 and 14/1964.
41 Cf. 64 Rivista di Diritto intemazionale (1981), pp. 662 ff., at p. 672. Here cited in 
English from 5 IYIL (1980-81), p. 253.
43 Ibid.
44 Cf. Giorgio Gaja: IX Individuals. A) Human Rights, 5 IYIL (1980-81), p. 253.
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to defend himself is not unconditional, but is limited by the State’s right to set up 
rules concerning the presence of lawyers before the courts (Application No. 722/60). 
When examining an application brought against a State whose laws require the 
presence of a lawyer before the Supreme Court, the said Commission asserted that 
the provisions in question does not impose on the contracting States an obligation to 
grant the accused persons an unconditional freedom of access to the highest courts, 
and that nothing prevents legislation from providing differently, if it intends to secure 
a good administration of justice (Applications Nos. 727/60 and 722/60). This inter­
pretation seems perfectly in line with the principle laid down in An. 24, para. 2, of 
the Constitution, as interpreted by this Court’s judgment No. 125 of 1969."45
The interpretation of the Court corresponds to the one given by the Commis­
sion46 and a previous decision of the Corte Suprema di Cassazione.47 On 
the other hand, the decisions of the Commission referred to by the Court did 
not, strictly speaking, deal with the question whether an accused person has 
a right to defend himself. In Application No. 727/60 the Commission found 
that "... the applicant did not fulfil the conditions laid down in Article 
6(3)(c), since his status was that, not of a person "charged" but of "plaintiff' 
appealing for a quashing of the judgment".48 Similarly, in Application No. 
722/60 the Commission held"... that the right to defend oneself through legal 
assistance of one’s own choosing, as guaranteed by... [Article 6(3)(c)]... of 
the Convention to everyone charged with a criminal offence, is not an 
absolute right, but limited by the right of the State concerned to make 
regulations concerning the appearance of lawyers before the Courts".4’ 
Finally, as regards the UN-Convention which was also invoked in the case, 
the Court expressed itself in a way which may suggest that it does not 
consider any provisions of the Covenant as self-executing. This view is in 
contrast to the line laid down by, for instance, Scandinavian courts which
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45 Cf. 64 Rivista di Diritto intemazionale (1981), pp. 662 ff.. at p. 672. Here cited in 
English from 5 IYIL (1980-81), p. 254.
M In Application No. 2645/65, cf. 11 Yearbook (1968), pp. 322 ff., at p. 350. the 
Commission ruled: "Art. 6, para. 3, (c)... does not confer upon the person charged with a 
criminal offence the right to decide in what way provisions should be made for his defence; 
whereas the competent authorities are entitled to decide whether the person charged shall 
defend himself in person or shall be represented by a lawyer of his own choice or appointed 
ex officio as the case may be."
47 Decision of 18 November 1972, cf. Massimario della Cassazione Penale 1973, pp. 393 
ff. For a summary in English, see 17 Yearbook (1974), p. 663.
** Cf. 3 Yearbook (1960), pp. 302 ff.. at p. 308.
49 Cf. 9 Collection, pp. 1 ff., at p. 3.
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have applied the Covenant in a way similar to the ECHR.
12.3.2. Conflicts between the European Convention and Domestic Law. 
There does not seem to be any case in which it is held clearly that there is 
a conflict between the Convention and domestic Italian law and that the 
latter, due to the lex posterior derogat legi priori principle, shall take 
precedence. However, it is possible to find examples in which the Convention 
or the UN-Covenant has been applied in a fairly unconvincing way and 
perhaps, in effect, has been disregarded.
In the decision No. 15/1982, re Galimberti, concerning the constitutio­
nality of a decree-law extending the maximun period allowed for pre-trial 
detention, inter alia, under Article 5(3) of the ECHR, the Corte Cos­
tituzionale stated:
"The said norm of the Convention is not placed as such on a constitutional level, nor 
does it offer any concrete test, since it refrains from giving any specification 
whatsoever. Any evaluation of reasonableness that is not linked with a concrete test, 
but only with a vague and elastic formulation, may become questionable in the 
absence of a more detailed and deeper analysis."50
The "reasonableness" referred to by the Court is the standard laid down in the 
case-law of the European Court with regard to pre-trial detention.51 How­
ever, the Court did not in any way attempt to apply this standard in the 
decision at issue.52
In a decision rendered by the Procuratore della Corte di Appello di 
Milano [the Public Prosecutor of Milan] on 21 November 1974, Zorn, the ap­
plication for provisional release, presented by an alian aiTested by the Italian 
police pursuant to a warrant issued under Article 663 of the Code of Criminal 
Procedure, was rejected. Appeal against the decision of the Public Prosecutor 
could be lodged with the Minister of Justice. Regarding the relationship to 
the Convention, it was held:
"The European Convention on Human Rights recognizes a right of appeal before the
50 Cf. Giurisprodenza iialiana 1982, II, pp. 85 ff., at p. 100. Here cited in English from 
5 IYIL (1980-81), p. 253.
51 See, for example, Eur. Court H.R., Ringeisen Case, Series A, Vol. 14 (1971), Vol. 15 
(1972) and Vol. 16 (1973); and Eur. Court H.R., StogmUUer Case, Series A, Vol. 9 (1969).
51 Cf. Giorgio Gaja, op.ciL. p. 254.
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competent jurisdiction against decisions restrictive of personal liberty, provided that 
the detention is illegal, whereas in the present case the detention is legal."53
It should be noted that, since Article 656 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 
embodies a provision stating that the provisions of the Code in the field of 
extradition shall be applied with the reservations deriving from international 
customs and conventions, one is here within the sphere of sector-monism (see 
supra section 4.1). This means that in this field international law prevails 
over domestic law, provided that the domestic rules are embodied solely in 
the Code of Criminal Procedure.
Article 5(4) of the ECHR lays down that "[e]veryone who is deprived of 
his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings by 
which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court 
and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful". It follows from the 
wording of this provision as well as the practice of the European Commission 
and Court (see infra section 13.3.4) that an administrative-polical organ such 
as the Minister of Justice does not fulfil the requirements of the said 
provision. Moreover, as pointed out by Professor Francesco Francioni, the 
decision represents "... also an exercise of illogical thinking: the "unlawfu­
lness” of the detention, indeed, cannot be considered as an a priori requisite 
for the admissibility of judicial review under Art. 5, para. 4, of the said Con­
vention, but rather an element to be established as a result of such review. 
Whether or not provisional release is to be granted depends upon the 
outcome of such judicial control over the pertinent application, and not upon 
an a priori and uncontrolled qualification of the arrest as "lawful".54
Thus the Public Prosecutor formally applied the Convention but he did 
not in effect take its merits into proper account. This can be understood from 
the way in which, on the one hand, he felt obliged to apply the Convention 
as valid domestic law and, on the other, he did not want to give it full effect 
in his concrete application of the law.
It is, however, also possible to find examples of cases in which the 
Convention is found to have been violated. For instance, in decision No. 
8157/1973 the Corte Suprema di Cassazione held that a first instance judge’s 
failure to admit an application by the counsel for the defence for the hearing
Chapter 11: the ECHR incorporated into a "Dualist" System: Italy
55 Cf. Giurisprudenza Italiana 1976, II. pp. 28 ff. Here cited in English from 3 IYIL 
(1977), p. 305.
54 Cf. Francesco Francioni: IX. Individuals. A) Human Rights in 3 IYIL (1977), p. 306.
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of witnesses who could refute the evidence of the prosecution witnesses, 
violated Article 6(2Xd) which stipulates that ”[e]veryone charged with a 
criminal offence has the right [...] to obtain the attendance and examination 
of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against 
him."53
Frequently, it is held that there is no conflict between domestic law and 
the way in which the Court interprets the Convention. Thus in a decision of 
19 February 1973 the Corte Suprema di Cassazione did not find that Italian 
law conflicted with the Convention. The appellant was sentenced to five 
days’ imprisonment as he did not inform the police that he was having 
foreign visitors to stay at his home. He appealed against this decision invok­
ing Article 8 of the ECHR, arguing that in accordance with this provision a 
person should not be traced by the police. The Court held:
"The question as to whether the norm contained in Article 2 of law No. 50 of 11 
February 1948 is in conformity with the Constitution with respect to Article 8 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights is manifestly ill-founded. Article 8 of the 
Convention guarantees the right to respect for a person’s private and family life but 
does not include a guarantee for a person not be traced."
Similarly, in decision No. 1131/1968 the Corte Suprema di Cassazione held 
that Article 375 of the Code of Civil Procedure could not be regarded as 
repealed by Article 5(l)(c) of the Convention, since "(t]his provision of the 
Convention indeed clearly gives as an alternative reason, sufficient in itself 
to justify deprivation of liberty, the simple existence of reasonable suspicion 
that the person in question has committed an offence."57
12.3.3. The European Convention as an Additional Argument.
As already mentioned, the most common way in Italy to apply the Conven­
tion is as an additional argument in the interpretation given to the Constitu­
tion. Frequently, this application takes the form of ascertaining that the 
interpretation of the Constitution reached does not violate the Convention.
Conflicts between the ECHR and Domestic Law
5i Here cited in English from 19 Yearbook (1976), p. 1135.
54 Cf. Massimario della Cassazione Penale 1973, pp. 718 ff. Here cited in English from
the extract in 17 Yearbook (1974), p. 664.
17 Here cited in English from the extract in 19 Yearbook (1976). p. 1132. See also the 
Corte Suprema di Cassazione's decisions Nos. 6588/1972 and 2628/1973, of which an extract
in English can be found in 19 Yearbook (1976), pp. 1132 f.
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Although one can find statements of the Corte Costituzionale inplicitly 
rejecting that the Convention is a means of interpretation of the Constitution, 
it happens frequently that the Convention, in effect, is applied in this way.
In a decision of 15 December 1972 the Corte Suprema di Cassazione 
held that, in accordance with the fundamental principle guaranteed by the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the ECHR, everyone charged 
with a criminal offence has the right to be informed promptly in a language 
which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation 
against him and also to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot 
understand or speak the language used in court. Accordingly, the use of the 
Italian language, while obligatory for persons who know Italian, can only be 
maintained in relation to foreigners insofar as they are provided with proper 
means of translation.3*
In a judgment rendered only a few months after re Galimberti, No. 
17/1981, re Basetto, the Corte Costituzionale showed a somewhat more open 
attitude vis-à-vis the Convention. The Tribunale per i minori di Venezia 
[Juvenile Court] in an order, concerning a minor’s right to a public hearing, 
had invoked Article 6(1) of the Convention and claimed that it was "... 
relevant under the Constitution", since "... the Convention provides an 
I indication of the tyncrete contents of A it-2  of the Constitution, which
* guarantees the uninfringeable rights of man, and also of Art. 1(2) of the 
Constitution".59 Under the latter provision "sovereignty belongs to the 
people” and, according to the referring court, this implies the right to a public 
hearing.
The Corte Costituzionale implicitly rejected the view that the ECHR 
could help in defining which rights are considered uninfringeable under the 
Constitution. It first referred to the various interests which are protected by 
the Constitution and come into play when the decision as to whether there 
should be a public hearing is made. Then it went on:
"One cannot assume that on the basis of a provision such as the one contained in the 
European Convention on Human Rights, implemented in Italy through an ordinary 
statute, the balance of the interests in question should be reserved by the Constitution 
to the courts, with the consequence that the legislator could have no discretion in
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M Cf. Massimario della Cassazione Penale 1973, pp. 347 ff. For an summary in English, 
see 17 Yearbook (1974), pp. 663 f.
* The order is reported seperately in 22 Giurisprudenza costituzionale (1977), II. pp. 805 
ff. Here cited in English from 5 IYIL (1980-81), p. 257.
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arranging for certain proceedings to be conducted in camera (see judgment No. 
16/1981).
Moreover, it must be pointed out that Art 6, para. 1 - by stating that "judgments 
shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or 
part of the trial [...] where the interest of juveniles [...] so require, or to the extent 
strictly necessary in the opinion of the court [...] where publicity would prejudice the 
interests of justice" - does not imply that the said exception must be affected by the 
courts rather than by statute. The same applies to Art 14, para. 4, of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights • adopted on 16 december 1966 and ratified 
by on the basis of Law No. 881 of 25 October 1977 - according to which "in the 
case of juvenile persons, the procedure shall be such as will take account of their age 
and the desirability of promoting their rehabilatation"."60
Thus, the Court examined in substance some aspects of Article 6(1) of the 
ECHR and of Article 14(4) of the UN-Covenant. The latter provision does 
not, however, specify how the exception to the principle that hearings arc 
public should be made.
In decision No. 62/1981, re Pinna, the Corte Costituzionale considered 
the question of constitutionality of section 435 of the Code of Criminal 
Procedure, insofar as it allows a conviction for a crime committed during a 
judicial hearing. After having considered various provisions of the Constitu­
tion, the Court concluded that an accused person has no right under the 
Constitution to an appeal against conviction which would necessarily involve 
a retrial. The Court added:
"One cannot deem that the situation was altered by effect of Art. 14, para. 5, of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights [...] Apart from the reasons of 
a general character given in judgment No. 188 of 1980 (para. 5 of the reasons 
concerning the law), especially with regard to Art. 2, para. 2 - which provides for 
legislative measures on the part of the contracting Stales for giving effects to rights 
recognized in the same Covenant - one may add that even now there is no conflict 
between Ait 14, para. 5, and a system providing for a conviction for a crime to be 
reviewed on its merits only when there has been an appeal alleging that serious 
irregularities affected the proceedings and the judgment and the said appeal has been 
allowed (Art. 11, para. 2, of the Constitution)."61
It is not quite clear why the Court referred to the UN-Covenant. The position 
of the quoted passage in the decision indicates that the Court was concerned
The ECHR as an Additional Argument
“  Cf. 65 Rivista di Diritto intemazionale (1982), pp. 400 ff. Here cited in English from 
5 IYIL (1980-81), pp. 256 f.
“ Cf. 65 Rivista di Diritto intemazionale (1982), pp. 402 ff. Here cited in English from
5 IYIL (1980-81), pp. 257 f.
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more with examining the question of constitutionality of a provision in the 
Code of Criminal Procedure than with ascertaining whether this provision had 
been modified by the effect of the statute implementing the Covenant 
However, the Court has on other occasions ruled out the possibily of 
reviewing the question of constitutionality of statutes with regard to the latter. 
Since the Court did not find any conflict between Article 14(5) of the 
Covenant and the domestic provision, it might have been the Court’s 
intention to give an obiter dictum with the idea of preventing a question of 
constitutionality from being raised in further orders.
Under Article 14(5) of the Covenant"... everyone convicted of a crime 
shall have the right to his conviction and sentence being reviewed by a 
higher tribunal according to law". The Court’s view that this provision does 
not imply the right to a full retrial seems to be consistent with the wording 
of the text.
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CHAPTER 13
The Application of the European Convention in a 
"Monist" System: Spain
13.1. Introduction.
Spain became a member of the Council of Europe on 24 November 1977 and 
at the same time signed the ECHR. This took place even before the present 
Spanish Constitution went into force. The Convention was subsequently 
ratified by Spain on 4 October 1979 after the Government had obtained 
authorization to do so from the Cortes Generates on 28 June 1979 in 
accordance with Article 94 of the Constitution.1 The text of the Convention 
was subsequently published on 22 December 1979.2 Following ratification, 
Spain recognized for a period of three years from October 1979 the 
compulsory jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights, on the 
condition of reciprocity; and this was followed by the acceptance of the right 
of individual petition, effective as of 1 July 1981.3
13.2. The Effect of Treaties in Domestic Law.
In accordance with the constitutional tradition,4 the Spanish Constitution of 
1978 contains in Article 96(1) a provision concerning the general status of 
international treaties in domestic Spanish Law. This provision reads as 
follows:
"Validly concluded international treaties, once officially published in Spain, shall 
form part of the internal legal order. Their provisions may only be repealed, amended 
or suspended in the manner provided in the treaties themselves or in accordance with 
the general rules of international law."*
It follows that treaties become directly applicable in domestic law with the
1 See Boletín Oficial de las Cortes/Congreso de los Diputados, 5 July 1979, No. 5-ID.
J Ibid., No. 213, 5525.
3 Ibid., 30 June 1981.
4 See Article 65 of the Republican Constitution of 1931.
5 Here cited in English from the official translation in Documentación Administrativa, No. 
180, extraordinario. Octubre-Diciembre 1978.
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only requirement being their prior official publication in Spain. This 
condition cannot be seen as an act of incorporation since it does not mean 
that a statute or any other legislative act stating that the treaty shall form part 
of domestic law must be passed. It only indicates that the treaty, like other 
acts of Parliament, needs to be published in Spain in order to comply with 
the constitutional provisions on the proclamation of legislative acts, in order 
to enter into force in domestic Spanish law.6
Since Article 96 applies to all kinds of treaties, human rights treaties - 
including the ECHR - fall under its scope. Thus the Convention becomes ap­
plicable law in Spain and it is, therefore, binding upon domestic courts in the 
same way as domestic law.7 Within the domestic norm-hierarchy, validly 
concluded treaties are situated above ordinary legislation and below the Con­
stitution. Although the debates on the draft Constitution eliminated an express 
provision stating that treaties shall take precedence over ordinary legislation, 
this conclusion may in fact be drawn from the final wording of Article 96(1) 
which stipulates that treaties ”... may only be repealed, amended or suspended 
in the manner provided in the treaties themselves or in accordance with the 
general rules of international law.” This means, according to Spanish legal
6 However, José Pastor Ridzvejo: Curso de derecho internacional público, Madrid (1986), 
p. 170, has described this system in the following way: "The present Spanish system regarding 
the application of treaties may be described as a moderate and reasonable dualist one. Dualist 
since it requires a formal act of reception. And moderate and reasonable because that reception 
is implemented through mere publication, and not through the order of execution of a treaty 
by means of law.**
[El sistema español actual sobre aplicación interna de los tratados puede ser calificado como 
de dualista moderado y razonable. Dualista porque exige un acto de recepción. Y moderado 
y razonable porque tal recepción se hace por la simple publicación, no por la orden de 
ejecución de un tratado mediante una ley.]
7 Enrique Linde: Capitulo Vil in Enrique Linde et alii: El sistema de protección de los 
derechos humanos, Madrid (1983), p. 179, states: "Concentrating now on the matter of the 
European Convention of Human Rights, we arrive at the conclusion that once it is officially 
published in Spain pursuant to Article 96, it will form part of the Spanish legal order, which 
is also true for all treaties and international agreements on fundamental rights signed by Spain. 
Consequendy, the former will be of direct and compulsory application by Spanish authorities 
and tribunals.”
[Centrándonos ahora en la consideración del Convenio Europeo de Derechos Humanos, 
llegamos a la conclusion de que, una vez publicado oficialmente en España conforme a lo que 
dispone el articulo 96, formara parte del ordenamiento jurídico español, lo que se puede 
aplicar a la totalidad de los tratados y acuerdos internacionales en materia de derechos 
fundamentales suscritos por España. Por consiguiente, aquel sera de aplicación directa y 
obligada para las autoridades y tribunales españoles.]
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literature, that treaties cannot be derogated from by an a posteriori statute.8
Surprisingly, however, Article 10(2) of the Spanish Constitution em­
bodies another and different provision with regard to inter alia the Conven­
tion. This provision stipulates:
The standards relative to the fundamental rights and liberties recognized by the 
Constitution shall be interpreted in conformity with the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights and the international treaties and agreements thereon ratified by 
Spain."
It follows from the wording of this provision that the ECHR is one of "the 
international treaties" ratified by Spain on the basis of which the Constitution 
shall be interpreted.
First, one may ask why the Spanish Constitution embodies two clauses 
on the status of international treaties. A proper answer to this question can 
only be given with reference to the period of the Spanish transition to demo­
cracy. Second, a number of questions related to the interpretation of these 
two provisions may be posed.
As is well known, the Spanish Constitution of 1978 was the result of a compromise 
between a number of political forces. Several of these were in open opposition to 
Francoism while others, inter alia, the center party UCD, which had won the majo­
rity in the first general election after the dictatorship and was thus in office in that 
period, was more ambiguous in its attitude towards the regime which had just come 
to an end. This added to the difficulties of achieving consensus on the draft Constitu­
tion.9
The Effect o f Treaties in Domestic Law
1 See, for example, the survey in Araceli Mangas Martin: Cuestiones de Derecho 
Internacional Público en la Constitución de 1978, Revista de la Facultad de Derecho de la
Universidad Complutense, No. 61 (1981), pp. 143 ff.
Accordingly, José Pastor Ridzvejo, op.cit., p. 169, states that Article 96(1) ”... 
unequivocally means that the derogation, modification or suspension of a treaty cannot be
implemented in the domestic sphere by means of law. The supremacy of treaties over domestic
legal provisions of an inferior rank to constitutional rules is thereby proclaimed, be they prior 
or posterior to the treaty itself."
See also Drzemezewski (1983), pp. 169 f., with further references.
A different position is taken by Enrique Unde, op.cit., pp. 173 ff., who defends the ap­
plication of "the principle of competence'’ rather than ’ the principle of hierarchy” in these 
cases.
[... da a entender de manera inequívoca que la derogación, modificación o suspensión de un 
tratado no puede realizarse a efectos internos por vía de ley. Se proclama así la supremacía 
de los tratados sobre las disposiciones internas que tengan rango inferior al constitucional, sean 
anteriores o posterioes al tratatado.]
9 There is a long bibliography on the Spanish transition to democracy. On the Constitutio­
nal process, see most recently, Gregorio Peces Barba, La elaboración de la Constitución de 
1978, Centro de Estudios Constitucionales, Madrid (1989).
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One of the areas in which this consensus had been most difficult to achieve in 
the Congreso de los Diputados [the Lower House of the Spanish Parliament] was the 
draft Article which regulated the right to education. At this stage of the proceedings, 
the draft Constitution contained only one provision • Article 96(1) - which regulated 
the status of international treaties in domestic Spanish law.
When the draft Constitition went to El Senado [the Upper House of the Spanish 
Parliament] the Government introduced Article 10(2), initially as a clause integrating 
international treaties on human rights into domestic law, and at a later stage as the 
interpretation-clause which was finally passed. In spite of the support the Socialist 
Party PSOE and other forces of the left had previously expressed for the international 
systems for the protection of human rights, they strongly opposed the inclusion of 
this provision in the Constitution.
The key to this was to be found in Article 27(6) of the draft Constitution itself. 
The center had forced the socialists to recognize "the right of individuals and legal 
entities to set up teaching establishments", but the Socialist Party had succeeded in 
not letting be included the right to "direct" them in this provision. Once negotiations 
on this point had been concluded, the Government tried to modify it by introducing 
Article 10(2). According to this Article, all fundamental rights, including the right 
to education, had to be interpreted in conformity with the international treaties in this 
field ratified by Spain. Among these, the International Covenant on Civil and Politi­
cal Rights of 1966 had then just been ratified. Article 18(4) of the Covenant lays 
down that the States have to respect the liberty of parents or of legal guardians "to 
ensure the religious and moral education of their children in conformity with their 
own convictions". One would have thought that, thanks to the new Article 10(2), this 
provision would be the criterion for interpreting Article 27(6) of the new Constitu­
tion. This is why the socialist leader in El Senado talked of a "parallel Constitution" 
that would thereby be created. However, the Article remained in the final text of the 
draft Constitution which was eventually passed.
Thus there is no overlap between the two provisions in the sense that Article 
96(1) enables the authorities, including the judiciary, to apply international 
treaties directly as domestic law while the interpretation-clause in Article 
10(2) is applicable in cases where a constitutional right has to be interpreted. 
What follows is that Article 10(2) can only be applied when a right included 
in the Constitution is being touched upon. In other words, when a treaty 
protects a right which is not embodied in the Constitution, it is applicable 
domestic law, but the treaty is not an obligatory means of interpretation of 
the Constitution itself. In this sense. Article 10(2) does not cover all the cases 
in which Article 96(1) is applicable.10
10 On this point, Araceli Mangas Martin, op.cit, p. ISO, rightly states that"... international 
agreements on human rights concluded by Spain form part of our legal order in accordance 
with Article 96 [...] On the other hand, this Article 10(2) does not refer to international 
conventions as internal law, since the explicit reference to the Universial Declaration of 
Human Rights and to other international conventions on the subject is only made with a view 
to the interpretation of the rights and freedoms embodied in the Constitution.'’
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To the extent a treaty embodies a right which is not contained in the 
Constitution, Article 10(2) will, as mentioned above, not be applicable. This 
has certain procedural consequences. Essentially, it means that in such cases 
the violation of a right embodied in the treaty cannot be invoked before the 
Tribunal Constitucional but only before the ordinary courts. The special 
procedure before the Tribunal Constitucional for the protection of fundamen­
tal rights, the so-called Recurso de Amparo, covers only rights embodied in 
the Constitution itself.
Since all rights protected by the Convention are with no exception em­
bodied in the Spanish Constitution, Article 10(2) is always applicable when 
a violation of the former is alleged. One may therefore talk about a double 
incorporation of the Convention into domestic Spanish law. In practice this 
means that ordinary Spanish judges may - and shall - apply the Convention, 
since by virtue of Article 96(1) it has become a part of domestic Spanish law. 
Since Spanish courts are moreover bound by the Constitution and frequently 
faced with the interpretation of its provisions, under Article 10(2) they have 
to apply the Convention as an obligatory means of interpretation. Conse­
quently, in all cases in which the question of the application of the Constitu­
tion is at stake, the case may be brought before the Tribunal Constitucional.
Where in previous Spanish legal writings there was a tendency to 
criticize this double incorporation of human rights treaties, contemporary 
Spanish legal literature qualifies the double incorporation as a "singular fact" 
and points to the constitutional status the Convention has thereby acquired.11
13.3. Specific Problems related to the Application of the European 
Convention in Spain.
A number of questions have arisen from the approach to Article 10(2) of the
The Effect o f Treaties in Domestic Law
[... los acuerdos internacionales concluidos por España sobre derechos humanos forman parte 
de nuestroordenamiento en virtud del art 96 [...] Por el contrario, este art 10.2 no apela a los 
convenios internacionales en cuanto derecho interno, sino que la referencia explícita a la 
Declaración Universal de Derechos Humanos y a otros convenios internacionales sobre la 
materia se hace solo a efectos de interpretación de los derechos y libertades incluidos en la 
Constitución...]
11 The former Spanish judge in the European Court of Human Rights, Eduardo García de 
Enterria: Valeur de la jurisprudence de la Cour Europenne des droits de l'homme en droit 
espagnol in Matscher & Petzhold (1988), p. 222. talks of "... un cas à tout fait singulier de 
valeur constitutionnelle directe de la Convention Européenne qui résulte de l'article 10 $ 2 de 
la Constitution de 1978.”
Araceli Mangas Martin, op.cit., p. 150, for her part, qualifies the double incorporation as 
a "singular legal technique" and Aiticie 10(2) as a 'guarantee clause".
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Spanish Constitution adopted by Spanish legal scholars. The first and 
foremost of these relates to the extent to which Article 10(2) can be seen as 
a real inteipretation-clause. Although Article 10(2) applies the term "inter­
pretation" to the Constitution, there arc nevertheless a number of controver­
sies deriving from this passage that may give rise to doubts as to the real 
meaning of this Article as an interpretation-clause.
First, it should be emphasized that the Convention is always an 
applicable parameter under Article 10(2) since all the rights protected either 
in the Convention itself or in its Protocols are without exception included in 
the Spanish Constitution.
Since all the rights protected by the Convention shall be applied in order 
to interpret constitutional rights, the case-law of the European Court of 
Human Rights - Spain having ratified its compulsory jurisdiction - must, to 
the extent it may be relevant to the case in question, be binding upon 
domestic Spanish Courts.
Accordingly, Spanish doctrine,12 as well as the Tribunal Constitucional 
itself, has accepted the "cnnstitmional value" of the judgments of the Euro­
pean Court of Human Rights not only in interpreting the rights embodied in 
\ the Convention, as granted by Article 45 of the Convention itself,13 but also,
• indirectly, in interpreting the rights embodied in the Spanish Constitution. 
Thus Professor Eduardo García de Enterria has explained:
"[P]ar le jeu combiné d’un double renvoi (renvoi de l’article 10 § 2 de la Con­
stitution à la Convention et renvoi de Particle 45 de la Convention aux arrêts de la 
Cour européenne), la jurisprudence de la Cour européenne est devenue directement 
pertinente en Espagne pour l’interprétation de la Constitution du pays.”14
To what extent the decisions of the other Convention bodies have the same 
value as judgments of the Court is. however, still open to discussion, since 
the decisions of the Commission and of the Committee of Ministers have
u See, for example, Enrique Linde, op.cit., p. 179.
13 This article vests the European Court of Human Rights with the power to interpret the 
Convention, by stating that "[t]he jurisdiction of the Court shall extend to all cases concerning 
the interpretation and application of the present Convention which the High Contracting 
Parties or the Commission shall refer to it in accordance with Article 48.”
14 Cf. Eduardo Garcia de Entema, op.cit., p. 224.
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rarely been referred to by the Tribunal Constitucional.15 In one judgment 
(Judgment No. 114/8416) the Tribunal Constitucional, on the one hand 
referred to a resolution of the Committee of Ministers as grounds for its deci­
sion and, on the other, noticed tha t"... in our legal order its meaning needs 
not to be taken into consideration on the basis of Article 10(2) of the 
Constitution [...] The relevant interpretation according to Article 10(2) of the 
Constitution is only that of the European Court and not that of the Committee 
of Ministers."
A specific problem emerges in relation to what extent the case-law of the 
European Court should have the same binding force on domestic Spanish 
courts in cases in which the Court has applied the so-called dynamic inter­
pretation of the Convention. The problem arises when an emerging right 
developed by the European Court is not expressly protected by the Spanish 
Constitution, as may be the case in the future. In such cases there is, in spite 
of the wording of Article 10(2), hardly any basis for claiming that the 
Spanish courts should be prevented from applying the case-law of the 
European Court, since the "new" right established by the European Court is 
nothing but the consequence of the proper interpretation of the Convention. 
\ Accordingly, this must also be the proper way for the Tribunal Constitucio- 
w nal to interpret the rights embodied in the Spanish Constitution.17
Furthermore, a distinction has been made between the different ways in 
which the case-law of the Court may have binding effect on domestic 
Spanish courts.1® On the one hand, both the "new" rules deriving from the 
dynamic interpretation and the main principles o f interpretation laid down 
by the European Court have the effect of introducing, respectively, new rights 
in the bill of rights and judicial precedents which are binding both upon the 
Tribunal Constitucional and the ordinary courts in cases involving rights 
protected by the Constitution. On the other hand, the interpretation 
techniques employed by the European Court in each case (i.e. empirical, 
historical, pursuing a European standard or leaving room for the State’s
Specific Problems related to the Application o f the ECHR in Spain
15 Sec the survey in Carlos Fernandez de Casadevante: La application del Convenio 
Europeo de Derechos Humanos en España, Madrid (1988), pp. 140 ff.
16 Cf. BOE 29.11.84.
17 See Miguel Angel Aparicio: La clásula de interpretación del artículo 10.2 de la 
Constitución Española como clásula de integración constitutional, unpublished paper presented 
at the Universidad de Granada. November 1988. pp. 21 ff.
“ Ibid., at p. 20.
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margin o f appreciation etc.) should not have such binding effect on domestic 
law-enforcing authorities. Since this question has been addressed by legal 
literature only very recently, it cannot yet be said whether or not this position 
will be generally accepted or discussed. It may well be regarded as the proper 
way to interpret the so-called expansive function which legal writers have 
accorded to 10(2) of the Constitution.19 However, seen from an analytical 
point of view it may be questioned to what extent, if at all, it is possible to 
distinguish between the principles o f interpretation and interpretation tech­
niques.
Two other questions on the interpretation of Article 10(2) have been 
discussed in Spanish legal writings.
First, is Article 10(2) applicable in cases in which a constitutional right 
does not need to be interpreted! The classic theory on legal interpretation 
liked to state that in claro non fi t  interpretario. This is the position of most 
Spanish legal writers on Article 10(2).20 This clause should then only be ap­
plicable when a constitutional provision on human rights was not in itself 
sufficiently clear. However, this principle can hardly gain support from a 
realistic point of view. Since the provisions to be applied are embodied in the 
Constitution itself, it is very hard to imagine a way of doing this without 
some previous interpretative work.21
Second, it has been discussed whether there is any possibility of an 
interpretario in pejus of the rights embodied in the Constitution itself by 
virtue of Article 10(2).
It has been pointed out that the application of Article 10(2) to a provision 
of the ECHR, regardless of the different levels of protection provided by the 
Convention and the Constitution, could in some cases reduce the standard 
granted by the Constitution. However, this presupposes (1) that the standard 
provided for in the Constitution in fact is higher than the one provided for 
in the Convention, and (2) that the in pejus application is included under the 
possible effects both of the Convention itself and of Article 10(2) of the
”  See Joaquin Ruiz Gimenez: Comentario al articulo 102 de la Constitución in Oscar 
Alzaga (ed.): Comentarios a las leys políticas, Madrid (1983-). p. 140.
20 See in this way, Araceli Mangas Martin, op.ciL, p. 150; Carlos Fernandez de 
Casadevente, op.cit.. pp. 51 ff.; and Fernando Garrido Falla: Comentarios ai Articulo ¡0.2 de 
la Constitución Española in Femando Garrido Falla et alii: Comentarios a la Constitución, 
Madrid (1985), p. 192.
11 Cf. Ross (1958), pp. 111 ff.
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Constitution.
Generally speaking, it cannot be assumed that the Spanish Constitution 
embodies a higher protection of human rights than the Convention. 
Nevertheless, it has been argued in Spanish legal literature that this is the 
case since the Constitution came into force in 1978, whereas the Convention 
was signed in 1950. In addition, the very nature of the Convention is said to 
be only the norma minimale, i.e. the Convention provides only the minimum 
common standard on human rights within the countries of the Council of 
Europe. Moreover, this would be precisely what, for a number of reasons, the 
drafters of the Convention intended22 and, therefore, the proper effect it is 
expected to have.23
But, even taking into account the more recent date in which the Spanish 
Constitution came into force, it may be argued that, although it has the power 
to reduce the scope of action of the Convention as "domestic applicable law” 
under Article 96(1), this is not the case regarding the application of Article 
10(2), due to the fact that judicial interpretation of the text still has to be 
developed to a greater extent, thus necessitating reference to a framework, for 
use as a guideline for accuracy. As Professor Diego Lihân Nogueras rightly 
points out "... it is not strange that the courts choose only infrequently to 
apply directly the provisions embodied in international treaties, given the 
more precise and advanced national legal body in these areas. For the inter­
pretation of rights and freedoms, however, international texts are extremely 
important, given the current lack of an adequate internal framework, due to 
the recency of the Constitution."2425
Therefore, the real question turns out to be the level of protection 
provided by the Convention and not the fact that it is nearly thirty years older
22 Cf. P. van Dijk & G.J.H. van Hoof: Theory and Practice of the European Convention 
o f Human Rights, Deventer (1984), p. 182.
23 This argument has recently been put forward by Santiago Muñoz Machado: Prólogo in 
Carlos Fernández de Casadevante, op.cit., p. 17. Andrew Z. Drzemezewski, op.cit., pp. 161 
f., refers to a similar statement by Diego Liñán Nogueras.
24 Cf. Diego Liñán Nogueras: Efectos de las Sentencias del Tribunal Europeo de Derechos 
Humnaos y Derecho Español, 37 Revista Española de Derecho Internacional, 1985, p. 367.
25 [...no es extraño que los tribunales de justicia, contando con un cuerpo noijnativo 
nacional en esta materia más preciso y avanzado, no acudan con gran frecuencia a la 
aplicación directa de las disposiciones contenidas en tratados internacionales. En cambio, esa 
misma actualidad explica que no se encuentre los órganos judiciales españoles con un marco 
de interpretación de derechos y libertades suficiente. Los textos internacionales ofrecen un 
marco especialmente importante para cubrir esta necesidad.]
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than the Spanish Constitution. In such cases where the Convention has been 
applied - including the use of the dynamic interpretation - by the European 
Commission and Court, there is no suggestion that it embodies a merely 
minimum standard for the protection of human rights in Europe today. And, 
in fact, the large number of applications to the Strasbourg organs confirms 
this.26
Moreover, this does not mean that the question of lowering the level of 
protection through the Convention cannot be raised in concrete cases regar­
ding specific rights. There is general agreement that, under such circumstan­
ces, the Convention should not be used to lower the domestic level of protec­
tion because the Convention itself prohibits any application of its provisions 
which are not in bonus}7 Moreover, the same consequences may be inferred 
directly from Article 10(2) of the Spanish Constitution itself28 which, as it 
is admitted, bans this kind of application.
Accordingly, in legal theory the problem of lowering domestic standards 
seems not to have been on the agenda. Nevertheless, it may well be 
questioned whether the Tribunal Constitucional has in practice always 
applied Article 10(2) in this way.
24 Cf. Eduardo García de Entenía, op.ciL, p. 224, who rightly states that ”[e]n practique, 
touts les Etats européens qui on signé tranquillement la Convention parce qu'ils étaient con­
vaincus que les droits garantis par leur législation suspassaient largement les normes 
minimales de protection imposées par la Convention ont constaté parfois avec étonnement 
qu’ils pouvaient faire Tobjet de condamnations... En d’autre terms, la jurisprudence de la Cour 
[Européenne] a notoirement élevé le niveau de protection des droits de l’homme effectivement 
reconnus en Europe".
In fact, if this were not the real situation. Article 10(2) of the Spanish Constitution could 
never be applied in bonus. Adversely, Santiago Muñoz Machado, op.ciL, pp. 17 f., points out 
that H[i]f the decisions of the Commission and Court of Human Rights could be compared, 
freedom for freedom, with the Member States* jurisprudences, and especially with the 
constitutional jurisprudences, it could then be seen how often the protection ¿forded by 
internal legal orders is superior to the European standard in those States [particularly] demand­
ing as regards the guarantees of freedom.
[Si se pudieran contrastar, libertad por libertad, las resoluciones de la Comision y el Tribunal 
Europeo de Derechos Humanos con las jurisprudencias de los Estados miembros, y 
especialmente con las jurisprudencias constitucionales, se vería cuantas veces, en los Estados 
exigentes con las garantías de la libertad, la protección dispensada por el ordenamiento interno 
aventaja al estandard europeo.]
27 Article 60 of the Convention states that "[njothing in this Convention shall be construed 
as limiting or derogating from any of the human rights and fundamental freedoms which may 
be ensured under the laws of any High Contracting Party or under any agreement to which 
it is a Party.”
n Cf. Carlos Fernandez de Casadevante, op.cit., p. 12.
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Legal Practice
13.4. Legal Practice.
The ECHR and other international human rights instruments have frequently 
been applied by Spanish courts. The first time Article 10(2) of the Constitu­
tion was applied seems to have been in the Tribunal Supremo’s [Supreme 
Court) judgment of 3 July of 1979 involving the right to association. The 
Court ruled that, according to the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the right to 
association, embodied in Article 22 of the Constitution, had to be interpreted 
in a broad sense, so that restrictions could only be permitted as an exception.
The first example of the Tribunal Supremo referring expressly to the 
Convention in the application of Article 10(2) was in a judgment of 14 
August 1979. The case concerned Article 20 of the Constitution protecting 
the freedom of expression. The Court stated that the domestic rule should be 
interpreted
"... pursuant to Article 20 of the Constitution and to the Content assigned to the 
freedom of expression by both Article 19 of the [International] Covenant [of Civil 
and Political Rights] and Article 10 of the [European] Convention [for the Protection 
of Fundamental Rights and Public Freedoms], provisions according to which the 
former Article must be interpreted, as Article 10(2) of the Constitution itself 
requires.”29
The interpretation of the rights embodied in the Constitution is among the 
assignments of the Tribunal Constitucional established in 1981. Although 
ordinary judges may also rule on the matter, in the bulk of the cases their 
interpretation is either challenged before the Tribunal Constitucional (Recurso 
de Amparo), or the judges themselves ask the Court for a preliminary ruling. 
Thus, it is for the Court, as the highest judicial instance in these cases, to 
finally inteipret constitutional rights. Consequently, it is also the Tribunal 
Constitucional which primarily has to rule on the interpretation of the ECHR 
and its position in domestic Spanish law.
Accordingly, the Tribunal Constitucional has on a number of occasions 
referred expressly to the Convention. Up to 1988, the Convention had, in one 
way or another, been referred to in more than 70 judgments and other
* [... conforme al artículo 20 de la Constitución y al contenido que al derecho a la 
libertad de expresión asignan tanto el artículo 19 del "Pacto" [internacional de derchos civiles 
y políticos] y el 10 del "Convenio" [europeo para la protección de los Derechos fundamentales 
y las libertades públicas] precetos éstos con arreglo a los que debe ser interpretado el 
primeramente citado, por exigirlos así el aríteulo 10(2) de la propia Constitución...]
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decisions from the Court.30 Thus the Convention is not only in principle part 
of domestic Spanish law, but alscLin practice it forms an integrated part of 
i Spanish constitutional law. In legal writings the function of the Convention
* in this connection has been described in a very positive way.
Among the constitutional rights which have been interpreted according 
to the Convention can be, inter alia, mentioned: The right to education 
(Judgment No. 5/8131); the right to life (Judgment No. 53/8532); the right 
not to be discriminated against (Judgment No. 22/8133); the right to object 
to military service (Judgment No. 15/8234); the right to adhere to trade 
unions (Judgment No. 53/8233); and the right to due process of law 
embodied in Article 6 of the Convention, in concreto the right to be brought 
before an ordinary judge (Judgment No. 10/8436 and Judgment No. 44/- 
8537); the right to be defended by a lawyer (Judgment No. 44/873*; Judg­
ment No. 74/8539; Judgment No. 7/8640; and Judgment No. 2/8741); to be 
informed about the accusation (Judgment No. 5/8442); and to a fair trial
The Application o f the ECHR in a "Monist" System: Spain
30 Eduardo Gara a de Entema, op.cit., passim, examines 19 judgments from 1981 to 1985. 
Carlos Fernandez de Casadevante, op.cit., passim, refers to 61 judgments and 15 other 
decisions in the period up to September 1988 and emphasizes that the Convention ”... is often 
used with binding value by Spanish courts and is invoked on numerous occasions by private 
parties as a direct sourc [...] The Court that most frequently uses European jurisprudence is 
probably the Constitutional Court."
es profusamente utilizado por los Tribunales españoles, con valorJurídico, e invocado en 
numerosas ocasiones por los particulares, como fuente directa [...] el Tribunal que con mayor 
profusion utiliza la jurisprudencia europea, posiblemente sea el Tribunal Constitucional.]
s‘ Cf. BOE 24.02.81.
M Cf. BOE 18.05.85.
M Cf. BOE 107.81.
54 Cf. BOE 18.06.82.
31 Cf. BOE 18.08.82.
* Cf. BOE 28.11.84.
37 Cf. BOE 19.04.85.
* Cf. BOE 19.04.85.
” Cf. BOE 17.07.85.
40 Cf. BOE 18.12.86.
41 Cf. BOE 10.02.87.
41 Cf. BOE 18.12.84.
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within a reasonable period of time (Judgment No. 24/8143; Judgment No. 
18/83**; and Judgment No. 5/8543).
Thus, the application of the Convention in legal practice may be des­
cribed briefly like this: since the Spanish level of protection is relatively 
high, there is not much room for the application of the Convention in 
domestic Spanish law. Nevertheless, the Tribunal Constitucional has on a 
number of occasions applied the Convention with a positive outcome. What 
domestic courts, and in particular the Tribunal Constitucional, have been 
doing on these occasions is clarifying the unclear and ambiguous parts of the 
Constitution in the light of the Convention and the case-law of the European 
Court.
One recent case. Judgment No. 145/88,46 may be taken as an example. 
It concerned facts which were more or less similar to those in UfR 1990.13 
(see supra section 8.4) and it illustrates very clearly the main differences 
between the reasoning of the Scandinavian Supreme Courts and the Tribunal 
Constitucional.
The case concerned a so-called organic law, i.e. a statute which 
implements the Constitution directly and which takes precedence over 
ordinary legislation. The Spanish Constitution embodies in Article 24(2) the 
right to a due process of law "with all the guarantees", but it does not 
expressly mention the right to be brought before an impartial judge. Section 
54(12) of the Spanish Criminal Procedures Code of 1892 [Ley Enjuiciamiento 
Criminal] recognizes, however, that a judge can be challenged on the ground 
that he has been in charge of pre-trial proceedings. A statute of 1967 made 
exceptions to this principle in a special urgent procedure and in 1980, two 
years after the Constitution came into force, the Organic Law 10/80 
maintained the exception in cases where minor offenses were involved. 
Section 2 of this statute stipulated:
"Examining judges [jueces de instrucción] of the jurisdiction in which the crime has 
been committed shall be competent to hear and deliver judgment in these cases. In 
no case shall the cause of challenge provided for in section 54(12) of the Code of
45 Cf. BOE 20.07.81.
* Cf. BOE 12.04.83.
45 Cf. BOE 23.01.85.
46 Cf. BOE 8.08.88.
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Criminal Procedure be applicable."47
In 1987 a judge from Madrid as well as one from Palma de Mallorca, who 
hadl to conduct both the preliminary proceedings and then the trial under 
section 2 of the Organic Law 10/80, asked the Tribunal Constitucional 
independently for a preliminary ruling on the constitutionality of this 
provision. According to the wording of the question submitted by both 
courts, the rights to a due process of law "with all guarantees" as embodied 
in the Constitution, by virtue of Article 10(2), had to be interpreted in accor­
dance with the ECHR. The result of this interpretation was, in these judges’ 
I view, that the right to be judged by ^ an independent and impartial tribunal" 
[ set forth in Article 6(1) of the Convention was to be included within the 
"guarantees" foreseen, in general terms, by Article 24(2) of the Constitution. 
Moreover, as to the proper interpretation to be given to Article 6(1) of the 
Convention, both Courts addressed the question as to the rule established by 
the European Court in the De Cubber Case.
Although the Public Prosecutor and the Advocate of the State, who were 
both parties to the proceedings before the Tribunal Constitucional, did not 
share this view, the discussion was centered on the interpretation of the De 
Cubber Case, and the extent to which the circumstances of both cases could 
be compared. Further, both the Advocate of the State and the Public 
Prosecutor stated that the judge, under the challenged provision, was not en­
titled, strictly speaking, to carry out any "instruction", but only minor preli­
minary proceedings which would not raise doubts as to his impartiality when 
he eventually took part in the trial. Consequently, the facts involved in the 
De Cubber Case case were not related to the matter at issue.
The Tribunal Constitucional based its decisions solely on the case-law 
of the European Court, together with a short and vague reference to the 
inclusion of the right to be judged by an impartial judge within the meaning 
of the "Estado de Derecho" which, according to Article 1(1) of the Cons­
titution, had been settled in Spain. The Court ruled that, according to the 
case-law of the European Court, the same judge cannot act both in the 
instruction functions and at the hearing of a case. Thus it stated:
,7 [Serán competentes para el conocimiento y fallo de estas causas los jueces de 
instrucción dei partido en que el delito se haya cometido. En ningún caso les será de 
aplicación la causa de recusación prevista en el apartado 12 del artículo 54 de la Ley de 
Enjuiciamiento Criminal.]
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"In brief, what interests us from the De Cubber Case is the principle that no 
accumulation of investigation and judgment functions may take place. The 
application of this principle shall take place bearing in mind the pecularities of our 
legal system taken as a whole and not only as regards certain isolated aspects of 
it."4*
Thus the Court found that section 2 of the organic law as a whole was 
' unconstitutional. It is likely that the Court could have found a compromise 
‘ according to which it could have declared unconstitutional only the second 
part of Article 2 of the Organic Law 19/80 which stated that "[i]n no case 
shall the cause of challenge foreseen in section 54(12) of the Code of 
Criminal Procedures be applicable." In doing so, it could have overruled only 
the impossibility of challenging the impartiality of the judge, but not the 
settled procedure involving the same judge both in the instruction functions 
and at the hearing. By this, the Court could have reached a solution, which 
would have complied with both the ECHR and the established organization 
of the judiciary in Spain. However, the Court decided to apply the "objective 
impartiality standard" which the European Court had established in the De 
Cubber Case and subsequently also in the Hauschildt Case, thus giving the 
Convention full domestic effect in Spanish law.
Moreover, the Tribunal Constitucional was aware of the fact that its deci­
sion could lead to a rather complicated situation for the judiciary in Spain:
"It has not gone unnoticed to this Court that the compulsory distinction between the 
investigatory function and the judging function affects an organizational principle of 
the procedure regulated by the Organic Law 10/80 and that, as a consequence, the 
effects of the application of the abstention and recusation grounds under examination 
are broader and more complex than those provoked by the application of other 
grounds that only rarely become relevant. This unequivocally leads to the fact that 
it is the Legislature who must assume the duty to modify the said procedure or to 
substitute it by another."49
4* [En suma, del caso de Cubber lo que nos interesa es el principio de que no puedan 
acumularse las funciones instructoras y juzgadoras. La aplicación de ese principio habra de 
hacerse teniendo en cuenta las peculiaridades de nuestro derecho contemplado en su conjunto 
y no en algún aspecto aislado.' ]
4’ [No se oculta a este Tribunal que la obligada separación entre la función instructora y 
la juzgadora afecta a un principio organizativo del procedimiento regulado por la Ley 
Orgánica 10/80 y que en consecuencia los efectos de la aplicación de la causa de abstención 
o recusación aqui examinados son más amplios y más complejos que los que se provocan por 
la aplicación de otras causas que sólo actúan muy esporádicamente. Ello conduce a que sea 
sin duda el legislador quien deba asumir la tarea de reformar ese procedimiento o sustituirlo 
por otro..']
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The description of the application of the ECHR in domestic Spanish law 
suggests that the Tribunal Constitucional is very loyal in its application of 
the Convention. The question is, however, whether the Court on some 
occasions has been too loyal in its application of the Convention. It seems 
that, as indicated above in section 13.3, regardless of the theoretical point of 
view adopted by the legal literature, an in pejus application of the Conven­
tion is possible • and that it has actually been applied in this way.
Certainly, it is difficult to imagine such an application in a direct way, 
i.e. clearly lowering the standard of protection provided by an ordinary 
statute on the argument that the Spanish Constitution, interpreted according 
the Convention, obliges the overruling of a legal rule passed by Parliament. 
This may be the case, however, when the result is to uphold a rule or any 
kind of administrative practice which reduces a fundamental right solely on 
the grounds that it is permitted under the Convention and regardless of the 
standard of protection which could be achieved by interpreting the Constitu­
tion on its own.
Judgment No. 89/8750 of the Tribunal Constitucional may be taken as 
an example of an in pejus application of the ECHR. The judgment upheld a 
decision to the effect that a prisoner should be prevented from seeing his 
wife in private on the ground that the European Commission had ruled that 
the deprivation of sexual relations under those circumstances was not 
"inhuman or degrading treatment" within the meaning of Article 3 of the 
Convention.
It may be argued that the same conclusion could have been reached from 
the interpretation of various provisions of the Constitution without taking the 
Convention into account. The point is, however, that the Tribunal Constituci­
onal based its decision on the sole argument that such a practice was not 
banned by the Convention. In doing so it interpreted Article 15 and 18 of the 
Constitution, which had been invoked by the applicant51 Consequently, the 
scope of these rights were lowered by virtue of Article 10(2) of the Constitu­
tion and the ECHR.
What the Tribunal Constitucional ought to have done was of course to
”  Cf. BOE 25.06.87.
51 Article 15 establishes that every person "may under no circumstance be subject to 
torture or to inhuman or degrading punishment or treatment" while Article 18 protects the 
right "to honour, to personal and family privacy and to personal reputation".
264
Legal Practice
look at the Convention and, since the standard embodied herein was lower 
than the one embodied in the Constitution, only to have applied the 
constitutional provisions. Clearly, this second part was not made in the 
judgment.
The same result may be achieved in a less direct way. Sometimes the 
Tribunal Constitucional has referred to either the Convention or the case-law 
of the Strasbourg bodies not as the main ground for a decision, but as an a 
fortiori argument or even as an obiter dictum. Again, the Court seems to be 
more likely to do so when it has to uphold a decision which, in one way or 
another, reduces the scope of a fundamental right. The point here is that the 
Convention could be used in order to add some kind of political legitimacy 
to a judgment of the Tribunal Constitucional which reduce the scope of a 
fundamental right.
Two decisions can be used to illustrate this. In Judgment No. 147/83,52 
the Tribunal Constitucional ruled that the right to a due process of law 
embodied in Article 24 of the Constitution did not include the right to be 
judged by a jury. Certainly, the Court argued that the jury as an institution 
was recognized by Article 127 of the Constitution, but this provision had no 
self-executing character.53 Given that Parliament had not yet decided to pass 
a statute concerning the issue, the jury could not be included within the scope 
of the right to a due process of law. The Court deduced this from the 
Constitution itself, but expressly noted that
"... neither could the jury institution be interpreted as being included amongst the 
judicial guarantees by means of an interpretation of Article 24, in accordance with 
Article 10(2) of the Constitution [...] as the alleged guaranty of a trial with jury is 
not embodied either in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights nor in the 
Convention of Rome of 4 November 1950 [—-] It is therefore not possible to consider 
the jury institution as one of the procedural guarantees referred to by Article 24(2) 
of the Constitution."
In Judgment No. 53/85M the Tribunal Constitucional ruled that the legis­
lation on abortion which had been passed by the socialist Government was
51 Reported in Jurisprudencia Constitucional 1983, pp. 870 ff.
”  Compare Article 65(2) of the Danish Constitution providing that ”[l]aymen shall take
part in criminal procedure. The cases and the form in which such participation shall take 
place, including what cases are to be tried by jury, shall be provided for by statute , cf. 
Blaustein & Flanz, Binder IV, October 1990, p. 22.
** Cf. BOE 18.05.85.
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in accordance with the Constitution, although the judgment compelled Parlia­
ment to pass a new statute including new requirements imposed by the Court 
The opposition in Parliament had challenged the Statute before the Court, and 
there had been wide political and social debate all over the country. It is 
likely that the Court tried to use all the possible arguments to support its 
decision.
Again, the Convention did not play the decisive role in the judgment. It 
had been expressly quoted by the applicants, and the Court also referred 
expressly to Strasbourg case-law: it noted that there was no judgment of the 
European Court on the issue, but that the Commission had ruled that the term 
"everybody” or "toute persone” who was entitled to the right to life according 
to the two official versions of the Convention did not include the fetus. It 
followed that the expression "todos" used in Article 15 of the Constitution 
did not include it either. Accordingly, the abortion law did not infringe upon 
the right to life protected by the Constitutioa
In these two decisions the Convention was not, on the one hand, used as 
the principal grounds for granting a restriction but, on the other, it was 
actually referred to in a situation where it should not have been related to the 
case, since the decision taken was to uphold an alleged reduction of the 
scope of a fundamental right. Certainly, the Tribunal Constitucional is com­
pelled to interpret the Convention if the reduction goes beyond the minimum 
provided by the Convention; but if, as was the case, the result of this inter­
pretation is that the restriction is not a violation of the Convention, it should 
not be used as a means by which to interpret the Spanish Constitution.
This does not mean that the Convention should not be referred to in the 
judgments at all but, given that it was, it should have been stated that, 
although the restriction was allowed for by the Convention, nothing could yet 
be said as to the extent to which the restriction complied with the Constitu­
tion. Neither in the former nor in the latter decision did the Court do this. It 
only stated that, among the reasons for upholding the restriction, was that it 
was in conformity with the Convention.
One may ask why such an attitude should add anything to a decision 
granted on domestic arguments. It is clear that on account of its recency the 
Spanish democracy still looks at Europe as having a higher standard than 
itself as far as human rights are concerned; it may be that the Tribunal 
Constitucional feels it necessary to quote the Convention whenever an 
imposed restriction on one right is to be upheld. The European argument, it
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might think, will be more likely to be undisputed.
Apart from the above-mentioned cases, the tendency to an in pejus 
application of the Convention seems to be most pronounced in relation to (1) 
cases involving a conflict of rights and (2) as regards the application of the 
margin o f appreciation doctrine developed by the European Court. Regarding 
the former, such a possibility is foreseen by the Constitution, (see e.g. Article 
20(4) which limits freedom of expression) as well as by the Convention (see 
e.g. Article 10(2) on the same issue).
In cases involving a conflict of rights both rights must be balanced 
against each other and, obviously, only one of the rights can be protected on 
the ground of the other’s reduction In those cases the Tribunal Constitucio­
nal has no choice: whenever it uses the Convention to define the level of 
protection of right A, it is applying the Convention at the same time to lower 
the standard of right B.
It may be argued that the Court should not be prevented from using the 
Convention in such cases. The lowering of the standard of right B is the 
natural consequence of the interpretation given to right A, but it can hardly 
be seen as a direct effect of the use of the Convention. This is true but it is, 
however, precisely in such cases involving a conflict of rights that in its case- 
law the European Court has been less clear.
Freedom of expression may be taken as a good example of this. The res­
trictions allowed by the Convention under the term "the rights of others" are 
provided for in the Spanish Constitution under the general clause in Article 
20(4) which states that the right to freedom of expression is limited "by the 
respect of the rights recognized in this title" (i.e. the part of the Constitution 
"concerning the fundamental rights and duties") and "by the precepts of the 
laws implementing it". Article 20(4) specifies a number of rights which 
should be "especially" respected when freedom of expression is exercised: the 
right to honor, to privacy, to personal reputation and to the protection of 
youth and childhood. These rights, however, are implicitly included by the 
general clause of "rights recognized in this title”. Their express presence in 
the wording of Article 20(4) has been qualified as simply "pedagogical",35 
since those are the rights which may more often conflict with freedom of 
expression.
55 Cf. Alfonso Fernandez-M ¡randa Cam pomar Comentario ai articulo 20 apdos 1-3 y 5 
in Oscar Alzaga (ed.), op.ciu p. 501.
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In a leading case on this matter brought before the European Court, the Barthold 
Case* the applicant, a German national, had been punished for breaching the 
norms of fair competition by indirectly giving publicity to his veterinary clinic during 
a press interview. The German Government claimed before the European Court that 
the punishment had been justified because it aimed at protecting the rights of the 
colleagues of the applicant and those of their clients. The Commission found that 
only the latter purpose was legitimate. The European Court • although it finally 
decided that the restriction was not necessary in a democratic society - found that the 
aim of the restriction could be legitimately described as the protection of the "rights 
of others", without any further specifications.
In another leading case before the European Court concerning privacy as a limit 
to freedom of expression, the Lingens Case,*1 Mr Lingens, an Austrian journalist, 
claimed that his right to freedom of expression had been breached because he had 
been punished for publishing an article regarding a political affair where the behavior 
of the Austrian Chancellor, Kreisky, was described as "immoral", "undignified" and 
"a monstrosity". Finally, the European Court found that in those circumstances the 
"right to privacy" of the Chancellor had not been violated to such an extent as to 
justify a restriction on freedom of expression.’*
Although these two judgments of the European Court have to some extent in­
fluenced the decisions of the Tribunal Constitucional, the situation in Spain 
regarding these two rights as limits to freedom of expression is not yet very 
clear. The Tribunal Constitucional has admitted that, in principle, the right 
to honor or to privacy allow a stronger restriction on freedom of expression 
than other rights which do not directly embody subjective rights such as, for 
instance, the authority of the judiciary. But, on the other hand, it has stated 
that the conflict is not one between two different rights of citizens. Freedom 
of expression is a subjective right, but it is also an essential characteristic of 
democracy, whereas this is not the case regarding the right to honour or 
privacy. This special nature of freedom of expression, which follows clearly 
from the case-law of the European Court, also applies when a conflict bet­
ween the former and the latter arises.
* Cf. Eur. Court H.R., Barthold Case, Series A, Vol. 90 (1985).
w Cf. Eur. Court H.R., Lingens Case, Series A  Vol. 103 (1986).
M The case arose out of the punishment which the applicant was subjected to for 
publishing two articles in the Austrian magazine "Profil”, just after the Austrian general 
elections of 1975, accusing the Chancellor, Kreisky. of defending Mr Peter, the leader of the 
Liberal Party, who had been blamed for an active cooperation with the Nazi regime. The 
applicant invoiced his role as a political journalist in a pluralistic society. Before referring the 
case to the Court, the Commission had considered that "a politician who was himself 
accustomed to attacking his opponents had to expect fiercer criticism than other people" (para. 
37).
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In Judgment No. 104/86”  the Tribunal Constitucional stated that when­
ever the right to honour and the freedom of expression conflict, we are faced 
with a "... conflict of rights, both of a fundamental rank”,“  which means 
that all the circumstances have to be carefully evaluated, but with the dif­
ference that the ”... guarantee dimension of the fundamental public institution, 
the free public opinion, is not included in the right to honour".61 This 
feature gives freedom of expression, as covered by Article 20 of the Consti­
tución, ”... a valuation that goes beyond what is common to and part of all 
fundamental rights".62 In Judgment No. 107/8863 the Court held that the 
freedom of expression and information were "... not only [...] every person’s 
fundamental right, but that they also lead to the recognition and guarantee of 
free public opinion, an institution unseverably linked to political pluralism 
[...] these freedoms being as a result provided with an efficacy that goes 
beyond what is common to and part of the other fundamental rights, includ­
ing that of the right to honour".64
The main distinction to be made, according to the Tribunal Con­
stitucional, is whether or not public matters are involved. If so, the margin 
given to freedom of expression is wider. When only private issues are 
concerned, the Tribunal Constitucional does not give it the preferred position 
which the right to freedom of expression may have in relation to the right to 
honor or the right to privacy. The relations between these rights vis-à-vis 
private citizens have been defined more precisely than in the case-law of the 
European Court, since the latter has not given a clear definition of the 
situation of freedom of expression in such circumstances. However, the 
solution reached is still far from being satisfactory.
"  Cf. BOE 13.08.86.
“  [... conflicto de derechos ambos de rango fundamental.]
61 [... dimensión de garantía de una institución publica fundamental, la opinion publica 
libre, no se da en el derecho al honor.]
M [...una valoración que trasciende a la que es común y propia de todos los derechos 
fundamentales.]
“  Cf. BOE 25.06.88.
44 [... no solo (...] derechos fundamentales de cada persona, sino que también significan 
el reconocimiento y garantía de la opinion publica libre, que es una institución ligada de 
manera inescindible al pluralismo político [...] estando por elfo estas libertades dotadas de una 
eficacia que transciende a la que es común y propia de los demas derechos fundamentales, 
incluido el del honor...]
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Other problems related to the content of the freedom of expression - such 
as the extent to which value-judgments should be as equally protected as 
information about facts - is still without a equitable answer in the light of the 
case-law of the Tribunal Constitucional. Judgment No. 6/88^ illustrates the 
lack of a clear solution on this point. The Tribunal Constitucional ruled that 
the dismissal of Mr Crespo from the press office of the Ministry of Justice 
had been unconstitutional since the applicant had used his right to freedom 
of expression to denounce the wrong functioning of a public office. The main 
arguments for reaching this decision were, regarding the content of Mr 
Crespo’s statements, the public nature of the issue and, surprisingly, the 
consideration that Crespo’s note was a description o f facts - whether or not 
they were true - and not a value-judgment.66 It seems as if the Tribunal 
Constitucional thought that a value-judgment, even on public issues, should 
only be rarely allowed when it includes any defamatory content. In such 
cases, the presumption of animus injuriandi would be preferred to the pre­
sumption of animus criticandi. Curiously enough, the Tribunal Constitucional 
quoted here • and wrongly, it may be added - the judgment of the European 
Court in the Ungens Case. Certainly, the European Court ruled on that 
occasion that a careful distinction between facts and value-judgments should 
be made. But the distinction was made in order to point out that value- 
judgments by their very nature could not be disputed by the truth; the Euro­
pean Court did not conclude, like the Tribunal Constitucional seems to have 
done, that they are not entitled to a corresponding protection under the right 
to freedom of expression.67
Thus it can be said that the case-law of the Tribunal Constitucional 
involving a restriction on a right on the grounds of protecting the "right of 
others" is in general consistent with the trends provided by the case-law of 
the European Court* inter alia, in the Lingens Case. The real problem is that.
“  Cf. BOE 5.02.88.
“  The Court stated that "... the statements on account of which the plaintiff was dismissed 
were made and understood by the receivers as relating to facts, regardless of what their 
veracity was."
[...las declaraciones por las que el actor fue despedido se formularon y se entendieron por los 
receptores como relativas a "hechos”, cualquiera que fuese su veracidad.]
47 The European Court held in the Lingens Case that "in the Court's view, a careful 
distinction needs to be made between facts and value-judgment. The existence of facts can be 
demonstrated, whereas the truth of value-judgments is not susceptible of proof', cf. Eur. Court 
H.R., Lingens Case, Series A, Vol. 103 (1986), para. 44.
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on this point, the European Court itself has not given a clear solution to all 
the questions which have arisen.
Finally, yet another way in which the in bonus application of the 
Convention may be frustrated should be mentioned. It concerns the cases in 
which the European Court has ruled that the contracting States of the 
Convention enjoy a margin o f appreciation in their application of the 
Convention.
As is well-known, the margin o f appreciation doctrine is one of the 
achievements of the European Court which has been most widely debated. 
Broadly speaking, it lets the Contracting States enjoy a certain margin to 
ascertain whether a right protected by the Convention should be limited by 
a domestic restriction. The only accurate guideline as to this doctrine is 
twofold: (1) That the margin the States enjoy depends on the right towards 
which the restriction is aimed as well as the reason for this, and (2) that in 
any case it is for the European Court to control the extent to which the 
State’s restriction complies with the Convention. The most strongly disputed 
point is whether, by leaving this margin to the Contracting States, the so- 
called European standard may be properly achieved.
The main problem posed by such a doctrine is that once the European 
Court has ruled that a said aim to limit a right is left to the margin of 
appreciation of the States, the States themselves could use this argument to 
restrict the right at issue.
In so doing the national court can apply the Convention in a way similar 
to the one described above. Whenever the margin o f appreciation is con­
sidered as the only ground for granting a restriction, a clear application in 
pejus is made. When the margin o f appreciation is used to add support to a 
restriction, some-kind of political use of the Convention might be found.
The latter might be the case of the Tribunal Constitucional’s judgment 
in Judgment No. 62/82“  which concerned "morals" as a limit of freedom 
of expression. An educational book, addressed to children and adolescents, 
had been published under the title A ver ["let me see"]. It included a number 
of texts and photographs on sexual matters and was accused of being obscene 
by several Catholic associations. A court sentenced the publisher to a fine 
and barred him from publishing for a period of six years. The sentence was 
subsequently upheld by the Supreme Court. He then brought the case before
"  Cf. BOE 17.11.82.
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the Tribunal Constitucional alleging a violation of his right to freedom of 
expression.
The Tribunal Constitucional focussed on the guarantees that should be 
taken into account when the right to freedom of expression is limited on the 
ground of protecting morals. Besides this, it expressly considered the case- 
law of the European Court before reaching a decision on the matter.69 It was 
indeed easy for the Tribunal Constitucional to find a relevant case in the 
case-law of the European Court In 1976, the latter had decided the 
Handyside Case70 which contained facts quite similar to the case now pen­
ding before the Tribunal Constitucional,n
According to the Tribunal Constitucional two kinds of guarantees, as laid 
down in the European Convention, were to be analyzed in this case: (1) 
Whether the restrictions imposed on freedom of expression were necessary 
in a democratic society, and (2) whether they had been applied to satisfy the 
purpose for which they had been prescribed.
As to the necessity of imposing such a restriction on freedom of expres­
sion in a democratic society, the Tribunal Constitucional followed the 
European Court in three points of its reasoning: (1) In weighing the 
importance of this freedom for a truly democratic society; (2) in balancing 
the fact that the book was aimed at children, and that the protection of 
childhood led to special considerations; and (3) applying the requirement of 
proportionality as the final test that should be applied to the restriction.
The Tribunal Constitucional's decision is without any doubt the one in
49 In order to determine ”... to what extent and within what limits the freedom of 
expression may be limited by the idea of a public moral (...] it must be surrounded by 
sufficient guarantees to avoid that under an ethical concept, juridified insofat as an ethical 
minimum is necessary for social life, an unjustified limitation of fundamental rights and 
public freedoms takes place [...] to specify these guarantees, we have to refer to the Conven­
tion of Rome [of 4 November 1950]."
[... en que medida y con que alcance puede ser delimitada la libertad de expresión por la idea 
de moral publica [...] ha de rodearse de las garantías necesarias para evitar que bajo un 
concepto etico, juridificado en cuanto que es necesario un minimum etico para la vida social, 
se produzca una limitación injustificada de derechos fundamentales y libertades publicas (...) 
para precisar tales garantías hemos de acudir al Convenio de Roma.)
70 Cf. Eur. Court H.R., Series A, Handyside Case. Vol. 24 (1976).
71 Handyside had been charged and prosecuted in the United Kingdom under the Obscene 
Publications Act (of 1959, amended in 1964) for publishing the English version of the so- 
called Little red school book. After exhausting the domestic remedies, he brought the case to 
the Commission which eventually referred it to the European Court. Finally, the European 
Court decided that Article 10 of the Convention had not been violated by the United Kingdom.
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which the influence of a judgment of the European Court has been greatest. 
To some extent, this judgment may even be regarded as having received a 
too great influence, notably by the margin o f appreciation doctrine. In 
applying this doctrine the Tribunal Constitucional stated that the sentence 
imposed on the publisher "... although broad, does not exceed from the 
margin of appreciation which corresponds to the Legislature when fixing 
criminal penalties, and nor does their content exceed the legal goods [bienes 
jurídicos] protection within which the limits must be recognized by the 
margin of appreciation corresponding to judicial discretion."72 However, the 
problem here is that the margin o f appreciation doctrine is taken from "the- 
less-than-clear-cut case"13 which has often been criticized precisely for the 
way in which it is applied.74
From this judgment onwards, the Tribunal Constitucional has often ruled 
that a restriction to the freedom of expression should be "proportionate to the 
aim pursued" and that its aim should be "legitimate" - although the propor­
tionality has very rarely been cross-checked with the criterion of a "demo­
cratic society". But, on the other hand, the Court has usually ruled that when 
a lower court has considered the issue, it is not for the Tribunal Con­
stitucional to review it, unless the former has argued in a manifestly 
unreasonable way. Only when facing a clearly not reasoned decision of the 
lower court, can the Tribunal Constitucional conclude that the former has 
breached the Constitution. In other words, the Tribunal Constitucional can 
only review a decision if the so-called constitutional perspective has not been 
taken properly into account by the lower court. This is the effect of the 
margin o f appreciation that the lower court enjoys.
72 [... aunque amplia, no excede del margen de apreciación que corresponde al arbitrio del 
legislador para la fijación de las penas, y su contenido no excede tampoco de la protecco "n 
de los bienes jurídicos lesionados dentro de los limites que es necesario reconocer al margen 
de apreciación que corresponde al arbitrio judicial." (para. 6)]
73 Cf. John A. Andrews: The European Jurisprudence of Human Rights, 43 Maryland Law 
Review (1984), pp. 463 ff., at p. 496.
74 See, for instance, P. van Dijk & G.J.H. van Hoof, op.ciL, p. 435, who state that “the 
conclusive consideration for the Court was evidently that no such thing as a unifonn 
European conception of morals’ exists. Even if this statement is correct, it still leaves one with 
the question of whether it is then not up to the Court to develop such a 'European conception' 
in its case-law, since the term morals is repeatedly mentioned in the Convention."
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CHAPTER 14
Conclusions to Part IV: the Position of the European 
Convention in Domestic Scandinavian Law in a 
Comparative Perspective
14.1. The General Position of the European Convention.
The Scandinavian countries have traditionally been regarded as "dualist" 
countries where treaties do not form part of the domestic legal system if not 
incorporated into domestic law by legislation or delegated legislation, 
although no constitutional provisions to this effect exist. In this respect the 
position of treaties in Denmark, Norway and Sweden is similar to that of 
those in Italy and the United Kingdom. In all these countries there does exist, 
however, a principle according to which to courts may presume that it was 
not the intention of the Legislature to legislate contrary to undertaken 
international obligations. In Spain, on the other hand, treaties, once officially 
published, automatically become domestic law by virtue of Article 96 of the 
Spanish Constitution.
In Denmark and Norway are, moreover, as distinct from the other countries 
discussed here, nor customary international law part of the law of the land.
Since the ECHR has not been incorporated in the Scandinavian countries 
nor in the United Kingdom, it is not a part of domestic law. In Italy the 
Convention has been adopted into domestic law by virtue of a so-called 
execution order (see supra section 12.1). In Spain, on the other hand, the 
Convention is automatically incoiporated into domestic law by Article 96 of 
the Constitution and by virtue of Article 10(2) it also constitutes an obli­
gatory means of interpretation of the Constitution, provided that the question 
touches upon a right embodied in the Constitution itself. This is known as the 
double incorporation of the Convention (see supra section 13.2). Since the 
Spanish Constitution guarantees all the rights protected by the Convention, 
the latter is for the present always a obligatory means of intertretation of the 
Constitution. In theory the legal position should then be clear; yet, as has 
already been seen, theoretical points of departure within this particular field 
of law are one thing, the way in which they are applied in practice another.
In chapter 10 it was concluded that the ECHR is a source o f law in 
domestic Scandinavian law which, however, at the moment appears to be
more forceful in Denmark and Norway than in Sweden. This conclusion was 
based on observations which may be summarized briefly as follows:
When one looks at the case-law concerning the ECHR in the Scan­
dinavian countries one common feature is obvious: the courts do not recog­
nize conflicts between the Convention, as interpreted by them, and domestic 
law. Consequently, with a few exceptions, they have managed to avoid taking 
a stand on how a (clear-cut) conflict between the Convention and domestic 
law should be resolved. These exceptions have, however, to a very large 
extent been obiter dicta statements. In spite of this, the courts, and notably 
the Supreme Courts, have on a number of occasions - in particular within the 
field of criminal procedure - in substance and, in the most recent case-law 
also in form or explicit terms, applied the Convention directly. Where there 
was previously a tendency only to ascertain that the domestic solution found 
did not violate the Convention, there is now a tendency to embark on discus­
sions on the application of the Convention and Strasbourg case-law. Thus 
there can be no doubt that the Convention is an international instrument with 
considerable and substantial force also on the domestic level. However, the 
number of reported cases in which the Convention has been referred to is in 
absolute terms low.
With the exception of three Swedish judgments1 and one Danish 
judgment2 (see supra section 6.2) there is, generally speaking, a firm practice 
of paying more and more attention to the Convention in domestic legal deci­
sions in the highest instances. Thus the cases in which most significance has 
been ascribed to the Convention appear from 1988 onwards. The strangth of 
this practice is thrown into relief if one compares it with the English, and to 
some extent also with the Italian, practice of the application of the Conven­
tion.
It would previously, however, have been desirable that considerations as 
to the relationship between the Convention and domestic law, which in the 
individual cases undoubtedly underlie the assumption that domestic law 
conforms with the Convention, had been expressed more clearly in Danish 
and Swedish judgments. This lack of explicit discussion of the position of the 
Convention in domestic law seems to have caused some doubt as to the 
domestic fulfillment of the obligations under the Convention. However, the
Conclusions to Part IV: the ECHR in a Comparative Perspective
1 AD 1972 No. 5. NJA 1973.423 and RÀ 1974.121.
2 UfR 1986.898.
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most recent case-law indicates an emerging change in the courts’ position in 
this respect. This critique does not apply to the same extent to the Norwegian 
case-law in which the relationship between the Convention and domestic law 
has usually been discussed more expressly.
English courts, on the other hand, have been more willing to establish 
that domestic law conflicts with the Convention. In the case of a conflict 
between the Convention and a domestic statutory provision the English courts 
have in accordance with the constitutional point of departure not hesitated to 
state that domestic law should prevail (see supra section 11.3.1). Further­
more, the courts have, so far, not had the possibility to rule on the question 
whether the Convention, as the expression o f principles o f customary 
international law, is a part of the common law; whereas the available case- 
law suggests that the Convention in certain circumstances may be considered 
part as the common law in the form of public policy (see supra section 
11.3.5). On the other hand, the relatively frequent use of the principle o f 
interpretative presumption (see infra section 14.4) have enabled the courts to 
avoid the violation of Britain’s obligations under the Convention. However, 
the very fact that case-law concerning the Convention is quite rare, even in 
comparison with the Scandinavian countries, as well as the fact that this case- 
law is far from consistent, makes it difficult to conclude exactly what the 
position of the Convention is in the United Kingdom (see supra section
11.3.2).
In Italy the Convention has been adopted into domestic law by an 
implementation order [ordine di esecuzione] contained in an ordinary statute. 
Accordingly, the Convention possesses the status of an ordinary law in 
domestic law (see supra sections 12.2.1 and 12.3). However, this applies only 
to those provisions of the Convention which may be regarded as self­
executing. Italian courts have stated in general terms that the provisions of 
Section I of the Convention are self-executing, whereas this is not the case 
regarding the UN-Covenant (see supra section 12.2.4). In case of a conflict 
between the Convention and other statutory provisions the principle o f lex 
posterior derogat legi priori, generally speaking, applies, i.e. the Convention 
takes precedence over previously enacted legislation but has to yield to 
subsequent legislation. Since Article 10(1) of the Italian Constitution 
provides that "Italy’s legal system conforms with the generally recognized 
principles of international law", it has been argued that the Convention is 
embraced by this provision because the Convention is no more than the
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expression of general principles of international law. The Italian courts have, 
like their English counterparts, rejected the idea that the Convention is merely 
the expression of customary international law, by which the Convention by 
virtue of Article 10(1) would acquire a position superior to ordinary 
legislation in the domestic norm-hierarchy (see supra section 12.2.1). In 
general, Italian courts seem primarily to have applied the Convention as an 
additional argument in conjunction with arguments of domestic (constitution­
al) law. This may be explained by the fact that the Italian Constitution 
contains a comprehensive Bill of Rights which to a large extent overlaps and 
in some instances goes even further than the provisions of the Convention 
(see supra section 12.3.3). Besides, like the English case-law, the Italian 
case-law concerning the application of Convention does not seem to be 
consistent.
In Spain, the Tribunal Constitucional has in accordance with Article 
10(2) of the Constitution frequently applied the Convention as a means of 
interpretation of the rights protected in the Constitution. Thus the Convention 
constitutes an important part of Spanish constitutional law. The double 
incorporation has meant that no direct conflicts between domestic Spanish 
law and the Convention have arisen; such conflicts have mostly been of a 
more indirect nature and phrased in terms of conflicts between the legislation 
and the Constitution, i.e. as mere conflicts of domestic rules (see supra 
section 13.4). The way in which Tribunal Constitucional has applied the 
Convention appears to be very loyal and on certain occasions perhaps even 
too loyal (see infra section 14.6).
14.2. The Position of the European Convention in the Domestic Norm* 
Hierarchy.
In the Scandinavian countries and the United Kingdom, where the Conven­
tion does not possess the status of domestic law from a formal-theoretical 
point of view there is no question of the Convention having a formal position 
within the domestic norm-hierarchy (apart from applying the Convention as 
a means of interpretation (see infra section 14.4)). However, this may well 
be the case.
It is argued in this study (see supra section 10.2) that in Scandinavia the 
Convention is a source o f law which in principle possesses the same status 
as other sources c f  law, with the principle o f legality being the only 
restriction on the courts’ power to apply the Convention. However, this res-
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triction does not really include the Convention since this latter aims at 
awarding individual rights rather than encroaching upon these. The conse­
quence of this view is not, however, that the Convention, in the case of a 
conflict with domestic law, should prevail absolutely. Such conflict, it is 
submitted, must be resolved on the basis of an overall evaluation o f the facts 
o f the case including the different sources o f law. As in other cases of 
conflict between, on the one hand, a statutory rule and, on the other, another 
source of law, it is certain that the statutory provision will carry considerable 
weight. But the considerations pointing in the opposite direction may carry 
such weight that a total evaluation makes the Convention rule prevail. In 
many cases this is in fact what is taking place when the courts reach the 
conclusion that there is no conflict between the Convention and domestic 
law.
Under the view presented here the traditional concept o f a domestic 
norm-hierarchy does not fit well into the idea o f accepting international 
sources o f law in domestic law. Attempts to try to adapt international law in 
general and the Convention in particular into the domestic norm-hierarchy 
within a "dualist” system are doomed to fail, and it creates nothing but 
misconceptions (see supra section 10.2). The considerations which have an 
impact on resolving the conflicts between these different sources of law will 
be discussed below in section 14.4.
Although one, under the Scandinavian concept of a source of law (see 
supra section 2.4), could argue that the Convention is a source of law in 
domestic law, it is, on the basis of the available case-law, hardly possible to 
maintain that the Convention possesses the status of a domestic source of law 
in the United Kingdom (see supra section 11.3). Accordingly, no question of 
its position proper in the domestic norm-hierarchy arises.
In Italy the Convention possesses the status of an ordinary law, since it 
has been adopted through an ordinary law (see supra section 12.2.1 and 
12.3), whereas in Spain it is situated partly above ordinary legislation and 
below the Constitution and partly over the Constitution in the sense that it 
forms an obligatory means of interpretation to the Constitution itself (see 
supra section 13.2).
On the basis of the study it may be questioned in general whether the 
formal position of the Convention in the domestic norm-hierarchy in itself 
says much about the impact of the Convention on the application of domestic
The Position o f the ECHR in the Domestic Norm-Hierarchy
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law.3 The problems of the application of the Convention seem to lie 
elsewere: notably when do the courts establish that there is a conflict between 
the Convention and domestic law?
14.3. Establishing a Conflict between the European Convention and 
Domestic Law.
As has been stated above in section 14.1, the Scandinavian courts have been 
very reluctant to recognize conflicts between the Convention and domestic 
law. In fact it has only been possible to find one reported and a few 
unreported judgments in which it clearly appears from the ratio decidendi of 
the judgment that domestic law, in the case of a conflict with the Convention, 
should prevail. By doing this, the courts have in general avoided ruling on 
how such conflicts should be resolved. Compared to the situation in the 
United Kingdom there are actually only a very few general statements on the 
relationship between the Convention and domestic law in Scandinavian 
practice. The courts’ practice in this respect goes, generally speaking, far 
beyond what can be explained by the use of the principle o f presumption (see 
infra section 14.4). However, there are some differences between the Danish, 
Norwegian and Swedish case-law in this respect.
In the United Kingdom the courts have on different occasions ruled, both 
in the form of obiter dictum and ratio decidendi, that in the case at issue 
there was a conflict between the Convention and domestic law and that th e . 
latter should prevail. However, in the most recent case-law it seems as if the 
English courts are becoming more unwilling to establish a conflict between 
the Convention and domestic law (see supra section 11.3.3).
In a "dualist" system the establishment of a conflict between the 
Convention and domestic law has decisive significance for the application of 
the Convention: if such a conflict is recognized, the courts have no choice 
but to let domestic law prevail. The courts’ willingness to recognize such 
conflicts is therefore to a large extent similar to their willingness to apply the 
Convention. The ways in which it is generally accepted that the courts avoid 
establishing a conflict between the Convention and domestic law is outlined 
below in section 14.4, but these principles also leave ample room for the
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standard of legal protection that a given state affords to individuals."
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courts in deciding whether or not to apply the Convention in the case at 
issue. It is in the latter relation in particular that there is a significant dif­
ference between the Scandinavian courts’ and the English courts’ application 
of the Convention. This difference may to some extent be explained by the 
fact that Danish and Norwegian courts at least are fairly familiar with 
exercising judicial review of the legislation. Also in these situations the 
courts have been extremely reluctant (in particular in Denmark) to overrule 
legislation on the grounds that it was unconstitutional. The British courts do 
not have this kind of experience, since in the United Kingdom Parliament is 
supreme thus leaving no room for judicial review of legislation.
Also in Italy the question of establishing a conflict between the 
Convention or, to be more precise, the law which has adopted the Convention 
and domestic law in general is gaining some importance. Since the Conven­
tion possesses the status of an ordinary statute, establishing a conflict 
between the Convention and a subsequently enacted statute means, as a rule, 
that the domestic statute prevails due to the principle o f lex posterior derogat 
legi priori. Italian courts have on some occasions held that in the case at 
issue there was a conflict between the Convention and another statutory 
provision, but these cases have, due to the principles discussed in section
14.4, been resolved in such a way that the Convention has not been explicitly 
disregarded. However, one may find examples of cases in which the 
Convention does, in effect, seem to have been disregarded (see supra section
12.3.2).
Since the Convention possesses a position superior to ordinary legislation 
as well as being an obligatory means of interpretation to the Constitution in 
Spain, establishing a conflict between the Convention and domestic law 
means only that it is then expressly stated that the Convention is to prevail 
in such cases. Accordingly, this question does not in Spanish law hold any 
independent significance.
14.4. Methods of Resolving Conflicts between the European Convention 
and Domestic Law.
In both the Scandinavian countries as well as in Italy and the United 
Kingdom a presumption exists that domestic law is in accordance with inter­
national treaties. This principle is elaborated in slightly different ways in the 
different countries.
In Scandinavia there is a principle o f presumption, according to which
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the courts are entitled to presume that domestic law is in conformity with 
undertaken international obligations. If in doubt about the interpretation of 
a domestic legal rule the courts should prefer the interpretation that will best 
comply with the Convention (the rule o f interpretation). Moreover, should 
there be a conflict between a clear domestic provision and the Convention, 
the courts may, in the absence of any specific indication to the contrary, 
apply the domestic provision in such a way that the Convention is not 
violated. This is known as the rule o f presumption: the courts should 
"presume" that it was not the intention of the Legislature to pass legislation 
contrary to undertaken international obligations. It is now recognized that 
both rules apply to legislation enacted previously as well as subsequently to 
the treaty in question (see supra sections 2.1 and 2.2).
It is submitted in this study that Scandinavian courts have gone further 
in their application of treaties in general and the Convention in particular 
than what can reasonably be explained by the principle o f presumption. Thus 
it is argued that the Convention is a source o f law in domestic law, and that 
conflicts between the Convention and domestic law should be resolved in the 
same manner as conflicts between different domestic sources of law (see 
supra section 10.2). Thus the lex specialis principle, the lex posterior derogat 
legi priori principle (but not the lex superior principle), the total or partial 
nature of the conflict, the practical and political problems involved in a brach 
of international law, the strength and clarity of the international rule, the 
strength and clarity of the domestic rule, the domestic rule’s position in the 
domestic norm-hierarchy and the possibilities of ascertaining the Legislature’s 
intentions are all considerations which have an impact on the resolving of 
conflicts between the Convention and domestic law. However, it is relatively 
rare to find clear statements qualifying these considerations. It is not possible, 
it is submitted, to resolve such conflicts on a basis which is more simple. 
"Lex specialis, lex posterior and lex superior are not axioms..." as A lf Ross 
has pointed out, "... but principles of relative weight, co-operating in the 
interpretation with other considerations - in particular with an evaluation 
concerning which way of achieving harmony will best agree with common 
sense, popular consciousness, or presumed social objectives.”4
The principle o f interpretative presumption according to which the courts 
are entitled to presume that it has not been the intention of Parliament to
Conclusions to Part IV: the ECHR in a Comparative Perspective
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legislate contrary to obligations deriving from concluded treaties recognized 
in English law applies only to situations in which domestic statutory law is 
unclear and/or ambiguous. This principle is applicable in relation to 
legislation both previous and subsequent to the treaty (see supra section
11.3.2). The principle has probably found its clearest expression in relation 
to the Convention. However, compared to the principle o f presumption its 
scope is relatively limited insofar as it is only applicable to unclear or 
ambiguous domestic statutory provisions. The question of whether or not 
domestic law is ambiguous is therefore becoming as important as establishing 
whether or not there exists in the case at issue a conflict between the 
Convention and domestic law: an affirmative answer to either question rules 
out the possibility of applying the Convention.
The main principle for resolving conflicts between the Convention and 
domestic law in Italy is the lex posterior derogat legi priori principle, that 
is, the Convention takes precedence over previous legislation and has to yield 
to subsequently enacted legislation. However, this principle is modified by 
the lex specialis principle as well as by a principle o f presumption which in 
Italian law applies to conflicts between adopted treaties and domestic law 
(see supra section 12.2.2). Moreover, the Corte Costituzionale has been very 
reluctant to hold that a treaty does not conform to the Constitution. 
Compared to the way in which the lex specialis principle and the lex pos­
terior derogat legi priori principle have been (implicitly) applied in Scan­
dinavia, the Italian courts seem to consider these principles as more absolute 
rules of interpretation leaving the interpreter with relatively little choice.
It does not appear from Spanish case-law that specific principles apply 
to the interpretation of the Convention. This is undoubtedly due to the fact 
that since the Convention is situated above ordinary legislation in Spanish 
law, it is so obvious to apply the lex superior principle that the courts do not 
find it worthwhile to mention it at all.
14.5. The European Convention and the Discretion of Administrative 
Authorities.
It is clearly established in Denmark and Norway that administrative authori­
ties are under a legal obligation to exercise their discretionary powers in 
accordance with undertaken international obligations and, accordingly, also 
the Convention. In Sweden this is probably not the case although one may 
find statements which are expressive of a tendency to accept that ad­
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ministrative authorities are under such an obligation. Apart from one Danish 
decision to this effect, no case-law exists confirming this view. However, 
legal writers have agreed upon the existence of such an obligation, as have 
thé official views of the Danish and Norwegian Governments (see supra 
chapter 9).
This is contrary to the situation in the United Kingdom where, following 
some attempts to establish such a duty for administrative authorities in the 
late seventies, it now seems that the couits do not require administrative 
authorities to take the Convention into account when exercising their discre­
tionary powers (see supra section 11.3.2).
In Italy and Spain, where the Convention possesses the status of domestic 
law, administrative authorities have to include it in their exercise of 
discretionary powers as with other kinds of domestic law and in accordance 
with its position in the domestic norm-hierarchy.
14.6. The Possibility of an "In  Pejus" Application of the European 
Convention.
The study of Spanish case-law has disclosed one surprising feature. Although 
usually very loyal in its application of the Convention, in certain situations 
the Tribunal Constitucional seems to have applied the Convention too loyally 
in the sense that it has applied the Convention in pejus, that is, lowering the 
standard of protection provided by the Constitution itself (see supra sections 
13.3 and 13.4). The main reasons allowing this kind of application seem to 
be the following:
First, there is a tendency to apply the Convention to support a fortiori 
restrictions on fundamental rights through which an improper use of the 
Convention is reached.
Second, the fact that the European Court, due to its specific nature, rules 
more on restrictions than on rights. This simple point - what the Court thinks 
about the restrictions of a right is clearer than the real content of the right 
itself - makes it easier for the national courts to find some principles to 
follow when the legitimacy of a restriction is at issue. This has enabled the 
Tribunal Constitucional to apply some points of the "Strasbourg test”, the 
extent to which a restriction is "necessary in a democratic society" being 
most important. But it has also enabled the Court to state indirectly that, once 
the Strasbourg test is passed, no further internal test is necessary.
Third, the fact that the European Court has not taken any decision yet as
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to the extent to which the dynamic interpretation, the minimum standard or 
the margin o f appreciation doctrines should be applied in a concrete case. It 
is possible that the three principles should stay in force at the same time as 
different guidelines to be applied depending upon the circumstances. But, in 
that case, the European Court should state this expressly. Thus national courts 
could avoid taking as a European standard what is nothing but the minimum 
standard, and it would prevent them from using the margin o f appreciation 
enjoyed by the European Court to lower their national standard of protection 
of Human rights.
Such an in pejus application of the Convention seems, apart from 
ascertaining that a solution found under domestic law does not seem to 
violate the provisions of the Convention, not to be possible in either 
Scandinavia or the United Kingdom, where it does not form part of domestic 
law, nor in Italy where it has the status of an ordinary statute. In the United 
Kingdom this can easily be explained by the fact that the Convention as such 
does not possess the status of domestic law. In Italy the Convention is 
inferior to the Constitution which embodies a comprehensive catalogue of 
rights. This fact also leaves little room for an in pejus application of the 
Convention. In Scandinavia this is due partly to the "dualist” point of 
departure, and partly to the existence of the principle o f legality requiring 
statutory authorization for those acts which encroach upon the rights and 
obligations of the citizens.
If the Convention is incorporated into domestic law in an ordinary 
statute, one cannot completely exclude the possibility of applying the 
Convention in pejus also in Danish and Norwegian law. Since in these 
countries a large number of rights are guaranteed in the ordinary legislation 
rather than in the very brief Bill of Rights embodied in the Constitutions, 
such possibility seems only to be likely on the legislative level. To the extent 
rights embodied in the ordinary legislation provide a better protection than 
those of the Convention there is at least some possibility of an in pejus 
application of the Convention. It is probably unlikely that Danish and 
Norwegian courts would embark on applying the Convention in this way, but 
in a situation where a court is short of arguments for granting a restriction 
to a rights guranteed in domestic legislation they may well do so. The 
Swedish Constitution contains a more comprehensive catalog of rights leaving 
less room for an in pejus application of the Convention.
285
Conclusions to Part IV: the ECHR in a Comparative Perspective
14.7. Overall Assessment.
As regards the style of reasoning, there are some important differences 
between the national courts. Thus the Scandinavian Supreme Courts have 
interpreted domestic law in accordance with the Convention without 
establishing a clear conflict between the Convention and domestic law, even 
in cases in which it was quite clear that there was such a conflict. As soon 
as the decision at issue touches upon the competence of the Legislature the 
courts use somewhat guarded terms in their decisions. Similarly, the Italian 
courts have avoided disregarding the Convention when conflicting with 
subsequently enacted legislation. The Tribunal Constitucional has, on the 
other hand, on a number of occasions directly overruled domestic provisions 
when it was not possible to reach an interpretation compatible with the 
Convention.
In spite of this difference in styles of reasoning and in the legal pro­
visions governing the relationship between international treaties and domestic 
law, it is surprising how similar, in effect, the application of the Convention 
in Scandinavia and Italy and Spain is. This study has indeed confirmed the 
view held by Dr. Andrew Z. Drzemczewski, a specialist within this field, who 
has explained, that "[t]he possibility of using the Convention’s provisions as 
pursuasive sources of law, however, where otherwise there appears to exist 
a lacuna in domestic law, or where the courts are faced with a doubtful or 
uncertain point of internal law, has self-evident advantages" (emphasis 
added).5
14.8. Incorporation of the European Convention into Domestic Scan­
dinavian Law?
Finally, one may ask whether or not it would really make any difference in 
the domestic application of the ECHR if it is incorporated into domestic law. 
From a strictly legal point o f view the answer is probably a qualified no: it 
would not have any significant consequences on the practical level. Under the 
existing "dualist" system it is to a very large extent already possible for the 
courts to ascertain whether the Convention has been violated in concrete 
cases. This conclusion presupposes, however, that the courts follow the line 
set forth recently by the Supreme Courts in all three countries. Experiences 
(in particular in Denmark and Sweden) with judicial review of legislation do 
not suggest that an incorporation of the Convention will change the courts’
s Cf. Andrew Z. Drzemzcewski, op.cit., p. 191. 
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attitude towards playing a more active role in the protection of fundamental 
rights. The same is the case with the Italian experiences with an incor­
poration of the Convention into domestic law by an ordinary statute. 
Needless to say that such a statute can be derogated from in subsequently 
passed legislation. However, as pointed out by Professor Claus Gulmann and 
the Director of the Danish Center of Human Rights, Lars Adam Rehof, one 
cannot exclude that incorporation of the Convention
"... will have important psychological consequences. It will open the eyes of the legal 
practitioners to the importance of the Convention, and for this reason, if for no other, 
the legal protection of the individual will be enhanced."6
If the Convention is incorporated into domestic law it will still be up to the 
Legislature to amend existing legislation whenever developments in the 
Strasbourg case-law give cause for doing so. This is due to the fact that the 
Scandinavian countries normally try to ensure that national legislation is as 
clear and unambiguous as possible. If a treaty is to be incorporated into 
domestic law, it is usually required that (1) the treaty provisions shall directly 
aim at or, according to their formulation, be applicable within the domestic 
law of the State and (2) the provisions of the treaty must be self-executing. 
The Convention does not entirely satisfy these requirements. If an incor­
poration of the Convention is followed by the usual practice of amending 
existing legislation when necessary, there would, on the other hand, not be 
any risks involved in such an incorporation. Thus an incorporation may have 
the function of a safety valve within the domestic legal order.
A delicate question would, however, arise in relation to the domestic 
application of Convention provisions having Drittwirkung: would the 
incorporated Convention as such satisfy the requirements of the principle o f 
legality? The answer to this question is far from clear. The demand for 
statutory texts to be clear and unambiguous is a fundamentil element of what 
is normally understood to be a community founded on the rule of law.
Finally, an incorporation might, although it is not very likely under 
normal circumstances, enable the law-enforcing authorities to apply the 
Convention as a means of lowering the protection provided by the ordinary 
legislation.
It may be concluded that there is neither much to win, nor much to loose
4 Cf. Claus Gulmann & Lars Adam Rehof in Rehof & Gulmann (1989). p. 3.
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PARTY
The Domestic Status of the European Convention 
in Scandinavia in Proceedings before 
the European Commisssion and Court

Introductory Remarks: Delimitation of the Study
CHAPTER IS
Parts III and IV of this study focused on how domestic courts regard and 
consider the ECHR. This part of the study concern the proceedings before the 
European Commission and Court of Human Rights.
The main aim of this part of the study is to present a survey (1) of the 
way in which the Scandinavian Governments argue the domestic position of 
the Convention before the Commission and Court, and (2) to determine 
whether or not there is conformity between the way in which domestic courts 
apply the Convention and the way in which the Commission and Court view 
its domestic status of the Convention. In other words, do the European 
Commission and Court agree that the Convention is, or may be regarded as, 
a source of law in domestic Scandinavian law? This question may have 
importance in contexts in which the Convention, for example, talks about a 
"remedy”.
It should, however, be observed that in many cases the question of the 
position of the Convention in domestic law is not necessarily brought before 
the Commission and Court. In other cases it is touched upon only indirectly, 
through the application of the individual Articles of the Convention. Further­
more, in proceedings before the Commission and Court the domestic status 
of the Convention may in many instances be without significance. In this 
respect, Dr. Andrew Drzemczewski has pointed out:
"And finally, when one talks about the very important subject of incorporation, I 
should stress that while this is a subject worth discussing by academics, judges and 
practising lawyers on the domestic plane, it may not be that important, or even 
pertinent, in terms of discussions in Strasbourg.
It may seem surprising to you, but that is the situation, I believe, in Strasbourg.
I stand to be corrected by Mr N0rgaard: -the extent to which (if at all) one country 
has incorporated the Convention, is by and large irrelevant in discussions before the 
Commission; or if discussed in the course of the deliberations, it is not considered 
a subject of major importance. The idea and the basic premise is that the defendant 
country must comply with the guarantees provided in the Convention. That is the 
guts of the international system established in Strasbourg."1
1 Cf. Andrew Drzemczewski: The Council of Europe's Position, in Mikkelsen (1989), pp. 
24 f.
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The attitude of the Commission and Court in this respect may be explained 
by the fact that they consider domestic law to be taken as a whole. In other 
words, it has only little significance whether or not the Convention is a 
source of law in domestic law or has some formal rank within the domestic 
norm-hierarchy. What is of importance for the Commission and Court is only 
the question of whether or not a State complies with the requirements of the 
Convention. The reasons for non-compliance with the Convention are of 
minor, if any, importance.
Moreover, it should also be noted that the domestic cases in which the 
Convention has been ascribed most significance are very recent, and for this 
very reason have not yet been referred to in proceedings before the 
Commission and Court Consequently, there is a "built-in" delay in the 
Commission and Court’s evaluation of the domestic position of the 
Convention. This delay does not mean, however, that it is of no practical 
value to study the Commission and Court’s evaluation of the domestic 
position of the Convention. In many cases, in fact, it is, on the basis of the 
Commission and Court’s rulings on this point, compared with more recent 
developments in domestic law, possible to predict, with a high degree of 
probability, the outcome of future cases regarding the questions at issue. The 
important point in this respect is to keep the time factor in mind.
Thus, the problems raised in this context are in their very character 
somewhat abstract. Nevertheless, an analysis from this angle may undoub­
tedly provide some interesting material which may throw light over the 
application of the Convention in domestic law in the broadest sense. 
Moreover, so far such analysis has not been carried out in Scandinavia.
In order to approach the topic from a more practical point of view, the 
questions posed above will be discussed on two different levels.
First, the extent to which the Governments have pleaded on the general 
domestic status of the Convention will be examined (chapter 16). Such 
questions on the general status of the Convention in domestic law seem to 
have been raised primarily in connection with argumentation relating to 
judicial review of administrative action and to questions of domestic sources 
of law. Second, the way in which the Governments have argued in questions 
posed by Article 26 (chapter 17) and Article 13 (chapter 18) of the 
Convention in relation to the exhaustion of domestic remedies and the exis­
tence of an effective remedy before a national authority will be examined and 
discussed. As regards Article 26, this part of the study will to a large extent
2
Introductory Remarks: Delimitation o f the Study
discuss which domestic remedies need to be exhausted before an application 
may be admitted by the Commission. Since Article 13 is frequently absorbed 
into Articles 6(1) and 5(4), disputes about these Articles will also be included 
in the discussion. On both levels the study will analyze both the parties, with 
emphasis on the Governments’ submissions, and the Commission and Court’s 
positions on the question at issue. Finally, the conclusions to chapters 16-18 
will be drawn (chapter 19).
The exposition is made in such way that, apart from the specific relation 
to the domestic position of the Convention, chapters 17 and 18 are also to a 
large extent a discussion of the application of Articles 26 and 13 of the 
Convention with special regard to Scandinavian law. This is due to the fact 
that in relation to the application of these Articles the question of the 
domestic position of the Convention is only rarely discussed explicitly, 
whereas it is possible to find implications touching upon the question under 
examination here. These chapters give the answer to, for example, which 
domestic remedies are effective and need to be exhausted; which Scan­
dinavian judicial bodies are independent and impartial tribunals etc.
This part of the study is based on all published decisions from both the 
European Commission2 and Court3 of Human Rights concerning the
2 Cf. Applications Nos. (* signifies that the decision is a decision on the admissibility): 
*343/57; *434/58, X v. Sweden; *867/60, X  v. Norway, *911/60, X v. Sweden-, *931/60. X 
v. Norway, *1329/62. X  v. Denmark, *1468/62, X  v. Norway, *1739/62, X v. Sweden-, 1855/63. 
X v. Denmark-, *2002/63, X v. Norway, 2095/63, X v. inter alia Sweden, 2358/64, X v. 
Sweden-, 2369/64, X v. Norway, 2385/64, X v. Norway, 2518/65, X v. Denmark; 2792/66, X 
v. Norway, *3071/67, X v. Sweden; *3444/67, X v. Norway; *3788/68, X  v. Sweden; 
*3893/68, X v. Sweden; *3916/69, X v. Sweden; *3934/69, X  v. Sweden; *4210/69, X v. 
Norway; *4279/69, X v. Norway; *4311/69, X v. Denmark; *4475/70, Svenska Lotsforbundet 
v. Sweden; *4733/71, X  v. Sweden; *4764/71, X v. Denmark; *5132/71, X v. Denmark, 
*5258/71, X v. Denmark, *5486/72, X v. Sweden; *5525/72, X v. Sweden; *5589/82, Folke 
Schmidt and Hans Dahlstrdm v. Sweden; *5614/72, Svenska Lokmannaforbundet v. Sweden; 
*5923/72, X v. Norway; *6094/73, Association X v. Sweden; 6776/74, X v. Sweden; *6853/74,
40 mothers v. Sweden; *6854/74, X v. Denmark, *6907/75, X v. Denmark, *6930/74, X v. 
Norway; *7011/75, Henning Becker v. Denmark, *7151/75 and 7152/75. Sporrong and 
Lonnroth v. Sweden; 7237/75, X v. Denmark, *7374/76, X v. Denmark *7376/76, X and Y 
v. Sweden; *7463/76, X v. Denmark *7565/76, Conscientious Objectors v. Denmark,
*7639/76, X v. Denmark; *7658/76, X v. Denmark *7805/77. Church of Scientology v. 
Sweden; *7911/77, X v. Sweden; *7945/77, X v. Norway; •1913/11, X  v. Sweden; *8045/77, 
X v. Sweden; *8282/78, Church o f Scientology et alii v. Sweden; *8395/78, X v. Denmark 
8588/79 and 8589/79, L. Bramelid and AM. Malmstrom v. Sweden; *8777/79, Per krohn 
Rasmussen v. Denmark *8811/79, Seven individuals v. Sweden; *8828/79, X v. Denmark 
*9017/80. McGoffv. Sweden; *9203/80, X v. Denmark; *9248/81, Torsten Leander v. Sweden; 
*9278/81 and 9415/81, G and E v. Norway; *9297/81. X Association v. Sweden; *9330/81, 
Abdulmassih Bulus et alii v. Sweden; 9330/81, Abdulmassih Bui us v. Sweden; *9401/81, X v. 
Norway, *9707/82, X v. Sweden; *9893/82, Frank Lysbro Pedersen v. Denmark, *9959/82 and 
10357/83, 19 Chilian Nationals and S Association v. Sweden; 9974/82, X v. Denmark, 
10031/82, A v. Sweden; *10141/82, L v. Sweden; *10144/82, Association K v. Sweden;
3
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Scandinavian countries as well as a number of recent unpublished decisions 
from the Commission.4 Emphasis will, however, as far as possible, be put 
on the Court’s judgments as well as on the Commission’s decisions on the 
admissibility of the applications. As regards legal literature on the application 
and interpretation of the Convention in general, references are only made to 
a few selected standard works. Since this part of the study takes a special 
approach to the application of the Convention, it has not been deemed 
necessary to make an in-depth analysis of the general application of the 
different provisions of the Convention.
10230/82, X v. Sweden-, *10263/83. R v. Denmark; »10326/83. R v. Denmark, *10371/83, T. 
Ruth v. Sweden; *10378/87, K v. Denmark; *10410/83, N v. Sweden; *10426/83, B. Pudas v. 
Sweden; *10473/83, T. Lundvail v. Sweden; *10476/83, W . K a n d L v ,  Sweden; *10486/83, 
Hauschildt v. Denmark; *10515/83, M v. Sweden; *10537/83, V. Uskela v. Sweden', *10554/83, 
E. Aminofv. Sweden; *10563/83, J. Ekbatani v. Sweden; *10600/83, / .  Johansen v. Norway; 
*10653/83, 5 v. Sweden; *10671/83, T v. Sweden; *10723/83, Viden v. Sweden; *10729/83, 
//  v. Sweden; *10801/84, L v. Sweden; *10873/84, Tre Traktorer AB v. Sweden; *10877/84, 
M. ValUn v. Sweden; *10878/84, 5. Jacobsson v. Sweden; *10911/84, Lundmrist v. Sweden; 
*11036/84, Svenska Managementgruppen v. Sweden; *11045/84, ZM. Knudsen v. Norway, 
*11122/84, V. Welter v. Sweden; *11219/84, John lb Nielsen Kurup v. Denmark; *11532/85, 
HammerdahLs Stormarknad AB v. Sweden; *11628/85, Linde v. Sweden; 11655/85, //. 
Glazewska v. Sweden; and *11776/85, Ulf Andersson and Monica Kullman v. Sweden.
3 Cf. Eur. Court H.R., Series A, Vol. 20, Swedish Engine Drivers' Union; Vol. 21, Case 
of Schmidt and Dahlstrom; Vol. 23, Case 0/  Kjeldsen, Busk Madsen and Pedersen; Vol. 52, 
Sporrong and Lonnroth Case; Vol. 83 Skoogstrom Case; Vol. 87, Rasmussen Case; Vol. 116, 
Leander Case,; Vol. 125, (AJ Boden Case, (5) Pudas Case; Vol. 130, Olsson Case; Vol. 134, 
Ekbatani Case; Vol. 144, Nielsen Case; Vol. 149, Barfod Case; Vol. 154, Hauschildt Case; - 
Vol. 155, Langborger Case; Vol. 156, ¡Eriksson Case; Vol. 159, Tre Traktdrer AB Case; Vol. 
163, A//an Jacobsson Case; and Vol. 181, Case 0/  £. v. Norway.
4 Cf. Applications Nos. 5095/71 Kjeldsen v. Denmark; 7151/75 and 7152/75, Sporrong and 
Lonnroth v. Sweden; 10465/83, Sfig ami Gun Olsson v. Sweden; 10537/83, v. Eskela v. 
Sweden; 10554/83, Eva Aminoff v. Sweden; 10563/83, /o/in Ekbatani v. Sweden; 10801/84,
v. Sweden; 10842/84, A//an Jacobsson v. Sweden; 10873/84, 7V* Traktdrer AB v. Sweden; 
10929/84, John Nielsen v. Denmark; 10930/84, Gunner Boden v. Sweden; 11179/84, 
Langborger v. Sweden; *11295/84, Frede Schmidt v. Denmark; 11309/84, ¿V/a/i Jacobsson v. 
Sweden; 11373/85, Cdcilia and Lisa Eriksson v. Sweden; *11464/85, Max von Sydow v. 
Sweden; 11508/85, 5  v. Denmark; 11533/85, /ngrid Jordebo Foundation of Christian Schools 
v. Sweden; 11540/85, //atm £arni v. Sweden; 11581/85, Pefer Darby v. Sweden; 11701/85, 
E v. Norway; *11704/85, Eva Kro/ v. Sweden; 11855/85, Gatfa Hdkonsson and Sune Sturesson 
v. Sweden; 12213/86,ion Axelsson et alii v. Sweden; 12258/86, 77ie Estates o f Mr and Ms and 
their Heirs and Children v. Sweden; 12570/86, Martin Denev v. Sweden; 12782/87, Eriik 
Karlsson v. Sweden; and *12867/87 and 14073/88, Owe Skoogstrom (II and III) v. Sweden
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CHAPTER 16
The General Position of the European Convention in 
Scandinavian Law in Proceedings before the Euro­
pean Commission and Court
As pointed out in chapter 15, it does not happen very frequently that the 
issue of the general domestic position of the Convention is put into question 
in proceedings before the European Commission and Court. The few cases 
which exist are, however, very interesting as to both the governments’ 
submissions, and the Commission’s and Court’s evaluation of the Convention 
as a source of law in domestic Scandinavian law. In some cases it is doubtful 
whether the submissions of the parties concern the general position of the 
Convention in domestic law, or whether they concern questions as to which 
domestic remedies are effective and need to be exhausted before a complaint 
may be admitted. In the latter cases the decision is discussed in relation to 
the individual Article 26 of the Convention in chapter 17, rather than here in 
order to give the discussion some structure.
The cases in which the general domestic position of the Convention has 
been discussed before the Commission and Court are particularly interesting 
regarding the governments’ argumentation because they represent, albeit in 
the form of submissions of one of the parties to the proceedings at issue, 
represent a kind of official national view on the domestic status of the 
Convention. If the Respondent Government’s submissions do not reflect the 
domestic position of the Convention properly, it may face severe criticism 
within the domestic legal community and, consequently, it may be presumed, 
from public opinioa This applies in particular within a field such as human 
rights. This probably leaves the Government only a certain margin within 
which it can plead the case.
First, it should be pointed out that the Convention itself does not require 
that its provisions be incorporated into domestic law. No such requirement 
appears to follow from the text of the Convention, although the provisions 
in Articles 5(5) and 13 might suggest so, neither do such requirements follow
from the travaux préparatoires.1 Furthermore, first the Court and subse­
quently the Commission have in, inter alia, two cases directed against 
Sweden, confirmed this view.
In the Swedish Engine Drivers’ Union Case the applicants submitted 
before the Commission that in AD 1972 No. 5 (see supra section 6.2) the 
Collective Bargaining Office stated before the Labour Court that the 
Convention could not be invoked before Swedish courts as it was not part of 
domestic Swedish law. The State had thus failed to conform with its 
obligation under the Convention and to incorporate it so as to allow Swedish 
subjects to refer to the Convention to support their rights. This situation is 
not, it was submitted, in conformity with Article 13 of the Convention.2
Since the Commission had found no violation of any of the Articles of 
the Convention, it concluded that Article 13 had not been violated without 
ruling on whether Article 13 in general requires that the Constracting States 
incorporate the Convention as such into their domestic law.3
The Court, on the other hand, went into the discussion of whether it 
could be deduced from the Convention that its Articles in Section I should 
be incorporated into domestic law and stated that "... in addition, neither 
Article 13, nor the Convention in general lays down for the Contracting 
States any given manner for ensuring within their internal law the effective 
implementation of any of the provisions of the Convention."4
In the proceedings on the admissibility in the more recent Application 
No. 10873/84,5 the Swedish Government seemed to have been more on the 
offensive and argued strongly that the fact that a State is a party to the 
Convention does not automatically mean that the authorities of that State are 
bound to found their decisions explicitly or directly on the Convention. The 
latter instrument is binding only on the Swedish Legislature and requires that
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1 See Drzemczewski (1983), pp. 48 ff., at p. 53, where it is concluded that an "... apparant 
lacuna exists in the travaux préparatoires since this particular point does not seem to have 
been adequatly (if at all) debated.” See also Bernhard & Lehmann (1985), p. 25; Danelius 
(1989), p. 66; and Fawcett (1987), p. 4.
2 Cf. Eut. Court H.R., Swedish Engine Drivers' Union Case, Series B, Vol. 18 (1977), 
Report of the Commission, para. 53.
3 Ibid., at para. 98. As will be seen in section infra 17.2.1. this is not a valid interpretation 
of Article 13 any more.
4 rbid.. Series A, Vol. 20 (1976), para. 50.
3 Cf. 44 D.R., pp. 246 ff.
296
national rules are in conformity with it. Thus, the fact that an authority has 
not examined or invoked the Convention in a particular case or decision 
cannot be regarded as a separate question before the Commission. The ques­
tion to be examined was only whether an authority’s application of the 
Swedish rules constituted a violation of the Convention.6
The Commission agreed with the Government in this respect and ruled 
that the
"... Convention does not lay down for the Contracting States any given manner for 
ensuring within their internal law the effective implementation of the provisions of 
the Convention [...) The Commission also recalls the following statement made by 
the Court (see Eur. Court H.R., judgment of 18.1 78, Case of Ireland v. the United 
Kingdom, para. 239):
"By substituting the words ’shall secure’ for the words 'undertake to secure’ 
in the text of Art. 1, the drafters of the Convention also intended to make 
it clear that the rights and freedoms set out in Section I would be direcdy 
secured to anyone within the jurisdiction of the Contracting States. This 
intention finds a particularly faithful reflection in those instances where the 
Convention has been incorporated into domestic law."
It follows that Sweden is not obliged to transform the text of the Convention into 
Swedish law."7
Since the Swedish Engine Drivers' Union Case was the first case in which 
the Court ruled on the question of incorporation of the Convention, it may 
be assumed that the argumentation put forward by the Swedish Government 
had at least some impact on the Court’s considerations in this respect.
Leaving aside the question of a general incorporation of the Convention 
into domestic law, the domestic position of the Convention may be of impor­
tance in relation to a possible violation of one or more of the Articles of the 
Convention. The Case o f Kjeldsen, Busk Madsen and Pedersen (see infra 
section 17.2.1) was the first case in which a Scandinavian Government 
submitted that the Convention, at least in some respects, was directly 
applicable in domestic law. Another very illustrative example of this may be 
found in the Hauschildt Case where the Danish Government argued quite 
strongly that the Convention was directly applicable in domestic Danish law.
The Position o f the ECHR before the Commission and Court
‘ Cf. the Report of the Commission, p. 45 (not included in the summary of the case in 
D.R.).
7 Cf. 44 D.R., pp. 253 f.
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Thus it was stated:
"It is the opinion of the Government of Denmark that, under the provisions of section 
60, cf. section 62, of the Danish Administration of Justice Act [quoted supra in 
section 8.4], the applicant was in fact offered a real opportunity to have judicial 
review of the question as to whether, under the provisions of the Danish Ad­
ministration of Justice Act and under Article 6 of the Convention, a judge having 
ordered detention on remand of a person accused of or charged with an offence shall 
be debarred from taking part in the subsequent trial and decision-making on the 
question of guilt."’
The Government then referred to UfR 1987.307 (see supra section 8.4) as an 
example of a case in which an appeal instance had in fact exercised judicial 
review of the question of whether the fact that a judge had ordered detention 
on remand per se should disqualify him from subsequently hearing the case 
as a trial judge. However, in this case the H0jesteret did not find that a judge 
who had ordered detention on remand per se should be considered disqua­
lified from hearing the case as trial judge. But, in the Government’s view, 
this was not the decisive point, since the Hojesteret had in fact reviewed the 
question put before i t
This made the Court ask whether the said statement implied that, in the 
Government’s view, Article 6 of the Convention was directly applicable in 
Denmark. The Government answered in the following way:
"[I]n their memorial the Government state that the courts make a real judicial review 
of the compatibility of the Danish Administration of Justice Act with the European 
Convention on Human Rights. This implies that treaties entered into by Denmark are 
a source of law in Danish courts. Therefore, the European Convention on Human 
Rights is relied upon by Danish courts particularly in the field of criminal law proce­
dure. In cases of doubt the courts will apply the direct test whether a decision taken, 
for instance, under the Danish Administration of Justice Act, is contrary to any 
provision of the Convention. In other words, the courts apply the European 
Convention on Human Rights as a true source of law when they determine the 
concrete legal contents of their decisions. Reference can be made to various decisions 
in... [UfR]... 1985.1080, 1987.440 and 1987.307.1 should like to refer to one case 
from 1987 where the Supreme Court decided whether a refusal of a counsel for the 
defence chosen by the accused was contrary to Article 6 of the Convention. In this 
respect, the European Convention was taken into account and is, though not formally 
incorporated into Danish law, a determining factor in the interpretation of the Danish 
rules of law, including the relevant sections of the Administration of Justice Act in
* Cf. Eur. Court H.R., Hauschiidt Case, Series A. Vol. 154 (1989), Memorial of the 
Government of Denmark (Cour (88) 70).
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this case" (emphasis added).9
This was, however, not enough to persuade the majority of the Court that the 
application be declared inadmissible for failure to exhaust domestic remedies 
in accordance with Article 26 of the Convention.10 The Court found that the 
Danish Government ”... had not alleged ascertainable facts - such as previous 
case-law or doctrine - which should have caused counsel for the defence to 
have doubts concerning his interpretation of the [Administration of Justice] 
Act."11 On the contrary, the Government did not deny that for several years 
nobody had ever challenged a trial judge on the ground of his having made 
pre-trial decision in the case. The latter fact suggested general acceptance of 
the system, or at least of the interpretation relied on by counsel for the defen­
ce. Furthermore, since UfR 1987.307 was delivered subsequent to the domes­
tic proceedings in the Hauschildt Case, neither the City Court Judge nor the 
President of the High Court thought it necessary to take any initiative 
themselves in relation to the question of their possible disqualification; the 
Court found that the Government had not shown ”... that there was available 
under Danish law at the relevant time [that is 1981-1983] an effective 
remedy to which the applicant could be expected to have resorted".12 The
9 Ibid., Verbatim Record (Cour/Misc (88) 239), pp. 41 f.
10 Similarly, in its decision on the admissibility the Commission had found that, since the 
applicant"... could not have pointed at any breach of Danish law when complaining about this 
situation", no effective remedy was available to him, cf. 49 D.R., p. 104.
11 Cf. Eur. Court H.R., Hauschildt Case, Series A, Vol. 154 (1989), para. 41.
12 Ibid., para. 42. However, a minority of the Court, consisting of Judges Thor Vilhjalms- 
son, Palm and Gomard (from Iceland, Sweden and Denmark respectively), found that "Mr 
Hauschildt and his counsel decided at the relevant time against raising the question of 
impartiality.'' Mr Hauschildfs present application was therefore, in the view of those Judges, 
inadmissible because of failure to exhaust domestic remedies. Judge Ryssdal (from Norway), 
in a separate opinion, concurred with the majority of the Court on this point.
It is interesting that three out of four Nordic judges found that the applicant had not 
exhausted domestic remedies in the case. Besides, on the merits of the case the same judges 
dissented. This suggests that there is a substantial difference in points of view between Nordic 
lawyers and lawyers from the rest of the Member States of the Council of Europe. Eva Smith: 
Menneskerettighedskonventionerne og de nordisk retsplejeordnineer, [The Human Rights 
Conventions and the Nordic Systems of Administration of Justice], The Proceedings of the 
32nd Nordic Meetings of Lawyers, Reykjavik (1990), Vol. 1. pp. 11 ff- at pp. 20 f., goes as 
far as classifying the judgment as ”... an error of judgment which is caused by the fact that 
the judges of the European Court of Human Rights do not have a sufficient understanding of 
those principles on which the systems of administration of justice of the individual countries 
are founded." [... en forkert dom, som sky Ides, at EMD’s dommere ikke har tilstr*kkelig 
forstAelse for de principper, de forskellige landes retsordninger bygger pA].
As pointed out by Sjren S tender up Jensen at the Meeting, Ibid., Vol. 2, [forthcoming], 
one should probably be careful of not overstating the far-reaching consequences for the
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same is probably true regarding the Government’s submissions on the general 
domestic status of the Convention in Danish law; in its judgment the Court 
did not comment on this submission.
On the basis of more recent Danish case-law regarding the domestic ap­
plication of the Convention - even if one excludes the H0jesteret's decisions 
in UfR 1990.13 and UfR 1990.181 which both refer to the Hauschildt Case - 
it seems to be doubtful whether the Court, on the basis of the same 
argumentation, would in future cases be able to uphold this view on the 
position of the Convention in domestic Danish law. With its emphasis on "at 
the relevant time" the Court seems to have indicated that it may be prepared 
to change its view on this point, provided relevant case-law and doctrine are 
available to i t  Now it is in fact possible to refer to domestic Danish case-law 
and doctrine in which the Convention is treated as a source of law (see supra 
chapter 8).
That the Court is prepared to accept that the Convention may be a source 
of law in domestic law in a "dualist" system follows from the recent 
judgment of 29 August 1990 in the Case o f E v. Norway. In the case the 
Commission had found that the combination of the Norwegian courts’ power 
to review administrative decisions under the unwritten constitutional principle 
of judicial review of administrative action and, as alleged by the Norwegian 
Government, the status of the Convention as a source of law in domestic law 
did not fulfil the requirements set forth in Article 5(4) of the Convention that 
a person deprived of his liberty shall be "... entitled to take proceedings by 
which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court" 
(see infra section 18.4).
In the proceedings before the Court, the Norwegian Government sub­
mitted even more strongly that the Convention is a source of law in domestic 
Norwegian law which the courts, when exercising judicial review under the 
said principle of judicial review of administrative action, would have to take 
into account:
"These arguments should be seen in the light of the Convention’s status as a source 
of law in the Norwegian legal system. The existance of Article 5(4), as interpreted
Chapter 16: the Position o f the ECHR before the Commission and Court
Scandinavian procedural systems deriving from this decision, since in para. 30(3) of (he 
judgment the Court generally approved the Danish criminal procedural system on this point 
(see supra section 8.4). However, this does not exclude, as rightly pointed out by Eva Smith, 
that the judgment at any rate may have some unfortunate effects on the Scandinavian 
procedural systems which in the end may turn out to be disadvantageous for defendants.
300
by the Court, is in fact in itself an additional argument for concluding that the 
domestic courts have full competence to review the merits of administrative decisions 
under section 39" (emphasis added).13
The Government then made references to NRt. 1984.1175, which was 
rendered half a year before the applicant lodged his application with the 
Commission, and NRt. 1989.1327 (see supra section 8.2) and concluded that 
"... it follows that the scope of domestic court control complies with the re­
quirements of the Convention. Even if one were to doubt this when reading 
the Norwegian sources only, one also has to take into account the traditional 
principle of presumption just mentioned and the relevant case-law there­
on..."14 Accordingly, ”[n]either the wording of [section] 39 of the Penal 
Code nor any other legislative enactment would seem to prevent a review 
consistent with the requirements of Article 5 § 4 of the Convention, as inter­
preted by the European Court of Human Rights."15
This argumentation proved to be more successful before the Court than 
it had been before the Commission.
Under the heading "Relevant domestic law and practice" the Court first 
outlined the case-law - including a number or rulings rendered after the 
public hearing before the Court in the case was held - of the H0yesterett 
regarding the status of the Convention in domestic Norwegian law.16 In 
particular, the Court cited extensive parts of the judgments in NRt. 1982.241, 
NRt. 1984.1175 and NRt. 1989.1327.
As will be seen in section 18.4, where the aspects of the decision speci­
fically related to Article 5(4) are discussed, the Court found that the com­
bination of the unwritten constitutional principle of administrative action and 
the status of the Convention as a source of law in domestic law fulfilled the 
requirements set forth in Article 5(4) of the Convention. The Court’s 
reasoning concerned primarily the possibility as such of having a judicial 
review of the decision of the Ministry of Justice to detain the applicant under
The Position o f the ECHR before the Commission and Court
15 Cf. Eur. Court H.R., Case of E v. Norway, Series A, Vol. 181 (1990), Verbatim Record 
(Cour/Misc (90) 24), pp. 39 f.
14 Ibid., at p. 41.
15 Ibid., Judgment, para. 59.
“ Namely NRt. 1961.1350, NRt 1966.476, NRt 1974.935, NRt 1982.241, NRt. 
1984.1175, NRt. 1987.612. NRt 1989.1327 and rulings of 16 and 29 March 1989 [to be 
reported in NRt.] (see supra sections 63 and 8.2.2).
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section 39(1 Xe) or (0 of the Penal Code. However, by explicitly mentioning 
that the Norwegian ”... Government further emphasized that there was general 
agreement that the Norwegian courts would follow the "principle of presump­
tion", that is to say, that domestic provisions have to be interpreted to the 
extent possible in such way as to be in conformity with treaties binding on 
Norway" within the grounds of judgment, the Court indicated that it found 
that the case-law concerning the application of the Convention in Norwegian 
law referred to by the Government provided a sufficient basis for a broad 
review of the Ministry’s decision under the unwritten constitutional principle. 
This basis was so strong that the fact that the Government was unable to 
refer to any decisions by the H0yesterett to the effect that an administrative 
decision taken under section 39 of the Penal Code can be overruled in 
judicial proceedings, was without decisive impact on the Court:
"Nevertheless, on the basis of the foregoing examination of the Norwegian system, 
the Court is satisfied that the available judicial review was wide enough to bear on 
those conditions which, under the Convention, were essential for the lawful detention 
of the applicant pursuant to Article 39 § 1 of the Penal Code."17
Against this background this decision must be regarded as a recognition of 
the status of the Convention as a source of law in domestic Norwegian law. 
In comparison with the Hauschildt Case the fact that the Norwegian Govern­
ment was able to refer to a large number of cases in which the Supreme 
Court had expressly referred to and/or discussed the Convention seems to 
have been decisive for the Court on this point. In the Hauschildt Case the 
Danish Government was only able to refer to three cases concerning the 
domestic application of the Convention, whereas in this case the Norwegian 
Government was able to refer to nine such cases. Moreover, in the Nor­
wegian cases the Hjyesterett had discussed the relationship between the 
Convention and domestic law more explicitly and more comprehensively than 
was the case in the Danish judgments. The existence of this case-law has 
probably been decisive for the Court.
Although the Court in the De Wilde, Ooms and Versyp Case has stated 
that ”... the judicial proceedings referred to in Article 5(4) need not, it is true, 
always be attended by the same guarantees as those required under Article
Chapter 16: the Position o f the ECHR before the Commission and Court
17 Ibid., at para. 60(5).
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6(1) for civil or criminal litigation",18 this decision will probably also have 
implications for the application of Article 6(1) in Denmark and Norway 
where one finds this combination of a general rule of judicial review of 
administrative action and the status of the Convention as a source of law in 
domestic law.
"  Cf Eur. Court H.R., De Wiide, Ooms and Versyp Case. Series A. Vol. 12 (1971). para.
78.
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CHAPTER 17
Article 26 of the European Convention in Pro­
ceedings before the European Commission and Court
17.1. Points at Issue.
Article 26 of the Convention reads as follows:
"The Commission may only deal with the matter after all domestic remedies have 
been exhausted, according to the generally recognised rules of international law, and 
within a period of six months from the date on which the final decision was taken.”
In Application No. 343/57 (see infra section 18.2.3) the Commission stressed 
the principle of State responsibility embodied in the rule:
"... the rule requiring the exhaustion of domestic remedies as a condition of the 
presentation of an international claim is founded upon the principle that the 
Respondent State must first have an opportunity to redress by its own means within 
the framework of its own domestic legal system the wrong alleged to be done to the 
individual. ''1
The application of Article 26 raises questions as to (1) what kinds of reme­
dies come under the rule; (2) the effectiveness of the remedies: and (3) 
special circumstances limiting the application of the rule.2
Without going into details, the application of Article 26 may be described 
briefly as follows: a remedy may be afforded by judicial process or by 
administrative authority, whereas an act of grace or discretion are not reme­
dies that must be exhausted under Article 26.3 I.e. a petition for the re­
opening of the case of which the applicant complains is normally not 
required since this kind of petition is granted only as a matter of discretioa4 
Moreover, the remedy must have the finality of decision to meet the require­
ments of Article 26. However, this Article does not require that a complaint
1 Cf. 2 Yearbook 1958-59, pp. 412 ff., pp. 438.
J Cf. Fawceu (1987), p. 356.
1 Ibid., at p. 357; and Jacobs (1975), p. 238.
4 Cf. Bernhard & Lehmann (1985), pp. 36 ff.; Danelius (1989), p. 52; and Jacobs (1975), 
p. 238.
be presented to the national authorities in terms of precise reference to the 
Convention or to domestic law, but that it be presented in substance to both 
facts and law. Any doubt that may exist as to the prospects of success of a 
particular remedy does not relieve the applicant of the obligation to exhaust 
that remedy, it being left to domestic courts to resolve. On the other hand, 
if the case-law of the appeal instances shows that an appeal has no reasonable 
prospect of success, the applicant is not obliged to lodge an appeal.3 This 
exception to the main rule is, however, usually interpreted narrowly. As will 
be seen, the Commission has on some occasions let special circumstances 
influence the application of Article 26.
If there is no remedy against a decision, the six months period begins 
from the date of the decision complained of.6 However, this applies - as the 
Commission held in ihe Sporrong and Lonnroth Case1 - only to cases where 
the complaint is directed against a decision as such or another particular 
event, and not where the grievances come about more gradually, on account 
of the passing of time from the accumulation of renewed delays of ad­
ministrative measures.
The application of Article 26 gives the opportunity of illustrating how the 
governments argue before the Commission. Although the rule does not 
require that the complaint be presented before the national authority with 
specific reference to the Convention, it happens frequently that the applica­
tion of the Convention in domestic law is at stake. The Commission’s direct 
evaluation of the Government’s argumentation in this respect, or more 
indirect evaluations implied in statements concerning which remedies are 
effective, give an idea of how the Commission views the domestic status of 
the Convention. This chapter therefore provides an outline of the domestic 
remedies that need to be exhausted before a complaint may be declared 
admissible.
17.2. The Different Remedies which need to be exhausted.
17.2.1. Judicial Review o f Administrative Action.
Chapter 17: Article 26 o f the ECHR before the Commission and Court
5 Cf. Bernhard & Lehmann (1985), p. 36; Fawcett (1987), p. 357; Erik Friberg: Europeiska 
konventionen om mansldiga rattigheter, [The European Convention of Human Rights], Lund 
(1984), p. 32; and Jacobs (1975), p. 239.
* See for example Applications Nos. 9959/82 and 10367/83, cf. 37 D.R., p. 89.
7 Cf. Applications Nos. 7151/75 and 7152/75, cf. 15 D.R.. pp. 20 f. See also Application
No. 10537/83, cf. 44 D.R., p. 105.
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The leading case concerning the question of whether or not proceedings in­
stituted under Article 63 o f the Danish Constitution were a remedy which 
needed to be exhausted is the Case o f Kjeldsen, Busk Madsen and Peder­
sen.* In the case the Danish Government submitted that the applicant had 
made no attempt to bring their complaint before the courts. The Government 
first explained that the rule o f interpretation and the rule o f presumption (see 
supra section 2.2) were considered as an integrated part of domestic Danish 
law. The Government then referred to Article 63 of the Danish Constitution 
which authorizes the courts to "... decide any question bearing upon the scope 
of the authority of the administration." Following these rules, the applicants 
could have pleaded before Danish courts that the provisions on compulsory 
integrated sex education were at variance with Article 2 of Protocol No. 1. 
Not only had academic writers maintained that it was possible to raise the 
Convention before Danish courts but the K0benhavns Byret had specifically 
referred to Article 6(3)(e) of the Convention in a case where it had ordered 
that the cost of interpretation should be paid out of public funds and not by 
the defendant who was a foreigner.9 As a further example, the Government 
referred to the discretionary powers given to the Ministry of Justice, under 
the previous Act on Alien’s Entry and Residence in Denmark, to take 
decisions on the expulsion of aliens. In exercising these powers the Ministry 
of Justice had taken into account the right to respect of family life as 
guaranteed under Article 8 of the Convention (see above chapter 8).10
The Commission partly concurred with the Government stating "... that, 
insofar as the present application relates to the directives issued by the 
Ministry of Education and other administrative measures taken by the Danish 
authorities regarding the manner in which the sex education referred to in the 
1970 Act should be carried out, it cannot be said that the remedy indicated 
by the respondent Government would clearly have been without any prospect 
of success."11
However, as regards the School Act of 1970 which laid down the 
principle of compulsory sex education and authorized the Minister of
1 Cf. Eur. Court H.R., Case of Kjeldsen, Busk Madsen and Pedersen, Series A. Vol. 23 
(1976).
* Judgment of 25 April 1966, Case No. 21472/1965,1 (see supra section 8.2.2).
10 Cf. Eur. Court 
78). Report of the
11 Ibid., at p. 81.
 f. r. rt H.R., Case of Kjeldsen, Busk Madsen and Pedersen, Series B, Vol. 21 
(19 ,  Commission, pp. 76 f.
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Education to issue regulations as how this instruction should be given, the 
Commission held:
"The applicants have asserted that no proceedings could be taken under Article 63 
of the Danish Constitution against an Act of Parliament. The respondent Government 
have not contested this assertation and have not suggested that any other specific 
remedy might be available to the applicants insofar as the provisions of the 1970 Act 
are concerned. The Commission therefore concludes that there was no effective 
remedy available to the applicants with regard to the principle of compulsory sex 
education embodied in the Act. It follows that, in this respect, the application cannot 
be rejected as inadmissible under Article 26 of the Convention."12
Dr. Niels Eilschou Holm, who was adviser to the Government in the 
proceedings, has pointed out that the Commission’s statement on this point 
is to some extent due to a misunderstanding. It is true that the Government 
did not dispute that Article 63 does not in general grant the courts a right to 
review legislation. However, in the case the Government maintained to the 
very end that the question of the scope of the authorization granted by the 
School Act of 1970, interpreted in the light of the Convention as set forth in 
the rule o f interpretation and the rule o f presumption, could be reviewed by 
the courts by virtue of Article 63 of the Constitution.13 Moreover, there 
exists in Danish law an unwritten constitutional principle according to which 
the courts are entitled to exercise judicial review of statutes.14
In all events the Commission accepted that Article 63 of the Constitution 
is an effective remedy with regard to administratively issued regulations.
The Commission holds the same view as regards concrete administrative 
decisions. In Application No. 6874/74 the Commission found that the 
applicant had failed to exhaust domestic remedies since he had not lodged an 
appeal against a decision taken by the local Child and Youth Welfare Board 
with the National Social Welfare Board as regards the merits of the decision, 
or instituted court proceedings under Article 63 of the Constitution as regards 
the legality of the decision. The Commission first referred to its decision on 
the admissibility in the Case(s) o f Kjeldsen, Busk Madsen and Pedersen.
Chapter 17: Article 26 o f the ECHR before the Commission and Court
11 Ibid.
15 Cf. Niels Eilschou Holm: En sag for menneskerettighedsdomstolen, [A Case before the
Court of Human RightsJ, Copenhagen (1980), pp. 79 f.
14 See, for example, the cases in UfR 1921.148 and 153, UfR 1921.168 and 169, UfR 
1921.644, UfR 1935.1, UfR 1971.299. UfR 1980.955 and UfR 1987.1. See also Germer 
(1988), Vol. 2, pp. 20 ff.; and Zahle (1989). Vol. 2. pp. 330 ff.
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Regarding the case at issue the Commission held "... that the applicant has 
failed to bring any court proceedings under Art. 63 of the Danish Con­
stitution in regard to the matters of which he is now complaining."15 He 
could not, therefore, be considered to have exhausted the remedies available 
to him under Danish law.16
It is stated expressly in Article 63 of the Danish Constitution that 
instituting proceedings under the provision does not have any suspensive 
effect regarding the enforcebility of the administrative decision which is 
challenged under the provision. This fact makes the remedy provided for in 
the provision less effective in relation to persons who are facing imminent 
deportation, expulsion, expatriation etc. One may, therefore, ask whether 
Article 63 is a domestic remedy which needs to be exhausted in such 
circumstances also. The Commission has dealt with this question on several 
occasions.
In Application No. 7011/75 the question at issue was whether a possible 
decision of the Danish Government to return a group of Vietnamese children 
to Vietnam would violate Article 3 of the Convention. The applicant 
submitted that, according to Article 63 of the Danish Constitution, the courts 
are only entitled to decide questions bearing upon the scope of the authority 
of the executive. In the present case the decision of the Government to return 
the children was final and completely discretionary. Consequently, this 
decision could not be subject to judicial review.17
The Government opposed this argument, stating that "... the courts were 
entitled to try any question pertaining to the legality of any decision of the 
Government on the return of the children, and also whether the decision was 
in conformity with the Convention." The applicant rejoined that it implied 
that the Convention had been incorporated into Danish law and therefore 
■would be respected by the Danish courts. This was, however, not the case 
and there existed no cases decided by the Danish courts supporting the theory 
advanced by the Government.18
15 Cf. 7 D.R., pp. 81 ff., at p. 83.
14 In Application No. 7639/76 the Commission came to a similar result in a case 
concerning the applicant's right to access to his children of whom the mother had the custody.
17 Cf. 4 D.R., pp. 215 ff.. p. 227.
"  Ibid.
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The Commission noted that the question at issue was whether or not Ar­
ticle 63 of the Danish Constitution offered a remedy against an order of the 
Government to return the children to Vietnam. The Commission recalled that 
ift its previous decisions it had found that proceedings brought under Article 
63 of the Constitution in relation to certain administrative measures would 
clearly not have been without any prospect of success. Then, it went on:
"However, in view of the arguments in the present case it should be pointed out that 
no decision with executory force has yet been taken to return the children and (even 
if the temporary residence permit would suffice as a basis for an action under Article 
63 of the Danish Constitution) the Commission notes that a court action under the 
said provision in any event would not have suspensive effect on an order of repatria­
tion. Consequently in this case it would not be an effective remedy within the 
meaning of Article 26 of the Convention and the application cannot be rejected for 
non-exhaustion of remedies."19
On the basis of the these decisions it may be concluded that Article 63 of the 
Danish Constitution is normally an effective remedy within the meaning of 
Article 26 of the Convention, which needs to be exhausted. However, if the 
applicant is facing an imminent order to leave the country. Article 63 does 
not provide an effective remedy because instituting proceedings under the 
provision has no suspensive effect20 In the latter context it does not matter 
whether or not the Convention is a source of law in domestic law which may 
be invoked under the said Article.
In the Case o f E  v. Norway21 (see supra chapter 16) which concerned 
the question of whether or not proceedings instituted under the unwritten 
Norwegian constitutional principle ofjudicial review o f administrative action 
fulfilled the requirement that a person deprived of his liberty shall be ”... 
entitled to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be 
decided speedily by a court" as laid down in Article 5(4) of the Convention 
in relation to the Department of Justice’s decision to implement security 
measures under section 39 of the Norwegian Penal Code, the Government 
also pleaded that there had been an effective remedy available in domestic
Chapter 17: Article 26 o f the ECHR before the Commission and Court
” Ibid., at p. 233. Similarly, in Application No. 7465/76, cf. 7 D.R., p. 154 ff„ the 
Commission found that instituting proceedings under Article 63 of the Constitution against a 
decision to expel the applicant was not an effective remedy which ought to have been ex­
hausted.
* Cf. Bernhard & Lehmann (1985), p. 38; and Fawcett (1987), p. 359.
!l Cf. Application No. 11701/85.
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law which the applicant had not exhausted.
The Commission noted that a dispute existed between the parties as to 
whether the remedy available fulfilled the requirements of Article 5(4) of the 
Convention. Therefore, the Commission found no reason to rely on Article 
26 of the Convention, but considered the issue under Article 5(4) in the light 
of the submissions of the parties (see infra section 18.4).
17.2.2. Leave to Appeal to the Supreme Court.
In Application No. 8395/78 the Danish Government contended that the appli­
cant had not exhausted domestic remedies since he had not applied in time 
to the Ministry of Justice for leave to appeal to the H0jesteret against a 
decision of the High Court rejecting the applicant’s request for release from 
isolation when detained on remand.
The Commission first noted that the applicant had no direct right 
prescribed by law to appeal against the decision of the High Court to the 
H0jesteret. Then, it was held:
"To lodge such an appeal he had to be granted leave by the Minister of Justice, by 
way of exception, pursuant to the provision of Section 968, sub-section 3, cf. Section 
966 of the Administration of Justice Act Hence the Commission is of the opinion 
that the application to the Minister of Justice for leave to appeal to the the Supreme 
Court was an extraordinary remedy, but not an effective remedy as of right that the 
applicant had to exhaust, for the purpose of fulfilling the requirements of Article 26 
of the Convention."11
Had the applicant in fact applied for leave to appeal to the H0jesteret, the 
question would have arisen whether the six months’ period should be 
calculated from the date of the decision of the Ministry of Justice. It probably 
follows from the Commissions decision in Application No. 10326/83”  (see 
infra section 17.2.3) that the decision of the Ministry of Justice should not 
be considered the "final decision" within the meaning af Article 26.M
17.2.3. The Re-Opening o f Cases.
a Cf. 27 D.R., p. 50 ff., at p. 51
23 Cf. 35 DR, pp. 218 ff.
14 Bernhard & Lehmann (1985), p. 38, on the contrary, assume that if an application for
leave to appeal to the He jester et has been lodged with the Ministry of Justice and dismissed,
there must be a presumption that the six months’ period should be calculated from the date 
of the decision of the Ministry of Justice.
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The re-opening of cases is usually a remedy which it is not necessary to 
exhaust in order to comply with Article 26. This is due to the fact that such 
a re-opening of a case is normally based exclusively on a discretion; no legal 
right exists in relation to the resumption of cases.
A series of decisions concerning the question whether or not Den scerlige 
Klageret [the Special Court of Revision] in Denmark is an ordinary remedy 
which needs to be exhausted before lodging an application with the Com­
mission is very illustrative of how the Scandinavian Governments plead cases 
before the Commission. Though the decisions do not in particular touch upon 
the domestic position of the Convention, they are nevertheless very 
interesting in terms of illustrating the Danish Government’s successful 
attempt to make the Commission revise its own case-law.
Den scerlige Klageret is a permanent court set up under section 1 a of the 
Danish Administration of Justice Act. The Court consists of three ordinary 
members - one Supreme Court Justice, one High Court Judge and one City 
Court Judge - appointed by the Queen on the recommendation of the Mini­
stry of Justice. In matters concerning the re-opening of a criminal case, the 
Court is to be reinforced by the addition of two persons of whom one is to 
be a practising advocate appointed from four candidates proposed by the 
Danish Bar Association and the other a university teacher of jurisprudence 
or a jurist with a special scientific training. These two members, as well as 
the three ordinary members, who are appointed for a term of ten years, are 
eligible for re-appointment, and may not be removed from office except by 
a judgment of a court of law.
Sections 976 and 977 of the Administration of Justice Act lay down the 
grounds on which the resumption ["genoptagelse"] of a criminal case may 
be ordered at the instance respectively of the Public Prosecutor and a 
convicted person. The main ground for the resumption of a case is in both 
instances the existence of new evidence.
In Application No. 343/57,“  the Nielsen Case, the Danish Government 
contended that it was the judgment of the Hojesteret and not the decision of 
Den scerlige Klageret which constituted the "final decision" within the 
meaning of Article 26 of the Convention.26 Den scerlige Klageret, it was
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“  Cf. 2 Yearbook 1958-59, pp. 412 ff.
“  The case is discussed by Ole Espersen: Nogle bem a rkn in g er om  m enneskeret- 
tighedskonventionen og Bjern Schouw  Nielsen sagen, [Some Observations on the Human
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maintained, is an extraordinary court outside the ordinary system of the 
Danish courts of law. Consequently, a petition to the Special Court is not a 
domestic remedy according to the generally recognized rules of international 
law. In particular, a petition to the Special Court cannot be described as an 
appeal and, with regard to the filing of petitions with the Court, the law does 
not impose any time limit. If the Commission were to consider that a petition 
to the Special Court is an extraordinary remedy, criminal cases, dating back 
from many years, could be submitted to the Commission by the simple 
expedient of first petitioning the Special Court in this respect and then 
applying to the Commission within six months from the date of the decision 
of the Special Court. This practice would in the Government’s view give rise 
to the filing with the Special Court of many ill-founded petitions and also to 
the non-application to many Danish criminal cases of the six months time 
limit. A further consequence of the view that the Special Court is an ordinary 
remedy would be that the applicants before lodging a complaint with the 
Commission would have to petition the Special Court. However, this appears 
to be untenable because the Special Court will not normally be competent to 
decide whether the rights guaranteed by the Convention have been infringed. 
For example, complaints relating to the duration of detention or to the judi- 
fication of arrest may be dealt with by the Commission but fall outside the 
competence of the Special Court. On the other hand, the principle function 
of the Special Court, namely the assessment of evidence, falls outside the 
competence of the Commission.27
In its decision on the admissibility, the Commission first established that 
the rule requiring the exhaustion of domestic remedies as a condition of the 
presentation of an international claim is founded upon the principle that the 
Respondent State must first have an opportunity to redress by its own means 
within the framework of its own domestic legal system the wrong alleged to 
have been done to the individual.28 Regarding the case at issue the Commis­
sion held that
Rights Convention and the Bjem Schouw Nielsen Case], UfR 1962 B, pp. 102 ff.; and Niels 
Madsen: "Hypnosemordsagen" for den europaiske menneskerettighedskommission, ['The 
Hypnosis Murder Case" before the European Commission of Human Rights], Juristen 1962, 
pp. 29 ff.
Cf. 2 Yearbook 1958-59. pp. 431 ff.
a  Ibid., at p. 438.
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"... the right to petition the Special Court of Revision for the re-opening of the 
proceedings and an order for a new trial must be considered as having offered to the 
Applicant the possibility of an effective and sufficient legal remedy with regard to 
some of the matters which form the subject of his complaint before the Commission; 
whereas, moreover, the Danish Administration of Justice Act has established the 
Special Court of Revision as a permanent court and has expressly invested it with 
the power to re-open the proceedings and to order a new trial in certain cases and 
on certain specified grounds; whereas, therefore, the right of recourse to the Special 
Court of Revision appears to be an integral and regular part of the Danish system of 
administration of justice in criminal cases; and whereas it follows that, prima facie, 
under the generally recognised rules of international law relating to the exhaustion 
of domestic remedies there does not appear to be any ground for excluding petitions 
to the Special Court of Revision from the remedies which must me exhausted before 
an international tribunal may be seized of the case."29
Accordingly, the Commission held "... that, in applying the provisions of 
Article 26 of the Convention to the present case, the decision of Den scerlige 
Klageret, and not that of the H0jesteret, is to be regarded as the "final 
decision" in the case so far as concerns all those matters with respect to 
which the remedy before the Special Court of revision must be deemed to 
have offered the Applicant the possibility of an effective and sufficient means 
of redress."30
The Commission’s decision in this case appears to be incorrect because 
Den scerlige Klageret only grant the resumption of a case on the basis of a 
discretion in the case.31 However, the Commission partly agreed with the 
Danish Government’s contestation that those parts of the application relating 
to matters regarding to which Den scerlige Klageret is not competent to give 
a remedy must be considered inadmissible, since with respect to those parts 
of the application, the final decision was rendered by the H0jesteret. Thus the 
Commission held that this question is "one which has to be determined in the 
light of the nature and the circumstances of each particular ground of com­
plaint.”32
In Application No. 4311/69 the Danish Government repeated its 
argumentation in the Nielsen Case. Moreover, the Government pointed out 
that when the petition was filed with the Special Court neither the decision
°  Ibid., at pp. 440 ff.
30 Ibid., at pp. 444.
31 Cf. Jacobs (1975). pp. 238 f.
M Cf. 2 Yearbook 1958-59, p. 444.
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of the Hojesteret nor the complaint concerning the High Court proceedings 
could have been made the subject of an application to the Commission; only 
the petition to the Special Court rendered the application to the Commission 
possible. In the words of the Government:
"Such a resuit is manifestly unreasonable. Section 977 of the Administration of 
Justice Act prescribes no time-limit because it is considered undesirable in Danish 
law to bar a case from being resumed if more recent circumstances give rise to 
strong doubts about the correctness of a judgment. But this should not preclude the 
considerations underlying Art. 26 from being applicable in Denmark" (emphasis 
added).33
This use of strong language of the part of the Danish Government seemed 
to have had some effect on the Commission: the Commission was probably 
already on the defensive on this point, although it was not yet prepared to 
revise its decision in the Nielsen Case:
"Whereas, in making this examination, the Commission has in particular taken into 
account its extensive jurisprudence, subsequent to the above decision in the Nielsen 
Case, concerning the relevance, for the purpose of Art. 26, of an application for 
retrial made according to the laws of other Contracting Parties; whereas, in the light 
of this jurisprudence the Commission has considered the question whether or not to 
maintain the principle expressed in the Nielsen Case as regards recourse to the 
Special Court of Revision; whereas, however, in .the present case, the Commission 
has found it undesirable to base its decision on an interpretation of Art 26 different 
from the one adopted in the Nielsen Case and has decided, while leaving the question 
open for consideration in any future case, to pursue its examination of the present 
application on the basis that recourse to the Special Court, in principle, be regarded 
as an effective and sufficient remedy for the purpose of Art. 26 of the Convention" 
(emphasis added).34
However, the Commission did not find that the application concerned matters 
in respect of which the Special Court offered the applicant the possibility of 
an effective and sufficient means of redress, that is, that the Special Court 
lacked competence to rule on the matter - basically alleged procedural errors 
- of which the applicant complained. Accordingly, the application was decla­
red inadmissible.
This decision may be understood to mean that it is not normally required 
that an applicant should petition Den scerlige Klageret in order to exhaust 
domestic remedies within the meaning of Article 26. If the Court has.
”  Cf. 37 Collection, pp. 82 ff., at p. 89.
34 Ibid., at p. 96.
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however, been petitioned, the 6 months limit may be calculated from the 
decision of the Special Court, provided the petition concerns matters of which 
the Special Court is competent.35
Finally, in Application No. 10326/83, also concerning the question 
whether or not the six months period provided for in Article 26 of the Con­
vention should be calculated from the date of the decision of Den scerlige 
Klageret, the Commission accepted the arguments put forward steadily by the 
Danish Government over three decades, that Den scerlige Klageret is an 
extraordinary remedy within the meaning of Article 26 of the Convention. 
Thus the Commission referred to
”... its extensive jurisprudence according to which an application for retrial or similar 
extraordinary remedies cannot, as a general rule, be taken into account in the 
application of Article 26 of the Convention (...] It is true that the Commission has 
sometimes, in view of the particular circumstances of the case concerned, accepted 
a petition to the Special Court of Revision as a remedy to be exhausted under Article 
26 of the Convention [...] In one previous decision [...] however, the Commission ex­
pressly stated that it left the question whether or not recourse to the Special Court 
of Revision is a remedy, within the meaning of Article 26, open for consideration in 
any future case.
In the present case the Commission finds it desirable to base its decision on an 
interpretation of Article 26 consistent with its extensive jurisprudence regarding ap­
plications for retrial and similar remedies. In accordance with this jurisprudence, an 
application to the Special Court of Revision should not normally be taken into con­
sideration as a remedy under Article 26 of the Convention [...]
Consequently, the petition to the Special Court of Revision did not constitute a 
domestic remedy under the generally recognized rules of international law, and the 
decision of that Court cannot be taken into consideration in determining the final 
decision for the purpose of applying the six months’ time-limit laid down in Article 
26. ”36
In Application No. 2385/64 the applicant had failed to appeal against a 
decision taken by the High Court to the Norwegian H0yesterett and, conse­
quently, failed to exhaust domestic remedies. The fact that the applicant 
subsequently lodged a petition for the re-opening ["gjenopptakelse"] of the 
proceedings "was not, having regard to the special preliminary conditions to 
be satisfied, effective and sufficient remedies, and... [did]... not, therefore, 
constitute domestic remedies under the generally recognized rules of
Chapter 17: Article 26 o f the EC HR before the Commission and Court
” Cf. Bernhard & Lehmann (1985), pp. 37 f.
54 Cf. 35 Collection, pp. 218 ff., at pp. 221 f.
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Also in Sweden the re-opening ["resning"3*] of a case is normally not 
considered a remedy which the applicant has to exhaust.39
In Application No. 1739/62*° the applicant had on a number of different 
occasions lodged petitions for the re-opening of civil proceedings to which 
he had been a party in accordance with Chapter 58 of the Swedish Code of 
Procedure. Since it followed from the title of Chapter 58 that the remedies 
mentioned are extraordinary; that the proceedings relating to these remedies 
do not until successful affect the validity of the final decision; and that the 
applicant’s petitions, under the provisions of Swedish law, for a re-opening 
of the case were not effective and sufficient remedies and did not, therefore, 
constitute domestic remedies under the generally recognized rules of 
international law, the Commission found that the six months limit could not 
be calculated from the date of the rejection of the petition of the re-opening 
of the case.
In Application No. 3788/6841 the applicant had failed to observe a time­
limit for bringing an appeal before the Swedish Regeringsratten. However, 
he had lodged an appeal with Riksdagens Ombudsman and Justitiekansleren. 
Subsequently, the applicant requested a restitutio in integrum which was 
dismissed by Regeringsratten. since the applicant had failed to establish that 
he had been unable to make an appeal in time for reasons of bad health. 
Then the applicant filed a complaint with Hógsta Domstolen and the King-in- 
Council who both, for obvious reasons, dismissed the appeal. Finally, the 
applicant requested a re-opening of the case before Regeringsratten which 
was also dismissed.
Since the applicant had failed to lodge an ordinary appeal with Rege­
ringsratten in time, the Commission held that he had not exhausted domestic 
remedies. Neither the request for restitutio in integrum nor the request for a
international law."37
57 Cf. 22 Collection, pp. 85 ff„ at p. 88.
* The Swedish term ”resning“ is here - in accordance with the terminology employed by 
the Commission and Court - translated as “a re-opening of the case". However, the term is 
sometimes translated as "relief for substantive defect". See Gustaf Petrén: Consequences of the 
Ratification of the European Convention on Human Rights, in Sundberg (1986/2), p. 47 note 
15.
"  Cf. Erik Friberg, op.cit., p. 36.
40 Cf. 13 Collection, pp. 99 ff.
41 Ibid., at pp. 56 ff.
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re-opening of the case could substitute the failure to lodge an ordinary 
appeal. The same applied to the complaints lodged with the Hogsta 
Domstolen and the King-in-Council respectively.
Similarly, in Application No. 10537/8342 the Commission considered 
that a request for the re-opening of a case concerning the Government’s 
decision to grant an expropriation permit before Regeringsratten could not 
as a whole be regarded as an effective remedy within the meaning of Article 
26 of the Convention. Accordingly, the decision of Regeringsratten on the 
re-opening could not be taken into account when calculating the six months 
period.
On the contrary, in Application No. 7805/7743 the Commission 
considered whether the applicant’s petition for a re-opening of the case to 
Hdgsta Domstolen was a remedy which needed to be exhausted and, 
consequently, for the calculation of the six months period in Article 26 of the 
Convention.
The Commission first observed that a procedure which is directed 
towards the re-opening of a case or a retrial of its merits is not normally a 
remedy which needs to be exhausted and which can be taken into account for 
the purposes of the six months rule.44 But the Commission then went on:
"In the applicant's case, however, he based his appeal on a provision of the Swedish 
Code of Civil Procedure according to which the Supreme Court may examine 
whether the application of the law [...] was manifestly contrary to the law under 
Chapter 38, Article 1, sub-paragraph 4. Such an appeal is only allowed if brought 
within six months after the decision of the Court in question [...] The appeal was not 
admitted because the case did not disclose any obvious inconsistency with the law. 
If it had been admissible the Supreme Court would have acted further as a court of 
cassation. According to Chapter 58, Sections 6 and 7 of the Swedish Code of Judicial 
Procedure, the Supreme Court may order that a judgment should not be executed 
and, if it admits a case, it may choose to send the matter back to the lower court, or, 
if the case is obvious, the Supreme Court may decide itself. In the Commission's 
case-law, appeals on points of law and pleas of nullity have always been held to be 
important for complying with the requirements of Art 26 [...] Furthermore, since the 
Supreme Court pronounced negatively on the merits of the appeal, any possible
Chapter 17: Article 26 o f the ECHR before the Commission and Court
41 Cf. 44 D.R.. pp. 98 ff.
°  Cf. 16 D.R., pp. 68 ff.
44 See for example Application No. 1739/62, cf. 13 Collection, pp. 99 ff., and Application 
No. 2385/64, cf. 22 Collection, pp. 85 ff.
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remedy would be likely to lack prospects of success. "<s
Consequently, in the circumstances of this application the Commission 
accepted that the applicant’s recourse to Hogsta Domstolen was an effective 
remedy and that the six months period should run from the date of the 
decision of Hogsta Domstolen.
It is difficult to say why the Commission in this case accepted the re­
opening of the case as an effective remedy within the meaning of Article 26. 
The short time-limit as well as Hogsta Domstolen’s possibility of acting as 
Supreme Court proper and not only a court of cassation in the proceedings 
on the re-opening may explain the Commission’s position on this point. 
However, in the light of the Commission’s subsequent case-law (see supra) 
it is probably doubtful whether this decision reflects the present state of law.
17.2.4. Judicial Authorities.
In Application No 4475/7046 the Commission finally was "... fully satisfied, 
for the reasons submitted by the Respondent Government, that the action 
brought by the applicant before...”47 the Swedish Arbetsdomstolen [the 
Labour Court] was an effective and sufficient remedy for the purpose of 
Article 26 of the Convention and that, accordingly, Arbetsdomstolen’s 
judgment in the case constituted the "final decision" from which the six 
months period must be considered as having started to ru a48 The Govern­
ment had strongly submitted that the question at issue was a question of 
interpretation whether the obligation to negotiate set forth in the 1936 Act on 
the Right to Organize and Negotiate meant that the parties must negotiate
45 Cf. 16 D.R., p. 71.
“  Cf. 38 Collection (first decision), pp. 68 ff., and 42 Collection (second decision), pp. 
1 ff.
47 Cf. 42 Collection, p. 13.
“  In its first decision the Commission did not find itself able to decide on the issue under 
Article 26 and found that this issue should be joined to the merits. This was due to the fact
(1) that the question whether Arbetsdomstolen’s decision was the final decision within the 
meaning of Article 26 depended upon the question whether Arbetsdomstolen was, in the 
circumstances, competent to correct the violation of the Convention alleged by the applicant;
(2) this again depended upon the question whether Swedish law and in particular the 1936 Act, 
which bound the Arbetsdomstolen, were in conformity with Article 11 of the Convention; and
(3) this question involved a study of Swedish law and an interpretation of Article 11 and was 
obviously closely linked to this substantial issue whose determination by the Commission 
would depend upon an examination of the merits of the case, cf. 38 Collection p. 76.
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with the intention of concluding a formal agreement. In the Government’s 
view, there was no clear previous jurisprudence in this matter and the pro­
ceedings could not be said to be without any chance of success.
, In the subsequent Applications Nos. 5589/724’ and 5614/7230 the 
Commission took it for granted that the judgment of Arbetsdomstolen was the 
"final decision" within the meaning of Article 26.
In Application No. 6930/7451 the applicant complained about criminal 
proceedings which had been instituted against him and pending between 1959 
and 1964. Subsequently, he instituted civil proceedings for damages. The 
H0yesterett finally rejected this claim in 1974. According to the Norwegian 
Government the civil proceedings for damages introduced by the applicant 
could not be regarded as re-opening the earlier proceedings for the purpose 
of the six months’ rule.
The Commission noted that these civil proceedings did not affect the 
character of the criminal proceedings nor the applicant’s conviction having 
the force res judicata. Moreover, it was true that the Htyesterett could have 
awarded the applicant compensation in 1974, provided that it could be 
assumed that he had a financial loss by reason of the errors committed in 
connection with the criminal proceedings. "In the Commission’s view, 
however, the civil proceedings for damages... [could not]... on the mere 
ground be regarded as an effective and sufficient remedy under the generally 
recognized rules of international law.”52
In Application No. 10873/84 the Commission considered that the issue 
whether the possibility of bringing litigation against the Swedish State under 
the 1974 Tort Liability Act was an effective remedy in regard to the revoca­
tion of a licence to serve alcohol, was a question inseparable from the merits 
of the applicant’s complaint under Article 6(1), and it should therefore not 
be determined under Article 26.53
On the contrary, in Application No. 10371/8354 the Swedish Go-
Chapter 17: Article 26 o f the ECHR before the Commission and Court
*’ Cf. 42 Collection, pp. 123 ff.
50 Cf. 42 Collection, pp. 130 ff.
51 Cf. 9 D.R., pp. 37 ff.
”  Ibid., at p. 39.
” Cf. 44 D.R., pp. 246 ff., at p. 253.
54 Cf. 42 D.R., pp. 127 ff.
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vemment contended that the applicant had not exhausted domestic remedies 
as required by Article 26 of the Convention since he did not, after Jus- 
titiekanslerert had rejected his claim for compensation for his detention, sue 
the State before the ordinary courts claiming compensation for the detention 
based on section 3 of the 1974 Act on Compensation in Case of Restrictions 
on Liberty or the 1972 Tort Liability Act.
The Commission concluded that the applicant could have brought an 
action against the State before the ordinary courts on the basis of the 1974 
Act. Moreover, the Commission was of the opinion that it could not be 
"clearly established" that such an action would "be futile", since there was no 
case-law to support the contention that an action before the courts would be 
meaningless. Consequently, the applicant had not exhausted domestic 
remedies.
17.2.5. The Ombudsmen.
In Application No. 3893/6855 the Commission ruled that a complaint to 
Riksdagens Ombudsman was not an ordinary remedy which should be 
exhausted before lodging a complaint with the Commission. Consequently, 
the decision of the Ombudsman should not be included in the calculation of 
the six months period. Likewise, in Application No. 9959/79,“  in a case 
concerning the Government’s decision to expel the applicant from Sweden 
and in Application No. 10371/83 (see supra section 17.2.4) concerning a 
claim for compensation for the applicant’s detention, the Commission held 
that an examination and decision by Justitiekansleren could not be taken into 
account in the application of Article 26 of the Convention.
In Application No. 11704/85 one of Riksdagens Ombudsman, on his own 
motion, had started an investigation of the matters of which the applicant 
complained to the Commission. The Ombudsman asked the Public Prosecutor 
to make a first examination as to whether there were reasons to institute cri­
minal proceedings against a Deputy Chairman of the Social District Council 
and a President of the Regional Administrative Court After having concluded 
his examination the public prosecutor recommended that criminal proceedings 
be instituted against the said civil servants for misuse of public power and 
negligent exercise of public power. However, in the end the Ombudsman
55 Cf. 33 Collection, pp. 8 ff.
* Cf. 37 D.R., pp. 87 ff.
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decided not to institute any criminal proceedings.
In these circumstances, the Commission considered that, even if it would 
still have been open to the applicant to institute proceedings against the 
Deputy Chairman and the President, such an action could not be regarded as 
a remedy within the meaning of Article 26 of the Convention for the alleged 
violation of Article 8 of the Convention.
17.2.6. Other Administrative Authorities.
In Application No. 4210/6937 the applicant had in general terms complained 
to the Public Prosecutor about the manner in which he was transported from 
a prison to another criminal institution. Since he had not "... raised any com­
plaints in this respect before the competent courts and authorities", the 
Commission held that he had failed to show that he had exhausted remedies 
available to him under Norwegian law.
In Application No. 5525/72 the applicant complained about violations of 
a number of Articles of the Convention in connection with criminal proceed­
ings instituted against him and a subsequent expulsion order. The applicant 
had lodged complaints with the Public Prosecutor and the Chief Constable 
of Stockholm. The Commission found, however, "... that the various com­
plaints made by the applicant or his friends to the police or the Public 
Prosecutor with regard to certain of these matters did not constitute effective 
remedies for the purpose of Article 26 of the Convention.5S
In Application No. 12258/86 the Swedish Government submitted that the 
applicants had failed to exhaust domestic remedies required under Article 26 
of the Convention. They referred to the fact that the applicants did not appeal 
against the building plan which was adopted in 1962. They also submitted 
that if the applicants have failed to appeal against that plan as a result of 
incorrect information allegedly given by the authorities, they could have 
asked for the time-limit for an appeal to be restored. The Government also 
submitted that the applicants could have asked Lansstyrelsen [County 
Administrative Board] to alter the building plan. They further maintained that 
the applicants had themselves prevented a further examination of the matter 
since they had not accepted the development agreement proposed by the 
municipality. Finally, the Government submitted that the applicants had not
Chapter 17: Article 26 o f the ECHR before the Commission and Court
51 Cf. 35 Collection, pp. 144 ff.
“  Cf. 43 Collection, pp. I l l  ff., at pp. 115.
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appealed against the decision of the Building Committee of 24 March 1986.
The Commission noted that the application was not directed against the 
adoption of the building plan in 1962, but against the decision of the Build­
ing Committee of 24 March 1986 refusing the applicants* request for a 
building permit Therefore, the remedies referred to by the Government with 
regard to the building plan and the development agreement could not be 
considered as remedies against this decision. The Commission continued:
'The only submission of non-exhaustion which remains to be examined is the 
allegation that the applicants could have appealed against the decision of the Building 
Committee to the County Administrative Board, had they considered that an 
exemption from the building plan was not necessary or that the issue had not been 
properly handled. The Government admit that no appeal lies against the decision 
insofar as it relates to the refusal to grant an exemption from the building plan. 
However, the applicants do not make any submission to the effect that the application 
for a building permit was incorrectly dealt with or that an exemption from the 
building plan was unnecessary. The applicants appear to admit that such an 
exemption was required.
In these circumstances, the Commission cannot find that there was an effective 
remedy which the applicants failed to exercise. It follows that the application cannot 
be rejected for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies”.59
59 Cf. Report of the Commission, p. 43.
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CHAPTER 18
Article 13 of the European Convention in Pro­
ceedings before the European Commission and Court
18.1 Introduction.
Article 13 of the ECHR provides that:
"Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this Convention are violated 
shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the 
violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.”1
The European Court has laid down that the following general principles are 
of relevance for the interpretation of Article 13:
"(a) where an individual has an arguable claim claim to be the victim of a violation 
of the rights set forth in the Convention, he should have a remedy before a national 
authority in order both to have his claim decided and, if appropriate, to obtain redress 
U ]
(b) the authority referred to in Article 13 need not be a judicial authority but, if it is 
not, the powers and the guarantees which it affords are relevant in determining 
whether die remedy before it is effective [...]
(c) although no single remedy may itself entirely satisfy the requirements of Article 
13* the aggregate of remedies provided for under domestic law may do so [...]
(d) Article 13 does not guarantee a remedy allowing a Contracting State’s laws as 
such to be challenged before a national authority on the ground of being contrary to 
the Convention or equivalent domestic norms..."(emphasis added).2
The Commission has in addition, inter alia, held that
(e) where the highest national court is alleged to have breached the Convention, the 
application of Article 13 is subject to an implied limitation [...] i.e. Article 13 does 
not normally grant a further remedy against acts and decisions by the highest national
1 For a general account, see, for example, Danelius (1989), pp. 158 ff.; Fawceu (1987). 
pp. 289 ff.; and Jacobs (1975), pp. 215 f.
2 Cf. Eur. Court H.R., Leander Case, Series A, Vol. 116 (1987), para. 77. In the case the
Court itself made references to Eur. Court H.R., Case of Silver and Others, Series A, Vol. 61 
(1983), para. 113; and Eur Court H.R., Case of James and Others, Series A. Vol. 98 (1986), 
para. 85.
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court.3
It follows from these general principles that in many cases the application of 
Article 13 involves submissions and considerations on the domestic position 
of the Convention.
For the purposes of this part of the study it is not necessary to go into 
the discussion of how to distinguish between Articles 13 and 26; the 
application of these Articles of the Convention is employed only to illustrate 
the way in which the Scandinavian Governments plead their cases, and how 
the Commission and Court evaluate this argumentation, rather than providing 
an in-depth exposition of the application of the said Articles.
Since the Court on a number of occasions4 has held that Article 13 is 
entirely absorbed in Articles 6(1) and 5(4) and has thus not found it 
necessary to rule on Article 13, it is, for the purpose of this part of the study, 
necessary also to include the application of these Articles in the discussion. 
In many instances the application of Articles 6(1) and 5(4) provide, however, 
due to their more specific character, material which is less illustrative as 
regards the domestic position of the Convention. Accordingly, the sections 
on these Articles are more concentrated than the large number of cases 
concerning in particular Article 6(1) would suggest.
18.2. Article 13.
18.2.1. General Principles.
In the Swedish Engine Drivers’ Union Case (see supra chapter 16) the Court 
held that it does not follow from Article 13 of the Convention that the Con­
tracting States are obliged to incorporate the Convention into domestic law.3
In Application No. 9297/816 the applicant complained that Swedish law 
did not provide him with an effective remedy before a national authority in 
a dispute with the Swedish Television. The Commission found that, as the 
Government decides which company has the right to broadcast programmes
* Ibid.. Report of the Commission, para. 89.
* See for example Eur. Court H.R., Sporrong and Lonnroth Case, Series A, Vol. 52 
(1982), para. 88.
5 Cf. Eur. Court H.R., Swedish Engine Drivers' Union Case, Series A, Vol. 20 (1976),
para. 50.
‘ Cf. 28 D.R., pp. 204 ff.
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and as the rules for that company are laid down either in the Radio Act or 
in an agreement with the Government, envisaged by the Radio Act, it was in 
fact the effect of legislation or what may be delegated legislation that were 
the main objects of the applicant’s complaints (see supra section 18.1). 
Accordingly, Article 13 was not applicable to the case.
On the other hand, in Application No. 8811/79 the applicants complained 
that under domestic Swedish law they were forbidden from punishing their 
children corporally. The Government questioned in their submissions whether 
the applicants were victims within the meaning of Article 25 of the 
Convention.
The Commission referred to its own case-law in which it had constantly 
held that the very existance of legislation may justify an applicant’s claim to 
being a victim within the meaning of Article 25 of a violation of one of its 
normative provisions where the legislation continously and directly affects 
him. Then, it was held:
"In the present case the applicants are all parents who have the custody of children. 
They are therefore all ipso facto affected by the provisions of the Code of 
Parenthood and, in the light of their firm religious convictions as to the ap­
propriateness of physical chastisement of children by their parents they are, in the 
Commission’s view clearly affected by the provisions of the Code and the state of 
criminal law in Sweden which they submit criminalizes behaviour which they regard 
necessary and proper.”7
18.2.2. Judicial Remedies.
In Application No. 10465/83 the Commission held that the possibility of 
lodging a separate appeal with the Swedish Administrative Courts against 
decisions by Sociala Distriksnamnden [the Social District Council] concern­
ing religious upbringing in a foster home was an "effective remedy" within 
the meaning of Article 13 of the Convention.
In Application No. 11704/85 the Commission found that Article 13 did 
not require a further remedy to Regeringsrdtten in a case where the applicant 
had had the possibility of lodging an appeal against a provisional care order 
first to the Ldnsratt and then to the Kammarrdtt.
In Applications Nos. 9278/81 and 9415/81 following the Alta Case 
before the H0yesterett (see supra section 6.3) the applicants, two Lapps who 
had been demonstrating against the construction of a hydroelectric power
7 Cf. 29 D R.. p. 104 ff.. at p. 109.
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station on the Alta river and subsequently fined for refusing to obey an order 
from the police to leave the square in front of the Norwegian Parliament, 
where the demonstration was held, stated that when the demonstrations took 
place, the Norwegian Government had already decided to start the works. 
They submitted that it would have been impossible for them to institute court 
proceedings claiming that they were the legal possessor of this particular part 
of Norway. Even if they had instituted such proceedings, the applicants 
submitted that the works would probably have been finished by the time the 
final court decision would have been taken or, at least, much damage would 
have been done. Hence the applicants maintained that they had no effective 
remedy under domestic Norwegian law.®
The Commission first recalled that, as a result of the Government’s 
decision to implement the Alta project, the responsible State authority bro­
ught the necessary action before the Alta District Court, for the determination 
of the compensation to be paid, and other measures to be ordered. The 
District Court’s judgment was subsequently reviewed by the H0yesterett, 
sitting in plenary session, who confirmed the judgment of the District Court, 
cf. NRt. 1982.241. In these proceedings the applicants could, in the Commis­
sion’s view, have presented any claims they might have had in connection 
with the Alta river project. It would also have been open to them to institute 
separate court proceedings with regard to such claims. Consequently, the ap­
plicants had had an effective remedy within the meaning of Article 13 of the 
Convention.9
18.2.3. Administrative Remedies.
In Application No. 10801/84 concerning involuntary commitment to a mental 
hospital, the Swedish Government submitted that Utsktivningsndmnden [the 
Discharge Council] and Psykiatriska Ndmnden [the Psychiatric Council] 
satisfied the condition of an "effective remedy" within the meaning of Article 
18.10 The Commission did not, however, rule on this point since it found 
that it followed from the terms of the applicant's submissions that it was 
basically the legislation as such that she was attacking. Insofar as the 
application could be understood to concern lack of an effective remedy for
Chapter 18: Article 13 o f the ECHR before the Commission and Court
' Cf. 35 D.R.. p. 30 ff., at p. 34.
' Ibid., at p. 37.
10 Cf. Report of the Commission, para. 91.
328
Administrative Remedies
an alleged violation of Article 8 of the Convention, the applicant could not 
be said to have an "arguable claim" of a violation of Article 8, since the 
Commission had held the Article 8 complaint "manifestly ill-founded".11 
However, in its decision on the admissibility, the Commission had found that 
the aforesaid submissions raised ”... issues of fact and law which are of such 
importance that their determination should depend upon an examination of 
the merits.”12
In Application No. 9330/8113 the Swedish Government submitted that 
the applicant had a remedy to the Government against a decision to expel 
him, and to Regeringsratten against a decision to hold him in custody. They 
maintained that Article 13 of the Convention does not require a further 
remedy for the enforcement of a decision which has already been examined 
by the authorities. Moreover, in any event the applicant could have brought 
a criminal action or a civil action against any public servant for misuse of 
office or careless misuse of office under Chapter 20, section 1, of the Swe­
dish Penal Code, if the applicant had been harmed by any act or omission by 
such a servant. In such proceedings the applicant could have claimed damag­
es. The Government, concluded, therefore, that the applicant had an effective 
remedy, and that the complaint was manifestly ill-founded.
After having carried out a preliminary examination of the issues raised, 
the Commission considered that the complaint raised several issues of fact 
and law, which were of such an important and complex nature that their 
determination should depend upon a further examination of the merits. 
However, a friendly settlement was subsequently reached, and the Commis­
sion did not get the opportunity to rule on this point. It was part of this 
settlement that the Government should appoint a Commissioner to deal with 
"... the question of a remedy on the enforcement stage of an expulsion order" 
and "... to propose such new rules for which the analysis may give cause”.14
11 Ibid., para. 93. Similarly, the applicant complained that the Discharge Council and the 
Psychiatric Council were not "tribunals" or "courts" within the meaning of Articles 6(1) and 
5(4) but, since the Commission did not find that these provisions were applicable to the 
question at issue, it did not have to rule on this point.
12 Cf. 45 D.R.. p. 189.
,3 Cf. 35 D.R.. pp. 57 ff.; and 39 D.R., pp. 75 ff.
M Cf. 39 D.R., p. 79.
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In the Leander Case,15 concerning the use of information kept in a 
secret police-register when assessing a person’s suitability for employment 
in a post of importance for national security, the Swedish Government argued 
that Swedish law offered sufficient remedies for the purpose of Article 13, 
namely
(a) a formal application for the post, and, if unsuccessful, an appeal to the 
Government;
(b) a request to the National Police Board for access to the secret police-register on 
the basis of the Freedom of Press Act, and, if refused, an appeal to the administrative 
courts;
(c) a complaint to Justitiekansleren;
(d) a complaint to Riksdagens Ombudsman
As regards Riksdagens Ombudsman and Justitiekansleren the Court noted that
(1) these officials had competence to receive individual complaints, and that 
they had the duty to investigate such complaints in order to ensure that the 
relevant laws had been applied properly; (2) in the performance of their 
duties, both officials had access to all the information contained in the secret 
police-register, and (3) in the present context both officials must be 
considered independent from the Government.17
Although the opinions of Riksdagens Ombudsman and Justitiekansleren 
by tradition command great respect in Swedish society and in practice are 
usually followed, the Court stressed that both officials, apart from their 
competence to institute criminal and disciplinary proceedings, lack the power 
to render legally binding decisions. However, the Court did not state ex­
plicitly whether or not it found that Riksdagens Ombudsman or Justi­
tiekansleren were sufficient remedies for the purpose of Article 13, but it 
follows from the context that the Court did not, just as the Commission did 
not,1* find that these remedies were sufficient under Article 13.
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15 Cf. Eur Court H.R., Leander Case, Series A, Vol. 116 (1987).
"  Ibid., at para. 80.
17 Ibid., at para. 81.
"  In its decision on the admissibility, the Commission found that neither a formal 
application for the post nor a request to the national Police Board for access to the secret 
police-register were “effective and sufficient" remedies which the applicant ought to have
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Similarly, the Court was not clear in its reasoning whether a complaint 
to the Government was an "effective remedy" within the meaning of Article 
18. On the one hand, the Court recalled that the authority referred to in 
Article 13 need not necessarily be a judicial authority in the strict sense. Thus 
it found that there could be "... no question about the power of the Govern­
ment to deliver a decision binding on the Board". On the other hand, the 
Court ruled that
”[e]ven if, taken on its own, the complaint to the Government were not considered 
sufficient to ensure compliance with Article 13, the Court finds that the aggregate of 
the remedies set out above [...] satisfies the conditions of Article 13 in the particular 
circumstances of the instant case..."19
The Court’s reasoning in this case is not consistent As stressed by judge 
Ryssdal in his dissenting opinion,20 the Government did not adress the ap­
plicant’s basic grievance under the Convention. Even if the requirements of 
secrecy did not permit him to be given the opportunity of commenting on the 
adverse material kept on him in the register, Article 13 guaranteed him a 
right of access to a "national authority" having competence to examine 
whether his Convention grievance was justified or not Against this back­
ground, and since the Court held that neither Riksdagens Ombudsman nor 
Justitiekansleren could be regarded as such remedies, the applicant did not 
have an efefctive remedy before a national authority. In other words, as 
pointed out in the partially dissenting opinion of judges Pettiti and Russo,"... 
ineffective remedies cannot amount to an effective remedy where, as in the 
instant case, their respective shortcomings do not cancel each other but are 
cumulative".21 Or, as another observer has expressed it, the Court’s rea­
soning could be described as 0 + 0 + 0 + 0 = l.22
However, it may be concluded from these judgments that neither 
Justitiekansleren nor Riksdagens Ombudsman are effective remedies within
exhausted, cf. 34 D.R.t p. 85.
19 Ibid., at para. 84.
20 Ibid., at p. 34.
21 Ibid, at p. 35.
22 Cf. Peter Germer Administrative Secrecy under the European Convention on Human 
Rights in Secrecy and Openness: Individuals, Enterprises and Public Administration, The 
Proceedings of the Seventeenth Colloquy on European Law, Zaragoza 21-23 October 1987, 
Strasbourg (1988), pp. 61 ff., at p. 71.
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the meaning of Article 13, whereas a complaint to the Government, in a 
system like the Swedish one, may in certain circumstances be an effective 
remedy in this sense.
In the Eriksson Case23 the Swedish Government submitted that the applicant had an 
effective remedy against decisions taken by Sociala Distriksnamnden since the 
activity of the Council is subject to supervision by Riksdagens Ombudsman whose 
functions and powers are basically laid down in Chapter 12, section 6, of the Instru­
ment of Government and the 1975 Act on the Instruction to the Riksdagens 
Ombudsman. The Ombudsman is elected by Parliament, and one of his particular 
dudes is to ensure that the fundamental rights and freedoms of citizens are not 
encroached upon in the process of administration. In fulfilling this duty, he is 
empowered to receive complaints lodged by individuals, to carry out the inspections 
and investigations he considers necessary, and to render decisions in which he states 
his opinion as to whether a measure or omission on the part of an authority or an 
official is illegal or otherwise inappropriate. The Ombudsman is also vested with the 
authority to prosecute officials or initiate disciplinary measures against them.24
Since the Commission had found a violation of Article 6(1) of the Convention, 
and "... the requirements of Article 13 are less strict than, and are here absorbed by, 
those of Article 6(1 )"(see infra section 18.3), the Commission did not find it 
necessary to examine whether the supervision of Riksdagens Ombudsman is an 
effective remedy within the meaning of Article 18.
In the Sporrong and Lonnroth Case the applicants submitted, inter alia, that 
Swedish law did not provide them with an effective remedy against a 
Government decision granting an expropriation permit. This applied even if 
the decision later proved to be in conflict with either the Swedish law or the 
Convention.25
The Government first explained "... that Sweden had a dualistic system 
in that international agreements did not become directly and automatically 
part of Swedish domestic law. The normal procedure was to transform the 
international convention into a Swedish act which was then the instrument 
which was to be applied by the Swedish public authorities."26 In the 
Government’s view this procedure was compatible as such with the 
Convention, since the Court had ruled that Article 13 does not require that
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23 Cf. Eur. Court H.R., Eriksson Case, Series A, Vol. 156 (1989).
24 Ibid., Report of the Commission, para. 178.
23 Cf. Eur. Court H.R., Sporrong and Lonnroth Case, Series B, Vol. 46 (1986), Report of 
the Commission, para. 51.
26 Ibid., at para. 83.
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the national authority shall examine a complaint with direct reference to the 
Convention, it being sufficient that the national law contains rules which in 
substance correspond to the provisions of the Convention (see supra chapter 
16).
In the next place the Government submitted that under Swedish 
administrative law the Government takes a number of purely administrative 
decisions of a basically legal nature. Sometimes these decisions were taken 
upon appeal from lower administrative bodies and sometimes in the first 
instance. Insofar as these decisions were taken in application of laws enacted 
by Parliament and duly promulgated, the Government was legally obliged to 
observe any conditions, procedures or other rules which might be laid down 
by the law in question. Therefore, when exercising functions of this kind, the 
Government was not acting as a purely political body but rather as a quasi­
judicial body which had to make an examination of the concrete case on the 
basis of the law.27
Finally it was submitted that when the Government was acting upon 
appeal from a lower administrative agency, such an appeal was an effective 
remedy of the kind dealt with in Article 18. Consequently, "... when, in 
certain circumstances, a person is given the privilege of having his case 
examined in the first instance by the highest and most qualified body of the 
land, he should not then be able to claim a further general appeal from that 
body."28
Regarding these submissions the Commission first held that Article 13 
did not guarantee a remedy allowing the national laws as such to be 
challenged before a national authority (see supra section 18.1). Then the 
Commission held that:
"158. In the opinion of the Commission, however, neither the Government’s above 
argument, nor the text of Article 13 itself can be taken as a basis for such a 
restriction of the right set out in that Article which is guaranteed "notwithstanding 
that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity". Even 
if these words are seen as an element suggesting that the scope and purpose of the 
Article is not unlimited, they do not restrict it to acts committed at lower levels of 
the State, or by persons acting individually rather than as members of higher or 
lower corporate bodies. The Commission considers that the purpose of Article 13 
would only be met if a "national authority" were in some way competent to apply
v  Ibid., at para. 84.
a  Ibid., at para. 87.
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the Convention or corresponding principles of national law effectively as a corrective 
against alleged violations resulting from administrative decisions taken at any level."
Thus, when the Government is the first and only instance - be that a privilege 
or not - Article 13 requires that a further remedy is available.
However, in the alternative the Government forwarded the "theory" that 
one might say that "... the first decision to include the applicant’s properties 
in an expropriation plan or to prolong the validity of such a plan, was not the 
decision taken by the Government but the decision taken by the municipal 
authority."29 Since the first decision with regard to the expropriation permits 
or prolongations thereof might not be that of the Government but that of the 
municipal authority, it was possible to launch an appeal against this decision. 
When the municipal authority decided to ask the Government for an 
expropriation permit, such a decision by the authority might be attacked in 
the form of an appeal first with L&nsstyrelsen and subsequently with 
Regeringsrdtten. According to Swedish law, one ground of appeal that could 
be invoked in such a case was that the decision of the municipal body 
violated individual rights. If this appeal was accepted by the Board or the 
Court, the result would be that the decision of the municipal authority to ask 
for an expropriation limit would be quashed.
Regarding this "theory" the Commission stated:
”160. The Commission cannot accept the preceding arguments put forward by the 
Government...
161. The Commission is furthermore of the opinion that the decision of the City 
Council to expropriate properties must be considered to be a mere preliminary step 
in the administrative procedure which may eventually lead to the granting by the 
Government of a permit to expropriate [...] It is within the exclusive competence of 
the Government to grant an expropriation permit and, in so doing, they act as an 
organ of first and final instance. Therefore, it cannot be considered that, in being 
seized with a demand for an expropriation permit, the Government would act as an 
instance of appeal and thereby constitute a remedy within the meaning of Article 13 
of the Convention.
162. It is true, in the next place, that apart from the normal procedure considered in 
the preceding paragraph, there is, in principle, a right to lodge a municipal appeal 
against decisions taken by the municipal council [...] However, it is of importance 
to note in this context that the decisions of the municipal council are not communi- 
catcd to the persons affected by them. What is announced on the municipal notice
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board is merely that the minutes concerning the decision taken have been approved, 
as well as the place where the minutes can be consulted. Furthermore, the right to 
lodge a municipal appeal to the County Administrative Board and to the Supreme 
Administrative Court is circumscribed and the competence of these bodies does not 
extent to the whole field envisaged by Article 18. The Commission observes more­
over that it has not been shown that a municipal appeal has ever successfully been 
made against a decision of a municipality to apply to the Government for an ex­
propriation permit or for an extension of the validity of an already existing permit 
The respondent Government have in this respect even admitted that they are not 
aware of any case where such an appeal has been lodged. In these circumstances, the 
Commission considers that the mere theoretical possibility of bringing an appeal can 
be disregarded for the purpose of Article 13 of the Convention. In the light of these 
facts the Commission concludes that a municipal appeal cannot either be considered 
to be a separate effective remedy within the meaning of Article 18."
Consequently, the Commission found that Article 13 of the Convention had 
been violated. The Court did not rule on this point since it found, like the 
minority of the Commission, that Article 6(1) had been violated in the case.
18.3. Article 6(1).
18.3.1. Introduction.
Article 6(1) of the Convention reads as follows:
"In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge 
against him, everyone is entided to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time 
by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be 
pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the 
trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic socie­
ty, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties 
so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the Court in special 
circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice.”
This paragraph establishes the principle of fair hearing in certain judicial 
proceedings - namely those concerning "the determination of his civil rights 
and obligations or of any criminal charges against him” - and rules of publi­
city of those proceedings. The reason why Article 6(1) frequently absorbs the 
Article 13 complaint is that "a fair and public hearing within a reasonable 
time by an independent and impartial tribunal” is a narrower concept than ”an 
effective remedy before a national authority” (see supra section 18.1).
18.3.2. The Composition o f "Tribunals”
In Application No. 9893/82 concerning the proceedings on the award of 
parental custody over a young child the applicant submitted that it was con-
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trary to Article 6(1) of the Convention that a Kredsret [Regional Court] in 
Greenland had consisted in one session of the ordinary judge and two lay 
judges, of whom one was the local Head of the Social Authorities and knew 
the applicant and the mother of the child through the applicant’s many 
previous unsuccessful attempts to obtain access to the child. Since this lay 
judge, as Head of the Social Authorities, had agreed to the Social Authori­
ties’ refusals to help him against the mother, he could not possibly make any 
impartial decisions in this case.30
The Commission noted that the Head of the Social Authorities had only 
acted in the first court session as lay judge. Furthermore, none of the parties 
was present and no decision concerning the case was taken. Taking this into 
consideration, the Commission found that this part of the application was 
manifestly ill-founded.31
In Application No. 10873/84 the Commission ruled that Lansstyrelsen 
and Socialstyrelsen [the National Board of Health and Welfare] were ad­
ministrative organs and thus did not constitute a "tribunal” for the purposes 
of Article 6(1).
Moreover, in the case the Government had suggested that the applicant 
under the Swedish Tort Liability Act could have brought the case before an 
ordinary court and allege that the authorities, having made a decision in an 
administrative matter, had made mistakes or had taken decisions which are 
contrary to domestic law. The Commission found, however, that th e "... court 
action suggested by the Government would relate to whether the authorities 
had been negligent or at fault and not to whether the licence should have 
been revoked..." Therefore, this kind of proceedings were not sufficient for 
the purposes of Article 6(1) in the case at issue.32
The Sporrong and Lonnroth Case33 (see supra section 18.2) was the 
first case in which the Swedish administrative system was challenged under 
Article 6(1) of the Convention. In Sweden in a number of different types of 
cases - those with the most important political or financial implications • the 
Government has traditionally been either the first and only instance or the
Chapter 18: Article 13 o f the ECHR before the Commission and Court
“  Cf. 37 D.R., pp. 50 ff„ at p. 56.
”  Ibid.
”  Cf. Report of the Commission, para. 143.
33 Cf. Eur. Court H.R., Sporrong and Lonnroth Case, Series A, Vol. 52 (1982).
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appeal instance. No ordinary appeal existed under this system against deci­
sions taken by the Government.
In the case at issue the Swedish Government had under the Expropriation 
Act granted an expropriation permit and upheld a decision taken by 
Lansstyrelsen imposing a prohibition on construction on the applicants’ 
properties. The question was then whether the proceedings before the 
Government or - as submitted by the Government - the possibility of a re­
opening of the case before Regeringsrdtten fulfilled the requirements set forth 
in Article 6(1). The Court, in contrast to the Commission, answered this 
question in the negative:
"86. The Government’s decisions on the issue and extension of the permits are not 
open to appeal before the administrative courts.
Admittedly, owners can challenge the lawfulness of such decisions by requesting 
the Supreme Administrative Court to re-open the proceedings. However, they must 
in practice rely on grounds identical or similar to those set out in Chapter 58, Article 
1, of the Code of Judicial Procedure [...] Furthermore, this is an extraordinary 
remedy - as the Government admitted - and is exercised but rarely. When con­
sidering the admissibility of such an application, the Supreme Administrative Court 
does not examine the merits of the case; at that stage, it therefore does not undertake 
a full review of measures affecting a civil right [...] It is only where the Supreme 
Administrative Court has declared the application admissible that such a review can 
be affected, either by that court itself or, if it has referred the case back to a court 
or authority previously dealing with the matter, by the latter court or authority. In 
short, the said remedy did not meet the requirements of Article 6 § 1."
In a number of subsequent applications both the Commission and Court has, 
in a more or less similar language in the different cases, held "... that 
proceedings before the Government did not constitute proceedings before a 
tribunal within the meaning of Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention", since no 
ordinary appeal to the courts lies against such a decision of the Government. 
Accordingly, this applies to cases concerning:
(1) The granting and extension of expropriation permits (Sporrong and Lônnroth 
Case (see supra), Bodén Case54 and Application No. 10537/83).
(2) The imposition and maintenance in force of building/construction prohibitions 
(Sporrong and Lônnroth Case (see supra) and Allan Jacobsson Case ).
* Cf. Eur. Court H.R., Bodén Case, Series A. Vol. 125 (1987), para 35.
”  Cf. Eur. Court H.R., AUan Jacobsson Case, Series A. Vol. 163 (1989), paras. 75-77.
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(3) The adoption of building plans (Application No. 11309/84).54
(4) Revocation of a licence to provide interurban public transportation (Pudas 
Case31) ”
(5) Revocation of a licence to serve alcoholic beverages (Tre Traktorer AB Case**)
(6) Permission to run classes in private schools (Application No. 11533/85).
(7) Permission to acquire agricultural land (Applications Nos. 11855/85 and 
12782/87).
(8) An order to plant trees on one’s own property (Application No. 12570/86).
Not only the lack of possibilities of appeal against administrative decisions 
within the Swedish administrative system has been challenged before the 
European Commission and Court, but also the question of whether certain 
(quasi-) judicial bodies arc "independent and impartial" tribunals has been 
dealt with by the Commission and Court.
In Applications Nos. 8588/79 and 8589/7940 the question was whether, 
in a case concerning a dispute over the prices of some minority shares, which 
the majority shareholder was legally entitled to buy, compulsory proceedings 
before three arbitrators by virtue of the Swedish Arbitration Act without 
recourse to the ordinary courts, fulfilled the requirements to "an independent 
and impartial tribunal” as set forth in Article 6(1) of the Convention.41
The Commission first stated that Article 6(1) prescribes that the hearing 
must take place before an "independent and impartial tribunal". It observed 
that there is a functional relationship between independence and impartiality, 
the former being essentially a precondition for the latter.42
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34 See also Application No. 12258/86 concerning a building permit where Bygg-
nadsnamnden [the Building Committee) decided the case in the last instance.
v  Cf. Eur. Court H.R., Pudas Case, Series A. Vol. 125 (1987), para. 40.
“  See also Application No. 12213/86 in which an appeal could be lodged with the central
Board of Transport
”  Cf. Eur. Court H.R., Tre Trakidrer AB Case, Series A, Vol. 159 (1989), para. 48.
40 Cf. 38 D.R.. pp. 31 ff.
41 For further information on the case, see Jacob W.F. Sundberg: Human Rights in Sweden. 
The Annual Reports 1982-1984, Stockholm (1985), pp. 64 ff.
42 Ibid., at para. 33.
338
The Composition o f ’Tribunals"
As regards the case at issue, the Commission held that the applicant had 
not produced conclusive evidence establishing bias on the part of one or 
other of the arbitrators, i.e. the arbitrators were considered impartial. Hence 
the question was whether the arbitrators were independent
"35. With regard to the criterion of independence, the Commission emphasizes that 
it is not sufficient that the arbitrators were in fact independent. Their independence 
must be seen by all to be incontrovertible. The Commisision recalls in this respect 
that the maxim of English law "justice must not only be done; it must also be seen 
to be done", expresses an idea contained in Article 6(1) of the Convention."
The Commission then examined whether the Arbitration Board was 
independent of the Executive as well as of the parties of the case. Both 
questions were in principle answered in the affirmative. However, the 
Commission stated that"... in the arbitration system designed for dealing with 
the compulsory purchase of shares, it is inevitable that the Arbitration 
Board’s independence from one of the parties cannot always be guaranteed. 
In regard to their relationship with the arbitrators they have themselves ap­
pointed. the parties may not always be an equal footing.”43 This led the 
Commission to the following conclusion:
39. The above considerations show the importance of pre-established courts to which 
are appointed judges who are totally unconnected with the case they are to hear. The 
tribunals referred to in Article 6 of the Convention are of this kind in the Contracting 
States. The Commission does not rule out the possibility of exceptions in specific 
procedures. On this assumption it considers that there must be a rigorous guarantee 
of equality between the parties in regard to the influence they exercise on the 
composition of the court An examination of the facts reveals that such equality did 
not prevail in this case."
Consequently, the Commission found that Article 6(1) had been violated in 
the case.44
In the Langborger Case45 the main question was whether Bostadsdomsto- 
len [the Swedish Housing and Tenancy Court], in the case at issue sitting
°  Ibid., at para. 37.
44 The Swedish Parliament subsequently passed an amendment to the legislation according 
to which a party not satisfied with a decision of the arbitrators was entided to start a 
procedure before an ordinary court, cf. Resolution DH (84) 4 of the Committee of Ministers, 
cf. 38 D.R., p. 43.
45 Cf. Eur. Court H.R., Langborger Case, Series A, Vol. 155 (1989).
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with four judges, two lawyers, one of whom had a casting vote, and two lay 
assessors representing the Federation of Property Owners and the National 
Tenants Union respectively, was "an independent and impartial tribunal” 
when dealing with a dispute between, on the one side, an individual and, on 
the other, the essentially common interests of the Federation and the National 
Union of maintaining a negotiation clause in lease contracts. The Court 
answered this question in the negative, since
”33. The proceedings instituted in the House and Tenacy Court concerned essentially 
the question whether the negotiation clause was to be retained... and not how it was 
to be applied (the fixing of the rent payable by Mr Langborger).
34. Because of their specialised experiance, the lay assessors, who sit on the Housing 
and Tenancy Court with professional judges, appear in principle to be extremely well 
qualified to participate in the udjudication of disputes between landlords and tenants 
and the specific questions which may arise in such disputes. This does not, however, 
exclude the possibility that their independence and impartiality may be open to doubt 
in a particular case.
35. In the present case there is no reason to doubt the personal impartiality of the lay 
asssessors in the absence of any proof.
As regards their objective impartiality and the question whether they presented 
an appearance of independence, however, the Court notes that they had been 
nominated by, and had close links with, two associations which both had an interest 
in the continued existence of the negotiation clause. As the applicant sought the 
deletion from the lease of this clause, he could legitimately fear that the lay assessors 
had a common interest contrary to his own and therefore that the balance of interests, 
inherent in the Housing and Tenancy Court’s composition in other cases, was liable 
to be upset when the court came to decide his own claim.
The fact that the House and Tenancy Court also included two professional 
judges, whose independence and impartiality are not in question, makes no difference 
in this respect/
Accordingly, the Court found that in the specific circumstances of this case 
the Housing and Tenancy Court was not an "independent and impartial 
tribunal" within the meaning of Article 6 of the Convention.46 Although the 
circumstances of this case were to some extent special, it seems likely that
46 In Application No. 10144/82, cf. 33 D.R., p. 278, the Commission held that the 
procedure by which a tenant’s association requests the competent authority, in the last instance 
Bostadsdomstolen, to designate, as provided for in the relevant Swedish legislation, a special 
manager for a building, does not involve civil rights and obligations.
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this decision in the long run may have some far-reaching consequences for 
the Scandinavian legal systems where it is very common to set up different 
bodies with (judicial) decision-making power in specific areas with the par­
ticipation of lay members representing interest organizations. This applies in 
panicular to the labour system.
18.3.3. The Procedure before the 'Tribunal”.
In Application No. 10515/8347 the Commission held that Article 6(1) of the 
Convention only provides certain guarantees in cases relating to the 
determination of civil rights and obligations or of a criminal charge. 
Therefore, this provision does not apply to the proceedings in which Hogsta 
Domstolen, without entering on the merits, refused leave to appeal against a 
decision of the Hovratt.
The question of the obligation to hold an oral hearing before the Hovratt 
in minor cases was dealt with in the Ekbatani Case.™ The applicant had 
been imposed 30 day fines, each of 20 SEK, in the Tingsratt. He appealed 
against this sentence to the Hovrdtt which, contrary to the applicant’s request, 
rejected the holding of an oral hearing and upheld the Tingsratt’s sentence. 
The Government pleaded that, although there was no oral hearing before the 
Hovratt, there was a "public hearing" within the meaning of Article 6(1) of 
the Convention since under the Swedish Freedom of the Press Act - which 
forms part of the Swedish Constitution - anybody has the right to have access 
to the written submissions of the courts.
However, neither the Commission nor the Court shared the Government’s 
view. Thus the Court explained that, provided there has been a public hearing 
at first instance, the absence of "public hearings" before a second or third in­
stance may be justified by the special features of the proceedings at issue. In 
this case
”... the Court of Appeal was called upon to examine the case as to the facts and the 
law. In particular, it had to make a full assessment of the question of the applicant’s 
guilt or innocence [...] The only limitation on its jurisdiction was that it did not have 
the power to increase the sentence imposed by the City Court.
However, the above-mentioned question was the main issue for determination 
also before the Court of Appeal. In the circumstances of the present case that
47 Cf. 40 D.R.. pp. 258 ff.
4* Cf. Eut. Court H.R., Ekbatani Case, Series A, Vol. 134 (1988).
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question could not, as a matter of fair trail, have been properly determined without 
a direct assessment of the evidence given in person by the applicant - who claimed 
that he had not committed the act alleged to constitute the criminal offence {...] - and 
by the complainant Accordingly, the Court of Appeal’s re-examination of Mr. Ek- 
batani’s conviction at first instance ought to have comprised a full rehearing of the 
applicant and the complainant.
The limitations on the Court of Appeal’s powers as a result of the prohibition of 
reformatio in pejus related only to sentencing. They cannot be considered to be 
relevant to the principal issue before the Court of Appeal, namely the question of 
guilt or innocence. Neither can the fact that the case-file was available to the 
public.4*
Accordingly, the Court held that there had been a violation of Article 6(1) of 
the Convention.
As pointed out in the different dissenting opinions in the case, Swedish 
law gives a defendant a limited right of appeal which goes beyond what is 
required by Article 6 of the Convention; furthermore, not even Article 2 of 
Protocol No. 7 requires that an appeal to a higher tribunal should be available 
since in this instance the offence was "of a minor character". Thus, the 
limitation on the appeal procedure was that the appellate court would be able 
to decide the case without a hearing where it did not consider one to be 
necessary on the basis of the facts as established by the lower court and the 
court’s application of the law. Moreover, in the case there was a prohibition 
of reformation in pejus where the appeal had been lodged by the defendant.
As pointed out by judge Thdr Vilhjalmsson in his dissenting opinion,"... 
it is not in the interest of justice to deny to appellate courts the possibility of 
dispensing with a lull rehearing of a case concerning a minor offence, even 
when they are called upon to decide both questions of fact and of law."50 
Thus, there is a lot to be said in favour of the assertation that the Court had 
gone too far in its application of Article 6(1) in this case, when holding that 
the applicant was not given a fair trial.
Similarly, in Application No. 11464/85 the Commission admitted an ap­
plication in which the applicant had been denied an oral hearing before the 
Kammarratt in a case concerning the imposition of a so-called special charge 
(tax supplement) on the applicant A friendly settlement was subsequently 
reached, so the Commission did not have to rule on the the merits of the
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case.
In Application No. 11855/85 the Commission held that a sale of a real 
estate which was conducted publicly by Kronofogdemyndigheten [the 
Enforcement Office] "... was not a procedure by which a court determined 
"civil rights" and, consequently. Article 6 of the Convention did not apply to 
that sale”.M The Commission then observed ”... that the Court of Appeal 
was the first and only judicial body which examined the merits of the 
applicants’ complaint against the public auction."
It considered, therefore, ”... that the applicant was entitled to a public 
hearing before that Court, since none of the grounds listed in the second 
sentence of Article 6 para. 1 could have justified an exception from the rule 
in the first sentence”.32 This applied even though the applicants had not re­
quested a hearing before the Hovrâtt, since the applicable procedural rules 
would not have secured them a hearing if they had requested to have one, 
since ”... the Court is not obliged to hold a hearing if the party requests it 
and there is nothing to suggest that, in the present case, such a request would 
have been granted had it been made.”53
A minority of the Commission found, on the other hand, that the "... 
failure to request a hearing should therefore be interpreted as tacit approval 
of the appeal being examined by the Court without a hearing."
In Application No. 10729/83 the applicant challenged the so-called "test 
case method" under Article 6(1) of the Convention. The applicant had 
brought a civil action against the manufacturer of a pharmaceutical product 
and the doctor who prescribed i t  She alleged that the product had damaged 
her health. On the 10 April 1981 the Court in the applicant’s case decided to 
adjourn the main hearing pending the outcome of these "test cases" before a 
different court. The applicant complained several times about this decision.
'Final judgment in the "test case" was given on 22 December 1982; the plain­
tiffs lost. Before the Commission, the applicant complained of the length of 
the proceedings.
The Swedish Government advanced several arguments in favour of this 
"test case method". The most convincing one was, however, that the 
Commission itself on several occasions had resorted to this method. In these
51 Cf. Report of the Commission, para 138.
52 Ibid.. at para. 139.
53 Ibid., at para. 148.
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circumstances it was difficult for the Commission not to agree with the 
Government. Accordingly, it held
"In principle, the Commission is thus prepared to accept the pilot case method 
adopted by the Swedish courts. A condition for finding this method acceptable in the 
circumstances of the present case is however that the pilot case could be said to have 
been a case of substantial significance for the outcome of the applicant’s action 
before the District Court"54
18.3.4. Other Questions relating to Article 6(1).
In Application No. 9707/8253 the Commission essentially held that a three 
years time-limit from the birth of the child for instituting paternity pro­
ceedings did not disclose any appearance of a violation of Article 6(1) of the 
Convention.
A rather peculiar situation as to the interpretation of Article 6(1) was 
present in the Eriksson Case.56 The question at issue was whether the appli­
cant, whose child was placed in a foster home and subjected to a so-called 
"prohibition on removal", under Swedish law had any remedy before a court 
with regard to restrictions imposed on her access to the child. However, 
under the Swedish legislation it was indeed doubtful whether Sociala 
Distriktsnâmnden was authorized to issue such restrictions. In a decision of 
18 July 1988s7 the Regeringsnamnden held that a decision by the Social 
Council to restrict the access rights of parents while a prohibition on removal 
under section 28 of the Social Services Act was in force had no legal effect 
and that, consequently, no appeal to the administrative courts would lie 
against such a decision. Nor could any such right of appeal be inferred from 
general principles of administrative law or from the Convention itself.
The Swedish Government admitted that this was so, but submitted that 
the applicant could have a court review of the reasons underlying the 
restrictions by challenging the prohibition on removal or by requesting the 
return of her child under Chapter 21, section 7, of the Parental Code or - as 
submitted before the Commission - Chapter 6, section 8, of the Parental
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54 Cf. 44 D.R., pp. 199 ff., at p. 200.
55 Cf. 31 D.R., pp. 223 ff.
“  Cf. Eur. Court H.R., Eriksson Case, Series A, Vol. 156 (1989). 
51 Case No. 2377 of 18 July 1988.
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Neither the Commission nor the Court were convinced by the Govern­
ment’s argumentation. Thus the Court stated:
"81. Like the Commission, the Court is unable to accept this argument. Especially 
in cases of the present kind, the question of access is quite distinct from the question 
of whether or not to uphold the prohibition on removal [...] only if sufficient access 
is first admitted will there be real possibilities of having the prohibition on removal 
lifted. The recourse available in the administrative courts in the form of a challange 
to the prohibition on removal is thus not sufficient for the purpose of the mother’s 
claim for acces rights. An application under section 7 of Article 21 of the Parental 
Code must also be considered irrelevant for this purpose, as such an application will 
in principle succeed only in the same circumstances as a challenge to a prohibition 
on removal..."
The Government’s argumentation seemed at a first glance to be quite 
convincing: the question of the restriction on the mother’s access should be 
seen in its proper context. But, as rightly seen by both the Commission and 
Court, this argumentation was in fact circular, since "... only if sufficient 
access is first admitted will there be real possibilities of having the prohibi­
tion on removal lifted."
18.4. Article 5(4).
Article 5(4) of the Convention stipulates:
"Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to 
take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily 
by a court and his release ordered if his detention is not lawful."
This paragraph lays down the principle of judicial control of the legality of 
the deprivation of liberty.59 It is quite clear that in cases in which a person 
has been deprived of his liberty this provision absorbs the Article 13 
complaint, since "proceedings by which the lawfullness of his detention shall 
be decided speedily by a court” is a narrower concept than "an effective 
remedy before a national authority” (see supra section 18.1).
In Application No. 7376/76 the Commission ruled that a detention of 
approximatly two hours as well as the time spent on an aircraft from Sweden
* See Eur. Court H.R., Eriksson Case, Series A, Vol. 156 (1989), para. 45. 
”  See Fawcett (1987), pp. 116 ff.; and Jacobs (1975), pp. 72 ff.
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to Japan did not, in spite of the absence of any local remedy by which the 
lawfulness of the applicant’s detendon could have been determined, amount 
to a violation of Article 5(4).60
In the Nielsen Case“  both the Commission and the minority of the 
Court found that the applicant, a 12-year-old boy who had been hospitalized 
in a closed ward in a psyciatric hospital by the holder of parental rights, did 
not have any possibility of bringing the question of the lawfulness of his 
detendon before a Danish court. The lawfulness of his detention had 
previously been challenged both before K0benhavns Byret and the 0stre 
Landsret under the Mental Health Act, but both courts had concluded that the 
placement of the applicant in the child psychiatric ward was not covered by 
the right to judicial review set forth in this act, since he was not considered 
to be of unsound mind.62 The majority of the Court did not have to rule on 
this point since they concluded that the hospitalization of the applicant did 
not amount to a "deprivation of liberty" within the meaning of Article 5(4) 
of the Convention. Before the Court the Danish Government submitted that 
Article 63 of the Danish Constitution provided the applicant with a direct 
right to judicial review, so it would have been interesting to see the Court 
rule on this point.63
However, in the above-mentioned Case o f E v. Norway,w concerning 
the unwritten Norwegian constitutional principle of judicial review of 
administrative action in relation to Article 5(4) of the Convention, the 
Commission did in fact rule on this point
Thus the Commission first held that the basis for the courts control is the 
unwritten constitutional principle of judicial review of administrative action.
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“ Cf. 7 D.R., p. 123 ff.. at p. 125.
41 Cf. Eur. Court H.R., Nielsen Case, Series A, Vol. 144 (1988).
a  Ibid., Report of the Commission, para. 136, and the joint dissenting opinion of judges 
Th6r Vilhjalsson, Pettiti, Russo, Spielmann. de Mayer and Valdcos, p. 28 f.
65 More specifically, the Government submitted that "... regarding that provision the 
Government admits, however, that - aside from the general right of courts of justice pursuant 
to section 63 of the Constitution to verify the lawfulness of actions of public authorities - there 
does not exist any special right to bring questions of the lawfulness of commitment before a 
court It is, however, provided in Danish law that the lawfulness of not only legal acts but 
factual actions of public authorities may be brought before courts of justice for review 
pursuant to section 63 of the Constitution. This applies also to questions regarding 
hospitalization", cf. Eur. Court H.R. Nielsen Case, Series A. Vol. 144 (1988), Memorial of the 
Danish Government (Cour (87) 134), p. 14.
“  Cf. Eur Court H.R., Case o f E v. Norway, Series A, Vol. 181 (1990).
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In the opinion of the Commission the competence of the courts is, however, 
limited in relation to administrative discretion, such as the assessment of the 
most expedient choice of preventive measures. The courts were able, 
however, declare a decision invalid if it it could be regarded as an abuse of 
power. As regards the possibility of judicial review of the Ministry’s decision 
under section 39 of the Penal Code, the Commission concluded:
141. It has also been established that there exists no Norwegian case-law which 
shows that an administrative decision taken under section 39 of the Penal Code has 
been overruled by the courts. In fact only one case exists whereby a court has 
considered such decisions taken under section 39 para. 1 (e) outside mental hospitals. 
This is the judgment of the Oslo City Court [Oslo Byrett] of 27 September 1988 
against which no appeal was lodged by the applicant. Furthermore not a single case 
exists whereby the courts have considered administrative decisions taken under 
section 39 para. 1 (0 of the Penal Code. Consequently the Commission finds that the 
state of the case-law is not yet such as to establish with adequate clarity whether the 
review meets, from the point of view of its scope, the requirements of Article 5 para. 
4. This view is supported by the commission, established by the Ministry of Justice, 
which in 1983 raised the question whether the Norwegian provisions relating to secu­
rity measures were in conformity with Article 5 para. 4 of the Convention."
Consequently, the Commission found that the scope of the control afforded 
by the remedy available was not wide enough to bear on the conditions 
essential for the applicant’s detentions in the sense of Article 5(4) of the 
Convention.
Before the Court it was explained that under the unwritten Norwegian 
constitutional principle of judicial review of administrative action, the courts 
ensure that the administrative authorities have acted within the legal 
framework by which they are bound. They ascertain whether the impugned 
decision or regulation has been made by the competent authority and in 
accordance with procedural requirements, including those contained in the 
Public Administration Act. They always have an unlimited power to review 
facts on which the decision is based. Thus, where the mental capacity of the 
person concerned is relevant, psychiatric experts may assist the courts as 
expert witnesses. Nor are there any restrictions on the courts’ competence to 
review the authorities’ application of the relevant legal provisions [ "rettsanv- 
endelsesskfinn"], even where these provisions seem to leave some discretion 
to the authorities, for instance by referring to such standards as "unreason­
able", "unacceptable" or "good business practice". However, as regards purely 
discretionary administrative decisions, namely decisions or steps in a specific 
decision-making process which are left unregulated by the relevant law ["fritt
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sk^nn eller hensigtsmessighetsskpnn", the courts will usually limit their 
examination to determining whether or not there has been a misuse of power 
or whether the decision is manifestly unreasonable.“
Moreover, it has been established that applications for judicial review of 
administrative decisions are very frequent in Norway. They account for more 
than a third of all civil cases heard by the H0yesterett (and amount to more 
than 200 a year).46
Finally, as was seen in chapter 16, the judgment contained an outline of 
the Norwegian case-law regarding the domestic application of the Conven­
tion.67
In its reasoning, the Court first laid down that Article 5(4) does not 
provide a right to judicial review of such a scope as to empower the Court, 
on all aspects of the case to substitute its own discretion for that of the 
decision-making authority. The review should, however, be wide enough to 
bear on those conditions which are essential for the "lawful" detention of a 
person according to Article 5(1).
Regarding the availability of adequate review of the applicant’s case the 
Court first observed that the applicant had the possibility of challenging in 
the ordinary courts each of the Ministry’s decision that he should remain 
detained in custody under section 39(l)(e) or (f) of the Penal Code. Such 
proceedings could be instituted in accordance with Chapter 30 of the Code 
of Civil Procedure. This was confirmed by the fact that the applicant had 
been a party to such proceedings. The Court then elaborated on the pos­
sibility of such proceedings and finally concluded:
”50(4). The existence of a remedy under Article 5 § 4 of the Convention must be 
sufficiently certain to give the individual concerned adequate protection against 
arbitiaty deprivation of liberty [...] However, under the Norwegian system the courts 
have the competence not only to determine whether the two main conditions for 
imposing security measures are still satisfied but also, in the light of a full 
examination of the facts, to determine whether the administrative authorities’ decision 
to impose the impugned measure of detention was or was not arbitrary.
It is true that there have not so far been any decisions by the Norwegian 
Supreme Court to the effect that an administrative decision taken under Article 39 
of the Penal Code can be overruled in judicial proceedings. Nevertheless, on the 
basis of the foregoing examination of the Norwegian system, the Court is satisfied 
that the available judicial review was wide enough to bear on those conditions which,
Chapter 18: Article 13 o f the ECHR before the Commission and Court
45 Ibid., at para. 41. 
u Ibid.. at para. 45. 
87 Ibid., at para 42.
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under the Convention, were essential for the lawful detention of the applicant 
pursuant to Article 39 § 1 of the Penal Code."
Regarding the courts’ power to order release of the applicant the Court ruled:
”62. If a Norwegian court considers that a disputed administrative decision cannot 
be upheld, the conclusion in the judgment will normally be only to declare the 
decision invalid [...] However, the Court is satisfied that there where an ad­
ministrative decision to detain a person was considered to be invalid, the Norwegian 
court would - in accordance with the general principles of judicial review • have the 
power to order his release. An order for immidiate release could be based on Article 
148 of the Code of Civil Procedure, under which a court may, on petition, decide 
that a judgment can be enforced before it becomes final if "special circumstances so 
require”..."
However, in the end the Court held that the proceedings instituted before the 
City Court were not carried out speedily and, consequently, for this reason 
a violation of Article 5(4) had taken place.
Thus it can be concluded that proceedings instituted under the unwritten 
Norwegian constitutional principle of judicial review of administrative action, 
or under Article 63 of the Danish Constitution, in combination with the status 
of the Convention as a source of law in domestic law, in the Court’s view, 
provide better garantees than the so-called habeas corpus proceedings which 
the Court dealt with and found insufficient for the requirements of Article 
5(4) in the Case o f X  v. the United Kingdom.61 As pointed out in chapter 
16, this decision is a recognition of the unwritten Norwegian constitutional 
principle of judicial review as eficient court proceedings, as well as a 
recognition of the status of the Convention as a source of law in domestic 
Norwegian law. Or to be more precise, it is probably the combination of 
these principles that led the Court to its conclusion.
“  Cf. Eur. Court H.R., Case o f X v. the United Kingdom, Series A, Vol. 46 (1981).
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CHAPTER 19
As was seen in chapter 16, in some cases the Danish and the Norwegian 
Governments have, on the basis of Article 63 of the Danish Constitution and 
the unwritten Norwegian principle of judicial review of administrative action, 
argued that the Convention is a source of law in domestic law, whereas no 
such argument has been put forward by the Swedish Government. This is, of 
course, due to the fact that in domestic Swedish law no - written or unwritten
- rule providing the courts with a general competence to review ad­
ministrative decisions exists.
In the Case o f Kjeldsen, Busk Madsen and Pedersen the Danish 
Government argued for the first time that Danish administrative authorities 
have to take the Convention into account when exercising their discretionary 
powers. Such decisions are, the Government explained, subject to judicial 
review by virtue of Article 63 of the Constitution. The Commission accepted 
this argument as regards judicial review of administrative decisions, whereas 
it did not consider it effective in relation to legislation. As pointed out in 
section 17.2.1, this seems to some extent to be due to a misunderstanding, 
since Danish constitutional law recognizes judicial review of legislation by 
virtue of a constitutional custom. The Commission has subsequently 
confinned that instituting proceedings under Article 63 of the Danish 
Constitution is a domestic remedy which is effective, unless the applicant 
faces imminent deportation from Denmark, and which needs to be exhausted 
because the Danish administrative authorities are under a legal obligation to 
exercise their discretionary powers in accordance with the Convention.
The next step was probably taken in the Hauschildt Case where the 
Court indicated that it would be willing to accept that the Convention has - 
not only in relation to the exercise of discretionary powers but also in general
- the position of a source of law in domestic Danish law, provided that the 
state of case-law and legal doctrine suggest in a convincing way that the 
Convention holds such a position. In the case at issue, the Court did not find 
that the Danish Government had submitted sufficiently ascertainable facts 
with regard to the domestic position of the Convention as a source of law.
In the Case o f E v. Norway the Court, in contrast to the Commission, 
accepted that the combination of the unwritten Norwegian principle of
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judicial review of administrative action and the position of the Convention 
as a source of law fulfilled the requirements set forth in Article 5(4) con­
cerning judicial review of the deprivation of liberty. This is, if not in explicit 
terms, in effect a recognition on the part of the Court of the domestic posi­
tion of the Convention as a source of law in domestic Norwegian law.
The fact that the Norwegian Government was able to refer to a more 
constant domestic case-law than the Danish Government was in the Hau- 
schildt Case seems to have been the decisive point for the Court. Since a 
similar case-law has evolved in Denmark over the last couple of years, it is 
likely that the Court would also recognize that the Convention holds a similar 
position in Danish law. Moreover, it is likely that the Court may also 
recognize that the combination of a general principle of judicial review of 
administrative action combined with the Convention as a domestic source of 
law are sufficient for the purposes of Article 6(1) and as an effective remedy, 
undoubtedly, before a national authority within the meaning of Article 13.
Whether this also is the case concerning Swedish law is more doubtful. 
Although there has been a sharp change in the attitude of the Swedish courts 
vis-à-vis the Convention over the last years in a positive direction, the large 
amount of cases directed against Sweden, as well as the violations of the 
Convention which the Commission and Court has found, probably exclude 
Sweden from arguing that the Convention has a strong position in domestic 
law. Furthermore, some quite strong (obiter dicta) statements from the 
Swedish courts state that the Convention does not hold any domestic position 
in Sweden (see supra section 6.2).
One thing is, however, certain. As in other cases where the Commission 
and Court have indicated that it was willing to accept the argumentation put 
forward by the Scandinavian Governments in future cases, the governments 
will from now onwards plead extremely strongly on the position of the 
Convention as a source of law in domestic law. The Case o f E v. Norway, 
viewed in the light of the Hauschildt Case, provides the basis for such an ar- 
gumention.
Apart from the above-mentioned cases it is difficult, due to the diversity 
of the questions which have been at issue before the Commission and Court 
involving the Scandinavian countries, to characterize in brief terms the way 
in which the Scandinavian Governments plead their cases in Strasbourg in 
relation to the domestic position of the Convention. The fact that in many 
cases the question of the domestic status of the Convention has not been an
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issue at all does not make the task easier. However, a few simple obser­
vations can be made.
Like any other government or party to a case, the Scandinavian 
Governments tend to describe the status of domestic law - including the 
domestic position of the Convention - in somewhat more positive terms than 
probably matches practice. As pointed out in chapter 15 and confirmed by 
this examination, the possibilities of doing so are, however, rather limited, 
due to the fact that the Government has to answer to the domestic (legal) 
community. Nevertheless, it is possible to find examples of a dissolute 
argumentation in some cases (see, for example, Sporrong and Lonnroth Case 
(see supra section 18.2.3) and Eriksson Case (see supra section 18.3.4). If 
one excludes these relatively rare examples, the Scandinavian Governments 
seem to plead their cases properly and endeavour to stick to the disputed 
points. This applies in particular to some recent cases directed against 
Sweden.
As regards the domestic position of the Convention there seems to be a 
difference between the way in which the Swedish Government, on the one 
hand, and the Danish and Norwegian Governments, on the other, present the 
issue before the Commission and Court. Where the Swedish Government 
tends to stress the fact that its incorporation into domestic law is not required 
under the Convention itself, the Danish and Norwegian Governments 
emphasize the fact that the Convention is a source of law in domestic law. 
This difference in argumentation tecnique may reflect an underlying 
difference in the governments’ view on the domestic status of the Conven­
tion.
As regards the more practical application of Articles 26 and 13 (and 6(1) 
and 5(4)), it does probably not make much sense to try to summarize the 
discussion in chapters 17 and 18. These chapters give a survey of the 
remedies which are effective within the meaning of Article 13, and the ones 
which need to be exhausted within the meaning of Article 26. However, the 
Governments’ argumentation in these cases is, although not as illustrative as 
the above-discussed cases, also interesting within the present context. Of 
particular interest in this context is the way in which the Danish Government 
argued that a petition for the re-opening of a criminal case should not be 
exhausted before an application is filed with the Commission.
Finally, it is probably worth mentioning that the exposition in chapters 17 
and 18 are illustrative of the particular fields of domestic Scandinavian law
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in which there are problems in relation to the procedural guarantees deriving 
from the Convention. The most important examples here are:
(1) The lack of judicial review of certain administrative decisions in Swe­
den is probably the best example of a whole branch of (Scandinavian) law 
which, generally speaking, was irreconcilable with the Article 6(1) of the 
Convention. Within this branch of law the Swedish system was, and still is, 
different from both the Danish and the Norwegian ones. It should be 
mentioned here, that Sweden has now passed legislation in order to fulfill the 
requirements of the Convention in this respect (see supra section 4.3.2.C).
(2) The composition of judicial of quasi-judicial bodies with the par­
ticipation of interest organizations, common in all Scandinavian countries, in 
relation to Article 6(1).
(3) The guarantees provided in domestic law in relation to the removal, 
with or without the consent of the holders of parental rights, of children from 
their homes.
(4) The lack of a public hearing in appeal proceedings.
(5) The disqualification of judges, who have ordered detention on remand 
or taken other pretrial decisions, from subsequently hearing the case as trial 
judge. In the long run this question may have consequences for the whole 
system of criminal procedure in Scandinavia, due to the large number of 
single judge courts in Scandinavia.
(6) The possibility of judicial review of a number of administrative 
decisions.
Apart from these branches of law, the cases directed against the Scan­
dinavian countries have concerned a number of very diffirent questions.
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General Recapitulation and Conclusion
CHAPTER 20
The basic aim of this study has been to examine the impact of the European 
Convention on Human Rights on domestic Scandinavian Law. It will be 
recalled that the study has approached this question from the following five 
angles:
(1) The theoretical point of departure as to the rules governing the 
relationship between international law and domestic Scandinavian law.
(2) The impact of the Convention on the legislative process in Scan­
dinavia.
(3) The application of the Convention in domestic Scandinavian law.
(4) The application of the Convention in domestic Scandinavian law in 
a comparative perspective: a survey of Spanish, Italian and English law 
regarding the domestic position of the Convention.
(5) The official Scandinavian view on the domestic status of the Conven­
tion as it has been put forward by the respective governments in proceedings 
before the European Commission and Court of Human Rights.
The Convention has not been incorporated into domestic law in Denmark, 
Norway or Sweden, since no such general incorporation was considered 
necessary. It is surprising how little debate there was in the Scandinavian 
Parliaments when they had to approve the ratification of the Convention. It 
seems beyond all doubt that the Parliaments considered that the national 
jurisdictions more than fulfilled the requirements of the Convention. It may 
be said that this was a "laissez-faire" way of "incorporating" it into domestic 
law. However, it has frequently been the case that domestic legislation has 
been amended in order to fulfil the obligations under the Convention; such 
amendments to existing legislation may be considered as partial incorpora­
tions of the Convention. Moreover, it should be noted that principles and 
rules similar to the provisions of the Convention were to a large extent 
already in force by virtue of the national Constitutions, of express statutory 
provisions and of general principles of law. As regards provisions of the 
Convention where this was not considered to be the case, special legislation 
was passed or a reservation was made.
This does not mean, of course, that the Convention did not make a legal 
impact on the Scandinavian countries. It served, and still serves, as a basis,
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binding upon each country under international law, for a corresponding set 
of domestic rules of law. Thus the responsibility for the day-to-day fulfilment 
of the Convention lies primarily with the Legislature, although the law-en­
forcing authorities also have a major responsibility in this respect.
The exposition in Part 11 suggests that the task of securing that domestic 
legislation conforms to the Convention is a manageable one. Although from 
time to time it may be difficult to predict the innovations of the European 
Court, it still seems possible to ensure that domestic law is compatible with 
the Convention without with few problems.
The political will to make sure that domestic law is compatible with the 
requirements of the Convention seems to be very strong in Denmark, usually 
all (responsible) political parties agree on amendments aimed at bringing 
domestic law into line with the Convention. The same must be assumed to 
be the case in Norway, but the lack of explicitly discussed cases in the 
Storting does not allow clear conclusions to be drawn. However, some of the 
Danish examples discussed show that the quality of the amendments passed 
has been affected by the eagerness to bring domestic law into line with the 
Convention as quickly as possible. In Sweden there seems to have been 
somewhat more debate on whether or not, and to what extent, decisions of 
the European Commission and Court should be implemented in domestic law. 
This has basically applied to the question of the lack of judicial review of all 
kinds administrative decisions.
Apart from the impact of decisions of the Commission and Court to 
which the State has been a party, the Convention itself plays a certain role 
in the preparation of legislation. It is possible to find examples where the 
Convention or decisions directed against other states have been the principle 
reason for amending domestic legislation. Moreover, it is also interesting to 
observe that it is to a very large extent within the same fields of law that the 
Scandinavian expert committees have discussed the Convention: aliens 
legislation, coercive measures in psychiatric treatment, the principle o f 
legality within criminal law etc. The scope of these considerations varies con­
siderably, however, from committee to committee.
As regards the application o f the Convention by domestic law-enforcing 
authorities, it is submitted that the ECHR - although it has not been formally 
incorporated into domestic law - de lege lata is a source of law in domestic 
Scandinavian law, and that this de lege ferenda and de sententia ferenda is 
desirable. Thus it has been argued that legal practice, taken as a whole but
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with certain exceptions, has gone so far in its application of the Convention 
that this application can only be explained by the fact that the Convention 
holds the position of a source of law in domestic law. Accordingly, the study 
as such has taken a source of law perspective on the application of the 
Convention in domestic Scandinavian law. Furthermore, the study has sought 
to elaborate more generally on this source of law perspective.
This approach is to some extent contrary to the traditional view which 
may be characterized by the catch-word "dualism" and may briefly be 
explained in the following way: When and if a conflict between a treaty and 
an express provision of a domestic statutory rule arises, the courts should 
apply the domestic rule and not the treaty provision. This is known as the 
principle o f the supremacy o f domestic law. Any treaty provision which is to 
have domestic effects must be incorporated into domestic law by a domestic 
legal acL This is known as the principle o f transformation. However, 
domestic Scandinavian law is generally presumed to be in conformity with 
undertaken international obligations. This is known as the principle o f 
presumption.
Sources o f law is understood here as factors on which the judge not only 
shall or may rely when deciding a case, as is usual in Scandinavian 
jurisprudence, but factors which actually carry some weight in this respect.
The source of law perspective and the more traditional general principles 
seem at first to be at loggerheads. This may, however, not be the case. While 
the traditional view focuses on the clear-cut conflicts between international 
law and domestic law and emphasizes that, in such cases, the constitutional 
principles must predominate, the writers in favour of the sources of law 
approach underline that more attention should be paid to the more frequent 
cases in which only minor - and presumably unintentional - divergences bet­
ween international law and domestic law appear. Moreover, they emphasize 
that it is not possible to resolve such conflicts by simple means. A conflict 
between international law and domestic law does not differ in kind from 
conflicts between two domestic rules and, consequently, it must be resolved 
by similar means. In other words, where the traditional view is normative in 
its approach, the sources of law perspective is descriptive, i.e. it attempts to 
describing the law-enforcing authorities’ application of international law.
As regards the Convention it is unlikely that clear-cut conflicts between 
the Convention and domestic law will emerge, since rights similar to those 
in the Convention are to a large extent embodied in the national Constitu-
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tions. In this particular area the practical problem confronting domestic autho­
rities is to find means of preventing accidental infringements of the develop­
ing European standards of human rights from the dynamic element of com­
mitments undertaken.
y
On the basis of this sources of law perspective the study examines in 
Part /// the application o f the Convention in domestic Scandinavian law by 
the courts and other law-enforcing authorities. This part constitutes the core 
of the study. The results of this examination may be summarized as follows:
When a treaty (this also includes a partial incorporation of the Conven­
tion) is incorporated into domestic law by being reformulated in a statute, the 
treaty itself is an important factor in the interpretation of the statute, unless 
it is clearly indicated that the Legislature has deliberately intended not to 
incorporate the treaty completely. It is especially in this context that the prin­
ciple o f presumption is applicable. The travaux préparatoires of statutes, 
generally speaking, have a very strong impact on the interpretation of statutes 
in the Scandinavian countries. This also applies to treaties which are incor­
porated into domestic law by an administrative act; they should be regarded 
as an important part of the travaux préparatoires, not only of the regulation 
itself, but also of the statute which empowers the administration to issue the 
regulation.
However, this applies not only to treaties. In Scandinavian law the 
travaux préparatoires of a statute carry considerable weight, especially if the 
wording of the provisions is unclear and ambiguous. From the cases dis­
cussed in this context, it is difficult to conclude whether or not the treaties 
which have been incorporated into domestic law by a specific act have 
played a more prominent part in the interpretation of domestic law than tra­
vaux préparatoires have in relation to the application of "pure" domestic law.
Of particular interest is the fact that no reported Danish or Norwegian 
case-law exist in which it is established that in the case at issue there is a 
conflict between the ECHR and domestic law. Consequently, Danish and 
Norwegian courts have avoided taking a stand on how a conflict between the 
Convention and domestic law would be resolved. On the contrary, Danish 
courts have, in effect, though without phrasing it in terms of a conflict, on 
at least two occasions let the Convention prevail over domestic Danish law.
As regards the three Swedish cases which have normally been viewed as 
a judicial affirmation of the transformation theory, it is submitted that only 
one of them can be viewed as a clear precedent for the transformation theory.
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Consequently, in Scandinavian law there exists only one case in which 
the courts, in the case of a conflict between the 'Convention and domestic 
law, have allowed domestic law to prevail over the Convention. This is quite 
remarkable and certainly cannot be regarded a proper judicial affirmation of 
the traditional "dualist" approach to the question of the relationship between 
international law and domestic law, embodied in the principle o f the 
supremacy o f domestic law which has been set forth in legal writings.
On the contrary, in a number of cases it is held that there is no conflict 
between domestic law and the Convention as interpreted by the Court. 
Reaching such a conclusion presupposes that the Court has interpreted the 
Convention independently and then compared this interpretation with 
domestic law. Under a "dualist” system, strictly speaking, such a laying down 
that in the case at issue there is no conflict between the Convention and 
domestic law would seem unnecessary. However, there can be no doubt that 
the courts prefer to pass judgments from where appears that they have 
actually considered the relationship with the Convention. From an analytical 
point of view this establishment of conformity of domestic law with the 
Convention can undoubtedly be regarded as a direct application of the 
Convention, because the Convention in such cases has formed an integral part 
of the Court’s reasoning. In other words, the Convention has been applied as 
a source o f law. However, this does not exclude that the courts from time to 
time base their decisions on an interpretation of the Convention which subse­
quently proves to have been erroneous and is overruled by the European 
Commission or Court.
If there is an internal source of law which can be interpreted in seceral 
equally acceptable ways this is in principle a situation where the question of 
whether or not there is a conflict between international and domestic law can 
be raised. Here it is established in legal writings and confirmed in judicial 
practice that the person or authority applying the law shall choose the inter­
pretation which corresponds with the international source of law.
Moreover, it follows from the case-law discussed that international law 
and the ECHR certainly play a more prominent role in judicial practice than 
presupposed in the principle o f presumption. Thus there exists a positive 
interaction between international law and domestic law which, inter alia, 
manifests itself in the fact that the courts, in particular Norwegian courts, 
have on a number of occasions applied international law in cases in which 
there was no risk that domestic law would be contrary to international law.
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It should in particular be pointed out that in these cases the courts have 
applied domestic law in accordance with often quite unclear rules of interna­
tional law. This is probably most appropriately regarded as an attempt to 
enforce international law by applying it at the domestic level or as an attempt 
to harmonize international law and domestic law. This is in itself an interest­
ing aspect of the issue since it shows that the principle o f presumption is not 
qualified to explain the process of the application of international law in 
domestic law and provide clear guidelines for the resolution of such conflicts. 
This is probably due to the fact that the principle has two different functions; 
it serves both as legitimation for the application of international law in the 
domestic legal order and as a principle of interpretation for conflicts between 
international law and domestic law.
Furthermore, it may be concluded that, in cases in which the Legislature 
has incorporated a treaty passively and this subsequently proves to be an 
insufficient fulfilment of the treaty, the courts will grant the administration 
a margin of appreciation in the sense that in their application of domestic law 
the courts will follow the interpretation on the basis of which it was 
considered unnecessary to incorporate the treaty.
Scandinavian courts have on a number of occasions gone further and 
applied directly international law in general and the Convention in particular. 
The intensity of this application of international law varies from ascertaining 
that a specific interpretation of domestic law is not contrary to the Conven­
tion, to regarding international law as sufficient authority for pronouncing the 
death penalty. However, the very fact that the courts embark upon a 
discussion of the relationship between domestic law and international law 
shows that international law is regarded a source o f law in domestic law. 
That the courts on some occasions, in the case of a conflict between the 
Convention and domestic law have, in effect, made the Convention prevail 
over domestic law is not only further proof that the courts regard the 
Convention as a source of law in domestic law, but also that the position of 
the Convention in the domestic norm-hierarchy is significant
Recently, in some cases the courts have made ex officio references to the 
Convention when dealing with a question of domestic law. This probably 
demonstrates more strongly than anything else that the courts consider the 
Convention a source of law in domestic law. Similarly, the courts have 
recently become extremely aware of the European Court’s judgments 
involving the country at issue. Thus the courts have discussed and interpreted
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Strasbourg case-law more explicitly than they have ever done with domestic 
precedents. Therefore, there can be no doubt that the courts feel very bound 
by these judgments, and both the Danish H0jesteret and the Swedish Hôgsta 
Domstolen have been willing to revise their own case-law as a consequence 
of the judgments from the European Court.
Danish and Norwegian administrative authorities are under a legal obliga­
tion to include the Convention, whenever relevant to the case at issue, in the 
exercise of their discretionary powers. This obligation is subject to judicial 
review under Article 63 of the Danish Constitution and the unwritten 
Norwegian principle of judicial review of administrative action. In com­
parison with Denmark and Norway the legal position in Sweden in this 
respect is less clear. However, the current tendency seems to be, as in the 
other Swedish cases concerning the Convention, to pay more attention to the 
Convention than was previously the case. On the other hand, it is not 
possible to say in clear terms that under Swedish law administrative autho­
rities are under a legal obligation to exercise their discretionary powers in 
accordance with the Convention; a recent decision from one of Riksdagens 
Ombudsman suggests that no such obligation exists.
To sum up, one common feature is manifest: the courts do not recognize 
conflicts between international law, as they interpret this, and domestic law. 
Consequently, with a few exceptions, the courts have managed to avoid 
taking a stand on how a (clear-cut) conflict between international law, 
including the Convention, and domestic law should be resolved. These 
exceptions have, however, to a very large extent been obiter dicta statements; 
it appears that the courts have in only three instances expressly let domestic 
law prevail over the treaty provision as part of the ratio decidendi of the 
judgment As regards the Convention only one such case exists. In spite of 
this, the courts have on a number of occasions in substance and, in the most 
recent cases also in form, or explicit terms, applied the Convention directly. 
Where there was previously a tendency to ascertain only that the domestic 
solution found did not violate the Convention (international law), there is 
now a tendency to embark on discussions on the application of the Conven­
tion and Strasbourg case-law. There can be no doubt that the Convention is 
an international instrument, with considerable and substantial force at the 
domestic level also. Even so, the number of reported cases in which the Con­
vention has been referred to is in absolute terms low, although in comparison 
with other international instruments it is by far the most applied treaty in
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domestic law.
With certain exceptions there is, generally speaking, a firm practice of 
paying more and more attention to the Convention in domestic legal deci­
sions from the highest instances. Thus the cases in which most significance 
has been ascribed to the Convention are from 1988 onwards.
The Norwegian courts appeared, until recently, to have been more willing 
to apply the Convention than their Danish and Swedish counterparts, but the 
Danish and Swedish courts now tend to show a more or less similar will­
ingness to apply the Convention. This applies in particular to the Danish 
courts which at the moment seem to be very determined to give the 
Convention a stronger position in domestic law.
Apart from the above observations, the available case-law can hardly be 
said to be a basis for drawing clear and unambiguous conclusions on the ap­
plication of international law in general and the ECHR in particular in 
domestic Scandinavian law. However, it is certainly possible to point to some 
trends in legal practice:
(1) In deciding a case the courts apply international law as law and not 
as facts.
(2) There is apparently no difference in the courts’ application of 
customary international law and treaties.
(3) The distinction between the rule o f interpretation and the rule o f 
presumption, in an analytical sense, does not reflect practice. This applies to 
both the criterion for making the distinction between the rules and the 
assumption that the rule o f presumption cannot be applied to treaties which 
are more recent than the statute in question. Nevertheless, from a more 
practical point of view it may be useful to use this distinction because, in 
spite of all, it highlights whether the vague principle o f presumption is 
applied as a principle of interpretation or as the legitimation for deviating 
from the wording of a domestic legal rule.
(4) In some cases the courts have applied international law to a greater 
extent than international law has itself required. This has been designated as 
enforcing international law in domestic law. The question of international 
law as a source o f law in domestic law is very interesting since an applica­
tion of this type goes considerably farther than what is presupposed in the 
principle o f presumption.
(5) In Denmark and Norway it is clearly established that administrative 
authorities are under a legal obligation to exercise their discretionary powers
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in accordance with undertaken international obligations - be they incorporated 
or not - whereas in contemporary Swedish law there seems to be only a 
tendency to recognize such obligations.
Against this background it has been concluded that the European 
Convention on Human Rights is a source o f law in domestic Scandinavian 
law. However, this source of law appears at the moment to carry slightly 
more force in Denmark and Norway than in Sweden.
One could, however, have wished that considerations regarding the rela­
tionship between international law and domestic law, which in individual 
cases undoubtedly support the assumption that domestic law should conform 
to international law, had been expressed more clearly in the judgments. This 
(previous) lack of explicit discussion of the position of the ECHR in 
domestic law seems to have caused some doubt as to the domestic fulfilment 
of the obligations under the Convention. However, in the most recent case- 
law the courts seem to have changed their attitude and in fact discussed and 
applied the Convention.
Finally, it should be mentioned that the terminology in this particular 
field of law de lege feranda in itself has some impact on the application of 
the Convention and other treaties.
Since in nearly all the available Scandinavian judgments no conflict 
between international law and domestic law was assumed, it is not possible, 
in general terms, to draw unambiguous conclusions as to the weight o f the 
international sources o f law. However, a few indications of how the courts 
may be expected to resolve such conflicts have emerged from the individual 
cases. But these indications do not provide any basis for general guidelines 
for the resolution of conflicts between international law and domestic law.
The writers who have asserted that international law is a source of law 
in domestic Danish law have assumed that, with regard to its position within 
the domestic norm-hierarchy, it should only yield to a domestic statutory pro­
vision if regard for it means that the Legislature’s intentions are not being 
carried out However, this view leaves ample room for the interpretation of 
the Legislature’s intentions and says in fact only a little about how such con­
flicts should be solved.
In this study it has been submitted that in principle it is probably possible 
to go one step further and recognize that nothing unambiguous can be 
concluded from Article 19 of the Danish Constitution, from Article 26 of the 
Norwegian Constitution and from the Chapter 10, section 2, of the Swedish
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Instrument of Government on whether international law can be applied 
directly. The only fundamental restriction on the law-enforcing authorities’ 
application of international law is the principle o f legality: international law 
carywt substitute the requirement of statutory authorization laid down in this 
principle. The impact of the principle o f legality is, however, not overwhel­
ming in relation to human rights conventions. This view has reasonable 
support in the available case-law.
Apart from the restrictions following from the principle o f legality, the 
view put forward does not mean that international law, in the case of conflict 
with domestic law, should prevail absolutely. Such a conflict must be 
resolved on the basis of an overall evaluation of the facts of the case - 
including the different sources of law. As in other cases of conflict between, 
on the one hand, a statutory rule and, on the other, another source of the law, 
it is certain that the statutory rule will carry considerable weight. But the 
considerations pointing in the opposite direction may carry such weight that 
a total evaluation makes the international law rule prevail.
Thus, the lex specialis and the lex posterior derigat legi priori principles 
will give some guidance in resolving a conflict between international law and 
domestic law, whereas the lex superior principle will normally be applied in 
such a way that it is assumed that international law, by definition, is holding 
a lower position in the norm-hierarchy than legislation.
Moreover, it is possible to point out some considerations which seem to 
have had specific significance in the resolving of conflicts between interna­
tional law and domestic law. These considerations have been expressed, more 
or less explicitly, in the available case-law, but are also based on more com­
mon considerations:
(1) Is the conflict of a total or of a partial nature? The more limited the 
conflict is, the easier it is to base the application of the rule of international 
law on the lex specialis principle.
(2) The political and legal problems which might be involved in a breach 
of international law.
(3) The strength and the clarity o f the international rule, including the 
degree of acceptance of the rule by the international community. There can 
be no doubt that the ECHR and other human rights conventions are treaties 
with a considerable impact on domestic law; this follows very clearly from 
the available case-law. The Convention is undoubtedly a forceful expression 
of a legal policy to which the Scandinavian countries profess to adhere.
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Case-law ftom the European Court to which the country at issue has been 
a party has a particularly strong impact on domestic courts. Thus the 
H0jesteret has been willing, in effect, to disregard a clear domestic provision 
in order to follow the interpretation of the Convention laid down by the 
European Court Similarly, the Hogsta Domstolen has in such a case paid 
considerable attention to the Convention, although there has been no question 
of disregarding the domestic provision.
(4) The strength and the clarity o f the domestic rule. It should, however, 
be recalled that the Swedish courts have emphasized as obiter dicta that 
incorporation is required if international law is to be applicable directly in 
domestic Swedish law. This may be interpreted as meaning that in Sweden 
domestic law is apparently per se regarded as having more strength than 
international law. But again, the question seems to be more complex; thus in 
some recent cases Hogsta Domstolen has laid down that the Convention is 
an important means of interpretation regarding the Instrument of Government.
(5) The domestic rules’ position within the domestic norm-hierarchy. As 
indicated previously, generally speaking, it is probably still fair to conclude 
that the Convention is regarded as being placed beneath legislation in the 
domestic norm-hierarchy. But in contemporary case-law there seems to be a 
tendency to allocate the Convention the same position in domestic law as 
legislation. However, one should probably be careful of not thinking too 
much in terms of a domestic norm-hierarchy when discussing the relationship 
between international law and domestic law.
(6) Is it possible to ascertain the Legislature's intentions? To the extent 
that these intentions can be ascertained, they will be ascribed considerable 
significance. This applies both when it is clear that the Legislature intended 
to fulfil an international obligation completely, or when it is clearly indicated 
that the Legislature did not want to implement a treaty obligation completely.
The large number of cases in which it has been established that there was 
no conflict between domestic law and the Convention in particular indicates, 
however, that it may be questioned whether the very concept of a conflict o f 
rules reflects the process which leads the courts to the conclusion that, in the 
case at issue, there is no conflict between the domestic provision and the rule 
of international law. It appears quite clearly from the case-law discussed in 
this context that the interpretation of the domestic rule and the interpretation 
of the international rule influence each other mutually. This means that the
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domestic and the international sources of law are harmonized into one 
process and in the majority of cases, as a result of this harmonazition, 
international law is not found to be in conflict with domestic law. According­
ly, the considerations listed above probably establish that no conflict exists 
between domestic and international sources of law, rather than acting as a 
guideline for the resolving of such conflicts.
Part IV  of the study examines the position of the Convention in a 
"dualist" system (the United Kingdom), in a "dualist" system into which it 
has been incorporated (Italy) and in a "monist" system (Spain). These surveys 
do not serve any independent purpose, but have been used to view the 
application of the Convention in domestic Scandinavian law in a comparative 
perspective. The conclusions set forth above concerning Scandinavian law are 
indeed confirmed and to some extent amplified by this comparative analysis. 
On the basis of this analysis at least three points deserve to be mentioned:
First, it may be questioned in general whether the formal position of the 
Convention in the domestic norm-hierarchy says much in itself about the 
impact of the Convention on the application of domestic law. The problems 
of the application of the Convention seem to lie elsewere: notably, when do 
the courts establish that there is a conflict between the Convention and 
domestic law?
Second, as regards the style of reasoning, there are some important dif­
ferences between the national courts. Thus the Scandinavian Supreme Courts 
have interpreted domestic law in accordance with the Convention without 
establishing a clear conflict between the Convention and domestic law, even 
in cases in which it was quite clear that there was such a conflict. As soon 
as the decision at issue touches upon the competence of the Legislature the 
courts use somewhat guarded terms in their decisions. Similarly, the Italian 
courts have avoided disregarding the Convention when it conflicts with 
subsequently enacted legislation. The Spanish Tribunal Constitucional has, 
on the other hand, on a number of occasions directly overruled domestic pro­
visions when it was not possible to reach an interpretation compatible with 
the Convention.
Third, in spite of this difference in styles of reasoning and in the legal 
provisions governing the relationship between international treaties and 
domestic law, it is surprising how similar, in effect, the application of the 
Convention in Scandinavia and Italy and Spain is. This study has indeed 
confirmed that the possibility of using the Convention’s provisions as pur-
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suasive sources of law, where otherwise there appears to exist a lacuna in 
domestic law, or where the courts are faced with a doubtful or uncertain 
point of internal law, has self-evident advantages.
Accordingly, it is concluded that from a strictly legal point o f view it 
would not have any significant consequences on the practical level if the 
Convention were incorporated into domestic Scandinavian law. Under the 
existing "dualist" system it is already possible to a very large extent for the 
courts to ascertain whether the Convention has been violated in concrete 
cases.
Finally, Part V examined (1) how the Scandinavian Governments argue 
the domestic position of the Convention before the Commission and Court, 
and (2) whether or not there is conformity between the way in which 
domestic courts apply the Convention and the way in which the Commission 
and Court view the domestic status of the Convention. In other words, do the 
European Commission and Court agree that the Convention is, or may be 
regarded as, a source of law in domestic Scandinavian law?
In some cases the Danish and the Norwegian Governments have, on the 
basis of Article 63 of the Danish Constitution and the unwritten Norwegian 
principle of judicial review of administrative action, argued that the 
Convention is a source of law in domestic law, whereas no such argument 
has been put forward by the Swedish Government. This is, of course, due to 
the fact that in domestic Swedish law no - written or unwritten - rule exists 
providing the courts with a general competence to review administrative 
decisions.
In the Case o f Kjeldsen, Busk Madsen and Pedersen the Danish 
Government argued for the first time that Danish administrative authorities 
have to take the Convention into account when exercising their discretionary 
powers. Such decisions are, the Government explained, subject to judicial 
review by virtue of Article 63 of the Constitution. The Commission accepted 
this argument as regards judicial review of administrative decisions, whereas 
it did not consider it effective in relation to legislation. This seems to some 
extent to be due to a misunderstanding, since Danish constitutional law 
recognizes judicial review of legislation by virtue of a constitutional custom. 
The Commission has subsequently confirmed that instituting proceedings 
under Article 63 of the Danish Constitution is a domestic remedy which is 
effective, unless the applicant faces imminent deportation from Denmark, and 
which needs to be exhausted because the Danish administrative authorities
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are under a legal obligation to exercise their discretionary powers in accor­
dance with the Convention.
The next step was probably taken in the Hauschildt Case where the 
Court indicated that it would be willing to accept that the Convention has - 
not only in relation to the exercise of discretionary powers but also in general
- the position of a source of law in domestic Danish law, provided that the 
state of case-law and legal doctrine suggest in a convincing way that the 
Convention holds such a position. In the case at issue, the Court did not find 
that the Danish Government had submitted sufficiently ascertainable facts 
with regard to the domestic position of the Convention as a source of law.
In the Case o f E v. Norway the Court, in contrast to the Commission, 
accepted that the combination of the unwritten Norwegian principle of 
judicial review of administrative action and the position of the Convention 
as a source of law fulfilled the requirements set forth in Article 5(4) con­
cerning judicial review of the deprivation of liberty. This is, if not in explicit 
terms, in effect a recognition on the part of the Court of the domestic posi­
tion of the Convention as a source of law in domestic Norwegian law.
The fact that the Norwegian Government was able to refer to a more 
constant domestic case-law than the Danish Government was in the Hau­
schildt Case seems to have been the decisive point for the Court. Since a 
similar case-law has evolved in Denmark over the last couple of years, it is 
likely that the Court would also recognize that the Convention holds a similar 
position in Danish law. Moreover, it is likely that the Court would also 
recognize that the combination of a general principle of judicial review of 
administrative action combined with the Convention as a domestic source of 
law are sufficient for the purposes of Article 6(1) and as an effective remedy, 
undoubtedly, before a national authority within the meaning of Article 13.
Whether this is also the case concerning Swedish law is more doubtful. 
Although there has been a sharp positive change in the attitude of the 
Swedish courts vis-à-vis the Convention over the last years, the large amount 
of cases directed against Sweden, as well as the violations of the Convention 
which the Commission and Court have found, probably exclude Sweden from 
arguing that the Convention has a strong position in domestic law. Further­
more, some quite strong (obiter dicta) statements from the Swedish courts 
state that the Convention does not hold any domestic position in Sweden.
One thing is, however, certain. As in other cases where the Commission 
and Court have indicated that it was willing to accept the argumentation put
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forward by the Scandinavian Governments in future cases, the governments 
will from now on plead extremely strongly on the position of the Convention 
as a source of law in domestic law. The Case o f E v. Norway, viewed in the 
light of the Hauschildt Case, provides the basis for such an argumention.
Apart from the above-mentioned cases it is difficult, due to the diversity 
of the questions which have been at issue before the Commission and Court 
involving the Scandinavian countries, to characterize in brief terms the way 
in which the Scandinavian Governments plead their cases in Strasbourg in 
relation to the domestic position of the Convention. The fact that in many 
cases the question of the domestic status of the Convention has not been an 
issue at all does not make the task easier. However, a few simple obser­
vations can be made.
Like any other government or party to a case, the Scandinavian 
Governments tend to describe the status of domestic law - including the 
domestic position of the Convention - in somewhat more positive terms than 
probably matches practice. As pointed out previously and confirmed by this 
examination, the possibilities of doing so are, however, rather limited, due to 
the fact that the Government has to answer to the domestic (legal) com­
munity. Nevertheless, it is possible to find examples of an unconvincing 
argumentation in some cases. If one excludes these relatively rare examples, 
the Scandinavian Governments seem to plead their cases properly and 
endeavour to stick to the disputed points. This applies in particular to some 
recent cases directed against Sweden.
As regards the domestic position of the Convention there seems to be a 
difference between the way in which the Swedish Government, on the one 
hand, and the Danish and Norwegian Governments, on the other, present the 
issue before the Commission and Court. Where the Swedish Government 
tends to stress the fact that its incorporation into domestic law is not required 
under the Convention itself, the Danish and Norwegian Governments 
emphasize the fact that the Convention is a source of law in domestic law. 
This difference in argumentation technique may reflect an underlying 
difference in the governments’ view on the domestic status of the Conven­
tion.
As regards the more practical application of Articles 26 and 13 (and 6(1) 
and 5(4)), it probably does not make much sense to try to summarize this 
discussion. These chapters give a survey of the remedies which are effective 
within the meaning of Article 13, and the ones which need to be exhausted
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within the meaning of Article 26. However, the Governments’ argumentation 
in these cases is, although not as illustrative as the above-discussed cases, 
also interesting within the present context. Of particular interest in this 
context is the way in which the Danish Government argued that a petition for 
the re-opening of a criminal case should not be exhausted before an applica­
tion is filed with the Commission.
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